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P R E F A C E

IN any attempt to deal in a small space with a vast subject it is clear that a bold use must be made of the art of arts—that of leaving out ; and by the skill with which this art is exhibited in it the quality of a historical work, as of a painting, may be largely determined.

In writing the following pages I have tried to keep this truth constantly before me ; with what success I must leave to the kindly judgment of my readers. For the guidance of this judgment, however, it would perhaps be well to state briefly the principles of omission and inclusion on which I have proceeded.

In general I have preferred to risk the charge of leaving out much that is essential rather than, by undue compression, to crowd my canvas with a mere lifeless diagram of facts. My aim has been, not to paint a finished picture, but to give a sketch which, sometimes with less, sometimes with more detail, shall always suggest more than it shows on the surface, and serve as an incentive and a guide to those who may wish to pursue the subject for themselves.

This sketch I have made from the point of view defined for me by the conspicuous events at the beginning and the close of the period under review : the

European Alliance and the Conference of the Hague. The attempt to establish a 'Confederation of Europe' I have made the central interest of my book, which is mainly occupied with the history of the forces by which this beneficent purpose has been forwarded or retarded. Incidentally, as I have more fully pointed out in the introductory chapter, this covers practically the whole field of the international politics of Europe in the nineteenth century.

I have been forced by lack of space to confine myself strictly to political history, to the neglect of those forces, economical, social, or religious, in which the roots of politics are necessarily set. Of political developments, too, I have treated only so far as they have affected directly the European system as a whole, dealing with the internal affairs of the several states only in so far as they have had an external effect. Lastly, I have given but a small space to military matters, which are of importance to politics only in their causes and their consequences. Two or three of the more fateful campaigns I have outlined; but descriptions of battles, always dull save in detail, I have avoided altogether.

With regard to references, I have thought it unnecessary, in view of the list of books supplied in the bibliographical note, to give these for the general narrative of events. On the other hand, I judged that a fairly frequent reference to diplomatic correspondence and the like would prove of distinct use to students; and though, for reasons of convenience, I have not

made these references as full as would have been possible, I have so arranged them that I hope they may serve in some sort as an index to those wishing to pursue the subject further. Important quotations I have also thought it well to substantiate by references.

In conclusion, I appeal once more to the patient judgment of my readers and critics. Of the shortcomings of my work I am very conscious; but there is something else that, in the course of it, has been vividly brought home to me, and that is that, as students of our own times, we are labouring largely in darkness. Even were all the chancelleries to yield up their jealously guarded secrets, and all private portfolios opened to students, a scientific history of modern Europe would still be an impossibility, for a hundred lives of mortal men would not suffice for the collation and comparison of the stupendous mass of documents. And so the historian, collecting his materials with misgiving at second, third, and fourth hand, can often at best only make a compromise with truth.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

5 LANGHAM CHAMBERS, W.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

IN the revision of this volume circumstances have limited me to the correction of certain errors of detail. For lightening this task I have to thank my critics. All their suggestions have been considered, and if in some cases they have not been followed, this is because I have satisfied myself that I was in the right.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

Feb. 1902.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

SINCE correcting this book for its Third Edition I have had an opportunity of examining the unpublished official correspondence, covering the years 1814 to 1822, at the Record Office. As a result I have made some minor alterations in the earlier part of the narrative; but, on the whole, my researches have tended to confirm and strengthen the argument followed in dealing with this period, notably that of the essential continuity of the foreign policy of Castlereagh and Canning.

Circumstances have, unfortunately, forced me to modify the optimistic forecast with which, four years ago, I closed my book. Prophecy is, in any case, no part of the function of the historian; but I have not felt myself debarred from substituting for the earlier vision a pious aspiration, of which, I regret to say, I can see in the world but few signs of any realisation.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

126 SAVOY COURT, W.C.

July 11th, 1905.

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

FOR the present edition I have, besides certain minor corrections, made certain alterations in chapters vii., ix., and x. I have also somewhat altered the scope of the bibliography and brought it up to date.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

12 ELDON ROAD, KENSINGTON.

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5. TO ILLUSTRATE THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Of the enormous mass of works dealing with the political history of the nineteenth century, by far the greater number are no more than party manifestoes masquerading as history. But even those which have historical value are so numerous, and of such various merit, that to give an even approximately complete list of them would be impossible here. The following list of books is merely intended to point out to students some of the best, or most accessible authorities on the period covered by this work.

I have omitted Memoirs, Biographies, and published collections of correspondence, of which it would be impossible to give even a full selection here. Many of the more important of these are, however, referred to in the footnotes. The many excellent bibliographies now available, moreover, and especially those attached to the several chapters of the *Cambridge Modern History*, have made any such list superfluous. On the other hand I have added a list of the principal collections of treaties, mainly in order to emphasise the special importance, for serious students of history, of verifying references to these.

GENERAL WORKS.—C. M'L. Andrews, *The Historical Development of Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (New York, 1896-1898). G. G. Gervinus, *Geschichte des XIXten Jahrhunderts seit den Wiener Verträgen*, 8 vols. (Leipzig, 1853-1866), from the German Liberal standpoint. E. Lavisse and A. Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, vols. x.-xii., 1815-1900 (Paris, 1898-1904), contains excellent bibliographies. *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x. (Cambridge, 1907), by specialists on the various Periods, with very full bibliographies. L. von Ranke, *Zur Geschichte Deutschlands und Frankreichs im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, in *Sämmtliche Werke* (Leipzig, 1867-1890). C. Seignobos, *Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine* (Paris, 1897), compendious and trustworthy, with good bibliographies. A. Stern, *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815*, 4 vols. published (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1894, etc.), a work of first-class authority.

COLLECTIONS OF TREATIES.—A. and J. de Clercq, *Recueil des Traités de la France* (Paris, 1864; new ed. 1880, etc., in progress). Sir E. Hertslet, *The map of Europe by treaty*, showing the changes since 1814, with maps and notes, 4 vols. (London, 1875-1891). G. F. and C. de Martens and others, *Nouveau recueil des traités, etc.*, 16 vols. (Göttingen, 1817-1842). *Nouveaux suppléments au recueil, etc.*, by F. Murhard (*ib.* 1839-1842). *Nouveau recueil général, etc.*, by C. Murhard and others, 20 vols. (*ib.* 1843-1875). F. (T. T.) de Martens, *Recueil des traités, etc. conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères*, 14 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1874, etc.), contains, besides the texts of treaties, etc., excellent introductory essays largely based on the unpublished Russian archives. L. Neumann, *Recueil des traités, etc. conclus par l'Autriche avec les puissances étrangères*, 6 vols. (Leipzig, 1855-1859), continued by A. de Plason, 18 vols. (Vienna, 1877-1905).

GREAT BRITAIN.—H. Martineau, *History of the Thirty Years' Peace* (1816-1846), 4 vols. (London, 1877). Sir Spencer Walpole, *History of England from the conclusion of the Great War*, 6 vols. (London, 1890). G. C. Brodrick and J. K. Fotheringham, *Political History of England*, vol. xi. (London, 1906).

FRANCE.—P. Duvergier de Hauranne, *Hist. du Gouvernement parlementaire en France*, 7 vols. (Paris, 1857-1865). A. T. de Vaulabelle, *Hist. des deux Restaurations*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1857-1868). L. de Viel-Castel, *Hist. de la Restauration*, 20 vols. (Paris, 1860-1878). E. Daudet, *Hist. de la Restauration* (Paris, 1882), and *Louis XVIII. et le Duc Decazes* (*ib.* 1899). K. Hillebrand, *Geschichte Frankreichs*, 1830-1871 (Gotha, 1877-1881). Émile Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral* (Paris, 1895, etc.). Pierre de la Gorce, *Hist. de la seconde République*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887), and *Hist. du Second Empire* (Paris, 1894, etc.). G. Hanotaux, *Hist. de la France Contemporaine* (Paris, 1903, etc.); English translation, *Contemporary France* (Westminster, 1903-1907). Bibliographies: G. Brière, etc., *Répertoire méthodique de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France* (Paris, 1898, etc.). G. Monod, *Bibl. de l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1888).

GERMANY.—H. von Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19^{ten} Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1879-1889). Karl Biedermann, *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Deutscher Geschichte*, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1889-1890). H. C. L. v. Sybel, *Die Begründung des Deutschen Reichs*, 7 vols. (4th ed., Munich, 1890-1894; English translation, New York, 1890-1891). Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte* (Berlin ed., 1906). For the Schleswig-Holstein Question see C. Jansen and K. Samwer, *Schleswig-Holsteins Befreiung* (Wiesbaden, 1897) for the German point of view, and F. de Jessen, *La*

Question de Slesvig (Copenhagen, 1906) for the Danish. The best bibliography of German history is Dahlmann-Waitz, *Quellenkunde zur Deutschen Geschichte* (new ed., Leipzig, 1906; supplement, 1907).

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.—*The Franco-German War* (semi-official), translated by Major-General F. C. Maurice (London, 1900). Albert Sorel, *Hist. diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1875). Bibliography: Palat, *Bibliographie Générale de la Guerre de 1870-1871* (Nancy, 1897).

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—F. v. Hartig, *Genesis der Revolution in Oesterreich im Jahre 1848* (Leipzig, 1851; 3rd ed., *ib.* 1851; translated as Appendix to Coxe's *House of Austria*, ed. 1853). W. H. Stiles, *Austria in 1848-1849*, 2 vols. (New York, 1852). A. Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden 1809*, 2 vols. to 1849 (Leipzig, 1863-1879). J. A. v. Helfert, *Geschichte Oesterreichs vom Ausgange des Oktoberaufstandes*, 1848, vols. i.-iv. (Leipzig and Prague, 1869-1889). W. Rogge, *Oesterreich von Vilagos bis zur Gegenwart*, 3 vols. (Leipzig and Vienna, 1872, 1873), from strong German standpoint. F. X. Krones, *Handbuch der Geschichte Oesterreichs*, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1876-1879), with copious references. Baron Henry de Worms, *The Austro-Hungarian Empire* (London, 2nd ed., 1876). Louis Leger, *Hist. de l'Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris, 1879), with Slav sympathies. J. Andrassy, *Ungarns Ausgleich mit Oesterreich*, 1867 (Leipzig, 1897). B. Auerbach, *Les Races et les Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris, 1898).

ITALY.—H. Reuchlin, *Geschichte Italiens*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1859-1873). Bolton King, *A History of Italian Unity*, 1814 to 1871, 2 vols. (London, 1899), the fullest political history of Italy in the 19th century in English; has a very full bibliography.

RUSSIA.—C. Joyneville, *Life and Times of Alexander I.*, 3 vols. (London, 1875). F. T. v. Bernhardi, *Geschichte Russlands und der Europäischen Politik*, 1817-1831, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1877). Theodor Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I.*, 2 vols. published (Berlin, 1904, 1907), a work of first-class importance; the first volume deals with the reign of Alexander I.; it gives many hitherto unpublished documents.

POLAND.—Schiemann, *op. cit.*, is important for Poland. W. A. Day, *The Russian Government in Poland, with a Narrative of the Polish Insurrection of 1863* (London, 1867).

SPAIN.—H. Baumgarten, *Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der französischen Revolution bis auf unsere Tage*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1865). G. Diercks, *Geschichte Spaniens* (Berlin, 1895). M. A. S. Hume, *Modern Spain*, 1789-1898 (London, 1899).

BELGIUM.—C. White, *The Belgian Revolution*, 2 vols. (London, 1835), and *Belgium and the Twenty-four Articles* (*ib.* 1838). T. Juste, *Hist. de la Belgique*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1853). *La Révolution belge de 1830, d'après des Documents inédits* (*ib.* 1872). *Le Congrès national de Belgique*, 2 vols. (*ib.* 1880).

TURKEY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.—G. Rosen, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 1826-1856 (Leipzig, 1866-1867). E. Driault, *La Question d'Orient* (Paris, 1898). Anon., *La Mer Noire et les détroits de Constantinople* (Paris, 1899). E. Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat, ou Hist. de Réformes dans l'Empire Ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1882).

GREECE.—Of the numerous histories of the Greek War of Independence none is quite trustworthy. The author's *War of Greek Independence* (London, 1897) is based on the histories of Finlay, Gordon, Prokesch-Osten, Mendelssohn-Bartoldy, etc. A full bibliography of works on the war and its diplomatic aspects is given by him on p. 803 of vol. x. of the *Cambridge Modern History*.

EGYPTIAN QUESTION.—An excellent sketch of the whole question is D. A. Cameron's *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1898). The best and fullest from the diplomatic side is C. de Freycinet's *La Question d'Égypte* (Paris, 1905). The author's chapter (xvii.) on Mehemet Ali in vol. x. of the *Cambridge Modern History* is based on new material from the Foreign Office records, and is accompanied by a full bibliography (p. 852).

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE political history of Europe in the nineteenth century may be said to begin with the Congress of Vienna and the final downfall of Napoleon, as that of the eighteenth may be dated from the collapse of the power of Louis XIV. and the treaties which ended the war of the Spanish succession. The year 1815, indeed, marks an epoch in a sense far more real than is the case with many of the dates chosen, for the convenience of historians, as fresh starting-points in the world's chronicle. The mind of the age itself, dulled with the din of battles and wearied out with efforts that had seemed almost superhuman, felt instinctively that the fall of the man with whose fortunes the affairs of the world had for fifteen years been bound up marked the end and the beginning of an era. Twenty-five years before, so it seemed, Europe had fallen into a dream; the dream had rapidly grown into a nightmare; and now the world, having by dint of desperate effort thrown off the incubus and waked, looked forward to a life of sober reality, a period not of dreams but of facts. And of this new era the Congress of Vienna was regarded as the inauguration. The assembling of the sovereigns of Europe in council to lay the foundations of the common weal of the civilised world was in itself a new departure, and one of hopeful augury. It had, moreover, been heralded by phrases of more than ordinary magniloquence. The object of the Congress was to be no less than 'the reconstruction of the moral

Europe and
the Congress
of Vienna.

order'; 'the regeneration of the political system of Europe'; 'an enduring peace founded on a just redistribution of political forces'; and the world had yet to learn that, however it may be with the humble Christian, the conversion of princes is usually no more than an apron to hide the nakedness of the old Adam.

The statesmen assembled at Vienna were themselves, indeed, under no illusion in the matter. For them the period just closed had been no more than an interlude, unpleasantly interrupting the legitimate development of the diplomatic comedy; and they were prepared, in all gaiety of heart, to resume the parts which they had filled before the Corsican interloper had thrust himself in and held the stage. The magniloquent phrases were but addressed to the gallery; intended only 'to tranquillise the peoples, and to give to the solemn reunion an air of dignity and grandeur.' The true object of the Congress was, after all, only, in accordance with a principle hallowed by immemorial tradition, 'to divide among the conquerors the spoil of the conquered.' And from this moral and political obliquity of vision, doubtless, it comes that Europe, instead of finding a permanent settlement on a foundation as firm as far-sighted and disinterested statesmanship could make it, has for nigh on a century, amid wars and rumours of war, been destroying piecemeal the political edifice which, at Vienna, monarchs and ministers patched together in the intervals of a round of gaiety which seemed, even to so cynical an observer as Talleyrand, to mock the misery of a world bled white by twenty years of war.

The weakness of the Congress was due to the fact that its members knew, and cared to know, nothing of the inner mind of the age with which they had to deal. They represented the diplomatic hierarchy alone. For them the principles of the Revolution had been proved to be a destructive heresy; and all that remained to do seemed to be to remedy the disorder this had caused, and to reaffirm once more the old

Intellectual
tendencies
of the new
age.

dogmas of orthodox statesmanship. At Vienna, the sensitive mind of the Emperor Alexander alone reflected, as in a distorted mirror, the intellectual tendencies of the times; and whatever concessions to popular opinion found their way into the treaties were due, in the main, to the supposed necessity for humouring his madness.

The reaction from the licentious idealism of the Revolution and the striving after a solid basis of life took a double aspect, according to the two eternal tendencies, conservative and progressive, of the ^{Romanticism.} human mind. On the one hand was the political and religious reaction, which appealed from abstract principles to what seemed the more certain voice of Authority, ecclesiastical and historical. This 'romantic' movement was, as its name implies, also tinged with idealism; but it was, none the less, an effort to find in the past a firm standpoint for the present. Its religious side is represented by the wave of Catholic revival which spread throughout Western Europe, and which is not yet spent. The Ultramontane movement in France and Germany, 'Tractarianism' in England, the orthodox revival in the Lutheran churches, are all but variations of a common tendency, of which the outward and visible sign was the reconstitution, in September 1814, of the Order of Jesus by Pius VII., a fact as momentous and significant as the foundation of the same Order in the sixteenth century. Its political side was represented by the doctrine of 'Legitimacy,' with its appeal to history and to the divine right of prescription, and of which the outward and visible symbol was the Holy Alliance.

On the other hand, Liberalism itself underwent a momentous change. The dogmas most characteristic of the Revolution had fallen into discredit even with the ^{Liberalism.} apostles of progress. The gospel of the Rights of Man had proved effective for pulling down the old order, but a sorry foundation for the new. Jean Jacques Rousseau was now deposed in favour of Jeremy Bentham. The pretty

theories, which had kept the salons in talk and convulsed the world, were replaced by a system, mathematical in its precision, more suited to a prosaic and practical age. The dreams of 'the state of Nature' and the 'Rights of Man' give place to the gospel of Utilitarianism, with its doctrine of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' as the supreme object of the state.

This chastened temper of Liberalism was revealed in the more modest flight of its ambitions. The principle of 'government by the people for the people' it had derived from the Revolution; but in practice this had come to mean no more than the claim of capital to share in political privileges hitherto monopolised by birth. This 'presumption,' as Metternich called it, was, in the main, due to the expansion of commerce, the development of manufactures, and, consequently, of the power of money. The great Revolution itself had changed the social but not the economic basis of society. It had resulted in the emancipation of the middle classes; but the protest of Gracchus Babœuf against the privilege of wealth had scarce found a hearing. Only with the development of the great economic revolution of the century did the claim of the 'proletariat' to an effective share of political power become articulate; and, when it does so, the 'individual liberty constitutionally defined,' which was the ideal of the Revolution, is replaced by the bondage of the individual to the community, which is the principle of Socialism. That the 'Revolution' is thus put into contradiction with itself is due to the fact that, whatever its abstract ideas, the form of their application has usually been the result of material necessities. Beneath the surface of society the chaotic instincts of the brute struggle for existence are ever seething and pressing against the crust—a crust which itself represents no more than the crystallisation of those elements which earlier convulsions have thrown to the surface; and in an age like the nineteenth century,

Material
causes of
political
tendencies.

of unparalleled material expansion, the consequent changes to social stratification will be proportionately great and far-reaching. Of the political changes of the century by far the greater proportion may be traced to this material expansion pressing against the barriers of privilege, whether of birth, wealth, or race. In internal relations it takes the form of the struggle for constitutional liberty; in external relations, broadly speaking, that of the struggle for national unity and independence.

Nationality, in its modern sense, is largely an indirect outcome of the Revolution, with the cosmopolitan spirit of which it has so little in common. In the eighteenth century it meant no more than the Nationalism. common tie which bound together a people in allegiance to the sovereign; and in this sense Metternich uses it when he complains that 'Liberalism had erased nationality from its catechism.' It meant for him what it meant for the *émigré* nobles of France, who thought it no treason to fight against their country, because for them—*ubi Petrus ibi ecclesia*—where the king was, there was France. It was due to the revolutionary wars that nationality, endued with a new and intenser meaning, became during the nineteenth century the principal force in moulding the political form of Europe. When the ragged armies of the Republic first poured over the frontiers of France, they believed themselves to be the missionaries of a new political gospel which was to break down all barriers between nations as between classes. When Napoleon placed upon his own head the imperial crown, the victories of humanity had become the victories of France, of a France of which the old provincial boundaries had been swept away by the Revolution; and which now, though its glory was for the moment embodied in the person of the emperor, would be for its people, whatever government might chance to be in power, the supreme object of their loyalty. But Napoleon's wars had done more than consolidate the national feeling of France. They had

produced the same sentiment in countries where it had had no previous existence, or where it had slumbered for centuries. The wave of French conquest had broken against the solid resistance of peoples conscious of their common interests; and the victory of the Spaniards and the Russians had been an object-lesson to all the world. Germany, tutored by bitter experience of French oppression in the consequences of weakness, saw that if she desired to be strong she must be united. Italy, too, began to feel the first stirrings of a common patriotism, which Austrian misrule was to turn into a militant force. And the idea, once proclaimed, spread with astonishing rapidity; till in all Europe there was not a race with a grievance, real or fancied, against the established order but based its resistance on the natural right of a 'nation' to be mistress of its own destinies. Thus 'nationality,' which had once been quoted as the antithesis of the subversive cosmopolitanism of the Revolution, becomes in the nineteenth century itself a revolutionary force.

In the national as in the constitutional movements of the age the motive power will always be found to be the same pressure of material needs or interests. For it is, in fact, in this conscious community of interests that the strongest tie of nationality consists. Race, religion, language, whatever their binding power, would not alone suffice to keep a nation together, or to bind it together if disunited. It was the happy idea of the Zollverein (customs-union) that made the unity of Germany under Prussian leadership inevitable. It was Piedmont's tariff war with Austria that ultimately helped to unite Italy under the House of Savoy. And, conversely, it was the conflict of material interests that led to the revolt from Spain of her American colonies, and to the war of secession in the United States. The nationalist movement in Bohemia was, at the outset, largely due to the antagonism between the Czech labouring classes and the German capitalists, as that in Ireland has found its main sustenance in agrarian grievances. At the opening of the century England

alone of the European states had learned the value of a compact national organisation from the point of view of material prosperity; and her 'insularity' and 'selfishness' were a by-word among the peoples. But the nation of shopkeepers, as Napoleon had called it, had but led where the rest were bound sooner or later to follow; and at the close of the century there is not one of the great nations of Europe to which Napoleon's sneer could not be more or less aptly applied, not one which is not as eager as ever was Great Britain to expand its commerce and its colonies. That they are not insular as well as selfish is their misfortune. But if England regards the burden of her fleet as the insurance on her commerce, the nations of the continent pay an even greater price for the security of theirs, and have hedged themselves with iron, as Britain is girdled by the sea. And they will not disarm till the millennium of the Manchester school has dawned, and all the world is included in a single tariff union. The nineteenth century opened with a vision of the brotherhood of man. It closed on the grim reality of armed nations face to face, guarding jealously their exclusive privileges, and justifying the ruinous burden of their armaments as the necessary insurance of their material welfare. So far nationality has not proved, as Mazzini believed it would, a necessary step in the direction of cosmopolitanism.

While the death struggle with the power of Napoleon was as yet undecided, the autocrats of the Grand Alliance had paid their tribute of recognition to that national spirit which had been a main instrument in their victories. This was not the effect of Machiavellian statecraft, of which indeed Alexander I. and King Frederick William were alike incapable. It was rather the expression of the exalted mood of the moment, of the intoxication of an un hoped-for triumph over the conqueror who had trampled in turn upon every human right. It was in the spirit of heartfelt consciousness of superior virtue that the allied monarchs, in proclamation after proclamation,

The Powers
and Nationalism.

sounded before them from Kalisch to Châtillon the purity of their motives and intentions. 'Nations,' they announced, 'will henceforth respect their mutual independence; no political edifices shall henceforth be erected on the ruins of formerly independent states; the object of the war, and of the peace, is to secure the rights, the freedom, and the independence of all nations.' Upon this text, unless we remember the sense in which the word nationality is used in it, the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna form a curious commentary. In them we search in vain for any recognition of the national aspirations which seemed of late to have enjoyed such exalted patronage. Of course, even had the map of Europe been an absolute blank, the wisest diplomacy could not have rearranged its boundaries so as to satisfy every national ambition. As it was, with the dubious exception of Poland, the factor of nationality does not seem to have entered into the calculations of the rebuilders of Europe. Their sole care was to secure what they supposed might be a permanent settlement by preserving the balance of power; and to this object every principle was sacrificed, save that of counting heads and calculating capacity for taxation. Norway was torn from Denmark, which had held too faithfully to the fortunes of Napoleon, and handed to Sweden, to compensate the latter for the loss of Finland, which had been absorbed by Russia, and for the relics of her Pomeranian lands, which were incorporated in Prussia. The incorporation of Genoa in Piedmont, though it proved the first step toward the unification of Italy under the House of Savoy, was intended only to strengthen the kingdom of Sardinia against any possible aggression on the part of France; while, to form a barrier against French ambitions towards the north, Belgium was joined to Holland, from which she was divided, not only by language, but by a long tradition of religious, commercial, and political rivalry. That the German Rhine provinces were severed from France seemed less unnatural; yet their

The territorial settlement of Vienna, 1814-1815.

population, forming the 'Celtic fringe' of Germany, had little enough affinity with the Prussians, with whom their lot was now to be cast, and after twenty years' union with France during the heyday of her glory would certainly not willingly have changed their nationality. Of these arbitrary settlements there was not one which was not pregnant with future perils for the peace of Europe. Sweden, indeed, reduced now to the rank of a third-rate Power, dwelt henceforward with her unwilling partner beyond the pale of European politics, which were unruffled by her domestic discords. But the violent severance of the union of Belgium and Holland in 1830 all but led to a great European war; while the hunger of France for her 'natural frontier' of the Rhine has been throughout the century a main cause of the world's unrest.

Still more significant, and still more suggestive of future developments, were the territorial rearrangements of the Great Powers. Austria, desiring to establish her empire without direct contact with France, refused to take back her former possessions in Suabia and the Netherlands, and found compensations by annexations in Upper Italy. By thus abandoning her outposts in the west and the duty of guarding the frontier of the Rhine against France, she in effect already proclaimed the severance of her material interests from those of Germany, and her intention of pursuing that purely Austrian policy which led inevitably to Sadowa and her final exclusion from the German Empire. Equally significant was the attempt of Austria, with the help of England, to exclude Prussia from a preponderating position in Germany by compensating her in Poland. The instinct of Prussian statesmanship was as strongly German as that of Austria was the reverse; and though the efforts of Frederick William to obtain the annexation of Saxony, and thus to round off his dominions into a compact whole, were defeated by the diplomacy of Talleyrand and the jealous opposition of Austria, he was successful in gaining territorial extensions in Germany which added immensely to the influence of Prussia in the

Confederation. The acquisition of Posen, indeed, with its population of some 2,000,000 Poles, did little to increase her prestige as a German Power; but that of Lower Pomerania and the half of Saxony strengthened her position in North Germany, while the annexation of the Catholic Rhine provinces and of Westphalia introduced into the Hohenzollern state new elements which brought her into closer touch with the South. Moreover, the long and straggling frontier of the new Prussian state, with its numerous 'enclaves' and outlying strips of territory, rendered almost inevitable that Tariff Union with the neighbouring Governments which became the basis of the future Empire; while, exposed to Russia on the Niemen, and to France on the line of the Meuse, on Prussia seemed to devolve that defence of Germany which Austria had resigned. In short, after the settlement of Vienna, the material interests of Prussia were bound up with the strength of Germany, while those of Austria were, as we shall see, bound up with its weakness. It was this latter fact which determined the constitution of the new Federation which was to take the place of the old Holy Empire. The problem of the reconstruction of Germany will be dealt with in a later chapter. It will suffice here to say that the influence of Austria was strong enough, aided by the jealousies of the lesser courts, to prevent the creation of anything but the loosest confederation of independent states, in which she could be certain of exercising a preponderating influence.

Less important from the point of view of international interests, though not without a sinister influence on the later fortunes of Austria, was the treatment meted out to Switzerland. The united republic, which had been established under the influence of the French Revolution, was dissolved, and the old loose Cantonal system, with its aristocratic and corporate privileges, revived. In two respects only was the Swiss Constitution superior to that which was to render Germany impotent for half a century; foreign Powers negotiated with the centre and had no representatives in the individual

cantons, and the military organisation was also not Cantonal, but Federal.

Last, but not least, must be mentioned the new situation created by the annexation of Poland to Russia.¹ By the acquisition of Finland in 1812, Russia had already become the leading Baltic Power, and laid the foundations of her rivalry with the future sea-power of Prussia in the north. Now, by the extension of her frontier to the Prosna, she thrust herself in like a wedge between Prussia on the north and Austria in the south, a position which not only symbolised the increased interest she intended to show in the affairs of western Europe, but was pregnant with possibilities of trouble with her rival neighbours.

Such, then, in its main outlines, was the territorial arrangement of Europe as settled by the Congress of Vienna and embodied in the treaties which, from this time forward, were to constitute the title-deeds of the European Governments.

But however sincere the belief in the finality of the Vienna settlement may have been, it was felt that, as a guarantee for the security of the established order, something more was needed than a series of parchments. The Concert of Europe.

The idea of the 'Concert' of Europe, foreign to the old diplomacy, had been mooted as early as 1791 by Count Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, in a circular-letter to the ambassadors, in which he had urged that, in face of the common danger from the Revolution, all Governments ought 'to make common cause in order to preserve public peace, the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties.'² Much had occurred since then to break and to re-cement the

¹ The city of Crakow was erected into a free republic under the guarantee of the Powers, and so continued till 1846, when, by arrangement with Russia and Prussia, and in spite of the protests of France and England, it was annexed by Austria on the plea that it had been made a centre of Polish disaffection.

² Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, ii. 232.

solidarity of Europe. But now the destinies of the world were in the hands of the four Great Powers, reunited once more by the common peril of the Hundred Days. The question then arose whether their alliance, formed originally for certain specific objects, could be placed on a permanent footing, and established as an international authority by which all questions perilous to the world's peace could be decided. The idea was a magnificent one; and the times seemed favourable to its realisation. Men were weary of warfare and, in general, prepared to accept any system which should give reasonable guarantees for a moderate liberty and progress. The Governments, for their part, had had bitter experience enough of the danger of disagreement. Under these circumstances the imaginative author of the Holy Alliance, Alexander I., was not the only one to believe in the possibility of a 'Confederation of Europe'; and some, like Lord Castlereagh, began to look forward to a time when the cobwebs of diplomacy would be swept away, and the councils of the great Powers endowed with 'the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single state.' To shrewder critics, as indeed presently to Castlereagh himself, the fatal flaw lay just in this possibility. It was proposed, in effect, to establish an international high court of sovereign judges, which, by placing the territorial arrangements fixed at Vienna on the basis of international law, was to prevent all possibility of wars of aggression, and to guarantee the permanence of the established order. As a convenient basis of principle for its decisions the doctrine of 'Legitimacy,' happily devised by Talleyrand, might serve: the doctrine, that is, that the long possession which gives to private persons a title to property gives to Governments the right to rule. But what if, in spite of this common basis of principle, the judges were to differ? What power would the majority have to enforce their decision? And if they were to receive such power, would it not be to reduce the sovereign states of Europe to the position of the petty princes of the German Confederation? But it was not

only the dignity and independence of sovereigns that were threatened. It was but a short step from interfering with the external relations of a state to interfering with those of its internal relations which might be supposed to exercise an external effect; and from the first the British Government had realised the danger to national liberties involved in any such claim. In the case of France the necessity for intervention had been admitted by all the Powers; but when, at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, the Emperor Alexander attempted to formulate as a general principle of international action what had only been admitted as an exceptional counsel of expediency and clearly defined by treaties *ad hoc*, the divergence of opinion within the Concert became apparent. Though, in view of the supposed imminence of renewed revolutionary danger from France, the Quadruple Alliance maintained at Aix-la-Chapelle an unbroken front to the world, the attempt then made to make the Holy Alliance the basis of a general union of guarantee was wrecked by the uncompromising attitude of Great Britain. At Troppau and Laibach, in 1820-1821, this attitude was proclaimed to the world; at Verona in 1822 it developed into an open breach. The Concert, as an effective machine for regulating the affairs of Europe, was broken up, even before the rise of the Eastern Question, which would in any case have destroyed it. Yet the name survived, and with the name the idea of the solidarity of Europe and of the common interest of the Governments, admitted even by statesmen reputed to be 'revolutionary,' in the maintenance of 'the treaties.' And it is with the contest between the conservative force, represented by this attitude, and the revolutionary forces of nationality and constitutional liberty, that the political history of the nineteenth century is mainly concerned.

CHAPTER II

THE REACTION IN EUROPE

Alexander I. and the Concert of Europe—The Holy Alliance—Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, November 20, 1815—Reaction in Europe—The Restoration in Spain—Europe and France—Position of the restored Bourbons—Violence of the reaction—The 'White Terror'—The 'Ultra-royalist' opposition—Ministry of Richelieu—Decazes—The 'Chambre Introuvable'—Execution of Ney—Reactionary legislation—Villèle—Rising at Grenoble and revolutionary unrest—Intervention of the Powers—Dissolution of the 'Chambre Introuvable,' and return of a moderate majority—Question of the evacuation of France.

THE European Alliance, which, during the Congress of Vienna, had been all but violently shattered by the dexterous diplomacy of Talleyrand playing on the jealousies of the Powers, had been saved by the revival of a common danger in the return of Napoleon from Elba. In vain Napoleon had tried, by publishing the secret treaty of January 3, 1815, which united England, France, and Austria against the ambitious designs of Russia, to throw an apple of discord into the councils of the allies. The Emperor Alexander forgave what he did not forget. He had made up his mind once for all when, in 1813, he had rejected the chance of making a peace glorious and advantageous for Russia, and had accepted the 'heavenly mission' of becoming the peacemaker of Europe.¹ The evil days of his league with the dragon of revolution were past; and since at the burning of Moscow his own soul had found illumination, the will of God had been so plainly revealed in victory after victory that all compromise with the principle of evil had become impossible.² No considerations of

¹ Martens, iii. 92.

² Eylert, *Charakterzüge*, ii. 246-248.

personal pique or political expediency should lead him to reject the lofty office to which Providence had, a second time, so plainly called him.

This attitude of the Tsar, and the strange unbalanced character of which it was the outcome, were of supreme importance in the actual condition of Europe. The downfall of Napoleon had left the continent under the domination of five great states, of which three were autocracies, while the foreign affairs of the other two were practically controlled by the ministers of the crown. Under these circumstances the personal character of the sovereigns and statesmen of the Alliance became the determining factors in politics. And among European rulers the Emperor Alexander was by far the most conspicuous and powerful. Austria, exhausted already by earlier efforts, had been reduced by the final struggle to the verge of ruin. Prussia had spent during the war of Liberation whatever strength she had regained since the campaign of Jena. England, wearied out with the colossal burden which the policy of Pitt had laid upon her shoulders, was preparing to withdraw from the affairs of the continent. Russia alone emerged from the contest with forces apparently unimpaired, and a prestige which was only increased beyond reason by the jealous fears of Europe. Much, then, depended upon the personal tendencies of the Russian autocrat.

Clever, impressionable, well-meaning, infirm of will, Alexander was to his contemporaries a riddle which each one interpreted according to his own temperament. To Napoleon he seemed a shifty Byzantine, a 'poseur,' the 'Talma of the North,' ready to assume any conspicuous part. To Metternich he was a madman to be humoured. His plastic nature had, in fact, been from the first exposed to the impress of the most contradictory influences. From his Swiss tutor, Laharpe, he had drunk in the precepts of Rousseau's gospel of humanity; by his military governor, General Soltikoff, he had been trained in the strictest traditions of the Russian

autocracy. Throughout his life the two principles struggled for mastery within his soul. Raised to the throne while still a mere youth, he had set to work at once to realise his dreams of the ideal state, only to discover very soon the narrow limits of absolute power. Disgusted, he had turned, under the influence of Napoleon, from schemes of internal reform to dreams of foreign conquest. The short-lived alliance had ended in the invasion of Russia; and the horrors of the Moscow campaign overset still more a mind never too well balanced. He fell into a vein of religious mysticism; and to the other contradictory influences that moulded his character was added the belief, carefully fostered by interested courtiers, that he was the instrument set apart by Providence for calming the world's unrest. The world cannot afford to laugh at the religious eccentricities of an emperor, least of all, perhaps, at those of an Emperor of Russia. In the pietism of Alexander, indeed, with much that was ridiculous, there was also much that was admirable. It was to his 'noble moderation,' not altogether inspired by the interests of Russia, that France owed her continued existence as a European Power of the first rank. When Prussia, with not unnatural vindictiveness, clamoured for her dismemberment, it was Alexander who determined the wavering counsels of England in favour of a wise clemency. France, by the second peace of Paris, had to submit to harder terms than at the time of Napoleon's first overthrow; but she was spared at least the bleeding wound which, half a century later, was inflicted on her by the severance of Alsace-Lorraine.

The settlement of Europe effected by the Congress of Vienna had been placed under the collective guarantee of the five Great Powers. But the history of the The Holy Alliance. Congress itself, and the lapse of France, had proved how unstable a basis this was. In the exalted mood of the moment, Alexander believed that, in order to make the Alliance a permanent security for peace, it must be raised to a higher level than that of expediency, and based on 'the

sacred principles of the Christian religion.' The result was the so-called Holy Alliance. In the document which the Tsar laid for signature before his disconcerted allies these were made to declare their intention of establishing their mutual relations on 'the sublime truths of the religion of God our Saviour,' and of taking as the basis of their internal and external policy the principles of justice, charity, and peace. Princes were henceforward to regard each other as brothers and their subjects as their children; and the nations of Christendom were to be one family, bound together by the principle of mutual succour.¹ The proposal was greeted in diplomatic circles with loud admiration and covert laughter. To Metternich, it was mere 'verbiage'; to Castlereagh, 'a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense.' The Emperor Francis, whose matter-of-fact mind was quite unable to understand Alexander's idealism, shrugged his shoulders, so to speak, and signed. Only Frederick William III. of Prussia, piously simple, and bound to the Tsar by ties of intimate friendship, added his name in all honesty of heart. In the name of the three monarchs, then, the Holy Alliance was solemnly proclaimed during a great review held on the plain of Vertus, on September 26, 1815; and all the sovereigns of Christendom were invited to give in their adhesion. With few, but significant, exceptions all consented. The British Government, indeed, was placed in an awkward dilemma; by adhering, it would risk the onslaughts of the Opposition for imperilling the liberties of England by an unnecessary engagement; by refusing, it might incur the accusation of desiring to break up the Concert of Europe. It sought safety in compromise. By the British Constitution the Prince Regent had no power to sign a public document save as the mouthpiece of the responsible Government in power; but he could, and did, write as a sovereign prince to his 'brothers' to express his cordial

¹ *Wellington Despatches* (supplementary), xi. 178; Martens, iv. 4; Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, i. 317.

sympathy with the sublime principles of the allies. If the approval of the Prince Regent lent little moral weight to the Holy Alliance, the cold attitude of the Pope would, later in the century, have robbed it of much which it actually possessed. Pius VII., who, a year before, in September 1814, had reconstituted the Order of Jesus, and was preparing for a grand crusade against 'Liberalism,' refused his adhesion to a league founded by a heretic and a Liberal. But the Ultramontane reaction was still in its weak beginnings, and the world was less exercised by the Pope's isolated protest than by the deliberate exclusion of the Sultan. The Caliph of Islam could, of course, hardly have been a party to a purely Christian alliance; but the omission of his name was, none the less, regarded as ominous of Alexander's intention of taking up once more his designs against the Ottoman Empire.

The Treaty of the Holy Alliance, as a treaty, was never effective. Of those who signed it, probably Alexander alone really believed that it would 'give a lofty satisfaction to Divine Providence,' as marking the opening of a new era. Yet, as the symbol of a political ideal, it played a great part in the history of the century; fixed like a religious creed, yet, like a religious creed, capable of various interpretations; meaning one thing to Alexander I., another to Nicholas I., and yet another to Nicholas II., but surviving in international politics as a force which it has never been safe to neglect. Meanwhile, to the statesmen assembled in Paris in 1815 the Quadruple Alliance between Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, which was signed on November 20, seemed of far greater importance. This was intended, in the words of its preamble, to give to the principles enunciated at Vienna and Chaumont the form best suited to the circumstances of the times; that is to say, it was directed primarily to watching, in the interests of Europe, over the affairs of France. But it went further. In Article 6 it was decided, in order 'to consoli-

The
Quadruple
Alliance
renewed.

date the intimate relations which now unite the four sovereigns for the world's happiness,' to hold periodical meetings, either of monarchs or their ministers, 'consecrated to great common objects,' and to concert measures 'for the repose and prosperity of the peoples.' It was the formal constitution of that Concert of Europe by which it was hoped the peace of the world might be preserved. But it was a departure from the principles of the Holy Alliance; for it substituted for the brotherhood of all sovereigns a dictatorship of the Great Powers, whose ambassadors were to form, at Paris, an international court for the settlement of all questions arising out of the treaties concluded at Vienna and Paris, which were henceforward to be the constitutional basis of the European states' system.¹

There was occasion enough for watchfulness on the part of the Powers, in view of the universal exhaustion and the universal unrest. The mass of the people everywhere longed, indeed, only for peace; and Liberalism, where The reaction not extinct, was cowed and silent. But every- in Europe. where the violence of the reactionary factions threatened to goad the exhausted forces of revolt into fresh activity. In Italy, in Germany, in Spain, above all in France, the statesmen of the Alliance watched with growing concern the folly and excesses of those whom they had restored to power. In their blind hatred of the Revolution, and of its incarnation Napoleon, the Legitimists stopped at no outrage, at no absurdity. In Rome the tide of clerical reaction was at the flood. The Holy Office was set up once more; laymen were deprived of all voice in the administration; and street lighting, as a French innovation, was abolished. In Turin the return of the House of Savoy was marked by similar fatuities. Victor Emmanuel I., returned from his many years' exile in Sardinia, like a royal Rip Van Winkle, with the costume and the ideas of a vanished generation, cancelled with a stroke of the pen every act of government since 1787;

¹ Text in Martens, iv. 28; Hertslet, i. 372.

while zealous officials, taking their cue from the Court, grubbed up the Botanical Gardens which the French had planted, and refused passports for the road over the Mont Cenis which Napoleon had planned. Not all the Italian princes, indeed, imitated the follies of Rome and Turin. Even Ferdinand of Naples preserved much of Murat's administrative system; and, in the North, the Lombards and Venetians had as yet no cause to complain of the restored Austrian rule, for Lasanzky had not yet declared the necessity for Austria to 'Germanise Italy,' nor Strassoldo sought to put the principle in practice. But the Italy of 1815 was widely different from that which had vegetated content under the benign rule of the Emperor Leopold. The fire of revolution had been stamped out and scattered; but the embers still glowed, ready to start a fresh conflagration as soon as the folly of those in power should have piled the material high and dry enough. The name of the Italian kingdom had not been revived by Napoleon to no purpose; young men, like Joseph Mazzini, had begun to dream, as once Machiavelli had dreamed, of an Italy freed from the presence of the 'barbarians'; numerous secret societies, of which that of the Carbonari (charcoal-burners) was the most widespread, had begun their often fantastic activity; and last, but not least, a host of respectable men whose fortunes had fallen with the Empire, ex-officials of Napoleon's administration, ex-officers of his army, formed a rich recruiting-ground for the forces of disaffection.

Germany, too, was still astir with the patriotic excitement roused by the War of Liberation; the federal Constitution established by the Vienna Congress—admittedly a mere instalment—had settled nothing; and Absolutists and Liberals were already busy wresting its articles in accordance with their views. The situation was disquieting to statesmen who wished to found the political order on a consistent principle. Prince Metternich, who was beginning to gather the threads of European diplomacy into his hands, watched with equal

disfavour the pig-headed and ridiculous reactionism of the Elector of Hesse and the constitutional experiments in Baden and Bavaria.

Still more alarming was the situation in Spain. During the war in the Peninsula the Cortes had been summoned by the Central Junta to Seville, and had there issued, on March 19, 1812, a Constitution for the whole kingdom. This wonderful production was based on the French Constitution of 1791, of which it had borrowed all the worst and most unworkable provisions. It rejected altogether the traditional constitutional system of Spain, depriving the Church and the aristocracy of all voice in the government, and this in a country where the influence of the nobility and clergy was paramount. For a people noted for their fanatical loyalty, it reduced the Crown to a mere pageant, without power and without influence. Finally, as though to cut away all chance of success, even within these narrowed limits, it introduced clauses forbidding the re-election of members, and excluding ministers from the debates. Yet such was the impression produced by the orgy of reaction indulged in by the restored King of Spain, that this precious Constitution became for years the rallying cry of Liberalism, not only in Spain, but in other countries as well. It is this fact which gives it its sole importance.

When, in December 1813, Napoleon had restored the crown of Spain to Ferdinand VII., the Cortes had made his acknowledgment by the Spanish nation dependent on his accepting the Constitution, and he had given a conditional consent. But when, in March of the following year, he entered Spain, he quickly found that there was no need to temporise. He discovered that the Constitution was 'generally odious to his people'; and there was certainly no note of a desire to make a bargain in the rapturous welcome which the Spanish populace gave to the most contemptible of their kings. As early as May 4 Ferdinand felt himself strong enough to

Spain: the
Constitution
of 1812.

The Re-
action in
Spain.

issue, from Valentia, a proclamation repudiating the Cortes and the Constitution. This was received 'without a murmur,' and had he been content with this triumph all might have been well. But Ferdinand was endowed by nature with every ill quality that can disgrace a king; and before the month was out, Spain was once more weighted with all the paraphernalia of her traditional misrule. In spite of the protests of the Powers, the Inquisition was restored, the innumerable religious communities were reinstated in their immense wealth and power, and a relentless persecution was begun against all that savoured of Liberalism. Even the most reactionary Powers viewed the excesses of the Spanish Government with alarm, which was increased by the obviously precarious condition of the country's affairs. Trade had been ruined by arbitrary taxation and an excessive tariff. Spanish commerce over sea had been destroyed by the revolt of the American colonies, a revolt directed in the first instance against the usurping Government, but which now aimed at securing the liberty which had come to be valued. The seaports were deserted, whence scarce more than two centuries earlier had issued the stately galleons for which English freebooters lay in wait. The wharves, where once the tribute of a hemisphere had been piled, were bare and rotting away. Inland, armies of brigands scoured the country and made the highroads impassable; while the soldiers who should have dealt with them, ragged and starving, were forced in many places, officers as well as men, to join the beggars at the gates of the monasteries. Such is the opening scene of the tragedy of Spain in the nineteenth century.

The affairs of Spain, however, though disquieting, were not for the present to engage the attention of the allied Powers. It was on the progress of events in France that this was, for the next two or three years, concentrated; for it was felt that, if the revolutionary forces could be kept under at the centre of disturbance, it would be easy to control them elsewhere. Revolution at

home had become inalienably associated with aggressive action abroad; and the main task of the Allies was to prevent the simmering political passions of France from again boiling over to the destruction of Europe. There were two methods of accomplishing this. The one, passionately advocated by Prussia and by a section of English opinion,¹ was to dismember France and render her too weak to trouble Europe again. The other, which commended itself to the generosity of Alexander and the common-sense of Wellington, was — while guaranteeing Europe against any immediate danger of a fresh aggression on the part of France — to leave her territory practically intact, and, by carefully watching over and directing the policy of the restored monarchy, gradually to establish her internal stability, until, cleansed and absolved, she should be ready to take her place once more on equal terms in the councils of Europe. To this plan Metternich, in the interests of the balance of power, acceded; and Russia, Austria, and England being united, Prussia had to forego her plans of revenge.

By the terms of the second Peace of Paris the frontiers of France had been modified in the interests of the safety of Europe. Savoy had been restored to Piedmont, as a barrier against French aggression in Italy; Saarlouis and Landau had been ceded to the German Confederation, to form barriers against a French advance westwards; while part of the enormous war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs imposed on France was to be spent in erecting a line of fortresses, to be garrisoned by the Allies, on her northern frontier.² This sufficiently controlled any danger to be feared from French aggression externally. To guarantee the internal stability of the country, the ambassadors of the four Powers at Paris were authorised to watch in common over the internal affairs of France; while at their back, as the irresistible sanction of their decisive influence, stood the allied army of occupa-

¹ Cf. 'Liverpool to Castlereagh' (*W. D.* xi. 24, 32).

² Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, i. 342.

tion, 150,000 strong, under the command of the Duke of Wellington.

It was one thing, however, to hold France under by an irresistible show of force; it was another to re-establish so firmly the authority and prestige of the Government recognised by the Powers that, when the force was withdrawn, it should of itself be a guarantee for the maintenance of peace. The problem, always difficult, had been rendered ten times more so by the events of the Hundred Days. When, in 1814, Talleyrand had persuaded the Senate to invite the Bourbons to return, he had done so because he believed that the restoration of the legitimate dynasty alone could disguise from the French people, so jealous of their military glory, the impression of the defeats inflicted on their flag, and at the same time give to the victorious Powers such a guarantee of the stability of French institutions as would induce them to trust the country to itself.¹ This calculation had been upset by the return of Napoleon from Elba. When the allied sovereigns entered Paris for the first time they found Louis XVIII. already there, 'by the grace of God,' it is true, but also by 'the free choice of the people.' When they entered Paris for the second time they brought the King of France, as the wits of the boulevards put it, 'in their baggage.' Still, the situation was capable of being retrieved, for the Bourbons were, at the moment, the only possible rulers of France; and if they could only avoid the mistakes which had paved the way for Napoleon, they might succeed in rooting their dynasty once more in that soil from which it had been so violently torn. Unhappily, some of these mistakes were beyond repair. The narrow-minded folly which had handed over the national tricolour, with all its glorious associations, to the enemies of the monarchy could not be undone. But Louis, like Charles II., was determined not to go again upon his travels. At the instance of the Tsar he had granted to his people a Constitution in some respects more liberal even

¹ Talleyrand, *Memoirs*, ii. 156, 159.

than that of England; and, encouraged by the Powers, he was determined to abide loyally by the 'Charter.' The task, however, was no easy one. All moderate counsels were in peril of being drowned in the storm of passions stirred up by the events of the last few months. The ease with which the Bourbons had been ousted at the outset of the Hundred Days had given the Powers an exaggerated idea of the strength of the revolutionary elements still surviving in France; and Fouché, on the plea that he alone could control the forces of Jacobinism, had used their fears to make himself seemingly indispensable to the Allies and the restored monarchy. But it was soon seen that the immediate peril lay in the opposite extreme. With the news of Waterloo the long pent-up fury of the Clerical and royalist reactionists burst out with uncontrolled violence. In the south especially the 'White Terror' threatened to eclipse the memory of the worst days of the Revolution. At Marseilles, at Toulouse, at Nismes, at Uzès, royalist and Catholic mobs rose and massacred the Protestants and all those suspected of Bonapartist sympathies. The local officials, paralysed by the change of authority at the centre, were unable or unwilling to stop these excesses, and France was forced to witness the shameful spectacle of foreign troops interfering to prevent her children from doing each other to death.

The king and the best of his counsellors, among whom the young prefect of police, Decazes, was already gaining considerable influence, were for mercy and moderation. They were moved, in fact, by the same reasons which had led to the inclusion of Talleyrand and Fouché in the ministry—the desire to reconcile Liberal sentiment to the monarchy. But already the rift was widening between the royal council and the royal court. The returned *émigrés*, vindictive and ignorant, would hear of no truckling to the *canaille*; and so far from resenting the crimes which, in the South, were sullyng their cause, desired to extend the reign of terror to the North. In spite of the 'absurd' promises of a general

amnesty made by the Charter, the royalist press of Paris clamoured day by day for 'the crushing of the Revolution,' and even some of the Allies thought it necessary to urge the king to severe measures. 'One can never feel that the king is secure upon his throne,' wrote Lord Liverpool, 'till he has dared to spill traitors' blood.'¹

Everything, however, depended upon the character of the Chambers for which, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, writs had been issued, and which, it was expected, would enable the Government to gauge the temper of the country. These met in August 1815. The House of Peers, nominated by the Crown and composed largely of ex-officials of the Empire, represented in the main a moderate Liberalism. With it the new Lower Chamber stood in violent contrast. Elected by a narrow constituency, by a complicated machinery, under the eye of the prefects, and above all under the influence of the 'White Terror' in the South and the presence of the allied armies in the North, the great majority of the members belonged to that party which Fouché nicknamed, for the first time, 'Ultra-royalist.' The fall of the sinister Minister of Police was, indeed, the first outcome of the elections. In vain he sought once more to scare king and nation with the bogey of Jacobin plots. Louis loathed his presence; and, since this was inconsistent with the clearly expressed views of the nation, seized the opportunity to rid himself of it. Talleyrand was the next victim. He had cheerfully thrown over his colleague, never doubting that he himself was indispensable to any Government. But the royalists hated the ex-Bishop, if possible, more than the ex-Conventional, and he was forced to retire.

The Ministry of Police, vacated by Fouché, was filled by Decazes. It was more difficult to replace Talleyrand; for it was necessary to find a man of reputation who should be acceptable at once to the royalists, the Allies, and the king. One man alone seemed to combine

The Duc de
Richelieu.

¹ *W. D.* xi. 95.

all the qualities essential in such a crisis. The Duc de Richelieu, bearer of a historic name, had left France at an early stage of the Revolution, had taken service under the Russian crown, and made himself a European reputation by his wise administration of the Crimea. All authorities combine to praise the singular nobility of his character. Robbed by the Revolution of an immense fortune, he displayed not the least sign of vindictiveness, and opposed in the interests of France the restoration of the confiscated property to the *émigrés*. Above all, from the point of view of Frenchmen, he possessed one inestimable quality—he had never been in arms against France. The one drawback—and it was a serious one—he pleaded himself in excuse for his unfeigned reluctance to take office: he had been absent for many years from France, and was ignorant of the very faces of those with whom he would have to serve. But Richelieu was not the man to refuse a responsibility which he saw it was necessary for the good of his country that he should accept. Above all, he realised that his influence with the Tsar would be of inestimable value to France, and he consented to form a Government.

The general character of the new ministry, though it contained one or two ‘Ultras,’ was one of moderate and enlightened royalism. ‘France,’ said Richelieu, ‘wants the king, but not the king without conditions (*le roi quand même*);’¹ and Decazes proclaimed the principle which he proposed to follow to be ‘to royalise France and to nationalise the monarchy.’² The principle was just and far-sighted, but difficult to put in practice. As long as the crushing burden of the army of occupation weighed upon the country, it was useless to pretend that the monarchy was really ‘broad-based upon the people’s will.’ To induce the Powers to withdraw from French soil became, therefore, the main object of Richelieu’s policy. But, until the Government had been firmly

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII. et le Duc Decazes*, p. 96.

² *Ib.* p. 107.

established, the Allies would never consent to withdraw. The situation seemed to revolve in a vicious circle. It was impossible to reconcile France to the monarchy until the Allies retired; impossible for the Allies to retire until France had been reconciled to the monarchy. Moreover, the ministry, though supported by the king, found itself opposed to the dominant party at the court and to the royalist majority in the new Chambers. For the moment it seemed strong only in the support of those very foreign Powers which it desired to remove from the soil of France. 'With his new servants,' wrote Lord Castlereagh, 'there seems to be but one opinion, that if the allied troops were withdrawn, his Majesty would not be on his throne a week.' For Paris, indeed, suspicious as ever, was noting 'the strong Russian tinge' of the new Government, and grumbling that 'the Emperor of Russia had been made head of the Cabinet.'¹ Richelieu's task, then, was to prove to France that the ministry was neither reactionary nor Russian, but French; that the interests of the monarchy were, in fact, bound up, not with those of a clamorous faction, but with those of the whole nation; and that the presence of foreigners upon French soil was as irksome to the king as to his people.

It was soon realised that the most dangerous enemies of the kingship were to be found among the royalists themselves. The new Chamber was mainly filled with country *noblesse*—honest gentlemen of France, choke-full of prejudice, and entirely ignorant of affairs. The king, under the first impression of their exuberant loyalty, had, with his accustomed ready wit, given the Assembly the name 'Chambre Introuvable' of the '*Chambre introuvable*,' which has since adhered to it. But it was, none the less, soon to make its presence unpleasantly conspicuous. The king and his ministers wished to rule in the spirit of the constitutional Charter; to proclaim a general amnesty for past offences; to save the credit of France by taking over

¹ *W.D.* xi. 170. *Ib.* Cooke to Liverpool, p. 171; *Cf.* Castl. to Liv.

all the financial obligations of former Governments, including those contracted during the Hundred Days; above all, to uphold the social and administrative system which was the outgrowth of the Revolution, and which had rooted itself in the soil of France. But, to the great majority of the Chamber, this programme was worse than incomprehensible. More royalist than the king, they would hear of no compromise with the evil thing. They accepted the Constitution, indeed, because it gave them power; but they hurled themselves blindly against those of its provisions which stood in the path of their own passions. Not even the royal prerogative of mercy was sacred to them. 'It is time to put a stop to clemency!' cried M. Delamarre in the Chamber. 'Divine Providence,' said La Bourdonnaye, 'has delivered into our hands the murderers of our kings, the assassins of our families, the oppressors of our liberties.' In the Assembly, and in the fashionable salons of the Faubourg Saint-Germain, arose a clamorous cry for proscription, and more proscription. The Government, in vain protesting, was forced to yield a step. Fouché, with his accustomed cynicism, had drawn up before his fall a proscription list which included many of his old friends and colleagues. Of these a few of the more notable 'traitors' of the Hundred Days, including Ney, Lavalette, and Labédoyère, were now marked out for the extreme penalty. The Ultras clamoured like bloodhounds on a hot scent; but the Government did its best to allow the victims to escape, and so to spare it the stain of what, in calmer moments, would seem to all France a judicial crime. Louis heard with unfeigned regret of the capture of Ney;¹ and Decazes cursed the infatuation of Labédoyère and Lavalette in not availing themselves of the opportunities given them to escape. Labédoyère was the first to die. The fate of Ney, a marshal and peer of France, was less easily hastened. For

Trial and
execution
of Ney.

¹ He said truly, 'By letting himself be caught he has done us more harm than he did on March 13' (Daudet, p. 74; Viel-Castel, iii. 524).

months the weary process dragged on. No military court could be got to condemn the bravest and most brilliant of French soldiers; and in the House of Peers the courageous defence of the young Duc de Broglie postponed for a while the fatal end. But the blood-lust of the salons only grew with delay. 'Don't let him languish—nor us either!' cried a noble lady. The Government was, or thought itself, powerless in the face of an overwhelming opinion; and on the morning of December 7, 1815, the death-sentence passed by his peers on 'the bravest of the brave' was carried out. The execution of Ney and of Labédoyère, so far from strengthening the Bourbon throne, as was supposed, merely provided the tricolour with conspicuous martyrs, and did more than anything else to keep the embers of the Revolution aglow. For the moment, however, the escape of Lavalette, effected by the heroism of his wife, threatened to be more immediately fatal, at least to the Ministry. This roused the fury of the 'Ultra' Opposition almost to madness. They accused the Government of connivance. They even shrieked for 'justice' against the heroic wife whose reason had already broken down under the awful strain. And, their appetites once whetted, they clamoured for a fresh holocaust of victims. A general amnesty had been suggested; and the majority seized the excuse to pass, under the mocking title of 'amnesty,' an act which, in the words of Richelieu, 'proscribed whole classes.' The Government resisted. Decazes appealed to the loyalty of the Chamber not to flout the will of the king, who held to the promises of the Charter. But the majority insisted that the 'regicides' at least should be dealt with. The king was forced to yield; and the remnant of those who, twenty-three years before, had voted for the death of Louis XVI. passed into exile. Carnot, 'the organiser of victory,' and Fouché, the unspeakable, were of the number.

But if the vindictiveness of the Ultras filled the Allies with misgivings, still more was this the case with their

fanatical opposition to the general policy of the Crown and its advisers; an opposition which was, in fact, a declaration of war against that system of compromise which, in the opinion of the Powers, formed the sole hope for the stability of the restored monarchy. The religious question stirred up, as usual, the angriest passions. Already the Bishop of Troyes had proclaimed the necessity for re-
Catholic
Reaction
in France.
viving and strengthening that 'eternal alliance between the throne and the altar' which has proved so fatal to Catholicism in France; and under the influence of the 'Congregation'—an aristocratic religious society founded in the dark days of persecution under the Terror, and which had expanded with the fortunes of the Church—the clerical reaction was in full flood. Zealous missionaries perambulated the country; and, under the double pressure of official and religious influence, the local functionaries displayed a most edifying zeal. In many towns the mayors and members of the municipalities walked in procession, and set up crucifixes, with the same gravity with which, a few years before, they had planted trees of liberty. As long as the movement was confined to these harmless demonstrations, the king, whether from conviction or policy, had gone with the tide; and sceptical Paris had witnessed, with feelings akin to those of Michal when she saw David dancing before the Ark, the successor of St. Louis carrying a candle in the procession of Corpus Christi. It was otherwise, however, when the majority of the Chamber showed a disposition to interpret 'the union of throne and altar' as the obligation of the Crown to restore the Church to her ancient position of custodian of the national mind and morals, and to make her once more a land-owning corporation independent of the State. In the matter of education the Ministry were willing to make certain concessions; and the 'University of France,' as the educational system of the Empire was named, passed largely under clerical control. The divorce laws, too, were repealed. But the Government refused to undo entirely the

system established by Napoleon's Concordat, or to restore the ecclesiastical lands still in its possession. True to this wise policy, Baron Louis, the Minister of Finance, even confirmed the sale of those which had been alienated during the Hundred Days.

The contest between the Ministry, supported by the king and by the minority in the Chamber, and the majority, which now began openly to acknowledge the Comte d'Artois as its chief, was in fact one of fundamental principles. The minority wished to preserve the social structure created by the Revolution and guaranteed by the Charter. The majority aimed at restoring the lost influence of the Church and the landed aristocracy. In the struggle, 'the Tricolour parties,' Bonapartists and Republicans, reduced in the Chamber to a wretched remnant of nine, took no part. It was fought out by two factions, both adhering to the monarchy, but both more careful of tendencies than of forms. The result was curious. The Ultras, in their anger with the Ministry, attacked the prerogative of the king, and asserted the English principle that ministers should always be chosen from the Parliamentary majority; while the Liberals, adhering to the Charter, affirmed that the king was free to choose his ministers where he pleased, and that these, so long as they kept within the four corners of the Constitution, were nowise bound by the voice of the majority. In their eagerness to maintain monarchical principles, the Ultras had, in fact, betrayed themselves into a championship of extreme Parliamentaryism, while the Liberals posed as the apologists of royal prerogative. A further anomaly followed. The Government, wishing to strengthen its hold on the constituencies, introduced a scheme of electoral reform cleverly contrived to this end. This gave the Opposition their opportunity. An attack was opened on the whole system of centralisation as elaborated under the Empire. M. de Villèle, now fast rising into prominence as the most brilliant and thoughtful of the reactionary leaders,

Contest
between the
Chambers
and Crown.

proposed that, so far from strengthening still further the grasp of Paris on the provinces, greater powers should be placed in the hands of the departmental authorities, and ended up by setting out an alternative plan of his own which, by enfranchising two million country voters, threatened to transfer the power of the prefects to the local noblesse. That the influence of a territorial aristocracy could ever have been restored in a country where the feudal tradition had been so hopelessly shattered may well be doubted. As it was, the experiment was never tried. The Government measure was, indeed, thrown out, and Villèle's bill passed the Chamber. But the peers intervened, and it never became law.

The Powers watched, with ever increasing uneasiness, the development of the quarrel between the Crown and the Ultras. As early as the end of February 1816, the Conference of Ministers had, on the recommendation of Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ^{Intervention of the Powers.} ambassador, urged Louis to a vigorous support of his ministers; and, at the same time, Wellington wrote to the king to tell him that it was absolutely necessary for the stability of his throne, and the security of Europe, that he should put a stop to the intrigues of the Court in opposition to the Ministry.¹ The great fear was a recrudescence of revolutionary agitation as a result of the violence of the reactionists, a fear which some local disturbances seemed to justify. At Grenoble, on May 8, 1816, a band of ex-soldiers and half-pay officers, aided by some peasants, made an attempt to seize the town. They were dispersed without the least difficulty; but the commander of the district, General Donnadieu, in order to magnify his own deserts, exaggerated the affair in his reports.² The Government, in terror, commanded vigorous measures; and for the time it seemed as though the era of proscription were about to reopen. It was soon found, however, that the peril had been grossly exaggerated; and the attention of the Government, distracted for a moment, was

¹ *W.D.* xi. 309.

² *Ib.* xi. 395.

again claimed by the more dangerous problems presented by the irreconcilables of the Chamber.

It was their attitude toward the financial policy of the Ministry that brought affairs to a crisis, and sealed the fate of the 'Chambre Introuvable.' In the budget, not France only, but all Europe, was interested. Its rejection by the royalist majority was an act of defiance not only of the Crown, but of the Powers. In their anger at the cold reception by the king of their electoral law, the reactionaries did not shrink even from this crowning folly. 'The Bourbons will never be strong,' they cried, 'until they mount on horseback!' The dissolution of the Chamber, it was clear, was demanded not only for the safety of the Ministry, but of France. It was the realisation of this fact which decided Louis, already angry at the flouting of his expressed will. The Chambers had been prorogued in April 1816. On September 5th they were dissolved. Richelieu wrote to Wellington, who had characterised the move as 'bold but wise,' to suggest that he might help the Government 'to re-enter within the limits of the Charter' by consenting to a reduction of the army of occupation.¹ But the action of the Powers had necessarily to depend upon the result of the elections, and the character of the Government these would make possible for France.

It was an anxious moment for France and for Europe. 'If it [ultra-royalism] triumphed,' Decazes had written, 'the establishment of the constitutional *régime*; the liberation of the territory; the liquidation of the enormous debt which the culpable folly of the Hundred Days had imposed on France; the re-establishment of peace and security, would be more than ever compromised—they would be impossible.'² The Government did what it could to avert these disasters. 'In order to preserve the Charter intact,' the Crown fixed by

¹ Sept. 7, *W. D.* xi. 486.

² Daudet, p. III.

Ordinance the number of members to be elected at 258 instead of 400, and raised the qualification of age to forty years. The elections were held in November, and their result exceeded the most sanguine expectations of the Ministry. The Ultra majority was swept away, and an overwhelming preponderance of moderate royalists returned. The effect was soon seen. The Chamber, mainly composed of affluent members of the upper middle classes and men of mature years, showed none of the storm and stress of its predecessor. The burning question of the sovereignty of the Crown or Parliament was quietly dropped, and the king ruled, unchallenged, through his ministers, while the Chamber occupied itself mainly in the disposal of the funds. The critical matters of the budget, of electoral procedure, and of the regulation of the press were settled to the contentment of the Government and of the Allies. The credit of France steadily rose, and she was able to negotiate a loan on favourable terms with the houses of Hope and Baring. All the signs pointed to the fact that the country was entering on a period of prosperity and content.

It began to be mooted whether the time had not come when France might with safety be left to walk alone. The passing of the budget, which ensured the satisfaction of the claims of foreign nations upon France, had been rewarded by the Powers by a reduction of 30,000 in the numbers of the army of occupation. Richelieu never ceased to press for the withdrawal of the remainder. The councils of the Allies were still divided in the matter; for the Hundred Days had stirred up in Europe a distrust of France which has never been appeased; and moreover, during the elections of 1817, the Tricolour parties had been displaying once more a disquieting activity. Finally, it was decided to make the evacuation of France, and her formal reception into the Concert of Europe, the main subject of discussion at a Conference of the sovereigns and their ministers, which, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of November 20,

1815, it was proposed shortly to hold. Aix-la-Chapelle, the old capital of the Holy Empire, was agreed on as a convenient meeting-place for the Conference, which was fixed for the beginning of November 1818. Here the fate of France, and, if Metternich could have his way, that of Germany also, was to be decided.

CHAPTER III

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY

Austria and the Holy Empire—The German states' system—Attitude of the smaller princes—Metternich's German policy—The Act of Confederation—The Federal Diet—Position of the Great Powers—Sterilisation of the Constitution—State Constitutions—Action of Weimar—Frederick William III. and the Prussian Constitution—Constitutional experiments in the South—Bavaria and the Baden succession—Alexander I. and the Polish Constitution—Prussian tariff reform and Customs Union—Popular movements—The Wartburg Festival—Reactionary measures—Influence of Metternich.

THE intervention of the four Great Powers in the internal affairs of France was from the first regarded as a temporary expedient. It was otherwise with the relation of the European Concert to Germany. The political organism of France had been troubled with a sickness, violent, it is true, and highly infectious, but with some purging and careful watching it might yet be restored to health. That of Germany, on the other hand, had long been visibly perishing of senile decay; and when it was finally swept away by the revolutionary epidemic, few noticed, and none bewailed, the loss. During the war of Liberation, indeed, the majestic spectre of the Holy Empire, waked by the patriotic turmoil, had risen from its grave, and continued to haunt the minds of German men. But the new romanticism had as yet no place in the councils of the Alliance. Above all, the common-sense of the Emperor Francis preferred realities to shadows. For him the Austrian Empire was a fact, the Holy Roman Empire a phantom, and he refused to take back again the crown he had renounced.

The history of the next half century in Germany is that of her gradual realisation of all that this renunciation involved, and of the true meaning of the action of Austria in withdrawing from her outposts on the Rhine, and leaving to Prussia the duty of guarding the frontiers of the *Reich*. At the time, no one saw that the first steps had been taken on the path that led inevitably to Sadowa and all that lay, and lies, beyond.

The Holy Empire being, by universal consent, dead and buried, it fell to the Allied Powers to settle what should succeed it. The question had been recognised as urgent early in the course of the war, as the political edifice erected by Napoleon out of the ruins of the old empire crumbled to dust behind his retreating armies. By the Treaty of Chaumont it had been agreed that Germany was to consist of independent sovereign princes bound together by a federal tie; and this had been repeated, with a slight verbal alteration, to meet the case of the free cities, in the Treaty of Paris. On this basis, too, the new federal Constitution of Germany was established at Vienna, and, included in the Final Act of the Congress, was recognised as forming part of the international code of Europe, which it was the duty of the Allied Powers to see maintained. The right of foreign states to intervene in the internal affairs of Germany seemed to be formally admitted.

This result, so lamentable from the point of view of German patriotism, and of no good augury for the liberties of the rest of Europe, was due to the peculiar conditions of the problem to be solved in the reconstruction of Germany. Of the multitude of states, big and little, which had constituted the old empire, thirty-nine had survived the storms of the revolutionary epoch. Of these the two greatest, Austria and Prussia, were also by virtue of their non-German territories European Powers of the first rank. Of the lesser states, Hanover was attached to the crown of England, Holstein to that of Denmark, and Luxemburg to that of the Netherlands. This alone would have given to the new Confederation an international rather than a

The German states' system.

national character. But it was not all. The attempts made at the Congress of Vienna to make the unity of Germany effective were frustrated mainly by the opposition of the small states. These had not weathered the tempests of the Revolution only to be sunk ignominiously in harbour. They had before their eyes the painfully suggestive picture of the 'mediatised' princes: royal mendicants clamouring pitifully for doles of privilege. To secure their precious sovereignty seemed to them of far greater importance than to create a strong and united Germany; and to this end, if the traditional device of playing off Austria against Prussia failed, they were prepared to summon the aid of a foreign Power, of Russia by preference, of France if need be. Metternich, during the discussion of the Constitution at Vienna, had made use of this temper for his own ends. He regarded the affairs of Germany from the point of view of an Austrian statesman, in the first instance, and in the second from that of the Concert of Europe; and from neither point of view did a strong, an independent, and a possibly aggressive German nation seem desirable. The Germans in the Austrian Empire, though the governing caste, were in a minority; the majority consisting of a heterogeneous collection of races, representing every stage of human culture, from the brave and cultivated Polish and Magyar aristocracy down to the degraded and brutalised Ruthenian serfs of Galicia and Roumanian peasantry of Transylvania. An effective union of Germany into a Federal State (*Bundesstaat*) would certainly have involved the disintegration of Austria, unless Austria could obtain such a paramount position in the new state that it would virtually be annexed to her empire. The position of Prussia placed this out of the question. But if the alternative was to be a loose Confederation of States (*Staaten-Bund*), then, from the Austrian point of view, the looser its organisation the better; for, the more indefinite its constitution, the more room would there be for the free play of Austrian influence, with its vague claims, based on the

Metternich's
German
policy.

Imperial tradition, and its more tangible arguments of irresistible physical force. During the sittings of the German committee of the Congress of Vienna, then, it had been Metternich's object to postpone, as far as possible, the settlement of the question; and he had been excellently seconded by the jealousies and fears of the smaller princes. Nothing definite had been done, when the news of Napoleon's return from Elba forced some sort of a decision. In eleven hurried sittings, from May 23 to June 10, the outlines of the future Constitution of Germany were agreed upon. The details were left for the Diet of the new German Confederation (*Bund*) to fill in at leisure. But the flimsy patchwork suited the purposes of Austria and her allies among the German princes too well to make them desire any improvement; and the 'Act of Confederation' (*Bundes-akte*), as it was included in the Treaty of Vienna, remained the sole common Constitution of Germany, until, fifty years later, Prussia laid the foundations of the German Empire on the ruins of the Austrian power.

The object of the Act for the Federal Constitution of Germany was stated, in its second article, to be to maintain the external and internal security of Germany, and the independence and inviolability of the Federal States. The members of the Confederation were, as such, to enjoy equal rights; and Federal affairs were to be confided to a Diet consisting of representatives of all the German Governments. By the terms of the Final Act the Diet was endowed with the widest powers for the development of the relations of the German states to each other in all matters of common interest. Its first task was to be to arrange the fundamental laws of the Federation; to fix the organic institutions relating to its external, internal, and military arrangements; to regulate the trade relations between the various states of the Confederation. By the famous thirteenth Article, moreover, which briefly decreed that there were to be Assemblies of Estates in all the

The Act of
Confedera-
tion.

The Federal
Diet.

countries of the Federation, the constitutional liberties of the German people seemed to be placed under its aegis. But the constitution of the Diet itself condemned its debates to sterility from the first. In the so-called Narrower Assembly (*Engere Versammlung*), by which the ordinary business was transacted, the eleven greater states—Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Württemberg, Baden, Electoral and Grand-ducal Hesse, Denmark (for Holstein), and the Netherlands (for Luxemburg)—had one vote each, while the remaining twenty-eight states were divided into six *curiæ*, of which each had but a single vote. In this Assembly questions were decided by the vote of the majority. But all questions of more than ordinary importance were to be decided by the General Assembly (*Plenum*), where a two-thirds majority was necessary to carry a resolution, and in this the voting power was somewhat differently distributed. But the attempt to make this bear some proportion to the size and importance of the various states worked out so badly, that Austria had no more than four times the voting power of the diminutive principality of Liechtenstein. Finally, as though to ensure the Federal Government against any risk of being made effective, it was declared by Article VII. that a unanimous vote was necessary for changing ‘fundamental laws, organic institutions, individual rights, or in matters of religion,’ a formula sufficiently wide to cover almost every question of importance with which the Diet might be called upon to deal. Austria, in virtue of her tradition, received the perpetual presidency of the Diet.¹

It was obvious that in a governing body so constituted neither Austria nor Prussia would be content with her constitutional position, and that the internal politics of Germany would resolve themselves into a diplomatic duel for ascendancy between the two leading Powers. That this was indeed the case was not long obscure. The Diet met at Frankfort, after a year’s delay, on

Position of
the two great
Powers.

¹ Hertslet, i. p. 200.

November 16, 1816. Its first proceedings inspired mis-giving in patriotic hearts. It rejected a proposal to make the imperial eagle the symbol of the Confederation; and the published protocols of the Diet were issued under the seal of the 'Imperial Austrian Federal Chancery.' This revealed at once the jealous particularism of the lesser states, and the intention of Austria to regard the Federal Diet as a mere branch of her Foreign Office. The antagonism of her aims to those of Prussia was, in fact, recognised, though not avowed. The Austrian delegates in the Diet were instructed so to manœuvre as not to allow Prussia the least influence on the course of business, while maintaining an attitude outwardly cordial; while the Prussian envoy was charged 'to master the conduct of the Federation, as far as circumstances permit, without seeming to do so.'¹ And this while, outwardly, the Prussian and Austrian courts vied with each other in professions of devotion to the common cause and in promises of cordial co-operation. In this preliminary sword-play, Metternich proved himself the more skilful master of fence. His aim was to attach the majority of the states of the Federation to the interests of Austria, so as to give the latter a permanent preponderance of votes in the Diet, which would thus become the instrument of Austrian policy in Germany. The object of Prussia was to find a *modus vivendi* for the two Powers within the Federation, according to which neither should sacrifice any of its prestige as a European Power. Hardenberg held that an effective Federation could be reached only by a separate agreement between Austria and Prussia, which they would unite to impose on the other states. The idea was elaborated, without authority, by Hänlein, the Prussian delegate at the Diet, his scheme amounting practically to a suggestion for the partition of the control of Germany between the two great Powers. Metternich saw his chance. He communicated the Prussian proposal to the other German courts, declaring at the same

¹ Stern., *Geschichte Europa's*, i. 311.

time that Austria would under no circumstances make a separate agreement. In vain the Prussian Government disavowed and recalled their over-zealous agent. The smaller princes, already frightened beyond measure by the growth of Prussia's military power, saw in this last proposal the confirmation of their worst fears, and believed that Austria alone could, and would, save them from extinction. Metternich hastened to follow up the stroke. Count Buol, the Austrian president of the Diet, was instructed to announce that the Constitution, as fixed by the Act of Confederation, and guaranteed by Europe, must be regarded as final; that, like the Bible, it might be interpreted, but not altered. This put an end at once to the fears of the German princes, and to the hopes of the German people.

All hope of the Diet developing into a strong central Government was now destroyed. It remained to be seen how far it would be able to safeguard the rights of the German people by making use of the powers it already possessed under the Act of Confederation. This was soon decided. The Elector of Hesse, who since his restoration had made himself as odious by his avarice as The Hesse incident. ridiculous by his reactionary follies, had decreed the confiscation of all the domains alienated by the Westphalian Government. Against this arbitrary decree one of its victims appealed to the Diet, and this decided in his favour. The Elector was furious, refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Diet, and protested in violent letters to the other princes. At Vienna he found a ready hearing; and Metternich took Buol seriously to task for maintaining the right of the Diet to protect recalcitrant subjects against their sovereigns. The decree, passed by a unanimous vote of the Diet, was indeed, at the instance of Prussia, allowed to stand. But the delegates had learned their lesson. Henceforth they would do nothing of the slightest importance without special instructions; and, by simply withholding these instructions, it became possible for any single Government indefinitely to

obstruct the business of the Federal Assembly. The warning which the Emperor Francis addressed to the Diet against 'hurry' and 'over-activity' was, under these circumstances, but advice wasted. The body which was to have been the effective symbol of German unity sank into little more than a Court of Chancery for considering the outstanding claims of private individuals against the old Empire. That in this capacity it was careful to follow the advice of the Emperor Francis is sufficiently proved by the case of an unfortunate contractor, who was paid in 1843 for military work done between the years 1793 and 1795. As for public business, to propose a law at Frankfort was to commit it to the grave without hope of resurrection. Germany soon ceased to listen to the sterile droning of the Eschenburger Gasse, and turned from the dream of united Germany to set her hopes on the development of the separate states, and notably on that of Prussia.

Among the people itself the national sentiment was not so widespread as it was clamorous. Its appeal was, as yet, almost wholly to the intellectual classes—university professors, students, writers. Prussian officers, who had been carried away by the pan-German enthusiasm roused by the war, were repelled by the attacks of the Liberals on the profession of arms, and the exaggerated glorification of the part played by the volunteers (*Freischaaren*). Even the Liberals themselves cared more for constitutional liberty than for national unity; and, from the very first, the activity of the separate Governments seemed to promise a larger output of democratic arrangements than the cumbrous machinery of the Diet. Charles Augustus, the Grand Duke of Weimar, the enlightened patron of Goethe and Schiller, led the way, as early as May 1816, by granting a Constitution, on the most approved Liberal pattern, to his little state. The confirmation of this by the Diet led to an inrush of petitions to Frankfort from all parts of Germany, praying the central authority to enforce

The question
of constitu-
tions under
Article xiii.

the carrying out of Article XIII. of the Act of Confederation. Metternich took alarm. It was bad enough that Weimar should develop into a revolutionary plague-spot. That peril might have to be dealt with later. But it would be fatal if, in such times of unrest, the Diet itself should hold itself bound, by any pedantic interpretation of the Act of Confederation, to propagate the poison. It would be better were all action under Article XIII. left to the wisdom of each individual state. In this view the Prussian minister Hardenberg concurred. The interpretation of Article XIII., he urged, must be left to each several state, as the Diet could do no more than frame 'abstract resolutions which would be suitable more or less to all.' This was in December 1817. Five months later, on May 25, 1818, the Diet resolved that the German Governments should, without undue delay, fulfil Article XIII. To this resolution no state could object, for no state was under the slightest obligation to obey.

In Germany, then, Liberalism was forced into alliance, for the present, with 'Particularism'; and for the future of constitutional liberty the attitude of the several Governments was all-important. This attitude was determined, with rare exceptions, by the immediate interests and ambitions of the princes. The territorial rearrangement begun at Vienna had, as far as Germany was concerned, not yet been definitely completed; and in many cases a wide margin was still left for hope and fear. In the south especially, the monarchies of the second rank—Württemberg, Bavaria, Baden—were in a temper at once timid and aggressive. They dreaded the growing might of Prussia, the vague claims of the Federal Government; and, to strengthen themselves against both, they were prepared to make a bid for popular support by granting Constitutions. So far, then, the triumphs of Liberalism were also those of Particularism. Whether constitutional liberty and national unity in Germany were to remain opposing forces, or were destined ultimately to advance side

by side, depended, however, as was widely realised, upon the attitude of Prussia.

This was, for the time, so ambiguous as to justify a certain measure of suspicion. Here, too, all depended ultimately on the king; and the king, what with the misfortunes of the past and the uncertainties of the future, oscillated miserably between two opinions. For Frederick William III., with the sober virtues of the Hohenzollerns, had inherited a double portion of their cautiousness. This had deserted him, indeed, when, in the enthusiasm of the triumph over Napoleon, he had promised a Constitution to his people. The Hohenzollerns had ever been men of their word; and the promise, once made, was twice repeated, on the 15th and the 22nd of May 1815. The German Liberals now clamoured for the fulfilment of these pledges; and, when this was again and again postponed, for what to them seemed no sufficient reasons, they allowed their anti-Prussian feelings vent in violent expressions of anger and suspicion.¹ To the South Germans, indeed, Prussia had always been the classic land of 'squiredom and the corporal's stick'; and now, when the Governments of the south granted Constitutions, while Prussia still held back, their traditional antagonism was confirmed and strengthened. With no practical experience of affairs, and their political horizon bounded by the walls of their lecture-rooms, it was impossible for the German Liberals to realise the difficulties that stood in the way of Prussia's fulfilment of her constitutional pledges.

There can be no doubt that Frederick William meant to keep his word; and, as an earnest of his intentions, a commission was appointed to 'collect materials' for a decision on the Constitution. The all but insurmountable obstacles

¹ Gervinus, *Geschichte des xix^{ten} Jahrhunderts*, is still interesting as giving the view of Prussia and her policy taken by the intelligent and patriotic Liberal. He wrote when Bismarck was still comparatively unknown. Treitschke's *Deutsche Geschichte* is a brilliant apology for Prussia throughout.

at once became apparent. If German nationalism existed only as a scattered and impotent sentiment, Prussian nationality had as yet no existence at all. The unifying forces inside the old Prussian monarchy had been, not national sentiment, but the prestige of the royal house, the admirable administrative system, and the ties of a common military service. The Brandenburger was conscious of no racial affinity with the half-Slav Prussian proper; the Pomeranians and Silesians described themselves as separate 'nations'; and when, by the Treaty of Vienna, the Rhine provinces and half of Saxony were added to his dominions, the Prussian king ruled over a population so heterogeneous that Metternich could even contrast the loosely-knit structure of the Prussian State, to its disadvantage, with the uniform organisation of the Austrian monarchy. To these differences of race were now added, moreover, the most conflicting religious, social, and political traditions. The Catholicism of the new Rhine provinces, overlaid with a thin veneer of Parisian Liberalism, had little enough in common with the Lutheran orthodoxy and unvarnished feudalism of those eastern provinces in which the work of Stein had been but half accomplished. To collect such antagonistic elements into a single body seemed to Frederick William full of risk at any time, and doubly so in an age of universal unrest. The new State was still in process of metamorphosis. It must be welded together, and the foundations of a sound administrative system laid, before the crown could surround itself with constitutional forms. The people were without political experience of any kind; and it seemed folly to expose the new provincial and military organisation, the reformed system of taxation, and the resettlement of provincial boundaries to the attacks of an Opposition, part of which would certainly be in avowed hostility to the State, and the whole of it ignorant of the essential conditions of national politics on a large scale. Metternich, who had no desire to see Prussia

Heterogeneous character of the Prussian monarchy.

in the rôle of a constitutional monarchy, encouraged these misgivings. A system of provincial Estates, he urged, was the most that a state such as Prussia could safely concede; to set up a central parliament would be to disintegrate the monarchy. This view was supported by the result of the royal 'inquisition' into the feeling of the provinces on the matter. It had been proposed to base the central Constitution on the existing provincial Estates; but these were discovered to be so various in character and function that no uniform system could possibly be founded upon them. Moreover, the surprising discovery was made that there was, in fact, no real demand for a central representation at all. This was discussed with more or less interest in the towns. But the mass of the Prussian people had as yet no eyes or ears for anything beyond the borders of their counties. The Constitution would be at best, not the outgrowth of a popular desire, but the gift of the king.

The first results of the constitutional experiments in the smaller states were, meanwhile, not calculated to overcome the reluctance of the king to follow their example. In Würtemberg King Frederick II., one of the most faithful of Napoleon's vassals, had in 1805 overthrown the ancient Constitution, and by a *coup d'état* established the absolute power of the crown on the revolutionary basis of social equality. The Constitution which he had now, under Article xiii., given to the country was not a revival of that which he had overset, but one of a far more Liberal and democratic character. He had hoped by this means to save himself from the traditional inconveniences of the feudal and Clerical opposition; but he was deceived. The Estates met, only to enter into a long struggle with the crown for the restoration of their old Constitution, with all its array of obsolete ecclesiastical and feudal privileges and exemptions. King and Estates were alike obstinate, and the result was a constitutional deadlock. In the end the king applied to the Diet of the Confederation to abrogate the

Constitutional experiments in the South.

Constitution he himself had granted. As an object-lesson in the results of free discussion the affair was unfortunate. The agitation alarmed and alienated the princes by its revolutionary character, without gaining the sympathy of the German people, since it was directed toward a senseless reaction. All efforts at effecting a compromise having proved vain, the king, on June 7, 1817, dissolved the Estates, and reverted to absolute government. The Liberal press of Germany wept over the infatuation which had gambled away the most precious liberties.

If the constitutional fiasco in Würtemberg gave Prussia pause in her liberalising schemes, Bavaria, for that very reason, prepared to woo the democracy. King Max Joseph and his minister Montgelas, ardent haters of Prussia, and, after as before Napoleon's fall, entirely French in sympathy, were maturing ambitious schemes of their own, which could only be helped if popular favour were on their side rather than Prussia's. Already they had risked a war by refusing to surrender Salzburg and the districts of the Inn and Hausruck restored to Austria by the Congress of Vienna. The matter had been settled by the Treaty of Munich, of April 14, 1816, by which the territories in dispute were handed over to Austria in return for the Palatinate on the left bank of the Rhine and the Federal fortress of Landau. A slice of Baden was to be added, to connect the otherwise dis severed halves of the Bavarian monarchy; and, according to a second secret article, the reversion of the Baden Palatinate was also promised in the expected event of the extinction of the legitimate line of the House of Zähringen.¹ Were this promise ever realised, Bavaria would be strong enough to assume the hegemony of the lesser states against the two great Powers; she might even, favoured by some fresh convulsion of Europe, swallow up her protégés, and emerge as a third German Power of European rank. Apart, then, from domestic considerations,

Bavaria and
the Baden
succession.

¹ Hertslet, i. 434.

a Liberal pose promised to be helpful to Bavaria in her larger schemes of ambition; notably in enlisting public opinion on her side against Prussia, and in her not very generous designs on Baden. So the Constitution, which was based on the traditional division of Estates, was proclaimed on May 26, 1818.

It is not probable that Austria ever seriously intended to aid the further expansion of Bavaria. In any case the secret of the Munich agreement and of Max Joseph's ambitions leaked out. The Grand Duke of Baden protested. Charles Frederick, last of the line of Zähringen, had married a lady not of royal blood, on whom the title of Countess of Hochberg had been conferred, and had declared that, in the event of a failure of heirs of the elder line, the children of this union were to succeed. In October 1817, accordingly, the Grand Duke issued a 'house-law,' declaring the indivisibility of the duchy, and the right of the Counts of Hochberg to the succession. At the same time he determined to grant a Constitution, partly in order to support the rights of his dynasty on a popular basis, partly in order to win the goodwill of the Emperor Alexander, whose Liberal fervour was just now at its zenith. On March 27, 1818, Alexander opened the Polish Diet at Warsaw with an oration couched in the language of orthodox Liberalism, and his minister Count Capo d'Istria—afterwards first President of Greece—issued at the same time a memorandum in which the granting of Constitutions was declared to be the logical outcome of the Holy Alliance. This, and the news of the promulgation of the Bavarian Constitution, precipitated matters. On August 22, 1818, was issued for Baden a Constitution which, in the Liberalism of its provisions, quite eclipsed that of Bavaria. In Nassau the Constitution had been proclaimed even before the Congress of Vienna, and the Estates met for the first time in March 1818. Thus, by the middle of that year, constitutional government had, from one motive or another, been recognised

Alexander I.
and the
Polish con-
stitution.

by the bulk of the states which had formed part of the Confederation of the Rhine ; and the Liberalism of the South stood in favourable contrast with the reactionary spirit which seemed to be paramount in the North.

Out of the chaos of conflicting counsels the policy of Prussia was beginning to emerge in a definite shape. Hardenberg, now rapidly sinking into his dotage, morally discredited, the shadow of a great name, was allowed to continue his favourite task of Constitution-building. But the most powerful influences about the king were opposed to any radical alteration of the traditional Prussian system. Moreover, for the present, the bureaucracy was fully occupied with the administrative changes needed for the welding together of the scattered elements of the new monarchy. A rearrangement of provincial boundaries had to be effected, the military system, organised by Scharnhorst during the war, to be perfected and applied to the newly acquired territories ; above all, a new tariff system had to be devised, to suit the conditions of a state with scattered territories and a broken frontier line of a thousand miles.

The solution of this last problem was destined to have the most important results for Prussia and for Europe, though it was long before its significance was recognised.

By the Act of Confederation the Diet had been empowered to make laws for the regulation of the internal commerce of Germany ; but it was

Prussian
tariff reform
and the Zoll-
verein.

soon clear that, in this as in other matters, nothing was to be expected of it. Prussia, realising this betimes, determined to pursue a policy of her own, and, half consciously, entered on that system of separate arrangements with other German states that led to the gradual formation of the famous Customs Union (*Zollverein*), which, by identifying Prussia's material interests with those of the greater part of Germany, became the foundation of her imperial power. The credit of this momentous reform belongs to the Finance Minister, Von Maassen. It was, however, not so much the result of a

far-sighted political calculation as of a keen perception of the needs of the moment. The impossibility of guarding a long and broken frontier pointed to the necessity for some form of Free Trade; the desire for welding together the various provinces of the monarchy to the expediency of abolishing internal customs barriers. By Von Maasen's system a uniform tariff on imports, so low as to make smuggling unprofitable, was imposed; only certain classes of colonial wares, which could be more easily supervised at the seaports, being more heavily taxed for purposes of revenue. Lastly, while trade within the boundaries of Prussia was made practically free, very heavy transit dues were levied on all goods passing through Prussian territory; which, since Prussia commanded the main trade routes into the centre of Germany, it was thought would, sooner or later, force the other states to attach themselves to her customs system. When the trend of this policy was realised, a huge outcry arose in all Germany. The first to feel the pressure of the new policy, and the loudest in their protests, were those little Thuringian states, and the Duchy of Anhalt, which were entirely surrounded by Prussian territory. For a while they stood upon their dignity. But when they discovered that the Diet was powerless to interfere, and that Prussia was acting within her rights as a sovereign state, they succumbed. Prussia offered generous terms; and the advantages of belonging to a large tariff union were obvious. On October 25, 1819, the nucleus of the Zollverein was formed by the signature of a Convention between Prussia and Schwarzburg-Sondershausen. So little was the future development from this small beginning realised, that Metternich had, throughout the tariff troubles, used his influence on the side of Prussia.

Of the immense works of administrative reform which were being carried out by the tireless officials of Prussia the German people at large saw little; and that little seemed only to confirm their suspicions of the anti-German ambitions of the Hohenzollern monarchy. The patriots had put their

trust in the Diet and in Prussia, and both had failed them. As the vision of a strong and united Germany faded, dissatisfaction grew, and found vent at last in demonstrations, innocent enough, but in the highest degree alarming to a nature like that of Frederick William. Young Germany was still effervescing with the enthusiasm of the war of Liberation. Crowds of volunteers had returned from France, covered with somewhat exaggerated glory, and naturally loth to settle down into the dull routine of German *Kleinstaaterlei*. 'Turnvater'¹ Jahn, a hero of the war, with the double object of cultivating the patriotic sentiment and the muscles of German youths, had, immediately after the war, set up gymnastic establishments. These rapidly grew in public favour, and spread throughout Germany. Gymnastics, combined with a somewhat noisy 'Teutonism,' soon became the favourite diversion of young Germans, who, clad in so-called old German costume, with unshorn locks, and staff in hand, wandered as zealous missionaries of German Unity. At the universities especially this propaganda was carried on. At Jena, with the express approval of the Grand Duke Charles Augustus, a new society of German students was founded to supersede the old 'national' corps (*Landsmannschaften*). This *Burschenschaft* rapidly spread its organisation throughout Germany, and even established itself in the universities of Prussia. That the society contained elements dangerous from the point of view of the established Governments there can be no doubt. But, in the main, it was composed of students whose patriotism was noisy rather than deep, and who certainly would never have dreamed of offering violent opposition to the 'high authorities.' The Governments, however, viewed this clamorous agitation with growing uneasiness. They cursed the Liberalism of Charles Augustus, which had made Weimar the focus of a revolutionary agitation. To an age unaccustomed to the free expression of opinion

Popular movements: The Gymnastic establishments and students' clubs.

¹ *i.e.* Gymnastic father.

the inflated articles of such pitiful prints as the *Nemesis*, *Patriot*, *Minerva*, and whatever other mushroom growths of journalism had sprung up on the unweeded soil of Weimar, seemed so many firebrands flourished over a powder magazine. The Grand Duke himself became suspect. The 'big Bursche' had even gone so far as to regale with beer and sausages in the courtyard of his palace a deputation of 'Burschen' who had come from Jena to congratulate him on the birth of an heir. But the event which precipitated a crisis was a festival held at the Wartburg, the Grand Duke's magnificent old castle at Eisenach, and the Mecca of all good Lutherans, to celebrate at once the battle of Leipzig and the tercentenary of the Reformation. The gathering had obtained the permission of the Grand Duke, and passed off in the main soberly enough. Hymns were sung, speeches patriotic and Protestant delivered, and the formal proceedings closed with a celebration of the Communion. Unhappily, some of the more ardent spirits thought the occasion a good one for a demonstration, half serious, half farcical, against the reactionary tendency of the German Governments. After the formal proceedings of the day had ended, a bonfire was lit, and, in imitation of Luther's burning of the papal bull, unpopular books, including—awful sacrilege—*A Code of Police Law*, by Kamptz, the Prussian Minister of Police, were solemnly committed to the flames. At the last moment were added, as symbols of the reaction, an Uhlan's stays, a pig-tail, and a corporal's cane.

The effect produced by this youthful escapade was out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance. The astonished members of the students' beer clubs suddenly found themselves elevated into a power capable, apparently, of striking terror into the hearts of monarchs and statesmen. At Berlin the justly offended Kamptz clamoured for justice against the 'traitors' who had dared to burn the decrees of the Lord's anointed. King Frederick William, too, was seriously perturbed. He ordered all clubs and associations in the

The Festival
at the Wart-
burg, October
17, 1817.

Prussian universities to be dispersed, and declared his intention of closing the universities themselves rather than suffer them to become the centres of revolutionary intrigue. Metternich, who had been awaiting an opportunity for effective interference in Germany, recognised that this had come. He had long watched, with growing apprehension, the rise of the national spirit in Germany; and he now declared to the Prussian ambassador that the time had come 'to rage against the spirit of Jacobinism.' The crisis was considered so fateful that a meeting was arranged between Hardenberg and the Austrian Chancellor. The Prussian minister travelled by way of Weimar, in order to hand to the Grand Duke autograph letters from the Prussian king and the Austrian emperor, protesting against his encouragement of revolutionary principles; while the French Government, and even the Tsar, wrote to Weimar to warn against the extravagance of the press. In the midst of this diplomatic storm the Grand Duke kept his head. 'The present excitement,' he said, 'is the natural result of events. Confidence and courage could suppress it, but suspicion and violent measures would embroil all Germany.' But confidence and courage were qualities conspicuous by their absence in the councils of the Great Powers. The Emperor Francis wrote to the Tsar, complaining of the slow but sure rise of revolutionary opinion in Germany, especially in the studies of savants, 'the workshops of these doctrines,' and even joined with the King of Prussia in an appeal to him to intervene. Alexander declined. It had not been proved as yet, he said, that the German Powers were too weak to curb the evil themselves. But if this proved to be the case, it was not for Russia alone to interfere, but for the whole Concert of Europe.¹

For Metternich, no pronouncement could have been more welcome. He had watched with some concern, and much contempt, the Tsar's Liberal and religious aberrations, and was prepared to take advantage of the reaction which he saw

¹ Martens, iv. (i.) 64.

to be inevitable. The discussions of the forthcoming Congress at Aix would, he saw, decide the direction of the Tsar's policy; and the political ferment in Germany would serve as a convenient means for working on Alexander's fears and drawing him into the current of Austrian policy. Of the Great Powers, Russia was the only one whose opposition could seriously hamper the aims of Austria in Germany; and if the diplomatic skill of Metternich could only win Alexander to embrace his point of view, Austria, fortified by the Tsar's goodwill and by the formal, or informal, mandate of Europe, would be supreme in Germany. And Austrian influence supreme in Germany would be, as matters stood, supreme in Europe.

Metternich set out for Aix with a good hope, as toward the goal of all his ambitions. A couple of days spent at Frankfurt on the way increased his self-satisfaction. The Diet, which for months had been debating the military organisation of the Confederation without result, under the spell of his presence settled, in a couple of sittings, the principles of the measure to be proposed. The division of the whole command between Austria and Prussia, as had been suggested by Hardenberg, was rejected. Instead, the army of the Confederation was to be divided into ten corps, of which three were to be Austrian, three Prussian, one Bavarian, one assigned to Würtemberg, Saxony, and Baden, one to the two Hesses and the Thuringian states, and one to Hanover and the small states of Lower Germany. The whole was to be placed under the command of an elected General-in-Chief. 'You can have no idea,' wrote Metternich exultingly to his wife, 'of the effect produced by my appearance at the Diet. An affair which would, perhaps, never have ended has been concluded in three or four days. . . . I have become a species of moral power in Germany and, perhaps, even in Europe.'¹

¹ *Memoirs*, iv. 64.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

Opening of the Congress—The Emperor Francis and German sentiment—Change in the attitude of Alexander I.—France reconciled with Europe—Further proceedings of the Congress—Influence of Metternich—Affairs of Germany—Murder of Kotzebue—Violent reaction in Prussia—Meeting of Metternich and Frederick William at Teplitz—Conference of Carlsbad—The Carlsbad decrees—Attitude of the middle states—Intervention of Russia and England—Conference of Vienna—The Vienna Final Act.

IN the events of the next few months there was nothing to mar Metternich's satisfaction. The Conference of sovereigns and their ministers had been arranged to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle at the end of September 1818. The Tsar Alexander, the Emperor Francis, and King Frederick William were to be present in person. England was to be represented by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh, France by the Duc de Richelieu. The Tsar was accompanied by Counts Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode, the King of Prussia by Hardenberg and Bernstorff, the Austrian Emperor by Metternich. The Emperor Francis travelled towards the capital of the Holy Empire by easy stages, and by a route carefully chosen as passing through districts where the Imperial tradition was strongest. His progress was a triumphal procession. Wherever the Imperial flotilla touched on its voyage down the Rhine the head of the House of Hapsburg, the inheritor of the traditions of Imperial Germany, was greeted with boundless enthusiasm. The renunciation of 1806 was forgotten; and the people, in acclaiming the 'Kaiser,' hailed, not the sovereign of Austria, but the successor of the Roman Cæsars.

The climax was reached at Aix. Here, in accordance with immemorial custom, Francis, the last of the Holy Roman Cæsars, and sole Emperor still in a world in which the title had not yet been vulgarised, was taken to pray at the tomb of Charlemagne. As he knelt down, the people, by a common impulse, fell on their knees, while their own sovereign, the Lutheran king of Prussia, stood among them, 'looking very uncomfortable.' The scene was symbolical of the relations of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns during the next half century.

The popular ovation to the Emperor Francis was gratifying, as proving the 'moral height' of the Austrian Court in Germany. It remained to be seen how far this could be exhibited in the councils of Europe. The attitude of the Tsar was still the unknown quantity which threatened to throw out the calculations of statesmen. Metternich was exercised by that zeal for 'proselytising' which led Alexander to plunge from blatant 'Jacobinism' into an aggressive Pietism hardly less disturbing. But it was not to the Tsar's zeal for Bible societies, inconvenient as this was for a Power that desired to stand well at once with Russia and with Rome, that inspired the greatest misgivings. Disquieting reports were brought in of the secret activities of Russian agents in every part of Europe. In Italy especially they were coquetting with the revolutionary 'sects,' and threatening to raise up a serious danger in the flank of Austria. England shared the alarm of the Court of Vienna; for the intrigues of General Tatischeff at Madrid menaced her influence in Spain and, combined with Russian machinations elsewhere, pointed to dangerous ambitions in the Mediterranean. For a couple of years, indeed, the fear had been growing that the Tsar meditated breaking away from the Concert of Europe, and, in league with the Bourbon states, launching out on a separate policy that would embroil all Europe. The course of the conferences at Aix would prove how far these fears were well founded.

The Emperor
Francis at
Aix.

Attitude of
the Tsar.

In one respect Metternich soon discovered that a change, from the Austrian point of view for the better, had come over the Tsar's mind. It is said that the discovery of the existence of a secret society among the officers of the Russian army had shaken his faith in Liberal principles; and the process of disillusionment had been completed by the revelation of a ridiculous plot to kidnap him on the way to Aix. The way was clear for Metternich to bring his unrivalled powers of personal influence into play, to lead him into the paths of Austrian policy. And, Russia once gained, Austria would be supreme in Europe; for, with the Tory Government of England sympathetic, Prussia on the brink of a reactionary panic, and France in the leading-strings of the Alliance, there would be no Power left in Europe strong enough to resist his policy of using the weight of the Concert to crush the 'Revolution' and maintain the stability so necessary to the well-being of Austria. But another peril remained. It was true that, if Alexander had ever dreamed of pursuing a separate policy, he was now in agreement with the other Powers as to the need for holding together in face of a common danger. He himself had fixed the main subjects to be discussed at Aix—the evacuation of France by the Allies, the question of her admission to the Alliance and, in the event of this being conceded, what guarantees, if any, should be taken for her good behaviour. On the first two points an agreement was easily reached. On the motion of Metternich, the evacuation of France was decided on in the session of October 1, and on November 4 the King of France was formally invited to join in the deliberations of Europe. But France joins it was found less easy to agree as to the basis of the Alliance. these deliberations. Austria, the keynote of whose policy at this time was fear and distrust of Russia, learned with alarm that the Tsar wished to make this basis, not the Quadruple Alliance, but that Act of the Holy Alliance which had 'united all nations in the tie of brotherhood.' Merely to renew the Treaty of Chaumont would, it was urged, rouse

the jealousy of all the Powers excluded from the Quadruple Alliance and divide Europe into two hostile camps. This danger the lofty principles and catholic comprehensiveness of the Holy Alliance would obviate, and all Europe would be united in combating the two perils by which her peace was menaced: revolutionary agitation, and the action of the Governments themselves, which 'persevere in their old policy of arbitrariness in internal administration and partial alliances in external relations.' Russia herself desired no more than to guarantee the territorial arrangements of 1815 and the sovereignty *ab antiquo* recognised by the treaties of Vienna as the surest foundation of a permanent peace.¹

Unhappily, 'the purified morale of the Gospel' did not 'speak to the hearts' of the other Powers, who clung to their 'superannuated ideas.' Austria interpreted the Tsar's mysticism in the dry light of her own interests and fears. To her it seemed that Alexander was aiming at becoming the head of a European confederation of states, and, under the guise of protector, becoming, in fact, the dictator of Europe. These suspicions were shared by England. In the month of June, Baron Vincent had reported to Wellington from St. Petersburg that Russia was 'covering with the language of evangelical abnegation the preparation of a great military force';² and, apart from the doubtful aims of the Tsar's diplomacy, a growing opinion in England, represented inside the Cabinet by George Canning, was beginning to declare itself against participation in an agreement for international action which might possibly imperil the liberties, and would certainly hamper the freedom of action, of Great Britain. Castlereagh, while sincerely believing that the strengthening of the Concert was essential to the best interests of Europe, recognised that, in the last instance, the British Government

¹ *Mém. confidentiel du cabinet de Russie*, Polovtsoff. *Corresp. Diplom.* ii. 832.

² 'Bathurst to Castlereagh,' *Castlereagh Correspondence*, third series, iii. 60.

was answerable to Parliament, and that this fact must determine its policy. It was open to an English statesman to join an alliance directed to a distinct and definite object of common policy; it was impossible for him to support an international organisation established on a principle vague in itself and capable of indefinite expansion. In reply to the Tsar's proposal, therefore, he argued that the admission of the smaller states would merely weaken the moral force of the alliance, and suggested in concert with Metternich that the Quadruple Alliance should be renewed, and France invited to attach herself to it.

Alexander, for his part, was strongly opposed to the admission of France to the 'Confederation,' unless she could give 'ostensible' security for the stability and tranquillity of her internal government; and in any case he urged, with some truth, the impossibility of inviting her to join an alliance directed primarily against herself. As for the smaller states, he insisted on their right to be consulted at least on matters in which they were themselves concerned. The result was a compromise. On November 15, 1818, two instruments were signed. The first, a secret protocol, merely renewed the Quadruple Alliance, and arranged for the military action of the signatory Powers in the event of fresh disturbances in France.¹ The second, a Declaration to which France was invited to adhere, proclaimed the intention of the Powers not to break the intimate union, strengthened by the ties of Christian brotherhood, contracted by the sovereigns; pronounced the object of this union to be the preservation of peace on the basis of respect for treaties; and stated, finally, that no 'partial re-unions' should take place concerning the affairs of other states without their invitation, and, if desired, their presence.²

Treaties of
November
15, 1818.

¹ Its terms were communicated to Louis XVIII. and Richelieu. Text in *Wellington Dispatches* (supplementary), xii. 835.

² Hertslet, i. 571.

This treaty represented the most serious effort ever made to provide 'the transparent soul of the Holy Alliance with a body.' It remained to be seen how far this was capable of being galvanised into life. On the whole, the results of the conferences at Aix were not encouraging to those who hoped great things from the realisation of the Tsar's beneficent dream. There is no law to prevent even royal 'brothers' from quarrelling, and since the Conference did not shrink from debating the affairs of all Europe, there was plentiful material for disagreement. An edifying unanimity was found possible in the enunciation of abstract propositions; and on certain practical questions, in which, as in the case of France, there was urgent need for agreement, compromise was possible. But where the peril was less pressing, it was found impossible to decide on common action, even in the most

The Barbary
pirates and
the slave
trade.

obvious cases of common interest. The Barbary pirates had become a terror and a nuisance to all Europe. Issuing from their nests along the northern coast of Africa, they scoured the Mediterranean and the seas beyond, levying blackmail in the Tiber, and lying in wait for German merchantmen at the mouth of the Elbe. In 1814, Austria had been forced to put her sea-borne trade under the protection of the Ottoman flag; while Prussia, and such other of the German states as had any nucleus of a mercantile navy, watched with helpless shame the ravages committed on their commerce. In concert with Russia, Prussia now proposed that Europe should suppress the nuisance. But common action would have involved the appearance of Russian warships in the Mediterranean. England strenuously objected, and the project fell through. The same fate befell England's proposal for the effective suppression of the slave trade. The traffic itself had been condemned in principle by the Congress of Vienna, but hitherto it had been found impossible to stop it, owing to the difficulty of laying hands on the vessels engaged in the trade. England now suggested that her war-vessels should be em-

powered to search all suspected ships on the high seas; but the other Powers raised not unnatural objections, and even hinted that this was but another device of perfidious Albion for hampering her trade rivals.¹ A counter proposal of the Tsar met with no greater acceptance, and the question was left unsettled at Aix.

But though, in these comparatively minor matters, the Powers had been unable to come to an agreement, they effected enough to make it seem as though their dictatorship had become an established fact. For a moment it looked as though their claim was likely to be extended beyond the borders of Europe. The famous message of President Monroe, with its doctrine of 'America for the Americans,' had not yet been given to the world; and the Congress was only prevented from interfering in the quarrel between Spain and her colonies by the hopeless divergence of views and interests among the Powers themselves, which was revealed as soon as the question was raised. But even in Europe the authority of the Allied Powers was not submitted to without murmuring. A contest was at this time raging between Sweden and Denmark, the latter of which had been aiding and abetting the rebellious Norwegians; and the Powers had called the king of Sweden (Bernadotte) sharply to order for certain infractions of the terms of the Treaty of Kiel done by way of reprisals. The king obeyed; but in a letter to the Emperor Francis he entered a formal protest, in the name of the states of the second rank, against the dictatorship of the Powers.

The intervention of the latter in the affairs of Germany was, in view of the European guarantee of the Federal Act, less open to criticism. Moreover, the former princes of the Rhenish Confederation had joined the alliance as independent sovereigns; and in their anxiety to preserve their status as such,

The Powers
and the
German
states.

¹ See 'Memoir of Capo d'Istria' in Martens, iii. 299. I find everywhere an invincible belief in the 'egoism and commercial calculation' of England.

they themselves appealed to the Congress as the only power whose competence to determine their status they would recognise. The Elector of Hesse petitioned to be made a king, and on the refusal of the Powers to recognise him as such, determined in dudgeon to cling to a title which had lost all meaning since the fall of the Holy Empire. The 'mediatised' princes, too, writhing under an intolerable sense of wrong, and weary of a position halfway between that of sovereigns and subjects, appealed to the Powers, and obtained an injunction to the rulers of Hesse and Baden to treat them with greater consideration. And, most important of all, the question of the Baden succession, which at one time threatened to involve Germany in internecine war, and which still continued to be a menace to peace, was settled, on the initiative of the Tsar, in favour of the Counts of Hochberg. A Conference, for the settlement of all outstanding territorial questions, met at Frankfort, and resulted, on July 20, 1819, in a general treaty signed by the four Powers. The Concert of Europe could afford to ignore the protests of Bavaria.

Never before and never since have the Great Powers, in spite of differences of opinion more or less serious, presented so united a front. Their action hitherto, so far as it had been unanimous, had been an honourable attempt to secure the peace of Europe. But Metternich was not content to let it rest here, and determined to seize so auspicious an opportunity for uniting the Powers in forwarding his favourite policy of crushing out the Revolution. The moment was opportune, for Alexander, hitherto the main obstacle to a policy of vigorous suppression, was now thoroughly awake to what seemed the perilous forces at work, especially in Germany. During the sitting of the Congress, he had commissioned a member of his suite, a young Wallachian named Stourdza, to write a report on the condition of opinion in Germany; and the result was a pamphlet, in which the German universities were described as hotbeds of revolutionary

agitation. Its publication produced a hurricane of indignation in Germany, which was increased when Kotzebue, a journalist supposed to be in the pay of the Russian Foreign Office, announced that it expressed the views of the Tsar. The rage of the 'Burschen' now turned against Russia, and Metternich was not sorry to see the rise of an agitation which, while alarming in itself, was well calculated to complete the conversion of the Tsar. The mind of Alexander might not yet be ripe for intervention in Germany in a reactionary sense, but, at least, Austria would no longer have to fear his opposition.

From the Austrian point of view, then, the meeting at Aix had been an all but unqualified success. In a memorandum addressed to Prince Metternich, Gentz exultantly summed up its material and moral effects. Foremost of these was the crowning fact that, by the self-abnegating spirit of the Powers, the dreaded rupture of the European Alliance had been prevented, and that 'truly sacred union, of which the Holy Alliance was but an imperfect symbol,' preserved to be 'the sheet-anchor of Europe' in tempestuous times. Metternich's own appreciation was less wordy, but no less exultant. 'I have never seen,' he wrote from Aix, 'a prettier little Congress.' He had reason, indeed, for his satisfaction; for from the Congress of Aix dates his own supremacy in Europe. Jealous diplomatists might scoff at the 'Dalai Lama' of Vienna, describe him as 'polished dust,' and laugh at the fine phrases in which he was wont, at times, to disguise commonplace thought. But the fact remained that the fine phrases were beginning to be received in all the chancelleries of Europe as pronouncements *ex cathedra* of an infallible political authority; and, with ever-increasing crowds of the faithful thronging his ante-chambers, the oracle could for the present afford to ignore the few sceptics who remained outside. The judgment passed by posterity upon Prince Metternich, influenced by the success of those forces which he spent his life in

Prince Metternich and his policy.

combating, has perhaps done him too little justice. He was not, it is true, like Bismarck, the product of a great national movement; nor did he, as his own statement of political faith abundantly proves, understand the innermost workings of the age which he aspired to guide. Standing on the threshold of a period of unparalleled material and mental expansion, he believed that his lot had been cast in an age of decay, in which his own sorry part would be to help prop up mouldering institutions. Nor did his political methods bear the impress of a master mind. Napoleon said that he mistook intrigue for statesmanship; and though Fouché, a competent judge, allowed him the detective's virtue of rapid insight into the faults and weaknesses of men, Talleyrand, of all men, called him a politician 'de semaine,' who changed his aims and his methods with every moment, without regard for truth and honour. That he was an opportunist is true enough; and perhaps the great mistake of his life was that he was not consistently such, that he converted a policy justifiable as a temporary expedient for preserving the world's peace in a critical epoch into a permanent principle of statesmanship, and so fell himself into that very fault of doctrinairism which he condemned in others. Yet, though limited and pessimistic in his general outlook, Metternich was skilful in adapting himself to changes of circumstances, and bold in handling them. At the crisis of Austria's fortunes, during the final struggle with imperial France, when every one was wavering, despairing, and trying to find a way out of the sorry tangle, it was he who gave to Austrian policy the vigorous and certain direction which enabled him afterwards to boast himself the conqueror of Napoleon. For a tired and timid generation he was the necessary man; and it was his misfortune that he survived his usefulness and failed to recognise that, while he himself was growing old and feeble, the world was renewing its youth. Still, in spite of his limitations, he held the reins of power in Austria for thirty-five years, and, for nearly half that time, was practically supreme

in the councils of Europe. Europe, her strength restored by the long peace which it was largely his merit to have secured for her, has passed judgment upon him. When Austria shall have survived half a century of constitutional experiment under the Dual Monarchy, it will be time for Austrians to condemn him.¹

Metternich's policy was, in fact, directed by the needs of Austria. The unstable equilibrium of the Hapsburg Empire might at any moment be upset by a shifting of political forces; and, from the Austrian point of view, the maintenance of the *status quo* became of supreme importance. This was menaced by the restless agitation carried on outside her borders, especially in Germany. To Metternich, revolution in Germany seemed a more serious peril than revolution in France. 'The French play with liberty,' he said. 'It is a more serious matter when the Germans add to enthusiasm perseverance.' To suppress the Liberal movement in Germany became, then, the immediate object of his policy. This once achieved, the German Confederation, powerful for defence, weak for purposes of attack, would, he hoped, become, under Austrian leadership, 'a great defensive combination for the preservation of the world's peace,'² its Diet a sort of international high court established in the centre of Europe to watch over the stability of the established order.

In Germany itself, the conditions were increasingly favourable for the realisation of this scheme. The King of Prussia had never recovered from the shock of that unfortunate picnic at the Wartburg, and received with growing testiness all references to the promised Constitution. This had as yet, indeed, not been dropped. But its life depended upon that of Hardenberg, who, though the king still clung faithfully to an old servant of the crown, had lost most of

¹ Demelitsch, *Fürst Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik*.

² Gervinus, i. 304

his influence, and was forced at the beginning of 1819, on the plea of age, to surrender several of his offices. He was replaced at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Count Bernstorff, the former Danish ambassador, and a traditional friend of Russia. This, in view of the relations established between the Tsar and Metternich at Aix, was fresh accession of strength for Austria. Not long before, Alexander had refused the request of the Prussian Minister Wittgenstein that he should urge Frederick William to repressive measures, on the plea that this would be contrary to the 'just principle' of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.¹ Now, to please the Court of Vienna, he was prepared to alter his standpoint, and join Austria in representing in Berlin the danger of allowing the revolutionary agitation to proceed unchecked. But, indeed, Frederick William did not stand in need of such urging; and any doubt that may have lingered in his mind as to the inexpediency of continuing in Liberal courses was removed by the folly of the Liberals themselves. Never was the saying, 'Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat,' better illustrated than in the history of German Liberalism at this period. If the noisy demonstrations of the students had alarmed the authorities, the result of the constitutional experiments in the South discredited the object at which these demonstrations were aimed. The struggle between the Estates and the Crown in Würtemberg has already been sketched. In Baden, matters went no better. The deputies, in the absence of any other tradition, modelled their behaviour on that of the National Assembly of 1789. They abolished the use of titles within the Assembly, declaring that none could be more honourable than that of 'representative of the people.' They cut down the appanages of the royal family. Finally, in a fine frenzy of Badenese patriotism, they fell foul of the Federal Constitution of Germany, receiving with rapturous applause a declaration by the

¹ Martens, vii. 377.

Minister Liebenstein that no decree of the German Diet could be valid in Baden without the ratification of the national Diet (Landtag). A series of debates in this strain at last exhausted the patience of the Grand Duke, and on July 28 he prorogued the House. It had talked for three months, without passing a single law. In the Bavarian Parliament, too, doctrinaire Radicalism was rampant; and the climax was reached when the Chamber demanded that the army should swear fealty to the Constitution. Max Joseph, alarmed at the rumours of military conspiracies in Italy, and fearing that South Germany might be drawn into their vortex, appealed to Austria and Prussia for help against the Parliament he had himself created. Prussia declined to intervene, and the quarrel was patched up. But, in the present mood of Frederick William, this appeal, combined with the awful examples of Würtemberg and Baden, could not but produce its effect.

A senseless crime did more than a thousand arguments to bring about the triumph of Metternich's policy. On March 23, 1819, Kotzebue, the poet and pamphleteer whose loudly expressed pro-Russian sympathies had earned him much hatred, was murdered by the student Karl Murder of
Kotzebue. Sand, a weak-minded enthusiast, who had prepared for the deed by prayer and the reception of the Holy Communion. More disturbing than the crime itself was the attitude towards it of a large mass of public opinion in Germany. The bulk of the educated classes were inclined to approve the motive, while condemning the deed. But, even among those who should have known better, there were not wanting voices to declare that the motive covered the crime. The preacher de Wette, in a letter to the assassin's mother, wrote: 'he held it to be right, and so he has done right . . . so, as this deed has been done by this pure, pious youth with this belief, with this confidence, it is a beautiful sign of the times.' Where men in responsible positions could see things through so distorting a medium of

prejudice, it was not to be expected that the hot-headed patriots of the 'Burschenschaften' should show greater wisdom. By the students Sand was hailed as worthy to take rank with Brutus, Harmodios, and Aristogeiton, and other classic ridders of tyrants. When, on the 20th of May 1820, he paid the penalty of his crime, his execution was made the occasion of a sympathetic demonstration, while the place of his death became known popularly as the field 'of Sand's Ascension.'

It was not to be expected that the German Governments should see the humorous side of a state of mind which could confuse Kotzebue with Julius Cæsar. Into their wavering counsels the news of Sand's crime fell like a bomb-shell. The panic was increased by another attempt, the work of the inevitable imitator, directed this time against the life of a high official. In Berlin, there was an end for the time to Hardenberg's Constitution-building, Hardenberg himself, who clung with senile tenacity to office, allowing himself to be carried away by the current. On May 4th, King Frederick William issued a series of ordinances giving the police extraordinary powers, appointing a ministerial Commission to conduct the inquisition against demagogues. At the same time he ordered all Prussian students to leave the university of Jena, the focus of all revolutionary propaganda, refused to sign the new arrangement for the gymnastic establishments, drawn up by his ministry to replace that of Jahn, which had been suppressed; and, finally, ordered Bernstorff to arrange with Count Zichy, the Austrian ambassador, extraordinary measures, to be proposed to the Federal Diet, for the common action of the German Powers in face of the revolutionary danger. In Prussia a reign of terror began, under the zealous conduct of the Minister of Police Kamptz, who revelled in the congenial task of 'demagogue hunting.' The flimsiest suspicions were enough to secure an arrest, if not a condemnation. No services, no reputation were a safeguard against molestation. Arndt, the poet of the War of Liberation, whose stirring war-songs had done more than anything else to rouse

the nation to throw off the yoke of Napoleon, was prosecuted for a book written by order of the Government, and accused of a willingness to murder clergymen, on the strength of a note, which turned out to be written in the king's own hand, on the border of a decree summoning the *levée en masse*. Nothing was too trivial to escape the anxious suspicions of the Government. A Cabinet Council was even summoned to discuss the cut of the students' clothes. Germany watched, with disgust and undisguised ill-will, the frenzy of reaction in Prussia, and comparing it with the placid surface of political life in Austria, unruffled as yet by any motions of constitutional or national aspiration, mistook torpor for contentment; and drew from the contrast a moral wholly misguided.

Metternich was with the Emperor Francis in Italy when the news of Kotzebue's murder reached him. He at once saw, and determined to profit by, his opportunity.

Before leaving the south, he arranged the preliminaries of a meeting of the more important princes of the *Bund*, over which he hoped to preside in August, at Carlsbad. Before this met, he went at the special invitation of King Frederick William to Teplitz, and there, in alliance with Wittgenstein and Bernstorff, he used his influence over the king to give the deathblow to Hardenberg's plans for a Constitution, and to win over Prussia to the support of the proposals which he intended to lay before the Conference at Carlsbad. After discussions which lasted some days, the principles which were to guide the action of the two Powers in the affairs of the Confederation were agreed on and embodied in a formal protocol signed on August 1 by Metternich and Hardenberg. By this document the two Great Powers, in virtue of the part played by them at the Congress of Vienna, claimed a special right to watch over the affairs of the Confederation established by that assembly, and to enforce the decrees of the Federal Diet, which, as emanating from the whole, were binding upon

Metternich
and Prussia.
Meeting and
Convention
of Teplitz.

the whole. This was a serious menace to the sovereign status of the lesser princes. The article of the Final Act, on which this claim was based, was intended only to throw on the Diet the responsibility for preserving the peace between the German states. This was now to be extended, in the interests of the reaction, into a claim of control over the internal affairs of the several sovereignties, a claim which the separatist ambitions of certain of the lesser courts might seem to justify. Besides this broad assertion of policy, the contracting Powers reserved certain matters for more immediate discussion, notably that of the proper interpretation of Article 13 of the Act, and of the more effective supervision of the universities. As regarded the first of these, Prussia was determined to complete the reform of her internal financial and administrative system before applying the Article to her own state, and, even then, to interpret it literally as authorising no more than a union of provincial Estates. As for those Governments which had, under the name of Estates, established representative parliaments, proposals were to be considered later on for bringing them back to a system more in consonance with the Federal Constitution.

This Convention, which formed the basis of the famous Carlsbad Decrees, was a signal triumph for Metternich and for Austria. As for Prussia, it was 'the most disgraceful humiliation that Hardenberg had ever prepared for her.' 'Like a penitent sinner, without any formal *quid pro quo*, the monarchy of Frederick the Great yielded to a foreign power a voice in her internal affairs.'¹ Metternich, it is true, was initiating a policy seemingly inconsistent with his earlier aims. But this was not really so. In strengthening the executive authority of the Diet, he did so not in the interests of German unity, but of Austrian particularism. The politics of Germany had hitherto been the affair of the Austrian Foreign Office. Henceforth they were to fall into the department of the Austrian police.

¹ Treitschke, ii. 551.

From Teplitz the Austrian and Prussian ministers proceeded direct to Carlsbad, where the plenipotentiaries of the German kingdoms, and of Baden, Mecklenburg, and Nassau had already assembled. The smaller states ^{The 'Carls-} had Decrees.' it was not thought worth while to consult. The question of Article 13, raised at an unwelcome moment by Würtemberg, was shelved with a general declaration that no Constitution 'inconsistent with the monarchical principle' should be granted. Less difficulty was experienced with the remaining, disciplinary, proposals of the Teplitz Convention. A provisional plan for strengthening the executive powers of the Diet was agreed upon, and a series of definitive measures were drawn up directed against the universities, the press, and the demagogic agitation. The 'Burschenschaften' and gymnastic establishments were to be dissolved, and in all universities, 'curators' nominated by the Governments were to be installed to watch over the good behaviour of professors and students. A severe censorship, especially of periodicals, was demanded; and, finally, a central Commission was to be established at Mainz, to inquire into the ramifications of the great secret conspiracy which, it was assumed, permeated all Germany. A proposal to give this Commission judicial as well as inquisitorial powers was rejected by the Emperor Francis, who, with great good sense, pointed out that, in the absence of any Federal code of criminal law, this might lead to injustice, and declared that offenders must be judged by the laws of their own states.

To make the Carlsbad Decrees effective, it was necessary for the Diet of the Confederation to pass them by a unanimous vote; and on this, in the ordinary course, it was impossible to reckon. Already the Grand Duke of Weimar, that *fons et origo malorum*, had protested at Frankfort against any supervision of the universities, where, he declared, freedom of thought and discussion must be safeguarded, so that in the open conflict of opinions the students might arrive at truth, and be preserved from devotion to authorities. But

Metternich was not to be turned aside by such 'childish stuff' as this; and he set to work to convert the smaller courts, offended by their exclusion from the Conference at Carlsbad. In a circular-letter he drew a harrowing picture of the plottings of the Carbonari in Italy, and pointed to manifold proofs that their organisation had been extended to Germany. The Prussian bureaucracy especially was, he declared, honeycombed with revolutionary sentiment. At the same time he took measures to obviate any possible opposition in the Diet. In four hurried sittings, the Decrees were pressed by Count Buol through the Diet, without debate and without the delegates having any opportunity of sending home for instructions. The protests of the few who dared to raise objections were expunged from the published protocol, and on September 20 the Decrees were confirmed by what was falsely proclaimed a unanimous vote.

The Carlsbad Decrees were the high-water mark of Austrian influence in Germany. 'Since Prussia has ceased to be the *point d'appui* on which the balance of German liberties rests,' wrote the Russian minister, Count Golovkine, from Vienna, 'and since this has been transferred to the states of the second order, Austrian supremacy has been a realised fact.'¹ Metternich himself spoke of the Decrees as marking the dawn of a new era of salvation. The loose federation of German states (*Staatenbund*) had been converted into a strong federal state (*Bundesstaat*), of which the Diet had more power than under the old Empire, more power to interfere in the internal affairs of the individual states than under the new German Empire. And in this state the House of Hapsburg was supreme. 'If the Emperor doubts that he is Kaiser of Germany,' wrote Metternich, 'he is much mistaken.' Henceforth Austria could indeed become what Talleyrand had called her, 'the Upper House of Europe, whose function is to keep the Commons in order.'

But all was not yet won. The lesser states were growing

¹ Martens, iv. (1.) 271.

restive under the dictatorship of the two Great Powers; and the king of Würtemberg, as a protest against the new claim of the Diet to interfere in the internal affairs of the states, issued, on September 26, a new Constitution, which was a compromise between the old system of Estates and modern parliamentarism. He appealed, moreover, to his cousin, the Tsar Alexander, against the encroachments of the two Powers; and the Tsar, who, while desiring the suppression of revolutionary agitation, by no means wished to see a strong Germany established under Austrian headship, refused to discourage the opposition of the lesser courts. Alexander was, in fact, at this time perilously balanced between two opinions. He dreaded revolution, but he still refused to surrender himself to reaction. He chose this very moment for issuing a new political confession of faith, in every line of which the influence of that 'coryphæus of Liberalism,' Count Capod'Istria, was clearly to be traced. He still believed in liberty, but in liberty limited by the principles of order. He still believed in free institutions, though not in such as are forced from feebleness, nor contracts ordered by popular leaders from their sovereigns, nor Constitutions granted, under difficult circumstances, to tide over a crisis. He saw, in fact, in English history 'the code of every statesman'; and, for this reason, welcomed the interference of the British Government in German affairs. For Castlereagh, too, had protested against the Carlsbad Decrees as an unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of sovereign and independent states, and had incidentally proved to the Russian ambassador in London, Count Lieven, that it was not in the interests of Governments to contract an alliance against the peoples. Russia and England, then, were at one in deprecating any intervention of Europe to support a league of which the sole object was 'the absurd pretensions of absolute power'; and the utmost the Tsar would do was to leave the German states to manage, or to mismanage, their own affairs.¹

¹ Martens, iv. (1.) 269-271.

In view of this 'double-faced' attitude of Russia, it was necessary for Metternich to walk delicately, since he realised that it was better to sacrifice some of his gains rather than risk the loss of all. A Conference of ministers of the German Powers had been summoned to meet at Vienna on November 20. Its object, as explained by Hardenberg to the Tsar, was to develop and complete the Federal Act of the Congress of Vienna, and especially to define the scope of the disputed Article 13, and the functions and powers of the Diet. At Vienna, Metternich found that he had to face a more formidable opposition than at Carlsbad. The states of the second rank, headed by Würtemberg, had drawn together, and formed the nucleus of an inner league of 'pure German states' against Prussia and Austria, and of 'Liberal particularism' against the encroachments of the Diet. With Russia and, in a minor degree, England sympathetic, their attitude could not be ignored. Moreover, Prussia herself was beginning to regard with misgiving any further extension of the Federal authority, lest it should imperil the Customs-Union which she was gradually building up by separate agreements with the several states. Metternich possessed in perfection the art of yielding gracefully, and of giving defeat the air of victory; and, as a result of this, the Vienna Final Act of

The Vienna Final Act of May 15, 1820. May 15, 1820, which received the sanction of the Diet on June 8, without lessening the prestige of Austria, was not unsatisfactory to the lesser states.

In the main, it was no more than a clearer definition of the principles of the Federal Act of 1815; and, so far from subjecting the individual states to the central Diet, it reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention, and, above all, renewed the clause forbidding any fundamental alterations in the Constitution of the Confederation without a unanimous vote. As to Article 13, Metternich wisely dropped his intention of requiring a revision, in a reactionary direction, of the South German Constitutions, and even refrained from pressing his heart-felt objections to publicity of debate. The

news, which arrived during the session of the Conference, of the revolutions in Spain and Italy helped him in one respect. By Articles 56 and 57 it was now laid down that Constitutions could only be validly altered by constitutional means; that the complete authority of the state must remain united in its head; and that the sovereign could be bound to cooperate with the Estates only in the exercise of particular rights. This definition Gentz described as one of the greatest and most worthy results of the negotiations of the age, and the day on which it was agreed to as more important than that of Leipzig!

On the whole, Metternich saw no reason to be displeased with the results of the Vienna Conference. He believed that the moderation shown by Austria had won back the confidence of the smaller states which had been lost at Carlsbad. For the rest, it was enough for Austrian purposes if the affairs of Germany went on without change; and, as long as the repressive machinery set in motion by the Carlsbad Decrees worked smoothly, it mattered little whether the Diet were any more efficient after than before the Final Act. Occupied soon with the revolutionary troubles in the south, his sole aim was to preserve the *status quo* in Germany, and, rather than this should be disturbed, he was prepared to discourage any attempt to interfere with constitutional liberties constitutionally obtained. This attitude, however, which he hoped would have some effect in reconciling Liberal opinion, had little weight in a Germany where, as he himself declared, the Carlsbad Decrees were about to enter upon their actual life.

The truth of this was too soon apparent in the crippling of the universities, the muzzling of the press, not only of journals, but of works of scientific value, and in a relentless persecution of all that could be distantly suspected of being an expression of dissatisfaction with the established order. The Commission of Inquiry erected at Mainz, indeed, owing to the jealousies of the several states, could do no more than

pile up an immense collection of more or less irrelevant evidence to the existence of conspiracies, since even Frederick William would not allow Prussian subjects to be examined by it. But the individual Governments made up in zeal for the defects of the Federal Court, and thousands of men, on the flimsiest evidence, on the most ridiculous charges, and with or without due process of law, were condemned to exile or imprisonment. These martyrs to German liberty were not, indeed, called on to shed their blood; but the seed was none the less being sown which, in 1830 and 1848, was to produce so rich a harvest of troubles.

Even now, amid this reactionary orgy, the idea of a Constitution was not dropped in Prussia. Frederick William had given his word, and was above all a man of conscience. Moreover, he regarded even Radical professors as wilful children of the State, whom a little paternal chastisement would restore to their filial obedience. While, therefore, poor 'Turnvater' Jahn, conscious of innocence, and acquitted by the regular courts, was being haled to a fortress-prison by royal decree, Hardenberg and Humboldt were once more allowed to occupy themselves, vainly, in an effort to build a central representation out of the medley of provincial Estates. On the 17th of January 1820, the king even issued an ordinance, placing the public debt under the guarantee of the Central Diet about to be created. This ordinance was of importance later, though the Diet never came into being. The news of the troubles in Spain and Italy, and a burlesque revolution in Darmstadt, which forced the Grand Duke to proclaim the precious Spanish Constitution of 1812—which the Darmstadters had just read and admired in their local papers—frightened the timid king back into the traditional round of the Prussian system. The reform of the internal administration was continued with conscientious industry; while beyond her borders Prussia continued, by unremitting economic pressure, to absorb the surrounding states, one by one, into her Customs-Union. But, as long as

Frederick William III. lived, no bold developments of policy on her part were to be expected. He believed heart and soul in the necessity for a cordial understanding with Austria, for which he had a traditional reverence. And, with Prussia sympathetic, and the Diet in her leading-strings, Austria could afford to ignore the sullen hostility of the Liberal states; while the German people, saved by Metternich's police system from the distractions of politics, were free, as the historian Gervinus bitterly remarks, to devote themselves to the cultivation of their unique glory—music.

CHAPTER V

THE CONGRESSES OF TROPPAU AND LAIBACH

Unrest and repression in England—France after Aix-la-Chapelle—Revolution in Spain—Question of the Spanish Colonies—Attitude of the Powers—Revolutions in Portugal and Naples—Relations of Portugal and Brazil—Revolution in Naples—The Congress of Troppau—The Troppau Protocol—Protest of England—Congress of Laibach—Austrian intervention in Naples—Revolution in Piedmont—Intervention of Austria—Austrian rule in Italy.

THE promulgation of the Carlsbad Decrees was recognised as an event of the first importance, not only for Germany, but for Europe. It was not only that the principle of reaction had won a signal victory. It was felt that what was the law for Germany to-day might become the law for Europe to-morrow; since Austria, which had thus openly taken the reaction under her patronage, was for the time the predominant Power in the European Concert. The Quadruple Alliance began to wear a new and alarming aspect. Castlereagh, it is true, had, in the name of England, dissociated himself from any such policy; but the world saw in him still only the faithful henchman of Metternich, and the course of events in England proved that the Tory Cabinet was not inclined to lag behind the other reactionary Powers in the work of restoring order. The misery of the times, the artificial dearness of bread, the dislocation of the labour market owing to the introduction of machinery, together with the impossibility, under the unreformed Parliament, of any constitutional expression of popular grievances, had led to much disorder and rioting. Bands of starving

Unrest and
repression in
England.

labourers scoured the country, burning and pillaging. Mobs of starving artisans in the towns attacked and wrecked the factories. Even more alarming than these excesses, with which the authorities seemed powerless to deal effectively, was the organised agitation for Parliamentary reform which, under the leadership of William Cobbett, was growing to gigantic proportions and threatening the very existence of the ruling oligarchy. An attack by the populace on the Prince Regent, who was loathed and despised for the sordid scandals of his private life, seemed even to point to danger to the crown itself. Mass meetings in the great manufacturing towns, as yet unrepresented in Parliament, were summoned to elect members on their own account, and threatened to send them to London under escort of an armed force. At Manchester, a serious collision actually occurred between the crowd and a force of regular cavalry, and the 'massacre' that ensued still further inflamed the passions of the people against the Government. Ministers seized the opportunity to summon a special session of Parliament, and, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Brougham, Lord John Russell, and other Whigs, hurried through without much difficulty six acts suspending the most cherished liberties of Englishmen—those of the right of public meeting, of freedom of speech, and of *habeas corpus*. The wisdom of the Government's action seemed to be justified by the opportune discovery of the Cato Street conspiracy, a plot concocted by a few obscure men for the murder of the ministers and the establishment of a provisional Government. England seemed fairly launched on a policy of frank reaction.

In France, affairs were tending by a different process to a like result. Already, during the session of the Congress of Aix, the Powers had been alarmed by the news of Liberal successes in the elections for the Chamber, and it was the return of such names as Lafayette, Manuel, and Constant which had hastened the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance. Richelieu, on the

France after
Aix-la-Cha-
pelle.

return from Aix, should certainly have been the most popular man in France. The dignity and moderation of his attitude at the Congress had done as much as anything to secure the reduction of the war indemnity and the liberation of French soil from foreign troops. This alone was materially and morally an immense gain. But he had done more. He had succeeded in persuading the Tsar that, in spite of the growing prosperity of the country, it was impossible for France to bear the burden imposed upon her by the immense sums, in respect of indemnity and private claims, which she would still have to pay before the country was evacuated. It was owing to this that Alexander used his influence, especially over Prussia, to secure a reduction in the demands of the several Powers. But for these good offices Alexander had demanded his price. Richelieu returned to France pledged to the introduction of an electoral law which should stem the tide of Liberalism in the Chamber; and when he found that neither his colleague Decazes nor the king would support him, he tendered his resignation, which was accepted (December 20, Richelieu resigns. 1818). Louis XVIII. thought it necessary to write to the Tsar to explain why he had been compelled, regretfully, to part with Richelieu. Alexander merely replied coldly that he shared the king's regrets. He himself had made one or two further advances in a reactionary direction by refusing to summon the Polish Diet and by reviving the censorship of the press; he was, therefore, the less likely to approve the steps in a Liberal direction taken by the new French ministry under Dessolle and Decazes, which relaxed the strictness of the press laws, pardoned some political exiles, and, above all, reformed the Upper House, in the interests of moderate Liberalism, by the creation of seventy-three new peers. All too soon his worst fears seemed to be realised. The Liberalism of the ministry had driven a section of their former supporters into alliance with the Ultras, and the Government was on the eve of an attempt to force through the House an

electoral law which should ensure it a secure majority for the future, when an event as startling as unexpected put out all their calculations. This was the election of the Election of Abbé Grégoire for the department of the Isère. Grégoire.

Of all the conspicuous names of the revolutionary epoch, none had a more sinister sound in the ears of the men of the Restoration than that of the former constitutional bishop of Tours, the regicide who had declared publicly that kings were in the moral what monsters are in the physical order, and who was now returned to the Chamber by 548 votes out of 1000. Beside this ominous fact, the loss by the Government of thirty-three out of the remaining fifty-three seats to be filled up sank into insignificance. The effect was immense and immediate. The Powers of the Quadruple Alliance had been for some time watching with growing uneasiness the progress of Liberal agitation in France, the onslaughts by a brilliant circle of writers on the Government, the Effect on spread of political societies, the unrest among the Powers.

the students. Was the time come for the four Powers to put in force the secret treaty of Aix, and once more to coerce France into good behaviour? To prevent a worse thing, Louis XVIII. saw the necessity for himself taking measures against the rising tide of Liberalism, and to this end for securing a new electoral law which should make the experiences of the last elections impossible for the future. Des-solle, refusing to be responsible for this policy, retired from the Cabinet, together with Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, the reorganiser of the army, and the Finance Minister, Baron Louis. The head of the new ministry was Decazes, whose name was a guarantee that the new Government would not overstep the bounds of all possible Decazes becomes head of the Government. moderation. But the vote, carried by the ministry, to exclude Grégoire from the Chamber, and the proposed changes in the franchise, embittered the Radicals, without going far enough to reconcile the Ultras.

These latter had received the news of the Carlsbad Decrees

with extravagant joy, as the earnest of their own victory. In January 1820 came the news of the outbreak of a revolution in Spain, and the attacks of the Ultra Opposition on the Government of Decazes redoubled in virulence. It was the fatal and foolish policy of the royal favourite, they exclaimed, which had everywhere unchained the spirit of Bonapartism and revolution. He was denounced as a new Sejanus, as the modern Catiline. Chateaubriand exhausted all the armoury of his inimitable style in heaping reproaches on the minister and clamouring for his overthrow. It was doubtful whether the almost doting affection of the king would be much longer able to protect his 'son.' A tragic crime precipitated the crisis.

The Duc d'Angoulême, eldest son of the Comte d'Artois, the heir apparent to the throne, being childless, the sole hope of preserving the elder line of the House of France from extinction, and of excluding the hated branch of Orleans, lay in the young Duc de Berri, who had but recently married. On February 13, 1820, as he was leaving the opera, he was assassinated by a fanatical Murder of the Duc de Berri, Feb. 13, 1820. saddler named Louvel. As usual, a crime intended to benefit one of two causes fell out to the advantage of the other. The first feeling of the royalists, when they learned the news, was one of utter horror and consternation; the next, an unreasoning fury against the minister whom they affected to believe responsible for the crime. Decazes, foreseeing the storm, had at once offered his resignation to the king, by whom it had been vehemently declined. 'They will attack,' he exclaimed, 'not your system, my dear son, but mine.' It was hoped that a couple of repressive laws, muzzling the press and guarding against any repetition of Louvel's crime, thrown as a sop to the Ultras, might disarm their fury, and render possible the continuance of the general policy of the Government. But passion had been too violently roused to be content with anything less than the complete downfall of the hated ministry. The king was forced to

yield to the storm, and Decazes, raised to the rank of duke, passed into honourable exile as ambassador in London. His political career in France, meteoric in its brilliance and its brevity, had come to an end. As for the Fall of Ultras, they were almost glad for the blood on Decazes. his path, in which, to quote the epigram of one of their number, 'he had slipped.' For though the return of Richelieu to power seemed to promise a continuance of moderate counsels, the fall of Decazes was the beginning of the reactionary *régime* which lasted until it produced its inevitable result in the revolution of 1830 and the exclusion of the elder line of the House of Bourbon for ever from the throne of France. For though Richelieu was nominal head of the ministry, the effective direction of its policy was in the hands of Villèle, the cleverest and most practical of the Legitimist party. The king, too, was growing old and infirm, was removed from the moderating influence of Decazes, and, falling more and more under that of a female favourite, Progress of Madame du Caja, gradually allowed himself to the reaction. drift with the turning tide. The freedom of the press had once more been restricted by Ordinance, and an electoral law, which still further narrowed the franchise, secured for the Government a large majority in the Chamber. But, on the whole, the attitude of Richelieu toward the Liberals was too moderate for the Ultras, conscious of their new strength. As usual, political discontent, deprived of the power of expressing itself openly, had been driven to work underground; and the unearthing of one or two secret societies, and an abortive riot of French Carbonari in the streets of Paris, provided the malcontent majority with handy arguments. Two events, moreover, had increased their self-confidence. Seven months after the death of the Duc de Berri, the duchess bore him a posthumous son, the Duc de Bordeaux, afterwards known as the Comte de Chambord; and, on May 5, 1821, France had no longer to fear the return of Napoleon from his living death. Richelieu, deprived of the confidence

of the Chamber and never tenacious of office, now retired, and Villèle became head of the French Government. France could, at last, take her place in the councils of the European Alliance beside the other Conservative Powers, and join with them in dealing with the revolutionary troubles of the South.

Richelieu
gives place
to Villèle.

It was in Spain, where the reaction had raged with the blindest fury, that the revolution first began again to raise its head. The Government, which had catered for the spiritual wants of the people by re-establishing the Inquisition and loading the clergy with power and wealth, had done nothing for their material welfare. The weary struggle with the colonies continued, and, in spite of the utter exhaustion of the country, and of the warning example of George III., the king and his ministers still believed in the possibility of their re-conquest. At one time the intervention of the European Alliance had been hoped, to prevent the peril of 'the establishment of a new world of republics beyond the Atlantic.' But, with the collapse of the power of Spain, her monopoly of the trade with her colonies had ceased, and a lucrative commerce had grown up between Great Britain and the South American states. Under these circumstances, the English Tory Cabinet found itself in an awkward situation. Ministers were anxious to preserve the solidarity of Europe, and to uphold the principle of legitimacy; but they could not afford to agree to a course which would imperil British trade-interests. As long, then, as the Spanish Government was not prepared to guarantee the continuance of the liberty won for English traders through her weakness, England was unlikely to do anything to restore the colonies to their allegiance.

Contest of
Spain with
her colonies.

Attitude of
England.

Until 1819, no serious effort had been made by the Government for the recovery of the colonies; but in that year it was decided to send out an expedition. If England was hostile, Russia was wholly sympathetic; and the Tsar consented to make over a certain number of warships to the Spanish

Government, on the pretext that they were needed for defence against the Barbary pirates. Meanwhile, an army of 19,000 ragged and half-starved soldiers had been collected at Cadiz, ready to embark. Here a plot was hatched for a military rising, to take place on July 9, under Marshal O'Donnell, Count of Abispal. It had not been hard for the conspirators to gain over the soldiers, already discontented with their treatment, and told now, with much truth, that to go to America was tantamount to a sentence of death. On July 7, however, Abispal betrayed the plot, and arrested a dozen of its leaders. The conspiracy had failed; but the expedition was postponed.

Military
revolt at
Cadiz,
July, 1819.

The expedition was again fixed to start in January 1820; and once more it was determined to use the fears of the soldiers as a weapon against the Government. This time it was decided to trust no officer of the highest rank; and the chiefs of the conspiracy were two colonels, Riego and Quiroga. On January 1, Riego, at the head of a battalion, raised the standard of revolt, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, and arrested the general-in-chief and his staff. Thereupon, followed by three battalions of the guard, he marched on the Isla di Leon, where, on January 7, he was joined by Quiroga with three other battalions. A series of small successes followed; but the resistance of Cadiz gave time for General Freyre to advance from Madrid with a force strong enough to surround and scatter the rebels. Riego, with 1500 men, succeeded in breaking through the hostile lines, and, marching into Andalusia, proclaimed the Constitution, meeting with a favourable reception in all the towns. But the royal army was hard on his heels. Defeated at Malaga on February 9, he once more escaped, marched over the Sierra Morreno into Estramadura, and, finally, halting at Badajos on March 11, disbanded the 300 men who still clung to his fortunes. But Riego's revolt, though stamped out, had fired the train for a general explosion. Galicia rose in revolt on February 20,

Revolution
in Spain,
1820.

and three days later its example was followed by Ferrol and Murcia. General Mina, who had long been awaiting his opportunity, seized the occasion to cross the borders into Spain, and raise Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, everywhere proclaiming the Constitution of 1812 and the abolition of the Inquisition. Ferdinand, meanwhile, had concentrated the royal army round Madrid under the command of Abispañal (O'Donnell). But the astute soldier of fortune saw that the tide had turned; and, on March 4, he threw in his lot with the insurgents. At the same time General Freyre proclaimed the Constitution at Seville.

Nothing was left to Ferdinand but to yield as graciously as might be, a resolution which was hastened by riots in Madrid. On March 9, he swore to the Constitution, and on the next day issued an ordinance suppressing the Inquisition. At the same time, a Junta in Madrid issued orders for the carrying out of the decrees of the Cortes of 1812, and summoned new Cortes to meet on July 9.

In the face of these events, the ambassadors of the Powers at Madrid preserved an ominous reticence. The American minister alone offered his 'congratulations.' However little they may have sympathised with the excesses of the late Government, there was soon, indeed, plenty of reason to justify their doubts as to whether a change so effected would be for the better. The Junta had already, early in its career, proved its genuine doctrinaire temper by arranging a new political division of the kingdom, regardless of the deep-seated local patriotism of the very provinces which had most helped the revolution to success. The Cortes, when they met, proved themselves no wiser. The most important problem they had to solve was that of bringing order into the chaos of the finances. To secure a solid material basis for their reforms, they determined to introduce a rigorous system of custom-houses, to sell the estates of the Church,

Ferdinand
accepts the
Constitu-
tion.

Civil strife
in Spain,
1820-1822.

and to abolish ecclesiastical and feudal dues, converting the moiety of them into a civil tax. In the abstract there was little to be said, from the Liberal point of view, against these measures. But the first was hardly wise in a country where most people had been accustomed to add to their income by smuggling. The second was madness where no Government could stand against the united opposition of the all-powerful clergy. And as for the third, it merely diverted the unpopularity which had fallen to the share of the feudal lords on to the new Government. The result of this blind policy was soon apparent. A reactionary Junta was formed, 'bands of the Faith' collected under the leadership of militant priests, and a guerilla war began against the new Government and its partisans. For two years, between 1820 and 1822, unhappy Spain was the arena for a relentless war of factions representing every shade and degree of violence, one way or the other: moderados, exaltados, absolutists, serviles, agreeing in nothing but their willingness to sacrifice the welfare of Spain to the fury of party passion. If ever the sickness of a country were to justify the intervention of the Powers, it was now.

Unfortunately, the self-constituted physicians of Europe agreed neither in their diagnosis of the disease nor in their suggestions for its cure. Alexander, indeed, made up his mind at once, suggested the joint intervention of Europe, and, for his own part, offered, in the true spirit of the Gospel, to march 15,000 Russians through Piedmont and the south of France to the succour of oppressed monarchy. Metternich, who had been for some time watching anxiously the activity of Russian agents among the Italian secret societies, was seized with a violent alarm. The remedy suggested by the Tsar seemed to him infinitely worse than the disease. He began, indeed, under the circumstances, to doubt whether there were really any disease at all. In his reply to the Tsar's offer, he argued that there was really no cause for intervention, which would

Attitude of
the Powers
toward the
Spanish
Revolution.

be not only useless, but dangerous, since 'Spain was suffering from a material sickness, while Europe was afflicted morally.'¹ Whatever this may have meant, it was clear that Austria would not welcome the passage of Russian troops through her dominions, and the project dropped. As for France, which seemed the most immediately interested in the troubles just beyond her own border, Louis XVIII. could not but disapprove of a Constitution forced on the Crown by the sword; but the internal crisis due to the death of the Duc de Berri, and, above all, the jealous opposition of England, ever on the watch against any extension of French influence in Spain, prevented her taking any action. As for England, Castlereagh had already, in the case of the Carlsbad Decrees, entered his protest against the principle of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states; he was the less likely, then, to favour such intervention in the interests of a worthless Government which had shown itself stubbornly hostile to Great Britain in the matter of the colonial trade. For the present, then, Spain was suffered to work out her own fortunes without interference.

But, meanwhile, sparks from the Spanish conflagration had fallen into the magazines of disaffection in the neighbouring countries. In Portugal, especially, the conditions were very favourable for a rising. The king, John IV., had left the country at the time of the French invasion in 1807, and had transferred the seat of government to Brazil. In 1815, instead of returning, he had proclaimed the union of the Portuguese dominions under the title of the 'United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves,' and had at the same time appointed as regent in Lisbon Marshal Beresford, the former commander of the British troops in Portugal. This arrangement could hardly be expected to please the Portuguese, who, from being an imperial power, found themselves reduced to the position of a dependency of their former colony, their original relations with Brazil being

¹ Metternich to Lebzelttern, June 5, 1820, in Martens, iv. (1.) 274.

exactly reversed. Moreover, the monopoly which the Portuguese had enjoyed of the Brazilian trade had been relaxed in favour of the British, in return for their services in Portugal during the late war; and this, while benefiting the Brazilians and the English, had meant ruin for many Portuguese traders. The absence of Beresford, who had started in April 1820 for Brazil, gave the opportunity for the gathering discontent to find vent. In August, the garrison of Oporto rose under Colonel Sepulveda, and the Revolution in Portugal. insurrection speedily extended over the whole country. The regency, recognising that the army was entirely disaffected, promised to summon the Cortes in November, and wrote to the king, begging him to return to Europe. In spite of this, on September 15, the garrison of Lisbon rose, deposed the regency, and established a provisional Government, with a view to securing a democratic Constitution on the Spanish model. In the midst of the turmoil, Beresford returned from Rio, armed with additional powers; but the Junta refused to allow him to land, and he was forced to proceed to England. Under these circumstances, the king thought it expedient to yield; and made up his mind, unwillingly, to return to Portugal. His son Pedro was left as regent in Brazil, and instructed, in the event of its being impossible to maintain the union of the two countries, to place the crown of Brazil on his own head, rather than allow it to fall into the hands of an adventurer. This contingency happened in 1822, when, on October 12, the Junta at Rio proclaimed the independence of Brazil, and Pedro assumed the title of Constitutional Emperor. The king accepts the Constitution of 1812. Meanwhile, on January 8, the Cortes had met at Lisbon, and, on June 27, 1821, passed a Constitution modelled on that of Spain. Six days later the king arrived from Brazil, and, in spite of the strenuous opposition of the Queen Carlota and of his brother, Dom Miguel, swore, before setting foot on shore to observe a Consti-

tution which practically deprived him of all power, and even of all influence.

The promulgation of the Constitution had been celebrated at Lisbon by a general illumination, and an insult offered on this occasion by the mob to the Austrian embassy had given Metternich an excuse for breaking off diplomatic relations with a revolutionary government. His example was followed by Prussia and Russia. The episode formed a convenient excuse for a harmless assertion of principle. But for this, however, it is doubtful whether the 'sickness' of Portugal would have seemed to him more serious than that of Spain, since Austria was, in this case, even safer from contagion. It was far otherwise, however, when the infection was found to have spread close to her own borders and within her special

Revolution in Naples, July 1820. sphere of influence. In Naples, the reaction had been less extreme than in Spain, in Rome, or even Piedmont. After the fall of Murat, the Bourbon dynasty had been restored under the special protection of Austria; and though King Ferdinand had given an undertaking to advance no further in a constitutional direction than Austria should at any time approve, Metternich was true to his policy of preserving the *status quo*, and joined with England in preventing any reprisals or counter-revolutionary violence. On the whole, the laws and administrative system of Murat had been preserved with but slight change. There was, however, nothing in these to make injustice and arbitrary conduct on the part of the Court impossible. Ferdinand had returned from his exile surrounded by the usual crowd of followers clamouring for their reward; and, especially in the army, widespread discontent was aroused by the preference given to the royalist officers who had been with the king in Sicily over those who had served under Murat. At the same time, the authority of the clergy was fostered in every way short of restoring the whole of their alienated estates; and a vigorous persecution was begun against any expression of Liberal opinion. Military discontent and

Liberal aspiration soon found a meeting-ground in the organisation of the Carbonari, which, in the classic land of brigandage and secret societies, had gained an extraordinary following. Under these circumstances, the news of the Spanish revolution produced an immediate effect. On July 2nd a body of troops, under Lieutenant Morelli, marched from Nola on Naples. On the 5th they were joined by General Pepe, at the head of a regiment of dragoons ; and the movement won such an immense following that the ministers had to give up all hope of resistance. Pepe had at once proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812 ; and the king, after a vain attempt to avoid the necessity by feigning illness, was forced to take the oath to it. Moved by some extraordinary impulse, whether of craft or theatrical instinct, he even went beyond the necessity of his position, and called down the instant vengeance of God upon his head if he lied. Perhaps he protested all the more warmly because he realised, that in taking the oath, he was breaking his engagement with Austria. In any case, he wrote off at once to Metternich to ask for advice and help.

The news of the Neapolitan outbreak at once disposed of Metternich's new-born principle of non-intervention. At the same time, he was reluctant to throw a matter which so closely concerned Austria into the crucible of a European Congress, and proposed instead a meeting of the Tsar and the Emperor Francis to arrange the question of intervention without the other Powers. The internal troubles of Prussia, and the gradual withdrawal of England from the affairs of the Continent, seemed to justify the policy of this course. But Alexander still clung to his belief, that in the principles of the Holy Alliance lay the sole hope for the world, though, 'thanks to the intrigues of Austria, the indifference of England, and the feebleness of Prussia,' Russia alone remained the guardian of its doctrines.¹ France, too, jealous of Austrian ascendancy in Italy, demanded a Congress. Under these circumstances

¹ Martens, iv. 272-276

Austria had to yield, and a Congress was summoned to meet at Troppau on October 20th.

In anticipation of its meeting, Metternich drew up a memorandum to prove that the interests of Austria in the affair of Naples were identical with those of Europe at large. All the Powers, he argued, were agreed in basing their general policy on the maintenance of treaties; therefore all were equally threatened by revolutionary movements, and equally interested in concerting measures for their suppression. Therefore the business of the Congress of Troppau would be to define by a general proposition the principle on which the Allies would intervene in Naples, and to proceed at once to the application of this principle. He then proceeded to lay down his own idea as to what the principle of intervention should be. Revolution, he said, might be either legitimate, when initiated from above, or illegitimate, when exacted from below. In the former case, the intervention of foreign Powers could not be allowed. In the latter, the signatory Powers should contract never to recognise changes so effected, and undertake to abolish such as have taken place in their own states.¹

It remained for him to persuade the other Powers to accept this programme. Frederick William of Prussia, now as ever, followed faithfully the Austrian lead. In the case of the Tsar, too, Metternich had little difficulty in completing the process of conversion begun at Aix. Alexander, indeed, had arrived at Troppau, as he himself confessed, a 'changed man.'

The ingratitude of the Polish Diet in venturing to have a will of its own had wounded him in his tenderest spot, and strengthened the misgivings with which he looked back on the part he himself had played in encouraging the general unrest in Europe. 'You have nothing to regret,' he said to Metternich, 'but I have.' In confidential conversations, over afternoon tea,

¹ *Mem. of Metternich*, Mart. iv. pt. i. 276.

Metternich unfolded to the Russian autocrat his political creed, and his plans for restoring order in the world. The news of the mutiny of the Semonowsky regiment of the Guard, which arrived on November 15th, came to his assistance. The Tsar saw in it a device of the Radicals to force him to return to St. Petersburg. Metternich did not believe this; 'but,' he added, 'this shows how the Tsar has altered.' It was hardly necessary any longer for him to argue that opposition to revolution did not mean opposition to reform, and that stability was not the same as immobility. Alexander's surrender was unconditional.

The attitude of France and England was, from the Austrian point of view, less satisfactory. Metternich had hoped that, if the three 'free' Powers could come to an agreement, the two 'limited' Powers would follow their example. But already that rift in the Alliance was showing which, later on, was to grow into the avowed breach between the Liberal Powers of the West and the Conservative Powers of the East. Alexander had in vain entreated the British Government not to betray the 'Conservative Alliance.' He feared that, if England refused to take part in the Congress, it would look as though the other Powers were in favour of arbitrary and unlimited government; he offered guarantees for the sincerity of his own constitutional sentiments, and declared that the Congress would decide nothing that could be disapproved by the 'enlightened suffrage of Parliament.'

Attitude of
Castlereagh.

Castlereagh was inexorable. The treaties, he said, were being strained beyond their meaning; there was nothing in them, or in the present circumstances, to justify another meeting on the lines of that at Aix; the troubles in Naples, like those in Spain, were of purely domestic concern; and though England might be compelled to take measures against the 'revolutionary pest,' she would never share in international measures decreed by an international council. If Austria chose to consider the unrest in Naples

a menace to her own security, England could not object to her taking action on her own responsibility. As for the Congress, Lord Stewart, the British plenipotentiary, would attend, but without taking any active share in its deliberations. The views of the English Government were shared by France; and when, on November 19th, the 'Troppau Protocol' was issued, it was signed only by Austria, Russia, and Prussia.

This contraction in the European Concert was accompanied by a corresponding limitation of its aims. The Holy Alliance, which was to have been the High Court whither all Europe might turn for justice, had become a mere league for the protection of princes against revolution; bigger, but no more venerable, than the Mainz Commission or the Frankfort Diet.

The
'Troppau
Protocol,'
Nov. 19,
1820.

The Protocol of Troppau was no more than the extension to all Europe of the Carlsbad Decrees. 'States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution,' so it ran, 'the results of which threaten other states, *ipso facto*, cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other states, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance.'¹

The moral effect of this remarkable pronouncement was somewhat discounted by the conspicuous disapproval of two of the five Great Powers; and this defect Metternich still hoped to rectify. France, while making certain reservations, was willing, for the sake of harmony, to give a general consent to the principles of the Protocol. But Castlereagh, on learning its terms, protested with renewed vigour, and especially against any chance of its principles being, under any conceivable circumstances, applied to England. In vain Metternich attempted to explain that the Powers had in their mind only such internal affairs as would have an external

¹ Text in Martens, iv. (i.) p. 282.

effect, and that the principles of the Protocol were strictly confined to violent overturns, to those revolutions which from time to time oppress legitimate authority. This argument, addressed to a Government which drew its authority from the revolutionary settlement of 1688, failed of its effect; yet, though the English Government remained obdurate, it was content with protests. There was no actual breach of the Great Alliance, and affairs in Italy were allowed to take their course.

The Congress held its last sitting at Troppau on October 24, 1820; but it was decided to continue its deliberations early in the following year at Laibach. At the same time, King Ferdinand of Naples was invited to attend, to concert measures for carrying out the will of the Powers. Meanwhile, every effort was made to persuade the Neapolitans to yield. The mediation of the Pope was invited, and the Tsar, in an autograph letter, besought his Holiness to use his influence to restore to their legitimate obedience the wilful children of the Church. The Neapolitans were obstinate, with the obstinacy not of conviction but of ignorance. The publication of the Protocol had been greeted with an outburst of popular anger. A second outburst followed the news that the king was about to depart for Laibach. Under the terms of the Constitution, it had been necessary for him to secure the consent of the Parliament to his leaving the country; and the Liberal ministry, realising the impossibility of resisting the will of the Allied Powers, had persuaded the Chamber to authorise his departure, on condition of his subscribing to a certain minimum of constitutional principles, which were to form the basis of negotiations at the Congress. But the Neapolitan populace would hear of no compromise. The news of the action of the Chamber was followed by a riot, and the king was forced, before setting out, to swear once more to maintain the Constitution of 1812. Nothing could have been more opportune for the enemies of constitutional

Ferdinand
of Naples
and the
Congress.

liberty. Oaths were not wont to lie heavily on the consciences of the Neapolitan Bourbons; and Ferdinand was, in fact, hardly out of reach of his subjects, when he addressed letters to the sovereigns of all the greater states repudiating, without a shadow of explanation or excuse, all his promises, and declaring his acts to have been, from first to last, null and void. A cynicism so unblushing produced a painful sensation, even in the not very sensitive circles of the higher diplomacy. Metternich had already deplored to Capo d'Istria the necessity for using so pitiful an instrument. Gentz congratulated the Congress that these sorry protests would remain hidden from the world's knowledge in its archives. Capo d'Istria even proposed to cover the disgrace to kingship in general by a pious fraud, offering himself to concoct a correspondence in which the king should be made to protest, nobly but in vain, against the decision of the Powers to overthrow the Constitution of his country. Yet all recognised that the madness of the Neapolitan mob had come to the assistance of Austria's policy. For, had Ferdinand come to Laibach pledged to a moderate Constitutionalism, it is probable that France and England, and possibly even Russia, would have opposed the violation of his promises; and a fatal blow might have been dealt to the Austrian 'system' in Italy. As it was, the revolutionists had delivered their ultimatum, and no room was left for negotiation. It was decided, therefore, that Austria was to be entrusted with the task of restoring Ferdinand to his throne as an absolute monarch, and that, whether or not the Neapolitans resisted, the country should be occupied for a time by Austrian troops. To save appearances, Ferdinand wrote to the Duke of Calabria to say that, in face of the opposition of the Powers, it was impossible for him to maintain the Constitution; that he would none the less take measures for all necessary reforms such as would guarantee good government; that the refusal of the Neapolitans to submit would entail war, but that, in any case, he had authorised the occupation of the country for a time by

the Austrian troops as a guarantee of order. The letter reached Naples on February 9, 1821. On the 6th the Austrians had already crossed the Po.

The Austrian campaign in Italy was a singular military burlesque. Eight months had been spent in preparation; yet when the army reached Rome, it was so ill-equipped that the general in command had to borrow money from Niebuhr to purchase the necessary supplies for his troops. An even moderately resolute defence might have held the invaders at bay, and by giving time for the jealousies of the Powers to develop, perhaps have turned the balance against Austria; a Neapolitan victory might have raised the greater part of Italy against the foreigner. But the Neapolitan army was in even a worse condition than the Austrian, without organisation, order, or discipline. Pepe neglected even to defend the difficult defiles of the Abruzzi, the gate of Naples, and was routed, after a half-hearted engagement at Rieti, by General Frimont. The Austrians now occupied the capital without further difficulty. The short-lived liberties of Naples ended in a foreign occupation and a reign of terror.

Fortune certainly favoured Metternich's statecraft. The resolution arrived at by the three Powers at Laibach to enforce the principle proclaimed in the Troppau Protocol had been hastened by the rumours of widespread unrest in Italy. Not only in Naples, but in some of the lesser states, and, above all, in Piedmont, the revolution was hatching; and had the various disunited movements had time to coalesce, it might have gone hard with the Austrian 'system' in Italy and in Europe. As it was, it was not till three days after Pepe's overthrow at Rieti that the Piedmontese revolt broke out (March 10). This was inspired by the usual medley of motives. The condition of the Government, which, in the attempt to set up again a perished social order, had fallen into hopeless confusion and corruption, would

Austrian
Occupation
of Naples.

Military
revolt in
Piedmont.

alone have explained a widespread discontent. All attempts at reform from within had broken against the stubborn opposition of the classes whose oppressive privileges had been restored to them; and with the failure of these attempts, the desire for change had become more acute. Among the younger nobles Constitutionalism began to come into fashion; while, in the army, officered largely by men who had fought under Napoleon, the old hatred of Austria was combined with a new vision of Italy united in a single kingdom under the House of Savoy. The organisation of the Carbonari was used to draw the forces of discontent together; and these, while wishing to make constitutional reform at home the preliminary step to the war against the 'Germans,' were so far from being republican, that they confidently looked to the royal house to supply them with a leader. Such a leader seemed ready-made to their hand in the Prince of Carignano, afterwards King Charles Albert.

Charles
Albert
and the
Revolution.

The prince, who was only twenty-three, was just of the age when sober judgment is apt to be outmatched by generous enthusiasms. As a boy, he had served in Napoleon's army; and he had made no disguise of his general sympathy with Liberal aspirations. When, therefore, on March 7, a deputation of the conspirators waited upon him to invite him to place himself at the head of a movement which was directed, not against the royal house, but against the foreigners by whom that house was insulted and coerced; when they eloquently unfolded to him the picture of Italy, united and free, under his own leadership, he was dazzled, and gave his consent. But with the night came reflection, and next day the consent was withdrawn. This ruined whatever chance of success the rising ever had. The preparations which, on the prince's acceptance being received, had been hurried forward, were again countermanded; but not in time to prevent a partial outbreak. It had been hoped to carry the whole army with the movement; but when, on March 10,

the garrison of Alessandria proclaimed the Spanish Constitution and Victor Emmanuel king of Italy, the example was not immediately followed by the other troops. On March 12, indeed, the garrison of Turin began to waver, while the students clamoured for the Constitution; and this was enough to determine the king, whose opposition to reform was but half-hearted, but who was bound by obligations to the Allies at Laibach, to abdicate the crown. Charles Albert, who had proved his loyalty by warning the Government of what was impending, was appointed regent until the arrival of the new king, Charles Felix, the Duke of Genoa. The ministry had resigned at the same time as the king, and the regent, who, in spite of his defection, still clung to his Liberal ideas, and who felt himself bound in a certain measure to the party which had trusted him, thought it necessary, in order to 'preserve the state for the new king,' to accept the Spanish Constitution, subject however to the approval of Charles Felix. As to the attitude of the latter, he was not long left in doubt. The new king, in an uncompromising manifesto, refused to surrender a shred of the royal prerogative, and at the same time ordered the prince to betake himself to Novara, where about half the Piedmontese army, which had remained loyal, had meanwhile gathered. Charles Albert obeyed; and any chance of carrying through the revolution by constitutional means was destroyed.¹

The appeal to arms was to lead to no better result. The failure to win the united support of the troops had depressed the Liberals; and though they refused to yield without a struggle, Santa Rosa was the only one of their leaders to propose a vigorous initiative and the forestalling of the action of the Powers by the invasion of Lombardy and the unfurling of the flag of Italian nationality. He was not listened to; and, indeed, the times were not ripe

Intervention
of the
Powers.

¹ For the question of Charles Albert's conduct, see Bolton King, *Italian Unity*, vol. ii. Appendix A.

for an enterprise which was not to succeed until the whole Italian people had become conscious of their common interests. Meanwhile the Powers at Laibach had rapidly made up their minds in face of this new peril. Eighty thousand Austrians under General Bubna were concentrated in support of the Piedmontese at Novara; while in the background, 100,000 Russians were held in reserve in case of need. On April 8, the unequal forces met outside Novara; and the battle ended in the rout of the Liberal army. The Austrians occupied and held Alessandria in the interests of European peace; and with the surrender of Genoa, which followed immediately after, the revolution was at an end.

Italy now lay helpless in the grip of Austria, and it was the grip of a mailed fist. Metternich had soon made the discovery that the Italians with whom he had to deal were not The Austrian the same light-hearted folk who, under the rule in Italy. Emperor Leopold, had been careful only of their vineyards and their mulberry groves. In them, too, the revolution had roused the slumbering passion of nationality, the sense of their separate tradition, and of their separate interests. From the first, then, the restoration of the Austrian rule opened up a problem not easy of solution. In the rest of the Hapsburg Empire, heterogeneous though it was, the German language and culture formed a tie, however slight, between the different nationalities. In Italy alone this was utterly absent. In an evil moment, the Austrian Government conceived it necessary to supply this want and to force the Italians into the general system of the Empire. What would have happened if the Archduke Anthony had been left a free hand to govern the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom after his own kindly fashion, it is impossible to say; but from the moment that he was superseded by the cynical Rainer, and Italy began to be ruled from Vienna, the struggle began; and from the moment that Count Lasanzky publicly declared that Austria 'must Germanise Italy,' this became, not only

the struggle of a people for reasonable freedom, but of a race with a great tradition for its very existence. Austria had left, in the provincial 'Congregations,' the shadow of self-government; but, on the one occasion when, in 1825, the Congregation of Milan ventured to petition the Vienna Government for the relief of some of the more notorious abuses of the administration, the petition, after being heavily censored, was left without an answer. There was, in fact, for self-respecting Italians no resource left but in revolutionary agitation, and no possibility for this save by means of secret societies. These in their turn necessitated, from the Austrian point of view, the secret police; and the whole social structure of the Austrian provinces in Italy was soon rotten with suspicion and honeycombed with plots and counter-plots. Spies were everywhere; not even the high officials, the very instruments of the system, were trusted. The chief of police was soon of infinitely more importance in the Government than the viceroy himself; yet even he was not trusted. To make assurance doubly sure, a police was created whose special function was to watch the police. Strassoldo, the author of the system, and Torresani, the head of the police, were watched by the high censor Brambilla; Brambilla, in his turn, was watched by one Malavisi. When, in 1848, many secrets were revealed, the seals, in duplicate, of nearly all the higher officials were found at the office of Bocking, the director of the Post Office.¹

That a system founded on this principle should be cruel was inevitable. It was severe, even before the revolutions in Naples and Piedmont. From that time the severity was redoubled. In the dungeons of the Spielberg, the Moravian castle-prison where the Emperor Francis caged those who dared to doubt the paternal character of his rule, the Lombard patriots, who had hoped from Piedmont the ending of

¹ For an account of the Austrian police system in Italy, see Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, i. 289; Gervinus, i. 463.

their woes, lay rotting in a living death ; while in Italy the common people, after their wont, began to sum up the situation in a little song :—

‘Italy’s three plagues that grieve her
Are friars and Germans and fever.’

CHAPTER VI

THE CONGRESS OF VERONA

Effect of the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach—The Eastern Question—The Turks in Europe—Attitude of the Powers toward Turkey—Russia and the East—Position of the Christian subjects of the Porte—Religious and political influence of the Orthodox Church—Causes of Ottoman misrule—Origins of the Greek revolt—Revival of 'Hellenism'—Growth of Greek commerce and sea-power—The Hetairia Philike—Greek nationalist movements—Supineness of the Turkish Government—Revolt of Ali Pasha of Janina—Insurrection under Hyspilianti in the Danubian Principalities—Attitude of the Tsar—End of the rising—Revolutionary troubles in Spain—Attitude of France—Greek revolt in the Morea—Execution of the Orthodox Patriarch—Russia intervenes—Attitude of Metternich—Intervention of the Powers—Alexander subordinates the interests of Russia in Turkey to those of the European Concert—Death of Castlereagh—Canning at the Foreign Office—The Congress of Verona—England breaks away from the Concert—France 'restores order' in Spain as the mandatary of Europe—Protest of England—Canning recognises the independence of the Spanish colonies—President Monroe's message—Affairs of Portugal—Intervention of England.

THE overthrow of Liberalism in Naples and Piedmont had put Metternich in high good-humour. The collapse of movements which, at one moment, had seemed to threaten to 'smother them in their beds,' had left the legitimate Governments stronger than ever. Above all, the sinister alliance of Russia with the Revolution, which since 1815 had loomed like a nightmare in the imaginations of Austrian statesmen, had been proclaimed to all the world, by the tangible demonstration of facts, to be the baseless fabric of a dream. At the call of Austria, a hundred thousand Russians had marched to quell the forces of disorder; at the word of Austria they had halted, when it was clear that she

would be able, unaided, to control the unrest in Italy. This had done more than all the speeches and all the promises of the Tsar to convince the 'factious' that behind the firm policy of the Court of Vienna was the irresistible might of the Russian Empire. Never, since the fall of Napoleon, had the political sky seemed to Metternich more serene. 'It looks,' he said, 'as though the dawn of a better day were beginning to break.' Yet, even in this mood of self-congratulation, he noted with some misgiving the gathering of a cloud in the East, small as yet, but ominous of future storms. For, on March 19, 1821, a courier had brought to the Emperor Alexander at Laibach the news that a revolt had broken out in the Danubian Principalities, directed against the Ottoman Power, and with the avowed object of restoring the Greek Empire of the East. It was the opening of that problem of the ultimate destiny of the Turkish Empire, and of the relations towards it of the European Powers, which from this time forward was known as the 'Eastern Question.'

'This damned Eastern Question,' said a Russian diplomatist, some years later, 'is like the gout. Sometimes it takes you in the leg, sometimes it nips your hand. The Eastern Question. One is lucky if it does not fly to the stomach.' It is a happy comparison, for the unrest of Europe has been, and is, largely due to the presence in its system of a foreign body which can neither be assimilated nor expelled. Through four centuries the Turks had been encamped upon the soil of Europe; but, cut off by their creed from the peoples they had conquered and from the currents of Western thought, they had remained an Asiatic horde, incapable of that progressive civilisation which alone would have brought them into line with the European Powers. The value of their military qualities, indeed, had been early recognised as a factor in European complications; and their diplomatic outlawry had been reversed since, to the scandal of Christendom, Francis I. had formed a league against Austria with Suleiman the Magnificent. Since that

time France had preserved, through all her changes of government, the tradition of friendship for the Porte and of special claims on its goodwill. Austria and England, too, by the beginning of the century, had grown to regard the expanding power of Russia as a greater menace than expiring Islam. Austria, in her anxiety to stem the tide of Russian progress southwards, forgot her catholic zeal against the infidel, made the integrity of the Ottoman Empire an article of her political creed, and admitted the Sultans into the ranks of legitimate sovereigns. England, too, jealous of the control of the Mediterranean and the safety of the trade-routes to the East, made the integrity of Turkey an axiom of her politics. Of the Great Powers, then, Russia alone, whose emperors inherited the blood and had taken the title of the Cæsars of Byzantium, recognised the actual relation of the Turks to Europe, and maintained unaltered the traditional attitude of her immemorial orthodoxy.

The exclusion of the Sultan from the Holy Alliance had been taken by the other Powers to mean that Alexander was meditating an attack on the Ottoman Empire, and did not wish to encumber himself with harassing obligations. The true reason, however, was that Russia Attitude of Russia. regarded the Turks as belonging, not to Europe, but to Asia; and she had learned, by long experience, that it was impossible to apply to Asiatic peoples those principles of 'reciprocity and good faith' on which the political relations of Europe are based. Fear alone, she maintained, formed the basis of treaty relations with Asiatic states, and this basis would be weakened by any element of hope that might be derived from the right of any other Power or Powers to volunteer their good offices. Her relations with Turkey, in short, as with other Asiatic states, Russia had no choice but to regard as her 'domestic concerns,' with which no other Power could be allowed to interfere.¹ From the outset, then, the opening of the Eastern

¹ Nesselrode to Lieven, April 14, 1816. Martens, xi. 265.

Question revealed a serious divergence of principle among the Allies. To the majority of the Powers, Turkey was a member of the European family of states. To Russia, she occupied a position altogether abnormal and isolated—was, in fact, not a homogeneous state at all, still less, as even Canning called her, a ‘nation.’ The theocratic basis of Islam Holy Russia could well understand, and she did not dispute the right of the Caliph to the undivided allegiance of his Mussulman subjects. But, in Europe, the Mussulmans were in the minority, and the Christian majority formed no integral part of the Ottoman system, but existed, as it were, on sufferance as separate and subordinate political and religious organisms. And it chanced that, of these organisms, by far the most important was that Orthodox Church of which the Tsars had for centuries been the champions. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Sultans had been glad to make use of the ecclesiastical organisation, as of an instrument of government which they found ready-made to their hand ; and the Patriarch of Constantinople became not only the religious, but the secular head of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte, for whose good behaviour he was made responsible. And as the Patriarch over the whole church, so the bishop in each diocese was a temporal as well as a spiritual official, sitting in judgment on suits between Christians, and sometimes even acting as arbitrator in disputes between a Christian and a Mussulman. Finally, in each village the parish priest, married, and not distinguishable from his flock in culture or education, brought each household into touch with the organisation of the church. As long as the Ottoman Power remained unimpaired, this system had worked, from the point of view of the Porte, well enough. The Patriarch was the nominee of the Sultan, and wholly dependent upon his will ; and through this pliable instrument, the Sultan exercised over his Greek subjects an authority which, as Caliph of Islam, he could not have wielded. But with the

The Ortho-
dox Church
in Turkey.

decay of the Turkish Empire, and the rise in the north of a great Orthodox Power, the conditions were altered. The Greek Christians had always looked, not to the Sultan, but to the head of their church as the object of their allegiance. Their orthodoxy had become the guarantee of their national existence. They felt themselves no part of a Turkish 'nation,' but a separate people, once the imperial rulers of the country where now they were slaves; hating the Ottomans with a double hatred as conquerors and infidels; and now, since the shadow of Russia had fallen on them, not without allies and not without hope. The insurgent Greeks had, indeed, been cynically sacrificed by the Empress Catherine in 1774, but an article of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, though carefully limited in its scope to a single church at Constantinople, foreshadowed the later claim of the tsars to be the protectors of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects; and from this time the latter had begun to turn their eyes northwards, and to look to Russia for their ultimate emancipation.

Machiavelli remarks in the *Prince* that, in dealing with a conquered people, one must either crush or conciliate. In their treatment of the Greeks, the Turks had certainly done neither. They had made their rule humiliating to the pride of the subject race; but they had not deprived it of the power of showing resentment. For the Ottoman government was no consistently applied tyranny. It had, and has, in moments of real or supposed danger, its outbursts of panic-stricken ferocity; but, in general, it was no more than incompetence and corruption at the centre, and rottenness in the branches, that made it at once oppressive and weak. The cause of the Greek revolt of 1821, indeed, was largely the very slackness which allowed the *rayahs* to know the sweets of a certain measure of independence, and to become prosperous enough to feel the fret of their chains. For the condition of the Christian peoples under Ottoman rule, in fact, compared, at the beginning of the century, favourably with that of the subjects

Position
of the
Christians
in Turkey.

of states reckoned in the front rank of civilisation. Their religious disabilities were less than those which crushed down the Catholics in Ireland or the Protestants in Austria. The Christian subject of the Porte was free to exercise his religion, to educate himself as he pleased, and to accumulate wealth undisturbed. There was no test to prevent his rising to high office in the state ; he might aspire to become Dragoman to the Porte, or even governor of an important province. As for the Christian peasantry, the wretched *moujiks* of Russia, the brutalised Ruthenian serfs of Galicia, the 'misera contribuens plebs' of Transylvania, and even the starving agricultural labourers of England, might have envied the lot of the *rayah*. For, though under the law of Islam he had the status of a slave, he was not the mere chattel of a feudal lord, but the proprietor of his own freehold ; and, in a country where no caste distinctions, save those of religion, were known, he was not debarred from carving out a career for himself beyond the borders of his parish. The main grievance of the Turkish peasantry, the vicious system of collecting the taxes, fell on Christians and Mussulmans alike ; the Mussulmans alone had, and have still, to bear the additional burden of a military service which often takes them away from home for many years without any sort of adequate compensation.

The Ottoman Government, moreover, had left intact in many parts the traditional system of local government, which served them as a useful machinery for, what alone they were concerned with, the collection of taxes. In the Morea, especially, the Greek peasantry had their own elected village and district officials, Demogeronts and Primates ; the latter of whom, men of wealth and consideration, were summoned annually to Tripolitza to consult with the Pasha as to the distribution and incidence of the imperial taxation. These formed a sort of aristocracy which, in the war of liberation, shared with the priests the leadership of the peasantry. But the free spirit of the Greek race had found its securest refuge

Local
autonomy
in Turkey.

in the mountains and islands. Brigandage became the recognised expression of the national and religious defiance of the Turk. Wild tribes, like the Mainotes in the extreme south of the Morea, made it their boast that they had never paid tribute to the Porte save at the point of the sword. Bands of *klephts*, 'owning no Pasha save the naked sword,' held the trade roads in terror, and levied blackmail on the Ottoman farmers. To combat the evil, the Turkish authorities had been able to devise no better way than to take some of the *palikars* (heroes) themselves into government pay; and so created that Greek militia, the so-called *armatoli*, which, if it fought the klephts one day, was as likely as not to turn against the Turks the next. If the continental communities had their measure of independence, the islands were bound to the Ottoman Government by a still looser tie. Many of these had, long before the Greek revolt, gained a very large measure of independence. Some of them were practically autonomous, being bound only to the payment of a small tribute, and to supply a certain number of seamen for the Ottoman fleet. The islanders, accustomed from their earliest childhood to sea-faring, were magnificent sailors; and, favoured by their conditions, had built up a considerable maritime trade. Since the Treaty of Kainardji, in 1774, the Greek merchantmen had become accustomed to sailing under the protection of the Russian flag. From this time, too, their vessels increased in size, their voyages in length. The constant peril from Barbary pirates necessitated the ships being armed; and thus, under the very eyes of the Ottoman authorities, was built up that Greek sea-power which was to play so decisive a part in the war of liberation.

The Greeks, then, partly by the deliberate policy, and partly by the want of foresight of the Porte, had preserved their national organisation and their national consciousness. As in so many other cases, it was reserved for a literary and antiquarian movement to stir this into active life. Whether or no the modern Greeks

Hellenic
literary
movement.

could be considered in any real sense the representatives of the Hellenes of the golden age of Greece, they had long since lost all tradition of its glories. Their memory was not for the Greece of Homer and Pericles, but for the orthodox Empire of Byzantium. They called themselves not Hellenes, but *Romaioi* (Romans). But the revived Hellenism in Europe, the child of the Renaissance, found early in the present century a welcome in the original home of its birth. Wealthy Greeks had already established schools here and there, where the classic writers were taught side by side with the orthodox Fathers. A movement was now begun to popularise the ideals of Hellenism, to restore to the Greeks the memory of their greatness, and as a means to this end to purify the Greek language, so as to make it possible for all to understand the masterpieces of their classic literature. The apostle of this propaganda was Adamantios Korais, who had studied in Paris, and who devoted his life to reproducing for the modern Greeks, in a language purged of its most obvious barbarisms, the great works of antiquity. The task succeeded almost beyond expectation. Just as Luther's Bible had been the foundation of the literary language of modern Germany, so Korais's editions of the classics served as a model for that of modern Greece. The vulgar patois continued to be the tongue of everyday life; but the language of intellectual intercourse was essentially identical with that of Plato and Thucydides. It is perhaps possible to exaggerate the importance of this classical revival on the course of the Greek revolution. It had, perhaps, more effect on the attitude of Europe than on the spirit of the Greeks themselves; though the latter were far too clever not to make the most of a sentiment which made their cause more interesting to a generation dazzled by the mirage of romanticism. It is certain that, as far as they themselves were concerned, though they once more called themselves Hellenes, the force that launched them against the Turk, and sustained them in the struggle, was not their Hellenism, but their

Orthodoxy; and that the dream which, at the outset of the rising, floated before their eyes, was not that of the free city-states of ancient Hellas, but of the restored orthodox Empire of the East.

It was this revival of the Greek Empire of Byzantium which was the avowed object of a vast secret society, the *Hetairia Philike*, which, founded at Odessa in 1814, had The Hetairia Philike. spread its ramifications with extraordinary rapidity throughout the Greek-speaking world, and even beyond, among the Slav nationalities of the Greek religion. With its usual supineness, the Ottoman Government had allowed the Hetairia to carry on an almost open propaganda, to enrol recruits, and to collect arms.¹ Emboldened by impunity, the society began to make preparations for an actual rising. Its members, throughout, had believed that, when the time came, it would have the active support of Russia; and it is possible that they had been encouraged in this belief by the sympathetic attitude of Count Capo d'Istria, who, as minister of the Tsar, never forgot that he was a Greek. When, however, the leadership of the Greek cause was, in 1820, formally offered to him in the name of the Hetairia, he refused, declaring that the time had not yet come for the movement to have any prospect of success. Even this refusal did not shake the faith of the conspirators in the good intentions of Russia. They determined to press on the movement, and found a leader in Prince Alexander Hyspilanti, a member of a Greek patrician family of Constantinople, and a major-general on the active list of the Russian army. Hyspilanti, convinced of the goodwill of the Tsar, and possibly deceived by some misunderstood confidences of Capo d'Istria, accepted the offer, not doubting that he would receive the moral, if not the material, support of Russia. The Greek cause was now provided with a leader, and nothing remained but to await a favourable opportunity for revolt.

¹ 'We have for some time warned the Ottoman Government of it, but they attached no importance to its existence.'—Metternich *Memoirs*, iii. 523.

The chance afforded by the war between Ali, Pasha of Janina, and the Porte, seemed to the Greek leaders too favourable to be neglected. The crafty ex-
Revolt of Ali of Janina. brigand, who had carved out for himself an empire in the south of the Balkan peninsula, and was now in the death-grip of a final struggle to throw off the authority of his master the Sultan, had himself taken no small share in preparing the Greek insurrection. Brave to recklessness, cruel, utterly unscrupulous, this Cæsar Borgia of Albania was the ideal hero of the wild hillsmen of Greece, and to this day his portrait hangs beside that of the Holy Virgin in the cottages of the Greek highlands. It was in his school that those chieftains were trained whose deeds of daring, and treachery, and cruelty make the annals of the war of Greek independence by turns glorious and infamous. Ali, who aimed at adding the Morea to his dominions, and at founding in the islands of the Adriatic and the Archipelago a sea-power which should rival that of the Dey of Algiers, had fomented for his own ends the unrest in Greece. He had even hinted that he himself would not be unwilling to head an emancipated Hellas; had posed, though utterly unlettered, as a patron of Greek learning, and even gone so far as to drink to the 'Panagia,' and suggest the possibility of his conversion to the orthodox faith. But the vaulting ambition of the Pasha had at last overleaped itself. The Porte, infinitely long-suffering so long as its tribute continued to flow in without interruption, had at last been awakened to the seriousness of the peril threatening from Janina. An expedition under Kurshid Pasha had been sent to crush the defiant vassal; Ali's allies, and even his own sons, passed over to the enemy, and the 'Lion of Janina' found himself surrounded in his lair by an overwhelming force. Still, his courage and resource made the task of the Ottoman commander no easy one. Month after month the castle of Janina held out; and meanwhile, the bulk of the Turkish army being thus

Beginning of
 the Greek
 revolt,
 March 1821.

engaged, the Greek insurgent leaders had time and a free field in which to carry out their plans. It was under these circumstances that, on March 6, 1821, Prince Alexander Hypsilanti, accompanied by a few Greek officers in the Russian service, began the rising by crossing the river Pruth from Russia into Moldavia.

In view of these facts, of the open sympathies of the Russian people, of the notorious hopes of the Greeks now loudly proclaimed, and last, but not least, of the impressionable and wavering character of the Emperor Alexander himself, it was an anxious moment for those who believed that the integrity of Turkey was necessary to the salvation of Europe. Metternich could congratulate himself that, at so perilous a crisis, he could bring his personal influence to bear to counteract the baleful influence of Capo d'Istria over Alexander's mind. As it was, his anxiety did not last long. In his present suspicious mood, the Tsar was only too ready to listen to his warning that the first Russian over the Pruth would mean a revolutionary outburst all over Europe. Castlereagh, too, wrote to the Emperor to urge that the events in Turkey were only part of the universal 'organised spirit of insurrection,' and that the Emperor of Russia ought 'to disavow the Greek cause as one essentially revolutionary.'¹ Moved by these arguments, Alexander once more 'gave proof of his noble and loyal character,' and agreed with his brother of Austria that 'the event should be left to itself.' At the same time, he cashiered and removed from the army all the military Greeks who had joined in the insurrection; and directed Capo d'Istria to write to Hypsilanti refusing all help or support to the Greek insurgents, and upbraiding him for his misuse of the Emperor's name. Metternich was convinced that, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, the Tsar had nothing to do with the rising. As for the affair itself, 'this,' he said, 'must be looked upon as placed

The Tsar
disavows the
Greek revolt.

¹ *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii. 404, 445.

beyond the pale of civilisation.’¹ It was the definition in a single sentence of Austria’s policy in the Eastern Question. The peace of Europe was of infinitely greater importance than a massacre more or less beyond the frontiers of Turkey; and if a misguided sentiment were ever to lead the Powers to interfere, who knew what widespread ruin might not ensue, if any attempt to patch the rotten fabric of the Ottoman Government were to cause its fall.

As for the present rising, Metternich’s belief that it would end badly for the Greeks was justified by the sequel. It had been adventured solely in the confidence that Russia would give it support; and though the Greek Hospodar of Moldavia, Prince Soutzo, gave it his countenance, there was no chance of a popular movement in a country where the Greeks were more bitterly hated than the Turks. It had from the first been made ridiculous by the vanity and incompetence of Hypsilanti, and infamous by his enforced connivance at the treacherous massacre of inoffensive Mussulmans. From the moment, then, that the Tsar’s disclaimer was known, it was doomed to be a fiasco. A few isolated acts of heroism, such as the death of the ‘Sacred Legion’ at Dragashan, and the last stand of the Greeks at Skuleni, saved the first rising of the Greeks from utter ignominy; but by the end of June 1821, the movement, which had begun with such an imposing flourish, was ended by the shameful flight of its leader over the Austrian frontier. Metternich might well hope that the Turks, who had so easily suppressed a movement which at one time had threatened to become formidable, would be able without difficulty to deal with the troubles that had, meanwhile, broken out in the Morea. The fire in the East, once isolated, might be allowed to burn itself out. The attention of the European Powers was required for conflagrations nearer home.

Collapse of
the northern
rising.

¹ *Memoirs*, iii. 525.

It was the critical state of affairs in Spain which gave a not altogether unwelcome opportunity for distracting the attention of the Emperor Alexander from the Greek question. The continued unrest beyond the Pyrenees had been for some time to the French Government a scandal and a menace.

Unrest in
Spain.
Attitude of
France.

An outbreak of yellow fever in Spain, in August 1821, gave it an excuse for posting a corps of observation on the frontier, under the pretext of establishing a sanitary cordon; and, in spite of the protests of the Spanish Government and of the disappearance of the fever, this was gradually increased until it formed an army of 100,000 men. Meanwhile, in the Chambers, the Ultras were clamouring for the intervention of France to avenge the insults offered to a Bourbon prince. But it was necessary for the French Government to tread warily. England was as adverse as ever to any intervention of France in Spain. She had not poured out her blood and treasure in ousting Napoleon from the Peninsula only to connive at its peaceful occupation by his successor. The British Government, moreover, held the trump card in the diplomatic game. It was open to it to do now what Canning afterwards did, and to oppose to the French occupation of Spain the formal recognition of the independence of the South American colonies. It did not believe that the time was yet ripe for this action, but it avowedly held it in reserve. This would have been to deal a cruel stab at the principle of legitimacy, and at the same time to deprive the Spanish crown of half its prestige. Under these conditions, the French Government shrank from isolated action, and determined, before interfering in Spain, to receive if possible the sanction of the European Concert.

The Congress of Laibach had, in the spring of 1821, been merely adjourned. It was decided that it should reassemble at Verona in the autumn of the following year. Metternich had not given up the hope of overcoming the opposition of England, and of establishing a central committee of

control to administer the affairs of Europe. From Germany, the cry of oppressed kinglets had never ceased to ascend to the judgment-seat of the Powers. In all Europe, the smouldering disaffection called for their ceaseless watchfulness. For the present, however, two questions obscured all others: the affairs of Spain and of Greece. The latter, indeed, which Gentz declared to have been 'quietly buried' at Laibach, had since displayed a most disquieting vitality. The seizure in the Dardanelles of Greek ships sailing under the Russian flag, the refusal of the Turks to evacuate the Principalities in accordance with the stipulations of existing treaties, and, above all, the execution of the Orthodox Patriarch in reprisal for massacres committed by the Greeks, had altered the attitude of Russia toward the whole question. It was no longer an affair 'beyond the borders of civilisation,' but concerned the treaty rights of Russia, the dignity of the Tsar, and the outraged sentiment of the Orthodox Church. In Russia, the Emperor stood alone in his desire to avoid war. Urged on by public opinion, by the attitude of his officers and of his ministers, he had gone so far as to send an ultimatum to the Porte demanding the redress of Russia's grievances, and breaking off diplomatic relations. But he shrank from further isolated action, which might shatter his pet creation of the Confederation of Europe, and proposed to step in, not to assert the just rights of Russia, but as the mandatary of Europe, to stop the Turkish oppression. General Tatitcheff was sent to Vienna on a special mission to attempt to arrange terms with the Austrian Government. Russia had supported Austria at Troppau and Laibach; she hoped now to be able to count on reciprocity. Austria had occupied Naples in the name of Europe. Should the Turks reject the Russian ultimatum, Russia would occupy the Danubian Principalities, also 'in the name of the General Alliance'; and she hoped that, in that case, in order to prove the 'legality' of Russia's action, the other Powers would

likewise withdraw their ambassadors from Constantinople. The logic was perfect and, for Metternich, disconcerting. An Austrian occupation of Naples was one thing, a Russian invasion of the Principalities another. This must at all costs be avoided. He saw the necessity for temporising, and, with his usual skill, he proceeded to disentangle the Greek question from the interests purely Russian. The Russian argument, he contended, had confused two distinct issues: that of 'strict rights' and that of 'the general interest.' As regarded the former, Austria was prepared to impress upon Turkey the necessity for respecting those treaty obligations on which the European system was based, and of yielding to the legitimate demands of Russia, as in the matter of the evacuation of the Principalities and the restoration of the *status quo* before the rebellion. As to the latter, Austria was willing to consult with the Allies as to the best means of establishing and guaranteeing a *régime* in Turkey such as should save Europe from the recurrence of the present troubles. The Congress of the Powers had been summoned for September. In view of the urgency of the crisis, it would be well if a preliminary meeting were held at Vienna to settle this question once for all. Meanwhile, Metternich was indefatigable in his efforts to avert the war he dreaded. He took Lord Strangford, the British ambassador at Constantinople, into his confidence, and in concert with him brought pressure to bear on the Porte to concede the minimum of the Russian demands. The ministers of France and Prussia also lent their support; and in the face of this united pressure, the Ottoman Government reluctantly yielded a step, and consented to the evacuation of the Principalities. The Tsar, for his part, was willing to go every possible length in the direction of conciliation. The decision of the Porte to fulfil the first article of the Russian ultimatum was responded to by the re-opening of negotiations on the part of Russia through the Austrian and British ambassadors; and the

Efforts of
Metternich
to avert war.

signature of an agreement by which the Dardanelles were made free to the vessels of all nations was followed by the despatch of M. Minciaky as plenipotentiary to Constantinople. The re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, however, was made dependent on the establishment of such a settled state of affairs in the Turkish Empire as should render impossible a repetition of the scenes which had caused their breach.

Austrian diplomacy had won a signal victory. Russia had delivered her ultimatum, and stood on the brink of war. She had been drawn back by the arguments of Metternich, based on that idea of the Concert of Europe which had obtained so powerful a hold over the Tsar's mind. The Autocrat of all the Russias would come to Vienna to sit once more at the feet of the prophet of the Hofburg; and the Council of the Powers, contrary to all the traditions of Muscovite policy, would sit in judgment on 'the domestic concerns' of Russia. It was, as Metternich wrote exultingly to the Emperor Francis, 'perhaps the greatest victory that one Cabinet had ever gained over another,' for, by destroying the prestige of Russia at Constantinople, it had 'with one blow destroyed the grand work of Peter the Great and all his successors.' This estimate was, of course, much exaggerated. But the danger of a Russo-Turkish war was, at any rate, postponed, though not altogether averted. For the rest, Metternich could hope that the affairs of Spain would create enough noise in the coming Congress to drown any suggestion for an effective intervention of the Alliance in the concerns of the Ottoman Empire.

The joy of Metternich was clouded by a tragedy which cast a gloom over the councils of the Alliance. In October 1821, the Austrian chancellor had accepted an invitation to meet King George IV. and his Minister of Foreign Affairs at Hanover, and the satisfactory character of their discussion had led him to hope that, if not the king himself, at any rate Lord Londonderry

Death of
Castlereagh,
Aug. 12, 1822.

(Castlereagh) would attend the preliminary conferences at Vienna, and eventually pledge England to an active part in the Congress which was to follow. This expectation was dashed by the suicide of Londonderry on the eve of setting out for Vienna. For Metternich it was a blow as cruel as unexpected. The presence of Castlereagh in the British Cabinet had been a pledge that the policy of England, if not entirely sympathetic, would at least not be actively hostile to his own. 'He had learned to understand me,' he said; 'it will be years before another reaches the same stage of confidence.' It was certainly ominous for the future of the European Concert that, in the very month that the Congress was fixed to meet at Verona, September 1822, George Canning became responsible for the foreign policy of England. Not, indeed, that the resulting change was as great as has been commonly supposed. Canning had been a member of the Cabinet before Castlereagh's death, George and his influence had largely determined that Canning. policy of 'non-intervention' which the Government of Lord Liverpool had been forced to proclaim. This policy Canning merely extended and carried out to its logical conclusion, without the *arrière-pensée* which had hampered the action of Castlereagh. The latter had believed in the Concert of Europe as the sheet-anchor of the world's peace; Canning regarded it merely as a drag on the free initiative of England, always strongest when least encumbered by continental obligations. But Castlereagh had by no means surrendered himself blindly to the continental policy, and had been consistent in his objection to the claim of the Powers to interfere in the internal affairs of the states of Europe. His action during the Congress of Aix, his refusal in 1819 to agree to Alexander's suggestion for the re-establishment of the Committee of Ambassadors to watch over the internal affairs of France, his reiterated protests against the decisions taken at Troppau and Laibach, are sufficient proof of this. He was, moreover, as little

inclined as Canning to sacrifice the practical advantage of England to a sentiment. The 'system' of the Tsar, he declared, 'tended to a perfection not applicable to this age nor to mankind'; it was but 'a beautiful phantom which England cannot pursue,' for 'all speculative policy is outside the range of her faculties.'¹ As for the Tsar's project of a general disarmament, the practical difficulties in the way seemed to him insuperable; but, he added with a dry humour, if Russia were to lead the way, 'it would be a salutary example to Europe.'² If, then, it could be said with truth that Canning was 'more insular than European,' it cannot be maintained that Castlereagh was prepared 'to sacrifice the real to the possible,' or to make the interests of England subordinate to those of Europe.

But for the personal pressure of King George IV., who expressed himself to the Tsar as deeply anxious for the restoration of 'morality' in Europe, it is possible that England would have been unrepresented at Verona. As it was, it was only the possibility of the Eastern Question being raised that induced the English Ministry to participate. As

Congress
of Verona,
Oct. 1822.

for the suggested interference of France in Spain, 'England could not suffer what had been loudly proclaimed as an attempt to restore a family influence which England had been combating for centuries.'³ When, therefore, on October 20, the Congress opened, the British plenipotentiary, the Duke of Wellington, assumed, according to his instructions, an attitude purely passive and observant; the more so, since it was soon apparent that Metternich had succeeded at Vienna beyond his hopes, and that the Greek Question was once more to be committed to the grave. The affairs of Spain alone remained to discuss, and on this point the decision of England was irrevocably taken. The appointment of Wellington had momentarily revived the hopes of Metternich; but it was

¹ Report of Lieven, Oct. 25, 1820. Martens, xi. 278.

² *Ibid.* xi. 261.

³ Stapleton, i. 149.

soon seen that, whatever the duke's personal views, he 'had not a free hand.' His instructions were to protest against any intervention of the Powers in Spain as 'objectionable in principle, and utterly impracticable in execution.' A definite proposition was, meanwhile, laid before the Congress by the French envoy, M. de Montmorency: Would France, in the event of her being forced to declare war on Spain, be able to reckon on the moral and material support of the Allies? To this question Russia, Austria, and Prussia returned a favourable answer; but the vigorous protest of England was sufficiently alarming to prevent Montmorency signing a definite treaty. It was suggested that the allied Powers should first try the effect of presenting identical notes at Madrid, calling the Spanish Government to order. Again England protested, declaring her intention, not only of not holding a common language with the Allies, but of making no communication to the Spanish Government on the subject of its relations with Spain; and, when the other Powers persisted, Wellington was instructed to withdraw from any further discussion of the subject. It was the formal breach of the Great Alliance.

The Allies were pained rather than surprised at the perverseness of the British Cabinet. As for the British protest, this—to use Canning's phrase—was mingled with the air; and the rump of the Concert set to work to define the terms of their intervention in Spain. Counsels were divided between the proposal for corporate action and the plan of allowing France to play in Spain the part which Austria had taken in Naples. To the Tsar it seemed perilous in the extreme to send 100,000 French soldiers into the infectious revolutionary atmosphere south of the Pyrenees; and he suggested the employment of Russian troops, to march by way of Germany and Piedmont. This revived all the fears inspired in Metternich by a like proposition two years earlier; and this, combined with the opposition of England, prevented the idea of common intervention from being realised. The

fate of Spain depended upon the attitude of the French Government. At Paris, meanwhile, opinion was divided. To the Foreign Minister, Montmorency, intervention in Spain was a matter of principle, called for by Opinion in France. the common interest of Europe in suppressing revolution. Villèle looked upon the whole question as purely French, and was anxious for a peaceful settlement, if such were possible. His aim was to restore French influence at Madrid, and, perhaps, by helping Spain to win back her colonies, to gain for France solid commercial advantages. His view was supported by the king and by the majority of his colleagues, and Montmorency resigned. But, none the less, war was inevitable. The despatches of the Powers had been forwarded to Madrid from Paris, and, as in three days no answer was received, the ambassadors of the Allies were withdrawn from the Spanish Court. An attempt of Villèle to pose as more moderate than the rest by postponing the delivery of the French despatch had broken down. The army, tired of inaction, and the bourgeoisie, anxious for the 200,000,000 francs invested in a Spanish loan, clamoured for war. The Government was forced to yield; an offer of mediation made by the British Ministry was rejected; and on January 28, 1823, Louis XVIII. announced to the Chambers, in a speech from the Throne, that he had withdrawn his ambassador from Madrid, and that 100,000 Frenchmen, under a prince of his house, were about to march, 'invoking the God of St. Louis, for the sake of preserving the throne of Spain to a descendant of Henry IV., and of reconciling that fine kingdom with Europe.' 'Let Ferdinand VII.,' he added, 'be free to give to his peoples institutions which they cannot hold but from him.' This last declaration was scarcely palatable to a Government which, whether Whigs or Tories were in office, was based upon the Attitude of Canning. principles of 1688. The relations of France and England were now, in fact, extremely critical. Canning had already repeated, in a correspondence

with the new French Minister of War, Chateaubriand, the British objections to the doctrine of intervention. He now protested again against the claim of France, announced in the royal speech, to make her own example a rule for foreign nations, and, more especially, against her pretension to enforce her claim in virtue of the relationship between the reigning dynasties of the two kingdoms. At the same time, a declaration of neutrality, which had been introduced into the king's speech, was removed; and in Parliament the old principle of the balance of power was invoked by the Opposition to prove the necessity for England to prevent by war the French attack on a constitutional state. Canning, however, refused to admit the need for this extreme measure. The France of 1823 was not that of 1808; and Spain, stripped of her colonies, was no longer the world-power which it had been in the days of Louis XIV. As a last resort, the recognition by Great Britain of the South American republics would counterbalance any advantage obtained by France in occupying the Peninsula. A last attempt to avert hostilities was made by using the influence of Wellington, as Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, to persuade the Spanish Government to make timely concessions to royalist sentiment. The attempt failed, and matters were allowed to take their course.¹

On April 7, 95,000 French troops, under the command of the Duc d'Angoulême, crossed the Bidassoa. The Powers watched in breathless suspense. It was the first time that the new army organisation of Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr had been put to the test—the first time, for thirty-four years, that French soldiers had marched under the Bourbon lilies. There was one critical moment, at the passage of the frontier stream, when a party of Bonapartist exiles met the invading army with tricolour flags. But the grenadiers of the royalist army showed no signs of hesitation. At the word of com-

French
invasion of
Spain, 1823.

¹ Stapleton i. 219, etc. Duvergier de Hauranne, vii. 128, etc.

mand they fired on the flag of the Revolution ; and when the smoke had cleared away, it was recognised that, with the tricolour flag, the tradition of Napoleon as a living force in the French army had vanished. The campaign in Spain, in fact, looked forward to with so much dread, proved little more than a military parade. Angoulême's plan was to press forward as rapidly as possible on Madrid, leaving corps of observation to mask the fortified cities on his road, so as to allow no time for the Government to mature its plan of defence, and, above all, no time for guerilla bands to assemble. This strategy, which was said to have been suggested at Verona by Wellington to Montmorency, was entirely successful. The Cortes, carrying the king with them, had already fled to Seville. The rapid progress of the invaders disconcerted the Spanish plans, and dissensions broke out among the Spanish commanders. Abispa once more played the traitor, and on May 16 issued at Madrid a proclamation against the Cortes and the Constitution. He was, indeed, forced to fly by a mutiny of his troops ; but his successor, the Marquis de Castel dos Rios, was unable to hold the capital, and retired into Estremadura. On May 23, Angoulême was already master of Madrid, and he immediately despatched two columns in pursuit of the retreating Spaniards. The Cortes, no longer safe in Seville, retired with the king to Cadiz. This was on June 13. By the 24th the French had already commenced the blockade of the city. Meanwhile, the scattered Spanish forces had been dealt with in detail. Murillo had made his submission to the provisional Government which, under Angoulême's sanction, had established itself at Madrid. Quiroga, forced to capitulate at Corunna, had escaped with his staff to England. In Murcia, Ballesteros, after several defeats, had come to terms with the French ; while Mina, in Catalonia, was shut up by a superior force in Barcelona. Nothing remained but to cut off the head of the resistance by reducing Cadiz and securing the person of the king. On August 16 the Duc d'Angoulême

arrived before the city. A letter to the king, in which he begged him to issue an amnesty and to summon the ancient Cortes, was answered by one in which Ferdinand was made to protest against the invasion of Spain. The siege was now pressed with vigour. On August 31 the French succeeded in storming the Trocadero, the key to Cadiz. A two hours' bombardment on September 16, and the capture of the island of San Petri on the 20th, convinced the Cortes of the uselessness of further resistance, while the moderate terms offered by Angoulême encouraged them to yield. On the 30th King Ferdinand, after taking a solemn oath to grant a general amnesty and to keep the Liberal officers in their places, was allowed to go to the French camp to arrange terms with Angoulême. A few places in various parts of Spain still held out, but the war was practically at an end. The French legitimists might well plume themselves; for, apparently, what Napoleon had failed to effect in seven years had been done by a prince of the House of Bourbon in as many weeks.

The conduct of the Duc d'Angoulême throughout the campaign had been marked by moderation and good sense. Unhappily, he was unable to control the monster he had set at liberty. As long as the king had been in duress he had been able to interfere to curb the violence of the reactionary authorities. With the liberation of the king his hands were tied. On October 1, the day after he had sworn to forget and forgive, Ferdinand solemnly repudiated all his acts signed since March 20, 1820, including the act of amnesty of the preceding day. It was the formal opening of a new reign of reactionary terror; and the French were forced to stand by, the helpless and disgusted spectators of crimes which seemed to tarnish the new lustre of their arms. All that Angoulême could do, after in vain urging the king to moderation and to grant a charter after the French model, was to mark his sense of the royal proceedings by refusing the decorations offered him for his services.

Absolutism
restored in
Spain.

The French occupation of Spain continued until 1828; but the absolute power which this secured for Ferdinand VII. continued, in spite of spasmodic risings, until his death in September 1833. By a so-called 'Pragmatic Sanction' he had suspended the Salic law before his death, and declared his daughter Isabella heir to the throne, to which she succeeded under the regency of her mother, Queen Christina. Her right was disputed by her uncle, Don Carlos, the younger brother of the late king, and to strengthen her position the 'Estatudo Real,' a compromise between absolutism and the Constitution of 1812, was proclaimed. From this time Spain was given up to the struggle between two principles; the 'Carlists' upholding the banner of absolutism and divine right; the other party, to whatever dynasty or Government it might be attached, maintaining the principle of Liberalism and popular government. By the general historian of Europe the Carlist wars, full as they are of picturesque and stirring incident, may well be left to burn themselves out behind the barrier of the Pyrenees, 'beyond the pale of civilisation.' As far as the Concert of Europe was concerned, Spain was thenceforth allowed to fight out her own battles. Individual Powers, according to their point of view, lent their sympathy, but seldom any material help, to one side or the other in the long struggle. But twice only did the dynastic questions agitating Spain produce any serious effect beyond the Pyrenees; once, when the question of the 'Spanish marriages' shattered the *entente* between the Government of Louis Philippe and England, and again, when the candidature of Leopold of Hohenzollern for the Spanish crown formed the pretext for the Franco-German War of 1870. For the rest, Europe, absorbed in her own more pressing affairs, has had but little time to wonder at the indomitable pride of Spain, still wearing haughtily her imperial mantle, though faded and threadbare, and gashed and rent by the dagger-thrusts of her own children.

The
'Pragmatic
Sanction'
and Carlism
in Spain.

The success of the French arms in Spain precipitated the settlement of the long-standing question of the status of the Spanish Colonies. Already England, while defending the interests of Spain at Verona and Paris, had been forced to defend her own at Madrid, and to protest strenuously against the seizure of British merchant vessels trading with South American ports. The British admiral had even been authorised to land upon the coast of Cuba, to extirpate the nests of pirates who, under the aegis of the Spanish flag, preyed upon the commerce of the West Indies. The whole question had long been acute; but its settlement had been postponed, partly in order not to compromise the position of Spain at Verona, partly in order to give the Cortes time to act. When, however, the French invasion of Spain was seen to be inevitable, Canning had intimated to the French Government that England would not tolerate the subjugation of the colonies by foreign force.¹ But, apart from the risk that France, for her own purposes, might be tempted to help Spain to recover her lost possessions, there was in 1823 some danger of the Great Powers combining to settle the question in a sense hostile to England. Spain, in fact, supported by France, did propose that a Congress should meet at Paris. Canning met the proposal with a strenuous protest. 'What was the influence,' he said, 'which we had in the councils of the Alliance? We protested at Laibach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste-paper; our remonstrances mingled with the air.' Henceforward England must be content 'to move steadily on in her own orbit,' and the interests of England alone should determine the policy of English statesmen.² This attitude was strengthened by the opportune action of the United States, which became the determining factor in the situation. On December 2, 1823,

¹ This had also been Castlereagh's attitude, *see* report of Lieven of Feb. 18, 1818. Martens, xi. 270.

² Stapleton, i. 489.

President Monroe sent to Congress the famous message in which he protested against the claim of the Great Powers of Europe to interfere in the affairs of South America, and declared that any such interference would be resented by the United States as an unfriendly act. It was the enunciation of the famous 'Monroe doctrine' of 'America for the Americans,' of which the full significance was not as yet apparent. On the whole, the intention of Canning to recognise the independence of the South American States, whether monarchies or republics, though it cut at the very basis of the Holy Alliance, was borne by the allied Powers calmly enough. A beginning was made on July 23, 1824, by the signature of a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Brazil; and the recognition of the other Governments was only postponed until they could give guarantee of their stability. Columbia and Mexico were recognised in December of the same year; Austria, Russia, and Prussia joining in a mild expression of regret that a step had been taken which 'tended to encourage that revolutionary spirit it had been found so difficult to control in Europe.' Canning himself, a great phrase-maker in an age of phrase-making, exclaimed, 'We have created a new world to redress the balance of the old!'

In the meantime, however, an after effect of the French intervention in Spain had created a situation which put a serious strain on the principle of non-intervention championed by England. With no continental state had the relations of England been more intimate than with Portugal; and the internal affairs of that kingdom were liable seriously to affect British trade interests. A diplomatic war had for some time been raging at Lisbon between the representatives of England and France; the former supporting the established Government, the latter intriguing with Dom Miguel, the king's brother, and leader of the reactionary opposition. The victory of the reaction in Spain encouraged the latter to

Reactionary
coup d'état
in Portugal.

adventure a *coup d'état*. A military rising which he headed was completely successful, the people hailing the downfall of the Constitution with the same joy with which they had once greeted its promulgation. The easy-going John VI. accepted the new order with a good grace. But the restoration of the old feudal anarchy soon produced a reaction; and the king again began to meditate reform. A commission was appointed, under M. de Palmella, to draw up a new Constitution. The project met with violent opposition on the part of the ambassadors of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; and in view of this, and of the threatening attitude of Miguel and his 'Apostolicals,' Palmella, a partisan of the British alliance, wrote to London to beg for the despatch of troops for the defence of the Government.

The English Cabinet was placed in an awkward position. To send troops would be to give the lie to all their former protests—would be, in fact, no more than an imitation of the action of Austria in Piedmont and Naples. There were, moreover, no troops to send. It was decided, then, by way of compromise, to send a squadron to the Tagus, to act as a 'moral support' to the Government. At the same time, Canning refused to guarantee any Constitution, Action of Canning. though, when it became apparent that France was using the reactionary opposition of the other Powers for her own ends—that is, to oust British influence from Lisbon—and had joined with them in threats against the new Constitution, he declared that England would resist by force of arms any foreign intervention in the affairs of Portugal. Meanwhile, between September 1823 and April 1824, the struggle between conflicting interests and principles within the ministry at Lisbon continued, raging round the question of the re-admission of Marshal Beresford and of the supremacy of French or English influence. On April 30, 1824, Dom Miguel, who retained the command of the army, attempted another *coup d'état*. At the outset he was completely successful. The ministry was scattered, and Palmella took refuge

on board an English man-of-war. The escape of the king, however, who also found an asylum on board the British flagship, upset the calculations of Miguel, who, 'with incredible fatuity,' allowed himself to be drawn on board the flagship, begged and received pardon, and passed into exile.

Rivalry of France and England. On May 4 the king returned to his palace. The danger from Miguel's ambition was for the time over, but the contest between British and French interests continued unabated. Those of France for a time prevailed. Even the ministers most favourable to England were alienated by her attitude towards the independence of Brazil, which had just been proclaimed. Beresford was excluded from the Cabinet, and M. de Subserra, a partisan of France, became prime minister. Egged on by de Neuville, the French ambassador, the latter devised a subtle plan for ousting the influence of England. He begged the British Government to send four or five thousand English or Hanoverian troops to support the Government. If this request were refused, as was sure to be the case, England would hardly be able to object to France undertaking a duty she herself had declined. The plot, however, broke down owing to the hostile attitude of the Conference of the reactionary Powers at Paris towards the new Constitution, an attitude which destroyed the influence of de Neuville at Lisbon.

In July 1825 a Conference of Austria, England, Brazil, and Portugal assembled at London to discuss the relations of Brazil to the mother country. During its session it was discovered that Subserra was carrying on separate negotiations with the Brazilian Government. Canning now demanded and obtained his dismissal; and soon afterward de Neuville, the chief opponent of English policy at Lisbon, was recalled. The victory of English diplomacy was complete; and on August 29, 1825, John VI. recognised the independence of Brazil under the Emperor Pedro. When, six months later, the king died, Pedro renounced his right of succession to the throne of

Independence of Brazil, Aug. 29, 1829.

Portugal in favour of his daughter, the Infanta Maria la Gloria ; but before doing so, he granted the country a Constitution on the model of that of England. To reconcile the opposing factions, Maria, though barely seven years old, was betrothed to her uncle, Dom Miguel, and it was arranged that she should remain in Brazil until the Constitution should have been established and the marriage arranged. In Portugal the news was received with mixed feelings. Part of the army took the oath to Maria and to the Constitution, but part revolted, marched over the Spanish border, and thence, with the active encouragement of Ferdinand VII., began a campaign in favour of Miguel and absolute government. Fighting went on with varying fortunes till, on the appeal of the queen-regent, British regiments were landed at Lisbon to enforce the diplomatic pressure already brought to bear upon the Court of Madrid. The reactionist revolt now immediately collapsed, and, in the vain hope of making peace permanent by satisfying all ambitions, Pedro conferred the regency on Miguel, and sent over the little queen to the country she was destined to govern.

The attitude of England in the affairs of Portugal and Spain, and the breach with the Holy Alliance, had spread abroad the impression that Canning desired to pose as the champion of Liberalism against legitimate government. Nothing could be further from the truth. The strenuous opponent of reform in England was not likely to be an enthusiast for revolution elsewhere. In all his foreign policy he had, in fact, but one thing in view—the interests of England. Castlereagh had refused to pledge his country to the fantastic schemes of the Russian Emperor. Canning, accused by Lord Grey of pursuing an ungenerous policy in the matter of Spain, quoted against him his own words, used on a former occasion : ‘That generous and high-minded disinterestedness which justly immortalise the hero cannot and ought not to be considered justifiable motives of political

Canning's
political
principles.

action, because nations cannot afford to be chivalrous and romantic.' Canning, in fact, merely applied Castlereagh's principles more consistently. He thought it inadvisable 'to force into conflict the abstract principles of democracy and monarchy'; he desired to hold the balance even between the two extreme opinions; and it was owing to no deliberate policy of his if the revolutionary elements on the continent worked in the interests of Great Britain. Nor, when circumstances forced him to turn his attention to the Eastern Question, was it Philhellenic sentiment that made him the main instrument for the emancipation of Greece.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE

The rising in the Morea, 1821—General character of the revolt—Causes of the failure of the Turks to suppress it—Influence of 'Philhellenism'—Greek massacres and Turkish reprisals—Execution of the Patriarch—Effect on European opinion—Breach between Russia and Turkey—Massacre of Chios—Greek piracy in the Archipelago—Canning and the Eastern Question—He recognises the Greek flag—Effect on the European Concert—Alexander I. and intervention—Conference of St. Petersburg—Attitude of Austria and England—Intervention of Mehemet Ali—Ibrahim in the Morea, 1825—England proposes intervention—Death of Alexander I.—Military conspiracy in Moscow—Nicholas I. and the Eastern Question—Protocol of St. Petersburg, April 4, 1826—Russian ultimatum to Turkey—Massacre of the Janissaries—Convention of Akkermann, October 7, 1826—Anglo-Russian agreement in the Greek Question—Split in the Tory party—Treaty of London, June 6, 1827—Death of Canning—Battle of Navarino—Its effect on the Powers—Wellington Ministry, January 1828—Russo-Turkish war—Its effect on the Greek Question—French expedition to the Morea—Protocol of March 22, 1829—Peace of Adrianople—Effect on the Conference in London—Settlement of the Greek Question, May 7, 1832.

THE collapse of Prince Hypsilanti's demonstration did not, as Metternich had fondly hoped, free Europe from the spectre of the Eastern Question. The rising in the Principalities had not, in fact, had the unanimous approval of the *Hetairia*, of which the leaders had thought, rightly, that the standard of the Hellenic cause would be raised with more chances of success on Greek soil. While, therefore, Hypsilanti was frittering away his time at Jassy and Bucharest, emissaries of the *Hetairia* were busily preparing for a rising in the Morea. Even here there was no concerted plan, no paramount authority. Irresponsible agitators passed from village to village, proclaiming a holy

Greek insurrection in the Morea, 1821.

war of the cross against the crescent, and calling on the Greeks to throw off the yoke of the infidel barbarians. On the dull apathy of the Roumanian peasants the Greek summons to arms had produced no effect. But in southern Greece the sparks of revolutionary oratory fell on inflammable material, and, the train once fired, the conflagration spread with a rapidity which defied the belated efforts of the Ottomans to cope with it, or the attempts of the self-constituted Greek leaders to guide it. For this was not, as in the case of the northern rising, an affair of a comparative handful of adventurers and enthusiasts, but the insurrection of a whole people,

General carrying away its leaders with it in the wild rush of
 character of its hatred and its fanaticism, and winning its way
 the revolt. at last in spite of their selfishness and incapacity.

From the first the war assumed a character of singular atrocity. The Greek clergy, headed by Archbishop Germanos of Patras, took the lead in proclaiming a war of extermination against the infidel; and the Mussulmans of the Morea, taken by surprise, had no time in which to organise resistance. At the outbreak of the revolt these numbered some 25,000 souls; within six weeks none survived, save the remnant which had escaped into the fortified towns. These, too, as one by one the strong places were starved into submission, were massacred with every aggravation of barbarity. The storming of Tripolitza, followed by the deliberate slaughter in cold blood of 2000 Mussulman prisoners of all ages and both sexes, completed the first chapter in the history of the revolt. At the end of 1821, with the exception of half-a-dozen fortresses blockaded by wild hordes of brigands and peasants, all the Morea was free of the Turks, while the flame of insurrection had passed the isthmus of Corinth, spread throughout continental Greece, and crossed the mountain passes into Thessaly, and even into Macedonia.

The details of the war of Greek independence, however picturesque and stirring, have little importance in the wider history of Europe; and it must suffice to note the general

character of the struggle, and to estimate the effect produced on it by the course of international politics. The war was, from the outset, one of barbarians against barbarians. At the first news of the rising, indeed, a few educated Greeks, of whom Prince Demetrios Hypsilanti and Prince Mavrocordatos were the most conspicuous, had hastened to the Morea and placed themselves at the head of the movement. But as leaders in irregular warfare they proved sorry failures, while their well-meant efforts to provide their countrymen with a Constitution on the approved western model ended, as might have been expected, in a lamentable fiasco. Not the central Government, which, until Capo d'Istria as first president of Greece established a virtual dictatorship, was never effective, but the local organisation under the traditional leadership of the Primates kept Greece from utter anarchy during the revolt. The true military leaders of the Greeks were the brigand chiefs, many of them apt pupils of Ali of Janina—Anagnostaras, Notaras, Petros Bey of the Maina, above all Kolo-kotrones—picturesque savages, well skilled in all the arts of guerilla warfare. And while these kept the Turks occupied on land, the mariners of the Greek islands were fighting the Ottoman power at sea by methods not very dissimilar. For here, too, was reproduced the same strange medley of heroism and cowardice, of sordid selfishness and lofty disinterestedness. The noble patriotism of Miaoulis, the devoted courage of Kanaris, covered the evil reputation of the seafaring Greeks with a halo of glory; but it was the fact that the naval methods of the Greek insurgents rapidly lapsed into piracy that made the intervention of the Powers inevitable, not in the interests of Greece, but in those of the commerce of all nations.

Two things prevented the effective action of the Porte in crushing the revolt at the outset. The part played by Ali Pasha has already been mentioned. This neutralised the Ottoman power on land. Meanwhile, the revolt of the Greek islands had deprived the Porte of its best recruiting

ground for sailors; and when the Turkish fleet at last left the Dardanelles, manned by a motley collection of Algerine pirates, Genoese mercenaries, and Constantinopolitan quay porters, the clumsy line-of-battle ships, 'adrift in the Archipelago'—as the English seamen put it—were helpless in presence of the agile brigs and fire-ships of the Greeks. The success of the Greek revolt, which so impressed the world, is thus easily accounted for. Even when the fall of Janina and the death of Ali Pasha released the Ottoman army, the struggle was not unequal. The army with which Reshid invaded West Hellas, or that with which Ali Pasha of Drama set out to conquer the Morea, were mere undisciplined hordes of irregular warriors, and, as long as they could keep command of the sea, the Greeks were easily a match for them. It was the failure of the Ottoman fleet to support the Pasha of Drama that led to his retreat, and the extermination of his army in the defiles of Devernaki (August 6, 1822).¹ The heroic defence of Missolonghi was only possible so long as Miaoulis was able to enter the lagoons with supplies. The appearance, in the summer of 1823, of the well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali of Egypt turned the balance of the war at sea, as that of his disciplined army was, next year, to be decisive on land. From this moment the only hope for the Greeks lay in opposing western methods to western methods, and, if they were to be saved, the intervention of the Powers became a necessity.

The attitude of European public opinion toward the Greek revolt at the beginning of the century is in strange contrast with the apathy of a generation which, at its close, is weary of the unsolved riddle of the Eastern Question, and jaded with full newspaper reports of countless massacres. The western world still lay under the glamour of Byron's genius, and even

¹ Cf. *Wellington Despatches*, iii. 115: 'The Greeks have the superiority at sea; and those who have this superiority must be successful.'

the Levantine Greeks, seen through the rosy mist of romanticism, assumed Homeric proportions. Their meannesses were overlooked, their cruelty condoned or glossed over with a classical allusion. They themselves were quick to seize an advantage which was at the same time gratifying to their vanity. Wily savages, like Odysseus of Ithaka, assumed the style and title of antiquity; and the men who afterwards proposed to pull down the Parthenon, and who did pull down the temple of Aphrodite in Ægina, posed ostentatiously before an admiring generation as the protagonists of classic culture against the barbarian. But 'Philhellenism' was not merely a sentiment begotten of romantic enthusiasm. The sympathy of the churches went out to an uprising of persecuted Christians; and, from the political point of view, most important of all, Liberal sentiment, gagged, and bursting to express itself, welcomed the opportunity given 'beyond the pale of civilisation' by a people struggling to be free. It is easy to criticise the uncritical attitude of the Philhellenes, as it is to criticise that of the Emperor Francis on the other side, when he said that the Greek revolt was 'the work of agitators who do not believe in God.' The fact remains that modern Greece owes her existence to a sentiment scarce to be understood by a generation which has begun to despise a classical education. Unaided, the Greeks must have succumbed. But soon, from all parts of Europe, money and volunteers were pouring into Greece. Old officers of Napoleon, like Colonel Fabvier, English officers like Colonel Gordon and Sir Richard Church, brought to the insurgents the help of their swords and of their rich experience. Byron himself came, prepared to give his life, as he had given his name, to the cause which he had made his own, and in which, in spite of grievous disillusionment, he nobly persevered to the end. Long before the Cabinets had made up their minds to essay the first tentative pluckings at the strands of the tangled knot, the public opinion of Europe had drawn the sword with which it was

Influence of
Philhellenic
sentiment on
the Greek
war.

destined to be cut ; and, long before the battle of Navarino, the complaint of the Reis-Effendi was not ill founded that Turkey was fighting, not Greece, but all Europe.

This result was due, in fact, largely to the infatuated policy of the Porte itself. The news of the massacres perpetrated by the Greeks produced at Constantinople, as was natural, a wild cry for retaliation. Sultan Mahmud, enlightened though he occasionally proved, was carried away by a paroxysm of rage. Strenuous exertions were made to fit out a force to crush the rising at its centre. Meanwhile, as this would take time, the Sultan determined, by a signal example, to strike terror into the rebels. According to the law of the Ottoman empire, the Orthodox Patriarch was responsible for the good behaviour of his flock. On the morning of Easter Eve, then, April 22, a decree was issued deposing the Patriarch, and ordering the bishops to proceed at once to the election of a new head of the Church. The Synod, which met immediately after the morning eucharist, had no choice but to obey ; and while the new Patriarch was receiving the investiture of his office, the venerable Gregorios, still in his sacred robes, was led out and hung before the gates of his own palace. The body, after hanging for a day or two, was cut down, dragged by a Jewish rabble through the streets, and finally cast into the Bosphorus.

The execution of the Patriarch was 'worse than a crime ; it was a mistake.' It was intended, and taken, as a gage of defiance flung down to all Christendom. In Russia especially the nation was stirred to its depths. The body of Gregorios had been picked up by a passing Russian merchant vessel, carried to Odessa, and there buried with the honours of a martyr ; and a great cry arose for a crusade to rescue the mother church of the East from her oppressors, to plant the cross once more on the dome of St. Sophia, to restore to the Christian Tsars the city which had never ceased to be known in Russia as *Tsarigrad*, the city of the Cæsars. For a

The execu-
tion of the
Greek Patri-
arch, April
22, 1821.

moment it seemed as though Alexander would be roused from his dream of universal peace, and take up the thread of Russian policy which he had allowed to drop. Had the news found him in the Kremlin, the spirit of the place, the ardour of his people, might easily have wrought upon his impressionable nature, and hurried him into the proclamation of a new crusade. But enthusiasm sickened in the cynical atmosphere of Laibach. Metternich, too, the very 'spirit of denial' of politics, was at his elbow to whisper doubts. So awful a crime as the murder of the Orthodox Patriarch could not, indeed, pass unnoticed by Russia; and the Russian ambassador and his staff were at once withdrawn from Constantinople. But, in the ultimatum which announced the motives of this breach, the broken treaty rights of Russia occupied a greater space than the grievances of the Church or the oppression of the Greeks. Metternich, and those who like him desired peace at any price, hoped with reason that it would still be possible to avert the threatened war.

Russia breaks off diplomatic relations with Turkey.

By the grudging concessions of the Porte, made at the instance of Austria and England, peace was actually preserved—but only for a time. Russia had refused to resume full diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Government unless the massacres were put a stop to; and there was little sign that this would happen. A year had passed since the death of Gregorios when the long series of horrors culminated in the awful massacre of Chios (April 1822), by which the whole of the most peaceful and the most prosperous community in the Archipelago was exterminated. The wholesale character of the crime produced a profound effect on European public opinion, now thoroughly roused; and when, on the night of June 18th, Kanaris steered a fire-ship into the midst of the Turkish fleet, and burned the flagship of the *Capudan-Pasha* with three thousand souls on board, all Christendom hailed the exploit as a glorious victory.

Massacre of Chios and its effect on European opinion.

Public opinion had, however, at that time, even in England, only an indirect influence on the Governments. Foreign policy especially was still the affair of the Cabinets; and the turning-point in the fortunes of the Greeks was, not so much the awakening of the conscience of Europe, as the change produced in English policy by the accession to office of George Canning.

That the sympathies of Canning, as a man of classical culture and a Christian, were with the Greeks is true enough.

Canning and the Greek Question. It is, none the less, a mistake to exaggerate the effect either of his Philhellenism or of his religious prepossessions on his policy in the Eastern Question. As in the affairs of Spain, so now, his attitude was frankly based upon the interests of England. 'Every nation for itself, and God for us all!' was his motto. The interests of England, in his opinion, demanded peace, and, in accordance with the traditional view which he supported, the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey as a bulwark against Russian aggression. His object, then, was in the first place to arrange the quarrel between the Porte and Russia, so as to deprive the latter of any pretext for war; and, secondly, to bring about an understanding between the Ottoman Government and the rebellious *rayahs*, such as should secure the latter against oppression without essentially weakening the Sultan's empire. True to his principle of non-intervention, Canning from the first strenuously denied that there was any obligation on the Powers to interfere to stop 'this horrible war'; and he agreed with Metternich that the cost of such intervention, with its serious risk of an international conflagration, might be greater than the mischief it was intended to cure. It was, then, purely from the point of view of British interests that diplomatic pressure was brought to bear upon the Porte; on the one hand to concede the just demands of Russia; on the other hand, by showing greater moderation towards the rebels, to disarm the anger of the northern Power. The efforts of Lord Strangford, seconded by the

Austrian Internuncio, at Constantinople were in the end successful in persuading the Divan to yield the more important points in dispute with Russia—the evacuation of the Principalities, which since the collapse of Hyspilianti's revolt had been devastated by Turkish troops, and the rights of the Russian flag in the Bosphorus. But the negotiations had, owing to the pride and obstinacy of the Porte, been so dragged on, that when they were at last concluded, the situation had so changed that the concessions were no longer adequate to the end aimed at.¹

The origin of this change was the recognition, on March 25, 1823, by the British Government of the Greeks as belligerents. This measure was dictated, like the rest of Canning's policy, purely by consideration for the interests of England, though he doubtless rejoiced that it made also for the interests of Greece. 'The recognition of the belligerent character of the Greeks was necessitated by the impossibility of treating as pirates a population of a million souls, and of bringing within the bounds of civilised war a contest which had been marked at the outset, on both sides, by disgusting barbarities.'² But, whatever the necessities which had produced this move, it was none the less regarded as a fresh defiance of the collective authority of Europe, and was read rightly by the other Powers as a sign that England in the East was determined to play for her own hand. Alexander again showed signs of restiveness. The British Government had always strongly denied the claim of Russia to a special right of protection over the Oriental Christians.³ What if it were now taking advantage of the Tsar's obligations to the Holy Alliance to steal a march on Russia, and itself set up as the

England
recognises
the Greek
flag, March
25, 1823.

¹ For Lord Strangford's negotiations, see *Wellington Despatches*, ii. 470; Instructions to Strangford, *Ibid.* i. 598-604.

² *Ibid.* ii. 534.

³ Cf. Conversation of Londonderry with Lieven (Martens, xi. 326).

patron and special protector of the Greeks? Once more the question of the joint intervention of the Alliance was mooted, to forestall any such isolated action. In October 1823 the whole matter was discussed at Czernowitz between the Emperors Alexander and Francis. It was soon seen, however, that the great Alliance was rapidly resolving itself into its elements. The action of England in recognising the Greek flag had made a new basis of negotiation inevitable; for it was impossible to regard the insurgents any longer as commonplace rebels against legitimate authority. The reactionary Powers found themselves, in fact, in an *impasse*. The stubborn resistance of the Greeks had ruined Metternich's plan of isolating the war, which the action of the British Government had now brought 'within the pale of civilisation.' That the Powers must intervene in the interests of Europe was now certain. But what form should this intervention take, and to what end should it be directed? To help the Turks crush the rebellion was obviously impossible, even had the Tsar been personally opposed to the sentiment of his people. To take the side of the insurgents would be to give the lie to every principle which had hitherto moulded the policy of the Concert. Canning watched with 'insular' complacency the statesmen of the Alliance floundering in a diplomatic bog from which there was no escape.

Alexander himself was now veering more and more in the direction of the traditional policy of the Tsars; and the war party at St. Petersburg, which had languished since the dismissal of Capo d'Istria (1822), again held up its head. The receipt at Czernowitz of the news of the Turkish concessions somewhat disarmed the Emperor's resentment; and M. de Minciaky was sent to Constantinople, as Russian agent, to watch over the carrying out of the new treaties. It was, however, intimated at the same time that the restoration of full diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte must depend on the satisfaction of still further claims. What

Effect of the
British action
on the Con-
cert of Eu-
rope.

was in Alexander's mind was revealed before he left Czernowitz. He there suggested, informally, a Conference of the Powers at St. Petersburg, to arrange a joint intervention in the affairs of Turkey, on the basis of the erection of Greece and the islands of the Archipelago into three principalities, under Ottoman suzerainty, but guaranteed by the European Concert.¹ The proposal was formally repeated in a Russian circular of January 1824, in which it was pointed out that 'the efforts of the Imperial Government to bring about a collective intervention were the best proof of its disinterestedness.'² Neither Metternich nor Canning shared this view. The former had no desire to see established in the south of the Balkan Peninsula tributary states on the model of the Danubian Principalities, which it was at that time generally supposed would be subject, if not to the formal protection, at any rate to the preponderant influence, of Russia. He replied to the Tsar's game by a sensational countermove, and proposed that negotiations should be opened on the basis of the complete independence of Greece. As for Canning, he objected to sharing in the Conference merely to act as a buffer between the colliding interests of Russia and Austria. The position of England, he maintained, would be stronger watching outside.³ In April, indeed, he so far modified his view as to allow Sir C. Bagot to take part in the Conference, which had meanwhile assembled at St. Petersburg, on condition that no coercion should be applied to Turkey, and that diplomatic relations should have been resumed between Russia and the Porte.⁴ In July Stratford Canning was sent to St. Petersburg; but by November, Canning, owing to the protests of the Ottoman

Alexander I. proposes a joint intervention and the erection of three autonomous Greek states.

England refuses to take part in the Conference.

¹ Prokesch-Osten, *Abfall der Griechen vom Türkischen Reich*, i. 243.

² Martens, xi. 328.

³ Canning to Granville, *George Canning and his Times*, 459.

⁴ Martens, xi. 327; cf. *Wellington Despatches*, ii. 197.

Government, and to the formal refusal of the Greeks to be bound by the decisions of the Conference, finally declined to take part in its deliberations. The last thread was thus severed between England and the continental Alliance. When the discussions on the Russian circular of January 1824 were opened, Bagot withdrew, and the Emperor Alexander declared all negotiations with England on the subject to be closed.

Austria and Russia were thus left fairly face to face; and it was soon seen that the divergence of their views would not allow of any common agreement for really effective action. Metternich, who early in 1825 had made a flying visit to Paris and won over Charles X. to his views, declared through the Austrian plenipotentiary that the Court of Vienna would recognise only one of two alternatives — the complete subjection, or the complete independence, of Greece. With the idea of a group of vassal states he flatly refused to have anything to do; and Russia was equally averse from the setting up of a strong Greek state which might endanger her own influence. The result of the Conference was, then, no more than that, on March 13, it was resolved to offer a joint note to the Porte inviting it to accept the mediation of the Powers in the settlement of the Greek Question. Needless to say, in the absence of any threat of coercion, this proposal was indignantly rejected by the Ottoman Government.

For a while the silence between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg on the Eastern Question remained unbroken, each side awaiting the hour when a suspicious curiosity should lead the other to make the first advances. Canning was the earliest to succumb. The affairs of the East, indeed, had reached a crisis which made it impossible for the Powers any longer to look on with indifference. In the course of 1824 Sultan Mahmud, realising the impossibility of putting down the insurrection by his own unaided forces,

Intervention
of Mehemet
Ali of Egypt
in the affairs
of Greece.
Feb. 1825.

had bent his pride to ask help of his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. The latter had learned in the struggle of the Mamelukes against Napoleon the value of European discipline, and had for some time been gradually forming a well-drilled army and an effective fleet. These he now willingly placed at the service of the Sultan in return for the promise of the sovereignty of Crete, the pashalik of Syria, and possibly the reversion of the Morea for his son Ibrahim. The Greeks, deceived by their easy successes over the undisciplined Turkish hosts, failed to realise the greatness of the danger which threatened them. Their only chance of averting this was to keep the command of the sea, which, with their fast sailing brigs and superior seamanship, they could probably have done. In spite of some successes at the outset, however, they neglected effectively to prevent the Egyptian fleet entering the Archipelago; and in December 1824 Ibrahim, to whom Mehemet Ali had intrusted the supreme command of the expedition, established his base in Crete, within striking distance of the Greek mainland. On February 24, 1825, he landed with an army of four thousand regular infantry and five hundred cavalry at Modon, in the extreme south of the Morea.

From this moment the whole aspect of the war was altered. The Greeks, who could cope well enough with the irregular Ottoman levies, were utterly unable to hold their own against Ibrahim's disciplined fellaheen. Before the year was out, in spite of isolated acts of heroism, the whole of the Peloponnese, save one or two strong places, was at the mercy of the invader, who was credited with the intention of deporting the Greek population and re-peopling the country with Mussulman negroes and Arabs. Only the heroic defenders of the mud ramparts of Missolonghi, hard pressed by the Turks under Reshid Pasha, stood between the Greek race and destruction. And Ibrahim, as soon as his work in the Morea was complete, would march northward, and finish with his seasoned troops what Reshid had failed to achieve.

Ibrahim in
the Morea,
Feb. 1825.

It was under these circumstances that Stratford Canning, the newly-appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg, was authorised, in the summer of 1825, to propose to the Tsar a joint intervention of the Powers, still, however, with the old stipulation that Turkey should not be coerced.¹ Russia, in face of this suggestion, maintained still a diplomatic reticence, desiring to draw England on by the fear that she intended to act alone. The day had gone by for mere 'representations' or offers of mediation to be any use. If the Powers intervened, they must be prepared to follow up their action until its end was attained. The movements of the Tsar increased the general belief that the world was on the eve of a Russo-Turkish war. In the southern provinces of Russia, which had suffered most from the closure of the Bosphorus, a vast army had been gradually concentrated. On August 18, in fact, the Tsar announced his intention of taking the solution of the Eastern Question into his own hands, and immediately afterwards started on a journey to the south of Russia. Canning believed that, 'in a temper of gloomy abstraction,' and deceived by Metternich, Alexander had resolved on war; and the fear that Russia was about to act alone forced him on.² He now opened negotiations with Prince Lieven on the basis of a separate understanding between England and Russia. The 'disloyalty' of Austria, the unreliability of France, the insignificance of Prussia, he argued, made them undesirable allies. But for an understanding between Great Britain and Russia 'the doors were open.' 'The time has come to act,' wrote Lieven; 'M. Canning and I are on the path of confidences.'

The negotiations were interrupted by the unexpected death of the Emperor Alexander, which occurred at Taganrog on December 1, 1825. For some days the uncertainty of the succession made diplomatic calculation impossible. The

¹ Martens, xi. 334, etc.

² Canning to Wellington (*Despatches*, iii. 85).

next heir was Constantine, whose character was in sharp contrast with that of his brother Alexander. 'I deceive myself,' wrote Metternich, 'if the history of Russia does not begin where the romance of Russia ends.'¹ This was true enough, though not in the sense intended. For Constantine had resigned his birthright during his brother's reign; he intended to abide by this decision; and if the Grand Duke Nicholas caused the troops to swear allegiance to Constantine as Tsar, this was only because he feared the consequences should he himself assume the crown without a more public abjuration on his brother's part. The result all but proved fatal to the dynasty. Hardly had the troops taken the oath to Constantine when they were ordered to renew their vows to Nicholas. The opportunity was seized to bring to a head the revolutionary sentiment—wide-spread in court and army. In St. Petersburg, on the 14th of December (O.S.) two regiments declared for Constantine; others were wavering; and, had the leaders acted with resolution, they would have carried all before them. But they hesitated to attack troops which they believed would join them; and when Nicholas, conquering his repugnance, took the initiative, a few rounds of grape dispersed the mutineers.²

Death of
Alexander I.,
Dec. 1, 1825.

The Decab-
rist con-
spiracy.

The accession of the new Tsar, so far from lessening the chance of war, greatly increased it. Alexander had grown life-weary, and disinclined, after the shattering of so many ideals, to embark on yet vaster enterprises. A little thing might yet have turned him from his warlike purposes. But Nicholas was to Alexander as steel to wax. In him the principle of autocracy and the spirit of Holy Russia were incarnate; and though he proclaimed to the world that he intended to walk in the footsteps of his brother, this meant no more than that he was prepared to uphold the Holy Alliance as an instrument for securing the stability of

Nicholas I.

¹ Metternich, iv. 261.

² The true facts of this episode are told for the first time in Schie-mann's *Russland unter Nikolaus I.*, vol. ii. (1908).

legitimate Governments. As for the affairs of the East, these were once more to be treated as 'the domestic concerns of Russia'; his policy toward the Ottoman Power would follow the traditions of Peter the Great and of Catherine.

Never had the Ottoman Empire seemed to British statesmen in more imminent peril. A huge Russian army was concentrated near the frontier; a young, vigorous, and ambitious autocrat sat on the seat of the Tsars; and, more than all, the mutiny at St. Petersburg had shown that a war might be necessary to restore the *morale* of the troops, undermined by hopes too often excited only to be deferred. Canning, therefore, to forestall the isolated intervention of Russia, determined to renew the attempt to arrive at a 'confidential concert' between the two Governments, which had been interrupted by the death of Alexander.¹ One of the obstacles to this course no longer existed. Canning had refused to take part in the Conference of St. Petersburg on the plea that the Greeks had refused to be bound by its decisions. But, meanwhile, the tyranny of Ibrahim had broken the spirit of the Greek leaders; and, in July 1825, they had even offered to place Greece formally under British protection. The offer had been refused, but Stratford Can-

ning, now ambassador at St. Petersburg, had, in
 Conference at Perivolakia, January 1826, met certain of the Greek leaders
 Mission of Wellington to St. Petersburg, Feb. 1826.

on the island of Perivolakia, off Hydra, and ascertained from them the terms on which they were prepared to submit, and which were substantially those which had been suggested by the Emperor Alexander. The objections of Canning to Conferences in general were as strong as ever; but he now proposed to Prince Lieven that the two

Powers should reopen negotiations with a view to intervention in Greek affairs on a new basis. In February 1826 the Duke of Wellington was sent as special envoy to congratulate the new

Tsar on his accession, and at the same time to consolidate relations of amity and alliance between the two countries,

¹ Cf. Canning to Wellington (*Despatches*, iii. 86, 90).

and to arrange the basis of a joint intervention in the affairs of the East.¹ The British advances were cordially received. The Tsar, indeed, was only too willing to enter into an agreement which, without hampering his initiative in the questions immediately at issue with the Porte, committed Great Britain at least in appearance to his views, and would, in the event of war, probably secure her neutrality if not her co-operation. On April 4, 1826, then, was signed the Protocol of St. Petersburg, by which England was empowered to offer to the Porte a settlement of the Greek Question, based on the terms agreed upon at Perivolakia, Russia promising her co-operation 'in any case.' According to this instrument, Greece was to be established as a vassal and tributary state. By another provision it was agreed that, in the event of the Porte refusing the proffered mediation, the signatory states should take the earliest opportunity, either *separately* or in common, of establishing a reconciliation on the basis of the Protocol.²

'Protocol of
St. Peters-
burg' of
April 4, 1826.

This 'feeble and ridiculous production,' as Metternich called it, led to a curious situation. Wellington, whose genius was not diplomatic, had fallen too easily under the influence of Nicholas's charm and had played unconsciously into the hands of Russia. Already, on March 17, in spite of his efforts to prevent it, the Russian Government had despatched an ultimatum to the Porte embodying the separate demands of Russia, that is, the withdrawal of the Ottoman 'police' from the Prin-
cipalities, the release of certain Servian deputies, and the despatch to the frontier of Ottoman Plenipotentiaries with a view to a final settlement. This being so, the Sultan naturally resented the sudden intrusion of an entirely new set of claims. There was little need for Austria to encourage the stubborn resistance of the Turkish Government, and Mahmud hurried on the preparations for the

Russian ul-
timatum to
the Porte.

¹ Canning's Instructions (*Wellington Despatches*, iii. 85).

² Hertslet, i. 129.

long meditated reform of the army. The measures taken to achieve this recoiled, indeed, on the Turks themselves. On June 15 the Janissaries, whose traditional privileges were threatened by the reforms, rose in insurrection. The Sultan, however, was prepared. They were surrounded by masses of Anatolian troops concentrated for the purpose at Constantinople, driven back into their quarters, and cut down to a man. Mahmud was thus freed at a stroke from a military caste which for centuries had tyrannised over his predecessors, and was able unhindered to continue his work of reform. But the destruction of the Janissaries seriously weakened his available forces; and in spite of his resentment at the fresh demands of the Tsar, he was forced to send representatives, in accordance with the ultimatum, to meet those of Russia at Akkerman. Here, on October 7, 1826, an arrangement was come to by which Turkey conceded all the special demands of Russia in respect of outstanding questions in the Danubian Principalities, the navigation of the Straits, and the tenure of certain Circassian fortresses.¹ Full diplomatic relations were now once more resumed between Russia and the Porte.

Meanwhile the general situation had become sensibly modified. Russia noticed with some suspicion that England displayed no anxiety to carry out the Protocol of April 4; while England complained of the attempt of Russia to force her hand by a premature revelation of its contents to the other Powers. Canning, indeed, wished to keep the Protocol in reserve in case the Porte were finally to reject the separate mediation of England; and Russia began to suspect that the British Cabinet had throughout merely aimed at postponing the evil day of a Russian armed intervention. As early as June Prince Lieven was instructed to press the English Government as to its intentions. The plans of Ibrahim for the depopulation of the Morea were notorious.

¹ Hertslet, i. 131.

What measures, in face of this situation, did England propose to take?¹ The attitude of English Ministers seemed to justify the Russian suspicions. Wellington denied that the intention to depopulate the Morea had been proved; he declared that the object of the Protocol was purely 'pacific,' aiming at most at the eventual intervention of a Concert of the Powers, and that Great Britain had consistently objected to forcing a mediation on the Porte.² A weary diplomatic correspondence between the chancelleries of Europe followed. Metternich was irreconcilable. Berlin but echoed the platitudes of Vienna. But Charles x. was prepared to take part in a holy war against the infidel.³ At the beginning of September, Canning thought it safe to venture a step forward. On August 29 he had informed the Russian ambassador that the situation had been materially altered by a formal application on the part of the Greek provisional Government for the mediation of Great Britain on the basis of terms agreed upon at Perivolakia; and on September 4, in a note to the Russian Government, he proposed that England should point out to the Sultan that 'the sentiments of humanity and the interests of commerce' necessitated his acceptance of her mediation, as proposed by the Greeks, the Protocol of April 4 being at the same time quoted to prove that this course was being followed in entire harmony with Russia. Should the Porte reject this mediation, the ambassadors of the two Powers were to be withdrawn from Constantinople, their consuls established in Greece, and possibly the independence of the Morea and the islands of the Ægean recognised.⁴ The Tsar accepted this proposal, with some slight modifications, as the basis of common action.⁵ He suggested at the same time

Russia and
England
agree on com-
mon action.

¹ Martens, xi. 345; also, *Questions relatives au Protocole du quatrièmè Avril*, 1826; *Well. Desp.* iii. 358.

² *Ibid.* iii. 362.

³ Damas to Granville (Prokesch, Appendix, vii. 27).

⁴ Stapleton, iii. 262; Martens, xi. 346; *Well. Desp.* iii. 396.

⁵ *Well. Desp.* iii. 459.

that an armistice should be insisted on, so as to save the Christians from extermination; and that the best way of enforcing this, without declaring war, would be that proposed by Canning himself, namely, to isolate Ibrahim in the Morea by cutting off his connections with his base of supplies in Egypt. This could be done by a reunion of the fleets of all the Powers sharing in the pacification of Greece.

In the spring of 1827 a new effort was made to bring about an agreement between all the Powers interested in the Eastern Question. In his despatch of September 4, Canning had expressed the hope that the accession of the other Powers to the arrangement under the Protocol of April 4 would be the first instance of a combined appeal to the Porte on the part of the Quintuple Alliance.¹ But the Conference opened at London only emphasised the irreconcilable differences which had split up the Alliance. To the protests of Austria and Prussia against the whole policy of intervention 'to serve revolutionary ends,' followed by their formal withdrawal from the Conference, France replied by suggesting, as early as January 1827, the conversion of the Protocol into a formal treaty. Russia agreed on the condition that the ultimate appeal should be to force. 'We are invited,' wrote Nesselrode, 'to sanction a principle. We invite to the recognition of its consequences.'² But Canning still objected to making the rejection by the Porte of the offer of mediation a *casus belli*. It was only after the Protocol, presented to the Sultan on April 4, 1827, by the Russian and English ambassadors, had been indignantly rejected as an impertinent interference in the private concerns of Turkey and as irreconcilable with the precepts of the Koran, that Canning saw the necessity, as the only way of holding Russia to the spirit of the Protocol and of preventing her from invading Turkey on her own account, of forestalling her by applying coercive measures to the Porte. This change in the attitude of English statesmen was simultaneous with a crisis in the British Cabinet. Early

¹ *Well. Desp.* iii. 398.

² Martens, xi. 350.

in 1827 Lord Liverpool had been forced through illness to retire from public life. Canning had become prime Minister and Lord Dudley had taken over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Canning's attitude in the Eastern Question had long been more than suspect to some of his colleagues. In April, Wellington, who had opposed the conversion of the Protocol of St. Petersburg into a treaty, who was more and more averse from any coercion of Turkey, and who suspected the Government of an intention to depart from the traditions of Lord Liverpool, especially in the matter of Catholic emancipation, refused a seat in the new Cabinet, and threw himself into open opposition to the policy of Russia.¹

Wellington
retires from
the Govern-
ment.

The repudiation by Wellington of the natural consequences of the Protocol which he himself had negotiated did not produce its effect till after the death of Canning; and, for the present, the Eastern policy of the Tory Cabinet followed a course opposed to the Tory tradition. On July 6, 1827, the Protocol of St. Petersburg was converted into the Treaty of London, Austria and Prussia refusing to sign as a protest against the threat of force. By this instrument the three signatory Powers bound themselves to secure the autonomy of Greece, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but without breaking off friendly relations with the Porte. By additional secret articles it was agreed that, in the event of the Ottoman Government refusing to accept the offer of mediation, 'commercial relations' by means of consuls should be established with the Greeks; that an armistice should be proposed to both parties; and that this should be enforced by all the means that might 'suggest themselves to the prudence' of the High Contracting Parties. Instructions were to be sent to the admirals of the Allied Powers in Levantine waters, to whom a wide discretion was necessarily allowed. In general, it was suggested that a 'pacific' blockade of Ibrahim in the Morea, according to

Treaty of
London of
July 6, 1827.

¹ *Well. Desp.* iii. 629; I. I, etc.

the plan already proposed, would be the readiest means of bringing him to terms.¹

On August 16, the ambassadors of the three Powers presented a joint note to the Porte calling on it to arrange an armistice with the Greeks, and threatening, in case of refusal, to use all means necessary to enforce it. In face of this determined attitude of the Powers, the Porte wavered; and Metternich tried a last move to save the crumbling edifice of his policy. There was some hope that he might yet achieve his object. The death of Canning on August 8 August, 1827. had removed the most dangerous of his antagonists, 'the man whom Providence hurled upon England and Europe like a malevolent meteor.' The Emperor Nicholas did not disguise his regret that, drawn on by the imperious necessities of Russian policy in the East, he should have been forced to sign the Treaty of London without two of his brother sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, with the conservative principles of which he declared himself still religiously in sympathy; and as for the Greeks, he protested that he hated and abhorred them as 'subjects in open revolt against their legitimate sovereign.'² Under these circumstances it seemed to Metternich that the situation, from the Austrian point of view, might still be saved if the Porte could be persuaded to invite the good offices of Austria, and at the same time make it clear to the intervening Powers that it was the method, and not the ground, of their proposals that it resented.³ On October 20, a letter embodying the Austrian proposal was received at Constantinople. But whatever chance of success it might ever have had, it was too late; for on the afternoon of October 20 the fate of Greece had already been decided in the Bay of Navarino.

The Treaty of London had been communicated to the French and English admirals at Smyrna on August 11. They were empowered to part the combatants by peaceful means

¹ Hertslet, i. 769.

² Metternich, iv. 489.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 402; Prokesch, Appendix, viii. 32.

if possible, by force if necessary. Admiral Codrington at once sailed for Nauplia, where the armistice was gladly accepted by the Greek Government. By the Turks, however, it was scornfully rejected; a naval expedition was fitted out to reduce the island strongholds of Hydra and Spezzia; while, at the same time, an Egyptian armada of ninety-two ships set sail from Alexandria, and, before Codrington could intercept it, succeeded in joining the Ottoman fleet in the Bay of Navarino (September 7). Five days later Codrington arrived, and informed the Turkish admiral that any attempt on his part to leave the bay would be resisted by force. On the arrival of Admiral de Rigny with the French squadron, the terms of the treaty were communicated to Ibrahim, who undertook not to leave the bay, pending the arrival of instructions from the Sultan. Upon this the admirals withdrew, leaving a couple of guard-ships to watch the movements of the Turks. The Greeks, meanwhile, having accepted the armistice, were free to carry on hostilities. On September 23, a Greek flotilla, under Captain Hastings, destroyed a Turkish squadron off Salona. Ibrahim, holding this to be a breach of the Convention, sailed out of the Bay of Navarino to avenge the disaster. Codrington, warned by the guard-ships, intercepted the Turkish squadron and turned it back. On reaching Navarino, Ibrahim found his instructions, which were to defy the Powers and to remain where he was. Columns of smoke from burning villages were to the admirals the signal of his defiance.

Battle of
Navarino,
October 20,
1827.

The fleets of all three Powers were now assembled; and the admirals held a council of war, at which it was decided to present another ultimatum to Ibrahim, demanding fresh securities, the return home of the Egyptian and Ottoman fleets, the cessation of hostilities on land, and the evacuation of the Morea. To this communication an evasive answer was returned; and Codrington, as senior admiral in command, decided to make a demonstration by entering the Bay of

Navarino. A battle was not intended; but all precautions were taken in the event of one becoming inevitable. On the morning of October 20, the allied fleets, without interference from the Turkish forts, sailed into the bay and took up positions opposite that of the Mussulmans. The refusal of the Turks to move some fire-ships which threatened the allied line led to an altercation, in which shots were exchanged, and the battle soon became general. Before nightfall Ibrahim's armada was completely destroyed.¹

The effect of the battle of Navarino was immense. Ibrahim, indeed, in spite of the destruction of his fleet, still defiantly held out. But 'for Europe,' in the words of Metternich, 'the event of October 20 began a new era.' Russia had already proposed to meet the refusal of the Porte to accept the mediation of the Powers by 'vigorous measures,' and had threatened that, should the other allies refuse to follow her, she would act alone, as, by the terms of Art. III. of the Protocol of April 4, 1826, she was entitled to do.² But the death of Canning had removed the firm hand of a statesman from the helm of British affairs. Goderich, the new Premier, was the incarnation of political weakness; Dudley, the Foreign Secretary, of political timidity. They disliked the treaty of July 6, which had been carried through by the masterful will of Canning; and, in reply to the Russian proposals, they refused to consider even the expediency of an effective blockade of the coasts of Greece. In this refusal they were supported by France. The news, then, that Codrington, without awaiting instructions, had shattered at a blow the Ottoman sea-power produced something like a panic in the British Cabinet. This the attitude of Russia was not calculated to allay. Nicholas, who regarded the victory of Navarino as a proof

¹ For events leading up to the battle, see *Memoir of Sir E. Codrington*, vol. ii. Appendix, p. 585. For Ibrahim's version, see *Well. Desp.* iv. 141.

² See p. 151, *supra*.

of the unity of the three Powers, proposed to follow up the blow by marching an army into the Danubian Principalities, and suggested that the maritime Powers should force the Dardanelles and compel the Sultan to agree to the terms of the Treaty of London. But the British Cabinet was quite incapable of any vigorous policy. Though Wellington, after reading the official report of the action, expressed himself satisfied with Codrington's conduct; and though the Cabinet decided to persist in the policy of the Treaty of July, they still refused to believe that the traditional friendly relations between England and Turkey had been hopelessly compromised.¹ The battle of Navarino was referred to in the king's speech as 'an untoward event,' which, however, it was hoped would not disturb the harmonious relations between His Majesty's Government and that of the Sultan. If these hopes were genuine, they were soon destroyed. The Porte, in answer to the somewhat timid excuses of the allied Powers, protested against the 'revolting outrage' committed in time of peace on a friendly Power, and claimed compensation and an apology. These were refused, even by the British Government, on the plea that the Turks had been the aggressors in attacking a fleet entering a friendly harbour in time of peace! Some further useless discussion followed; but the breach with the Porte was irreparable, and the ambassadors of the three Powers withdrew from Constantinople.

All this time the wrath of Sultan Mahmud had been with difficulty restrained; and no sooner had the ambassadors retired than it burst forth with untempered violence. On December 20 a solemn *hatti-sheriff* was issued, enlarging on the cruelty and perfidy of the Christian Powers, and summoning the faithful to a holy war against the unbelievers. Russia especi-

The Sultan
proclaims a
Holy War,
Dec. 20, 1827.

¹ Cf. Conversation of Dudley with Lieven in Martens, xi. 366; Note of Dudley in Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 3. So, too, Sir R. Peel, *Peel Papers*, ii. 35.

ally was singled out for denunciation ; and the recently concluded Treaty of Akkerman was declared null and void.¹

The Sultan repudiates his treaties with Russia and proclaims a Holy War.

The opportunity and the excuse for which Russia had so long been waiting had come at last. After this formal renunciation of Turkey's treaty obligations towards her, it was impossible for the other Powers to resent her declaring war on her own account. The Tsar attempted to allay the suspicions of France and England by declaring that, in occupying the Principalities, he had in view, not conquest, but the carrying out of the Treaty of London, and by signing, on December 12, 1827, a protocol whereby the Powers agreed that, in the event of war, none of them should derive from it any exclusive benefits, whether commercial or territorial.² This 'sterile' declaration did little to relieve the anxiety of the British Cabinet: the less so since, on December 26, a despatch of Count Nesselrode announced that if the Allies would not allow the Tsar 'to merge his special grievances in the general cause,' he would act alone '*selon ses convenances et intérêts.*'³

In January 1828 Wellington had succeeded Goderich ; and the majority of the Cabinet were now opposed to continuing the policy of Canning, as contrary to the interests of England in the East, which required the maintenance of an independent and powerful Turkey. In vain the French Government urged Wellington to prevent the isolated action of Russia by 'following up' the Treaty of July 6. The duke replied that any further violence done to Turkey would lead to a general revolt of the subject races and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. He would adhere to the Treaty of London, but was only prepared to carry it through by peaceful means. When, therefore, on January 6, a Russian despatch announced the intention of the Tsar to occupy the Principalities during the

¹ Text in Prokesch, Appendix, viii. 44.

² Text in Martens, ix. 381.

³ *Well Desp.* iv. 303.

following March, with or without the consent of England, the British Cabinet strongly protested against a course which would, it declared, entail the collapse of Turkey and the outbreak of a European war.¹

Toward the middle of March the danger of a catastrophe seemed imminent. The Conference of London was broken up, the policy of Canning to all appearance hopelessly wrecked. But all the Powers were equally anxious to avoid a general war, to the prevention of which their efforts had been for years devoted. Russia least of all desired to provoke a struggle in which she would stand isolated in opposition to all Europe; for, in the words of Prokesch-Osten, the Eastern Question, as far as Turkey was concerned, was a question between Russia and the rest of Europe. Moreover, in the councils of the Tsar voices were now being raised in criticism of the traditional policy of Peter the Great and Catherine towards the Porte. To break up the Ottoman Empire would certainly be dangerous, and, possibly, in the end of doubtful value. It was altogether to Russia's advantage to have a weak state on her southern frontier, and all she really needed was to keep open the gates of the Black Sea to her commerce. This being so, her true policy would be to humour the Powers by joining them in upholding the integrity of Turkey, while aiming at securing supreme influence at Constantinople. Here, then, was a basis for compromise. In a despatch of February 14, Nesselrode, indeed, announced to the Powers that war was inevitable. The repudiation by the Porte of treaties but recently concluded, the closure of the Dardanelles and consequent ruin of Russian trade, the intrigues of the Ottoman Government in Persia, and the proclamation of a holy war, left no other course open to the Tsar. But Russia, while making war for the redress of her just grievances, invited the Powers to use her intention of doing so in order to

Modified
attitude of
Russia in
the Eastern
Question,
1827.

¹ *Well. Desp.* iv. 280, and *Memoir of Wellington*, p. 310.

carry out the Treaty of London, which she would, in any event, make her basis.¹ Moreover, in order to disarm the suspicions and fears of her allies, she undertook not to carry the war into the Mediterranean, which was to be declared neutral. The move was an astute one. Wellington was unable to deny the right of Russia to make war; he could only deny that the refusal of the allies to follow her in her isolated aims would justify her in breaking away from the Treaty and settling the Eastern Question '*selon ses convenances et intérêts.*'² As long, then, as she proclaimed her adherence to the Treaty, Russia could attack Turkey without fearing any active opposition from the Powers. The Treaty had, in fact, as Lord Aberdeen pointed out, been made an instrument for the defeat of its own ends. It was no longer a case of Russia co-operating with England and France to establish a qualified independence of Greece, but of England and France co-operating with Russia in her war with Turkey and aiding her to accomplish those very designs which the Treaty had been, in part, intended to obviate.³ Fortune had certainly so far favoured Russia. Her ultimate triumph would depend upon the success of her arms in the coming campaign.

The Russian army crossed the Pruth on May 6, 1828, the first stage in what all Europe believed would be a 'military promenade' to Constantinople. But, once more, the 'Sick Man' showed unexpected signs of vitality. Once more the incompetence of the Ottoman commanders was outbalanced by the bravery of their troops, and the intention of the Tsar to push the war to a speedy conclusion was far from being realised. It cost the Russians two hardly-fought campaigns before General Diebitsch was able to dictate terms to the Ottoman Government at Adrianople. Meanwhile, the other Powers

Opening of
the Russo-
Turkish War,
May 1828.

¹ Despatch of Nesselrode (*Well. Desp.* iv. 280).

² *Ibid.* iv. 310.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 313.

tried to take advantage of the unexpected reverses of the Russian arms to settle the Greek Question before the end of the war, and so to blunt the edge of the Tsar's inevitable victory. The Conference had reassembled in London; and it was proposed in it, as a countermove to the Russian declaration of war, actively to interpose in order to secure the evacuation of the Morea.¹ Russia herself had no objection to a course which would create a valuable diversion on the flank of her enemy; and England agreed, on condition that she should not be asked to take part in the coercion of her ancient ally. It was, then, decided on July 19, 1828, that France should send an expedition to the Morea, a duty which the Government of Charles x., sadly in need of military prestige to cover its growing unpopularity, gladly undertook.² Before, however, the French expedition under Gen-^{French}eral Maison could reach the Morea, Codrington ^{expedition to the Morea.} had already settled the matter. A naval demonstration before Alexandria gave Mehemet Ali the excuse for withdrawing betimes from a situation which was rapidly becoming perilous; and, on August 9, he signed with the British Admiral a Convention arranging for an exchange of prisoners and the immediate evacuation of the Morea. The French troops, on disembarking at Modon, found that their sole task would be to keep order in the country till its fate should have been definitively settled by the Powers.

Inside the councils of the Alliance, meanwhile, the relations of the Powers were being sensibly modified by the progress of the war. In her anxiety to neglect no means of overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Turks, Russia, in the summer of 1829, had modified her attitude ^{Russia block-}toward the neutrality of the Mediterranean so far ^{ades the} as to proclaim a blockade of the Dardanelles. ^{Dardanelles.} A loud outcry arose in England against what was denounced

¹ *Well. Desp.* iv. 526. Wellington thought that, were the Greek Question settled, Russia would gladly make peace.

² Text in Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 21.

as at once a breach of faith and a menace to English commerce, and for a time diplomatic relations between Russia and Great Britain were considerably strained. One result of this was the renewal of relations between the Court of Vienna and the British Cabinet. Metternich had by this time fully realised the impossibility of restoring the old *régime* in Greece, and renewed his proposition of an independent Hellas, a settlement which, he said, would be more welcome both to the Porte and to Europe than the erection of a vassal state, which would lead to the constant intervention of outside Powers in the internal affairs of Turkey.¹ Wellington was, however, loth to take any course which might imperil the restoration of the traditional amity between England and the Porte. He moved indeed in the direction of the emancipation of Greece, but unwillingly, and drawn on by the current of events. On November 16, 1828, a protocol of the London Conference placed the Morea, with the neighbouring islands and the Cyclades, under the guarantee of the Powers; and this agreement was followed, on March 22, 1829, by a further protocol which, by extending the frontier to the line of Arta-Volo, included in Hellas a large part of continental Greece—which had meanwhile been cleared of the Turks by the expedition of Sir Richard Church to Acarnania²—and also the important island of Euboea. According to this arrangement, Greece was still to be a tributary state, but autonomous, and governed by an hereditary prince chosen by the Powers.³

Even this protocol, which was very far from satisfying the Greeks, had only been signed by Aberdeen with reluctance, and under conditions which, but for the pressure of events, would have made it abortive. But while the Powers were still hesitating and talking, the war in the Balkan peninsula,

¹ Metternich, iv. 461, 466, 494.

² In my *War of Greek Independence*, p. 308, I have not done sufficient justice to the decisive part played by Church in this settlement (see *Well. Desp.* v. 57).

³ Hertslet, ii. 804.

so full of surprises, came to a surprising end ; and, on September 14, was signed the Peace of Adrianople, which marked another halting-place in the victorious advance of Russia in the East.

This result was itself due rather to the audacious genius of the Russian commander than to the fortunes of the war. Diebitsch, with an army of some thirteen thousand men, had pressed on over the Balkans, leaving in his rear the unconquered armies of the Grand Vizier and the Pasha of Skutari. The very rashness of his strategy ensured his success. Though his force was greatly outnumbered by those opposed to it and was daily reduced by disease, the Turks believed it to be the van of the whole Russian army. Adrianople surrendered at the first feint of an assault that would never have been delivered ; and Diebitsch, installed in the ancient palace of the Sultans, proceeded to threaten Constantinople itself in the tone of a conqueror. Had the Turks procrastinated for a week or so the issue would have been different ; for the small Russian force was rapidly wasting away with disease. But of this the Turkish Government was ignorant ; it feared a rising of the disaffected elements in the capital in the event of a Russian advance ; and to save the Ottoman empire from what seemed otherwise inevitable ruin, the Turkish plenipotentiaries, on September 14, 1829, signed with Russia the Treaty of Adrianople.¹ True to his undertaking, the Tsar stipulated for no territorial increase in Europe ; but the Danubian principalities were erected into practically independent states, and so, presumably, more open to Russian influence than heretofore. The treaty rights of Russia in the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were once more confirmed ; and the affairs of Greece were arranged by the inclusion in the treaty of the terms of the protocol which had been signed at the Conference of London on March 22.²

The news of the Peace of Adrianople, and more especially

¹ The latest and most authentic account is in Schiemann, *Russland unter Nikolaus I.*, vol. ii. (1908).

² Hertslet, ii. 313.

of the fact that Russia, by including the March Protocol, had stolen the sole credit for the settlement of the Greek claims, produced something like a panic among the Powers. Wellington declared that the Turkish Power in Europe no longer existed, and that, this being so, it was absurd to talk of bolstering it up. In any case, since the Russian occupation of the principalities made Turkey to all intents and purposes a province of Russia, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was no longer of supreme importance to England.¹ Wellington, accordingly, was won over to Metternich's view, that Greece must be erected into a State independent of Turkey, and therefore independent of Russia; a State bound, moreover, by ties of gratitude, not to the Tsar, who had obtained for her no more than the terms which she had indignantly rejected, but to those Western Powers, from whom she was now to receive her liberty without conditions. On February 3, 1830, was signed at London a new protocol embodying the views of the British Government. Its terms showed that England had not abandoned all hope that the moribund 'sick man' might yet recover, and was reluctant to create a new Power which might imperil a consummation so devoutly to be wished. Greece, indeed, was to be erected into an independent State, under Leopold of Coburg as 'sovereign prince,' but the generous frontiers of the March Protocol were again contracted, and instead of the Greece of Pan-Hellenic dreams, a mere fragment of Hellas was restored to liberty.² In recommending this settlement it was the deliberate intention of the British Government to leave Greece at the mercy of the Porte.³ Count Capodistrias,⁴ however, who, since the period of the battle of Navarino, had ruled Greece as practical dictator, refused to accept the Protocol of February 3, as he had rejected that of March

¹ *Well. Desp.* vi. 192, 228.

² Hertslet, ii. 841.

³ Cf. Aberdeen to Wellington (*Desp.* vi. 175).

⁴ Capo d'Istria 'Hellenised' his name thus on becoming Greek president.

22. Prince Leopold, too, resigned his candidature, on the plea that his position would, under the terms of the Protocol, be intolerable. The Powers were compelled to make yet further concessions. Many reasons made a final and satisfactory settlement absolutely imperative. The revolution in Paris, which hurled Charles x. from his throne, raised questions even more vital than the affairs of the East; and, in the face of these new problems, it was felt that any arrangement of the Greek Question would be better than none. Greece, meanwhile, had lapsed into a more hopeless anarchy than ever. Capodistrias, who at least had ruled with a firm hand, had been assassinated; and the whole country was now being harried and wasted by armed factions struggling for the mastery. It was found practically impossible to curb the anarchy by 'instructions' from London, and the erection of a stable Government became indispensable. In November 1830 the Tory ministry of Wellington had been swept away by the rising tide of reform; and it was Palmerston who, in the name of the new Whig Cabinet, signed, on September 26, 1831, a protocol conceding to the Greek State the frontier of Arta-Volo, for which he had pleaded when in opposition. The crown of Greece was, at the same time, offered to, and accepted by, Otto, second son of King Louis of Bavaria, a youth of seventeen. King Louis stipulated that his son should be King, and not Sovereign Prince, of Greece, and that an adequate loan should be guaranteed by the Powers to enable him to carry on the government. On May 7, 1832, more than a decade after the outbreak of the Greek revolt, the treaty was finally signed which added a new Christian kingdom to the states' system of Europe.¹ On January 28, 1833, Otto, first king of Greece, landed at Nauplia to attempt, with the aid of Bavarian officials and Bavarian mercenaries, the task of moulding a race of Klephts and herdsmen into a civilised people.

The Kingdom of Greece, Sept. 1832.

¹ Hertslet, ii. 893.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REVOLUTION OF JULY 1830

Effect of the Greek War on the Concert—It does not shake the 'Treaties'—These are threatened by events in France—Origins of the July Revolution—Progress of the reaction under Louis XVIII.—Accession of Charles X.—Struggle between the bourgeois and landed noblesse—Retirement of Villèle—Moderate Ministry of Martignac—It is attacked by the two extreme parties—The king condemns compromise—Polignac Ministry—Orleanist party—Breach between the Chambers and the Crown—The Ordinances—July Revolution—Its effect on the Alliance.

THE political system, based on the treaties of 1814 and 1815, of which the foundations had been shattered by the long drawn-out rivalries of the Eastern Question, remained in theory still intact. The affairs of Turkey had been excluded from the arrangements made at Vienna, which formed the basis of the international relations of the European states. The territorial rearrangements in the east of Europe, then, had done nothing to alter the treaties. Wellington, indeed, had proposed, and Russia had for the moment agreed, to include the new kingdom of Greece, by a special act, in the states' system guaranteed by the Grand Alliance, and even to extend this guarantee to the Ottoman Empire in general. But no formal step was taken. Greece remained under the ægis of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of London; while Russia, since the Treaty of Adrianople, guarded the more jealously her isolated hold on the Turkish Empire. The dreaded breach of the treaties of 1815, and the definite split in the Alliance, were due, not to the Eastern Question, but to a crisis in the internal affairs of France.

To trace the origins of the revolution which excluded the elder line of the House of Bourbon finally from the throne of France, it is necessary to go back to the last years of the reign of Louis XVIII., during which the tendencies represented by his successor were already beginning to predominate in the French Government. The accession of Villèle to power had in itself seemed to mark a triumph of the reaction; of the aristocracy over the bourgeoisie; of the old *régime* over the Revolution. Villèle himself, it is true, though associated with the policy of the 'Congregation,' towered as a statesman head and shoulders above the fanatics of the *parti prêtre*; but, unsupported by the king, now almost in his dotage, he was swept away by the reactionary current, of which he saw the danger, but which he was unable to stem. The Spanish campaign had raised the courage of the Legitimists by proving that the army was to be trusted. The electoral law of 1820 had purged the Chamber in a reactionary sense; the elections of 1824 returned an immense majority for the Government; while the Septennial Act just passed secured this for many years to come. Liberalism in the representative assembly of France was reduced to a miserable remnant. Under these circumstances the death of Louis XVIII. and the accession of the leader of the Ultras as Charles X. seemed to produce little effect. The first acts of the new king even raised the hopes of the Liberals, or at least allayed their worst fears. But the reactionary tendency of the Government was soon accentuated. The *émigrés* were at last awarded the compensation for which they had so long clamoured. The Church, too, claimed and received much of the old ascendancy which the wisdom of Louis XVIII. had kept within bounds. And with each new encroachment the opposition grew. The wealthy bourgeoisie, monarchist to a man, resented the airs and pretensions of the noblesse; resented, too, the conversion at their expense of the five per cent. *rentes*, though

France,
Villèle
Ministry.

Accession of
Charles X.,
Sept. 16, 1824.

this was justified by the prosperity of the country. Galliganism grew alarmed at the activity of the Jesuits and the rapid growth of Ultramontaniam. Liberalism no longer found itself without allies in the Chambers; and the House of Peers began to oppose an impassable barrier to the policy of the Government. Ministers, failing to persuade, tried coercion, proposed to curtail the rights of the press, and dismissed officials who dared to oppose them. They closed the *École Normale* as a centre of sedition, and even threatened to abolish trial by jury. Paris grew violently excited; the royal princesses complained that insults were hurled at them in the streets; and when, on April 29, 1825, the king reviewed the National Guard, he was met from the ranks with cries of 'Down with the ministers!' His reply was to issue next day, on the advice of the ministers, a decree disbanding the citizen army.

In face of the gathering opposition Villèle tried one last stroke. At the beginning of 1827 an ordinance was issued re-establishing the censorship of the press. The creation of seventy-six new peers swamped the Liberal opposition in the Upper House; and the dissolution of the Chamber would, it was hoped, result in the return of a safe majority for the Government. The elections of 1827 were not without ominous signs. Riotous crowds collected in the streets of Paris; and when the cavalry sought to disperse them, they found refuge behind scaffolding and waggons. Thus, by accident, the *sansculottes* of Paris learned the art of making barricades, which had not been seen in the capital since the Fronde.

When the new Chambers assembled, it was found that a large majority had been returned in opposition to the ministry. Villèle resigned, and was succeeded by M. de Martignac, who attempted to return to the conciliatory policy of Decazes. Charles was prepared, though unwillingly, to consent to make trial

Reaction and
unrest in
France, 1824-
1829.

Martignac
Ministry,
1829.

of a policy of compromise. In the speech from the throne, in which he opened the session of 1829, he declared that the happiness of France lay 'in the sincere union of the royal authority with the liberties consecrated by the Charter.' But he had neither the wisdom nor the patience of Louis XVIII., which alone would have allowed him to play, outwardly at least, the part of a constitutional king. 'I would rather hew wood,' he exclaimed, 'than be a king on the conditions of the king of England.' When, therefore, the Liberal Opposition refused to follow a ministry which was not the outgrowth of the parliamentary majority, but of the royal will, he lost patience. 'I told you,' he said in April, 'there was no coming to terms with these men.' He had tried compromise; henceforward he would cast conciliation to the winds and rule as a king. The Budget being passed, and the session closed, he dismissed the ministry of Martignac, and called to his councils the French ambassador in London, Prince Jules de Polignac, the very incarnation of clericalism, and beau ideal of the old régime.

It was a defiance, not only of the Revolution, but of the Powers, who had guaranteed the charter of liberties as the best prophylactic against violent change. Europe stood aghast. 'There is no such thing as political experience,' wrote Wellington. 'With the warning of James II. before him, Charles X. was setting up a government by priests, through priests, for priests.' The French people knew what was coming, and found a voice to protest. 'The people will pay a milliard to the law,' said the *Journal des Débats*, on August 10, 1829; 'they will not pay a million to the ordinances of a minister. With the illegal taxes will be born a Hampden to break them.' Societies to resist illegal taxation were formed. Agitators, the indefatigable Lafayette at their head, toured the country. In the house of Talleyrand veteran statesmen of the Empire, like Baron Louis, forgathered with rising stars of journalism, like

Polignac
Ministry,
April 1830.

Mignet and Thiers, to form the nucleus of an Orleanist party. The fertile imagination of Frenchmen sought for historical parallels to illuminate the situation. In the days of 1814 Monk, Duke of Albemarle, had been on every one's lips. The talk was now of the Revolution of 1688, of William of Orange, and of the parliamentary monarchy. But the king and his ministers were incapable of being warned by the lessons of the past or the symptoms of the present. For them the uncompromising opposition to the Government in the Chambers was but a sign of criminal wrongheadedness. In the speech from the throne which opened the session of 1830, the king declared that he would 'find the power' to surmount the obstacles placed in his path by 'culpable manœuvres.' The reply of the Chambers was a dignified protest against 'the unjust distrust of the sentiment and reason of France,' which was now 'the fundamental idea of the Administration.' 'It afflicts you people,' continued the Address, 'because it is insulting to them; and excites their anxiety, because it threatens their liberties.' For answer, the king prorogued the Chambers. It was no longer the ministry, but the monarchy, that was in question.

The Government was confirmed in its attitude by successes abroad which would, it was hoped, cover the unpopularity of its policy at home. On May 25, an expedition under the Minister of War, General Bourmont, sailed for Algiers, ostensibly to punish the Dey for an insult offered to the Consul of France. France had, in fact, long dreamed of establishing her power on both sides of the Mediterranean; and she was now glad of an excuse which would disarm the effective opposition of the Powers. The Moorish states on the north coast of Africa were technically Turkish provinces; and the policy of the French Cabinet was to disarm the suspicions of Europe and to legalise its action, by obtaining the mandate of the Porte to interfere, and by inviting the co-operation of Mehemet Ali of Egypt. This would have

French
Invasion of
Algiers, May
1830.

served the double object of depriving the expedition of any suspicion of being a crusade, and of establishing French influence on the Nile. The British Government took alarm. It could not, of course, object to a punitive expedition against a monarch who had dared to flick his feather-fan in the face of a French consul ; but it succeeded, by diplomatic pressure, in preventing Mehemet Ali from sharing in the enterprise, and protested beforehand against any attempt of France to found a colonial empire on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The conversion of this sea into a French lake seemed to Wellington, anxious for the trade routes to India, a danger so threatening as to outweigh the argument that every French colony over sea was but one more hostage in the hands of British naval power. The French expedition, then, was allowed to sail, on the assurance being given that France had no intention of colonising Africa. On July 4, the power of the Dey was overthrown. Fresh lustre had been shed upon the arms of France ; the inglorious outcome of the expedition to the Morea was forgotten ; and in Paris the press began to indulge in pæans of triumph over the foundation of the new French empire in Africa.

Polignac, in anticipation of the French successes, had dissolved the Chambers on May 16, and appealed to the country. The news of the final conquest of Algiers, however, reached France too late to have much influence on the elections ; and in any case it is doubtful whether it would have altered the verdict of the constituencies. ‘ Had I a voice of iron and a hundred tongues,’ wrote Baron Matuszewic on May 24, ‘ I could not repeat to you what is said by men the most monarchical of the incapacity of this ministry, of its audacious feebleness, and the woes it is preparing.’ In the new Chambers the Opposition was largely increased. If the king were obstinate, the path of constitutional change was closed.

By Article xiv. of the Charter the king was empowered to make ordinances and regulations necessary for the security of the realm. Persuaded by his ministers, Charles believed,

or affected to believe, that the occasion had now arisen, owing to the 'culpable manœuvres' of the parties. On July 25, then, he issued four ordinances, suspending the liberty of the press, dissolving the Chambers, summoning a new Parliament, and altering the franchise by which this was to be elected. With singular fatuity the Government had made no preparations to support this arbitrary action by force. Opposition, indeed, seemed the last thing expected, though the revolution was foreseen by all the world, and both the Tsar and Metternich had besought the king not to drive matters to extremities. In all Paris were only some 14,000 troops, untried, untrusted, and scattered without plan in separate centres. The only warning which Marshal Marmont, their commander, had received was a jesting order from the Duc d'Angoulême to place them under arms, 'as some windows might be broken.'¹ This absolute neglect of all precaution gave the opportunity to that resolute minority by which the revolutions of Paris have ever been carried through. The deputies were not assembled when the ordinances were published. A small number, however, immediately collected together and drew up a protest. At the same time certain journalists, of whom the young Thiers was the most conspicuous, met, and agreed on the terms of a common action. But the actual revolution was the work neither of the deputies nor of the newspaper men, but of the republican party which, under the leadership of Godefroy Cavaignac, had gradually been spreading its organisation among the students and working men, and whose symbol was the tricolour of the Revolution. These were prepared to seize so favourable a chance for overthrowing a Government which they hated. Paris was still a city of narrow and winding alleys, well suited to partisan warfare, and paved with rough cobbles easily collected and piled into barricades. The mob, moreover, had no cause to fear that the soldiers would hold out against them long; for in spite of the glories of Spain, of Greece, and

¹ Greville Memoirs, ii. 37 (ed. 1888).

of Algiers, the Bourbon lilies had never quite replaced in their hearts the tricolour flag.

Street fighting began on July 27. The troops, kept waiting, weary and foodless, for hours, then overwhelmed with missiles, without enthusiasm, without effective leading, were gradually pressed back. On July 28 the insurgents captured the Hôtel de Ville, and the military abandoned the east of Paris. On the 29th the mob invaded the west, attacked the Louvre, and did battle with the Swiss Guards in the Tuileries. The line regiments, utterly wearied out, 'fraternised' with the populace. The remainder of the troops evacuated Paris.

The 'July Revolution' in Paris, 1830.

During the greater part of the time, the king, who was at his château of Rambouillet, was in entire ignorance of the course of events. After leaving the troops without instructions or encouragement, he had sent down orders to Marmont, on the second day, when they were quite worn out, to go on fighting; and when, on the 29th, a message was brought to him that 'all was finished,' he thought it was the announcement of their victory. When he at last realised the truth, and consented to withdraw the Ordinances, it was too late. A Commission 'for watching over the security of person and property' had established itself at the Hôtel de Ville, and had begun its activity by re-establishing the National Guard and giving its command to Lafayette. When the king's envoy arrived to open negotiations, he was dismissed unheard.

Paris was now divided into two parties, both sharing in the revolution, but differing as to their ulterior aims. In the Hôtel de Ville, the Provisional Government, led by Lafayette, was republican in sympathy. The rump of the Chamber, led by the banker Laffitte, and the journalists who headed the movement in the west of Paris, were in favour of a monarchy which should accept the tricolour flag, that is, which should frankly identify itself with the social and political ideals of the Revolution. A proclamation issued by

Parties in Paris.

Thiers admirably summed up the general facts of the situation. Charles x. had become impossible. On the other hand, the Republic was equally impossible, because it would inevitably lead to the intervention of the European Alliance, which France, herself split up by 'fearful divisions,' would be in no case to resist. Under these circumstances there remained but one course open. The Duke of Orleans was a prince who had fought for the Revolution at Jemmapes. He had the best right to wear the tricolour since he had carried it under fire. He was prepared to bow to the will of the people, and the best guarantee of his fidelity to the Charter would be that he would hold his crown as their gift.

Louis Philippe himself had, meanwhile, maintained a discreet reserve since the outbreak of the troubles. A deputation, headed by Laffitte and Thiers, now that the issue of the fighting was decided, went out to Neuilly, where he was in retirement, and prevailed on him to return with them to Paris.

Establishing himself at the Palais Royal, he declared his willingness to accept the office of Lieutenant-General of the realm, and to govern in accordance with the Charter, pending the assembly of the Chambers. A fresh proclamation, drawn up this time by Guizot, announced the devotion of the Duke of Orleans to the national and constitutional cause, and repeated the conviction that he would respect the rights of the people, because he would hold his own from them. This was on July 30. It still remained to conciliate the republicans of the Hôtel de Ville. These knew well enough that under the existing conditions of Europe and of public opinion in France their ideals were incapable of being realised. To cover their retreat and save their *amour propre*, a little *coup de théâtre* was arranged. On July 31 Louis Philippe, wrapped in a tricolour scarf, preceded by a drummer, and followed by a motley crowd of deputies and journalists, walked through the streets of Paris to the Hôtel de Ville. There, in the face of all the crowd, Lafayette, the very

incarnation of the Revolution, who aspired to be the younger Cato of modern France, embraced in the person of Louis Philippe the principles of the bourgeois monarchy. The scene was as grateful to the sentiment of the people of Paris as to the insatiable vanity of Lafayette. In the burst of enthusiasm that followed, the efforts of Charles x. to save his dynasty remained unnoticed. He confirmed the appointment of the Duke of Orleans as Lieutenant-General; and finally, as a last resource, abdicated in favour of his grandson, Henry v. (the Comte de Chambord), at the same time appointing Louis Philippe regent. All was useless. The Chambers, without seeking a fresh mandate from the nation, confirmed the *de facto* abdication of Charles x. and proclaimed Louis Philippe king, not of France, but of the French. Charles x., who remained at Rambouillet with his Guard, made no effort to resist. When he realised that all was lost, he began a dignified retreat towards the sea-coast, followed by his suite, and surrounded by the infantry, cavalry, and artillery of the Guard. The new Government did nothing to molest his march, merely sending a corps to observe his movements. At Maintenon the fallen king took solemn leave of the greater part of his troops, and, escorted by some 1200 men to Cherbourg, embarked there for England on August 16.

Louis
Philippe,
King of
the French.

If the exit of Charles x. from the political stage was dignified, the same can hardly be said of the entrance of Louis Philippe. An insecure foothold is, indeed, fatal to a dignified attitude, and the new king of the French stood in slippery places. It is true that, if popular demonstrations are any criterion of public opinion, France had welcomed the change of dynasty with a singular unanimity of enthusiasm. But there had been no plebiscite, such as based the Empire formally upon the people's will; and the majority of the Chamber, by whom Louis Philippe was elected, had received no special mandate for the purpose. The new king owed his crown

Character of
the new
Monarchy.

in the first instance, not directly to the will of the people, but to the intrigues of Talleyrand, the initiative of Laffitte as leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, and to the theatrical impulse of Lafayette at the Hôtel de Ville. He had not even that quasi-legitimacy which, in the English revolution of 1688, had served to disguise the usurpation of William III. Those who gave him their votes were careful to explain that they did so, not because, but in spite of, the fact that he was a Bourbon; and, in the 'patched-up Charter' (*Chartre bâclée*), so far from imitating the supposed precedent of the Bill of Rights, with its careful and conservative definition of the relation of the nation to the Crown, fresh inroads were made on the royal prerogative. There was no room for doubt that, whatever theories might be advanced later, Louis Philippe ruled by the will of the people; which at the outset meant, for all practical purposes, the whim of the Parisian populace. This being so, it was necessary for the new king to play the democrat. Charles X. had been 'anointed above his fellows' at Rheims with the last drops of the sacred oil of Chlovis. The Citizen King, with ostentatious humility, walked the streets of Paris, clad in the modest frock-coat and stove-pipe hat of the ordinary bourgeois, sent his sons to the public schools, or enrolled them as privates in the National Guard. For the present, too, he elected to avoid the Tuileries and to remain at the Palais Royal, associated with so many victories of the Revolution. Here, guarded only by uniformed citizens of Paris, he held his democratic court, receiving every day deputations from all the communes and municipalities of France, with multitudinous hand-shakings more familiar in Washington than in Paris. Louis Philippe was not the first Bourbon to care more for the reality than the trappings of power.

The problem that faced the new monarchy was, in fact, singularly complicated and difficult. To secure its position it had to conciliate Europe and the public opinion of France, and the two seemed utterly irreconcilable. The Great Powers

had, indeed, agreed to accept the *fait accompli* with more readiness than might have been hoped. In the first shock of the news from Paris the three Eastern Powers had drawn together, had agreed not to recognise Louis Philippe, and had entered into a military Convention for mutual aid in case of aggressive action on the part of France. In England, Lord Aberdeen even exclaimed that the time had come for the application of the Treaty of Chaumont. For a moment it seemed as though the history of 1815 were about to repeat itself with variations. But it was soon realised that the Holy Alliance survived only as a pious opinion, and the Treaty of Chaumont as a document of historical interest. Louis Philippe was no Napoleon to tame the forces of revolution into the ministers of a boundless ambition; and it was scarce worth while to deluge Europe in blood in order to rivet on the neck of France the yoke of Polignac.¹ Metternich, whose prestige had been sadly eclipsed by the Russian victories of 1828, had suggested a closer bond between the three Eastern Powers, partly in order to restore, in the interests of his 'system,' amicable relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, partly to oppose the Coalition to any possible designs of France upon Italy. But the well-known sympathies of the Emperor Nicholas were guarantees enough for his faithfulness to the principle of stability; and in any serious quarrel with France, Austria held a decisive weapon in the person of Napoleon's son and heir, the young Duke of Reichstadt.² Austria could afford to ignore principle in the interest of expediency, and to recognise the result of the July Revolution. Prussia, too, the leading motive of whose policy at this time was fear of war, resisted the revival of the Holy Alliance, from which she had reason to believe that not only France, but England also, would be excluded, and which would therefore divide Europe into hostile camps. She

¹ Opinion of Matuszevic (Martens, xi. 432).

² Martens, iv. Pt. I. p. 424.

preferred, by frankly recognising the new king, to draw France into the general guarantee of the *status quo*.¹ The Emperor Nicholas alone 'was ready,' to use his own words, to combat the revolution in the spirit of the Holy Alliance. But his counsellors besought him not to sacrifice the interests of Russia to an idea. France, they argued, restored and strengthened by the generous policy of Alexander I., was the natural ally of Russia; and her continuance as a Power of the first rank was essential to the normal development of Russian policy; and, once overwhelmed by a new Coalition, she would never be suffered to survive. Pressed by his ministers, and deserted by his allies, Nicholas at length, and with infinite reluctance, consented in his turn to recognise the King of the French, making 'this concession to the revolutionary spirit' with great reserve, and only on condition that the European Powers should hold Louis Philippe responsible for the execution on the part of France of all the international engagements resulting from the treaties of 1814 and 1815.² This, as a matter of fact, all the Powers, including England, had already done, not collectively, but individually. It was universally recognised that the relation of the king was twofold—to his own people and to the 'Confederation' of Europe. Even those who would have been reluctant to interfere in the former relation maintained that, in taking the crown of Charles x., Louis Philippe had taken over all his obligations to those treaties which were regarded as the Magna Charta of Europe, and that upon his acknowledging this fact must depend their recognition of his right to reign. In short, if the French king wore his crown by the will of the people, he wore it also by the will of the Powers.

For his own part, Louis Philippe was quite prepared to rest content with the sovereignty of 'the fairest country in Europe,' and to give all the required guarantees. But the public opinion which had borne him to the throne, ill informed as to the political conditions of Europe, and

¹ Hillebrand, i. 174.

² Martens, viii. 171.

ardently convinced of the mission of France to emancipate the world, clamoured for a revolutionary crusade. Nor was this aggressive spirit confined to the populace. Men of moderate views and responsible statesmen thought that the time had come for France to regain, if not her 'natural boundaries' of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, some at least of the territory she had lost in 1815. Talleyrand alone, of all the king's advisers, realised that the true policy of France lay, not in reviving the European Coalition against her by an attitude of aggression, but in utilising, as he had succeeded in doing at Vienna, the jealousies of the other Powers in order to break up for ever the hated Quadruple Alliance and put an end to the fatal isolation of France. This, he saw, could be best achieved by a cordial understanding on general policy with England, as the only other Liberal Power; and to this end, when opportunity should arise, he proposed to direct all the resources of his unrivalled diplomatic experience. With this view the king was in complete sympathy. It was, however, impossible to pursue a policy so unpopular until the new monarchy had smoothed the troubled waters of French domestic politics. For the present, Louis Philippe had to wear two faces—one turned toward the Powers, the other turned toward the people of Paris.

The King and revolutionary propagandism in France.

The strength of the July Monarchy, at the outset, lay in the fact that of the three parties which were in principle opposed to it—the Legitimists, the Bonapartists, and the Republicans—not one was completely organised, or provided with any definite programme. Under these circumstances, parties of the most opposite complexions had rallied to the Throne, and it was possible for Louis Philippe to avoid, what had been fatal to Charles x., identifying the Crown with a particular point of view. The weakness of the July Monarchy lay in the unruly temper of the populace of Paris, which it had neither the courage nor the means to curb. During the first months of his reign, indeed, Louis Philippe ruled, as he

himself confessed, by the grace of Lafayette; for 'the hero of two worlds' was the idol of Paris, and Commander-in-Chief of the million National Guards on whom the maintenance of order depended. This situation produced a constitutional position as characteristic as it was paradoxical. In the Chambers two parties had become apparent immediately after the revolution—the party of 'progress' and the party of 'resistance.' Of these the Conservative 'party of resistance' was in the majority. The king had begun by appointing a ministry composed of all the various elements which had helped him to the throne; but it was soon found that in these shifting times a Cabinet divided against itself could not stand. The Government, moreover,

The question
of the
Ministers of
Charles X.

was face to face with a question of singular difficulty, which only a ministry strong in the popular confidence could hope to bring to an issue at once honourable and safe. Ever since the July days the populace of Paris had never ceased to clamour for the blood of Polignac, and the other ministers whom they held responsible for the fatal Ordinances. The King and the Government were alike anxious to save them; and the Powers had made it clear that they would hold France responsible for their security. It was hoped that time might act as a sedative to the popular fury. But the mob had scented blood; and, as riot succeeded riot, the cry was ever for the death of the ministers. At last, in October, the Chambers resolved that Polignac and his colleagues should be brought to trial before the House of Peers. At the same time an attempt was made to save the situation by a proposal to abolish altogether the capital punishment for political offences. Louis Philippe expressed his approval, but the question was postponed until after the reassembling of the Chambers in November. Meanwhile, on October 17 and 18,

October riots
in Paris, 1830.

the disturbances in Paris culminated in a great riot, headed, as usual, by the students of the University and pupils of the Polytechnic schools. The

Palais Royal itself was invaded by a howling mob, clamouring for the heads of Polignac and the ministers. Ejected by the National Guards, the populace rushed, a yelling, seething mass, to Vincennes, where the ill-fated ministers were confined, and hurled itself with demoniac fury against the gates of the prison. The lives of the prisoners and the honour of France were saved by the courage and presence of mind of General Daumesnil, the governor of the fortress, an invalided veteran. Coming out alone to confront the mob, he threatened to blow up the powder magazine if they attempted to force an entrance. The effect was miraculous, or would have been with any other than a Parisian crowd. Silence, and then a roar of delighted laughter, succeeded the bloodthirsty pandemonium of a minute before; then the mob streamed back to Paris, with cries of 'Long live, old wooden-leg!'

The October riots decided the moderate members of the Cabinet to retire, and to hand over the responsibility of government to a ministry which should possess the confidence of the Radical population of Paris, and so be in a better position for saving the ministers from mob fury. In consequence of this resolution, Guizot, the duc de Broglie, Casimir Périer, Molé, and Dupin resigned their portfolios, and Laffitte, the millionaire banker of Paris, became Minister-President of a Cabinet almost wholly composed of pronounced members of the party of Progress, of the party, that is, which was found to be in a minority in the Chambers, when these met on November 3. Jacques Laffitte, indeed, who had preserved throughout a life mainly devoted to successful finance the nebulous ideals of his youth, represented neither the views of the king nor the opinion of the country as constitutionally expressed. In his person the spirit of revolutionary propagandism mounted to the seat of power in France. Europe was disquieted. But Louis Philippe hoped, not without reason, to be able, with the help of Talleyrand, to correct the

Revolutionary Ministry
of Laffitte,
Nov. 1830.

impression produced by the indiscretions of his ministers. The Powers would, doubtless, make allowances for a monarch placed in so difficult a position, and forgive the tortuous processes of his diplomacy. For the present, at least till the affair of the ministers was decided, the July Monarchy had need of Laffitte and of Lafayette.

The trial of the ministers, which began on December 10, 1830, was in reality a trial of strength between the Government and the mob. Not only the lives of Polignac and his companions, but the existence of the July Monarchy, was at stake. The cry for blood was as loud as ever, and extraordinary precautions had to be taken to guard the prisoners from the mob which howled round the Luxembourg, where the trial was held. All depended on the attitude of the National Guard. Even Lafayette's popularity had begun to give way, owing to his resistance to the blood-lust of the populace. There were signs of wavering in the ranks of the citizen-soldiers. But in the end the bourgeois instinct of order prevailed. The prisoners, condemned to various terms of imprisonment, were smuggled away from Paris under cover of darkness; and the crowd, baulked of its prey, relieved its feelings by maltreating the Peers as they left the judgment hall. But the crisis was over; and the Government had triumphed over the mob. Yet the July Monarchy felt that it had bought the victory dear. It had not triumphed by force alone, but had been compelled to make to the insurgents promises which it knew it could not fulfil; it had condescended to make terms with the school-boys of the Polytechnic Institutes in order to buy their neutrality; and, above all, it had placed itself under a new and burdensome obligation to Lafayette, who claimed, with justice, the chief merit for the restoration of order. But the reign of the old aristocrat of the Revolution was all but over. On December 23 the Chambers passed a resolution dividing the command of the Parisian National Guard from that of the rest

Lafayette
resigns his
command.

of France. Lafayette took this as aimed personally at himself, hurried to the Palais Royal, and tendered his resignation. The king, with no great warmth, pressed him to reconsider his decision, and to retain the command of the Guard of Paris. But Lafayette could be content with no secondary position after that which had placed in his hands the destinies of France. He refused, and his resignation was accepted.

Louis Philippe had rid himself of the first and most formidable of the instruments which had helped him to success, and since his attainment had hampered his freedom. Three months of unrest at home and anxiety abroad were to pass before Laffitte, ruined in fortune and damaged in his political reputation, realised that he had lost the confidence of his royal master, and, exposed to an official slight, which as minister he could not overlook, resigned his post, begging pardon of God and man for the part he had played in raising Louis Philippe to the throne. With the accession to office of Casimir Périer, on March 13, 1831, the Bourgeois Monarchy was at last able to reveal its true character. The policy of revolutionary propaganda, hitherto secretly resisted, was now openly dropped; and France, under the guidance of the strongest and most honest minister she had known for many years, entered upon a course of opposition to the revolution at home and abroad.

Casimir
Périer
Ministry,
March 1831.

CHAPTER IX

REVOLUTIONS OF 1830 OUTSIDE FRANCE

The revolution in Brussels—Attitude of the Powers—Talleyrand ambassador in London—France and England proclaim the doctrine of non-intervention—The Belgian Question referred to the Conference at London—Effect of the Polish insurrection—The Powers accept the principle of the separation of Belgium and Holland—Attitude of the Dutch and Belgians—Progress of the negotiations—Aggressive attitude of France—Prospects of war—Firm attitude of Lord Palmerston—The principle of the solidarity of Europe reaffirmed—Settlement of the question—Belgium established as a neutral kingdom under the guarantee of Europe—France and England coerce the Dutch—Attitude of the Eastern Powers—Effects of the July Revolution in Germany—and in Italy—Insurrections in the central states—Attitude of France—Intervention of Austria—The French occupy Ancona—The Insurrection of Poland.

THE French Revolution of 1830, serious as were its effects, was followed by no such universal conflagration as that which, eighteen years later, succeeded the fall of the July Monarchy. This was, in general, due to the fact that, in the countries which became the principal theatres of the struggle of 1848, the forces making for change had not yet been concentrated on any great common objects. In one country, however, this was decidedly not the case; and it was the successful revolt of Belgium against the Crown of Holland, directly inspired by the events of July in Paris, and fostered by hopes of French support, that removed the first stone from the political edifice erected at Vienna, and threatened at one moment to bring the whole structure down in hopeless and lamentable ruin. The union of the former Austrian provinces of the Low Countries, sometime part of Napoleon's empire, with

Relations of
Belgium and
Holland
under the
Treaties.

Holland, to form a barrier against possible French aggressions northward, had seemed in 1815 a master-stroke of British statesmanship. Nor did the project altogether deserve the scorn which clever judges, enlightened by events, have since poured upon it. The two nations were akin in race; and, economically, the agricultural and industrial Belgians might have seemed the natural complement of the commercial Dutch. But the reconstructors of Europe had allowed too little for the traditional bigotry of Belgian Catholicism, and nothing at all for the singular wrong-headedness of the clever sovereign to whom the fortunes of the new state were intrusted. King William had a passion for 'enlightenment,' and, undeterred by the warning of Joseph II.'s failure in a similar mission, he conceived it to be his duty to dissipate the clouds of obscurantism which darkened the intellectual life of his Catholic provinces. Protestant inspectors were appointed to visit Catholic schools; a College of Philosophy, which candidates for Catholic orders were forced to attend, was established at Louvain, the very stronghold of Belgian ultramontaniam; and when the objects of this misguided solicitude protested, he attempted to stifle their opposition by arbitrary interferences with the liberties granted by the Constitution. Gradually the clerical grew into a national opposition, as it was realised that the Protestant propaganda was but part of a scheme for establishing Dutch ascendancy. In this unfortunate contest the Belgians started heavily handicapped. In the States-General, where the four million Belgians were only represented by the same number of members as the two million Dutch, questions in dispute were inevitably decided against them, and the general legislation of the country tended always to favour Dutch rather than Belgian interests. A tax on flour, which fell heavily on the Flemish farmers, was substituted for the customs dues, which had pressed but lightly on the wealthy Hollanders. Dutch, too, was made the official language of the public offices, of the schools, and

of the law courts. Under these circumstances the bitter hatred between Catholics and Liberals, which in Belgium throughout the century had and has formed the dividing line of political parties, was forgotten in a common opposition to the Dutch. The Liberal-Catholic party, formed under the influence of the school of Lacordaire and Lamennais, helped to bridge over the gulf between the parties, and in 1828 a formal union of the two was established on the basis of common opposition to Dutch ascendancy. Long before the Revolution in Paris, a formidable agitation had begun, with a view to gaining the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and, above all, a separate administration for Belgium. Into the magazine thus charged fell the sparks from the conflagration in Paris.¹

On August 5, 1830, the king's birthday was being kept at Brussels. A revolutionary piece was performed at the Opera, and the audience caught the infection of the stage. Cries were raised for France and against Holland. The crowd outside took them up, words soon changed to deeds, and a formidable riot speedily developed. Then some one hoisted on the town hall the standard of Brabant, and the riot had become a revolution. The Prince of Orange, approaching the city next day with a body of troops, demanded the removal of the obnoxious symbol before he would parley; but when his demand was refused, parleyed none the less. Responsible men had meanwhile taken the revolution in hand, and Prince William, who had his own views and private ambitions, promised to lay their demands before the king. For the present they asked only that the States-General should be summoned, and a proposition laid before them for the separation of Belgium and Holland under the personal rule of the House of Orange. The king agreed; but when the States met, he introduced the proposal to them in such a

¹ Bulwer's *Palmerston*, vol. ii.; Juste, *Hist. du Congrès National*; Hillebrand, *Geschichte Frankreichs*, i. 126.

way that it was thrown out. The Prince of Orange, at the head of ten thousand men, now once more advanced on Brussels. This time he found the entrances to the lower town barricaded and held by armed citizens; and, after three days' fighting and a useless bombardment, he was forced, on September 26, to retire. A committee had been organised to direct the defence. This now constituted itself a provisional Government, and issued a proclamation declaring that the blood shed had dissolved all ties binding the Belgians to the Dutch Government, and summoning all Belgians in the Dutch army to return to their own country. Then, at last, the States-General, by fifty votes to forty-four, decided for the separation of the countries. But it was too late. All the provinces of Belgium had meanwhile followed the example of Brussels and risen against the Dutch. Luxemburg, too, joined the movement. The provisional Government only seemed to be setting the seal on an accomplished fact when, on October 4, it formally proclaimed the independence of Belgium, and declared its intention of convoking a National Congress with a view to drawing up a Constitution.

The diplomatic situation created by these events was singularly complicated. The Powers had acquiesced in the usurpation of Louis Philippe, because they believed that by doing so they would save the territorial arrangements of 1815. The Belgian Revolution had belied these hopes, and the dreaded war seemed inevitable. Already the Tsar, when the news of the riots of August 5 first reached him, had proposed an intervention of the Powers, and promised his own contingent of sixty thousand men under the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, in order 'to oppose an armed barrier to the progress of revolution'; and Prussia, though too cautious to follow the Tsar to all lengths, had massed troops on her eastern frontier, in view of possible disturbance in the Rhine provinces. But Louis Philippe realised that for him to stand

The Powers
and the
Belgian
Revolution.

by while the reactionary Powers stamped out the liberties of Belgium would cost him his crown. In this case valour was the better part of discretion; and he announced that any aggressive movement on the part of Prussia would be met by a similar move on that of France, 'in order to hold the balance even, pending the settlement of the Belgian question by a Congress in accordance with treaties.'¹

It was the assurance of British sympathy, and even help, that had emboldened the French Government to assume this decided attitude. The Tory ministry was, Attitude of England. it is true, still in office, and Wellington had ever been regarded as a pillar of the Grand Alliance. But he had upheld the European Coalition as a guarantee of peace, and he was prepared to renounce its principles when he saw that their application would lead to war. The news of the bloodshed in Brussels, and of the retreat of the Dutch troops, reached him on September 30. He realised at once that it would be impossible to reconcile the Belgians to the House of Nassau; that war would be inevitable if France allowed herself to be led by these events into a policy of aggression; and that it would be impossible for Louis Philippe, if any attempt were made to coerce the Belgians, to prevent the French nation from going to their assistance. On September 25, just before this crisis, Talleyrand had arrived in Talleyrand in London. London. He persuaded the Duke and Lord Aberdeen of the honest views of his Government, and of its ability to carry them out; and since the choice seemed to lie between the certainty of war and the sacrifice of a principle, they chose the lesser of two evils. In short, the British Government agreed to the separation of the Netherlands, and to recognise the new State, on condition that France should bind herself to respect the frontiers of 1815, and to assist in the establishment of the new State only in common with the other Powers. On October 4 Talleyrand himself proposed to lay

¹ Hillebrand, i. 144 (note).

the whole question before the Conference of the five Great Powers, which was already engaged at London in settling the affairs of Greece; and when, next day, the king of the Netherlands made a formal appeal to the Powers for the aid guaranteed to him by treaty, the Anglo-French Alliance was already an established fact, and the coalition against France a thing of the past. Talleyrand felt that he had a substantial sop to throw to the clamorous public opinion of Paris.¹

Russia viewed with sorrow the fall of England from grace. Wellington had proved the staff of a broken reed, and had allowed Talleyrand to claim him as a convert to the new French doctrine of non-intervention. Palmerston, when, after the fall of the Tory Government on November 14, he accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs under Lord Grey, proclaimed the arch-heresy as the main article of his political creed. England, in fact, had become 'powerless for the good of Europe and for the vigorous execution of the treaties.'² Yet Russia must keep hand in hand with her in the Belgian question; for to take a violent course in suppressing the unrest in the Netherlands might be only to play into the hands of the Revolution, by uniting the two western Liberal Powers against the rump of the Coalition. The peril was, indeed, pressing; for the autocratic temper of Nicholas fretted against counsels of expediency, and he still threatened to cut with the sword the tangled knot of the negotiations. Then, at the end of November, the great insurrection broke out in Poland, and cut Russia off for the time from the affairs of western Europe. Prussia, too, which had moreover already judged it expedient to follow the lead of England, had no room for repentance, being fully occupied in guarding her eastern frontiers. Austria, finally, distracted between the affairs of Poland and those of Italy, had neither

The doctrine of Non-Intervention.

Paralysis of the Eastern Powers.

¹ Hillebrand, i. 126. See Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, iii. 338, etc.; but cf. Ollivier, '*L'Empire libéral*,' i. 262, etc.

² Martens, xi. 439.

the will nor the power to embark on a legitimist crusade in the West.

Under these circumstances, the principle of the division of Belgium and Holland was accepted by all the Powers, and embodied in a protocol signed at London on December 30, 1830.¹ The Emperor Nicholas, though he ratified this, declared that its execution must depend on the attitude of the king of the Netherlands, and that he for one would never consent to use menaces against a monarch who was his friend and ally. At the beginning of 1831, in fact, the Belgian question seemed very far from solution. The unbending consistency of the Tsar, the stubborn obstinacy of the king of the Netherlands, the uncompromising attitude of the Belgian National Congress, and last but not least the equivocal manœuvres of France, made a coil difficult to unravel. The knottiest point for decision was the disposal of Luxemburg. This had been granted in 1815 to the king of the Netherlands in compensation for his hereditary territories of Orange-Nassau ceded to Prussia. It formed part of the German Confederation, and, as its duke, King William had a vote in the Diet of Frankfort. The city of Luxemburg itself was, moreover, a strong fortress, and commanded the approaches to Lower Germany. The Belgians, however, while consenting to reserve the rights of the German Confederation, claimed Luxemburg as an integral part of their country, and deputies from it took their seats in the Congress at Brussels.

On January 20, 1831, the Conference at London issued a fresh protocol, defining the basis of separation. According to this, Luxemburg was to be restored entire to the king of the Netherlands, while Belgium was to take over half of the National debt, the greater part of which had been contracted by Holland before the Union.² The protocol had given rise in the Conference to a violent

The principle of separation accepted.

Protocol of Jan. 20, 1831.

¹ For text, *Juste*, i. 158.

² For text, *ibid.*, i. 230.

debate, in which Talleyrand, in spite of the oft-repeated assurances of the disinterestedness of his Government, had claimed at least the cession to France of the fortresses of Marienbourg and Philippeville. Failing to secure his object, he had signed the instrument as the only means of preserving the peace of Europe. The Dutch king accepted the settlement, but the Belgians indignantly rejected it. The action of Talleyrand in signing the protocol had been promptly repudiated by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Sebastiani; and the Brussels Congress, encouraged by this singular attitude of France, refused 'to abdicate in favour of foreign cabinets the government confided to it by the Belgian nation.' It even went further, and, in proceeding to the election of a king, in accordance with the new Constitution, threw down a gage of defiance to Europe. In the National Congress an overwhelming majority had voted in favour of a 'national monarchy,' as opposed to a republic or to annexation to France. The candidature of the Prince of Orange, who was at London pressing his claims, was supported by only an insignificant minority; and opinion was practically divided between Auguste Beauharnais, duke of Leuchtenberg, and the Duc de Nemours, second son of the King of the French. The insuperable objection of the French Government to a Bonaparte excluded the first; the letter of Sebastiani encouraged the Congress to elect the second. On February 3, a Belgian deputation formally offered the crown to Louis Philippe on behalf of his son. The temptation was a strong one; yet, to accept would have meant war. Two days before, on February 1, the Conference had passed a resolution excluding all princes of the five principal dynasties from the Belgian throne. Under these circumstances, the king dared not accept. He kept the deputation waiting a fortnight for an answer, and then declined the proffered honour.

Belgium
makes over-
tures to
France.

In face of the defiant attitude of Belgium, and of the

equivocal behaviour of France, the Conference judged it expedient to issue a declaration of the principles by which its decisions were guided. A protocol, signed on February 19, reaffirmed the general obligation of the treaties of 1815, and asserted the right and duty of the Powers to uphold 'the salutary maxim' that the events which lead up to the birth of a new state in Europe do not give it the right to alter the general system into which it enters, and that changes in an old state do not exempt it from the obligation of anterior engagements.¹ This did not prevent France from trying to persuade England to allow it to regain some portion, however small, of the territory she had lost in 1815. But the firm language of Lord Palmerston shattered this hope, if it had ever been seriously entertained. 'We can have no security for Europe,' he wrote, 'but by standing upon a strict observance of treaties, and an abnegation of all interested views of aggrandisement.' This was no question merely of a disturbance of the Balance of Power. 'The moment we give France a cabbage-garden or a vineyard, we lose all our vantage-ground of principle.'² In short, England would cordially co-operate with France in her efforts to secure for Belgium her independence and national rights, and Palmerston

The Conference re-affirms the obligation of the Treaties.

Palmerston and the ambitions of France.

believed sincerely in the mutual benefit to be derived from a close union between the two countries; but the moment France should break away from the treaties, and embark on a career of aggression, she would find England ranked among her enemies.³ One concession only the Powers were prepared to make. On April 17, 1831, the old allies of Chaumont signed a protocol by which it was agreed to dismantle some of the fortresses erected in 1815, on the Belgian frontier, as a barrier against France. On the same day the Conference confirmed the Protocol of January 20, and formally

¹ *Juste*, ii. 56, 39.

² Palmerston to Granville (*Bulwer*, ii. 59).

³ *Ibid.* ii. 82.

summoned the Belgians to evacuate Luxemburg. To this the French Government, having gained a point in the matter of the fortresses, adhered; and the Belgians, and their revolutionary sympathisers in Paris, bitterly declared that revolutionary France had sold herself to the Holy Alliance.

The renunciation by France of her isolated claims removed one great stumblingblock from the path to a settlement. A second was cleared away by the discovery of a candidate for the Belgian crown who could be accepted by all the Powers. The refusal of the offer of the crown by Louis Philippe, and still more the manner of it, had disgusted the Belgians, who, in their turn, had refused to consider the candidature of the Prince of Naples, his nephew, and had elected a regent, pending the settlement of the matter. The sole candidate now left, whose claims were worth considering, was Prince Leopold of Coburg. The Emperor Nicholas, indeed, could not forgive the 'perfidy' of Leopold's conduct in the matter of the Greek kingship; but he at the same time stated his willingness to allow the Belgians and the Conference to settle the affair between them. The selection of a prince bound by the closest ties to England was wholly agreeable to the British Government; and Palmerston won over Louis Philippe by suggesting a marriage between the new king and the Princess Louise of Orleans. Leopold himself, however, with great good sense, refused to accept the crown unless he could bring as a gift to his new subjects a satisfactory settlement of the whole question; and he himself suggested amendments to the Protocol of January 20, which would make it more acceptable to the Belgians. These were embodied in the 'Eighteen Articles' of June 26, 1831, which were accepted by the Belgian Congress on July 7. The principal concessions made by these to Belgian feeling were the maintenance of the *status quo* in Luxemburg, and a repartition of the public debt, by which that incurred by Holland before 1816 was assigned to her alone. On July 16,

Leopold of
Coburg,
King of the
Belgians,
July 16, 1831.

The 'XVIII.
Articles.'

Leopold set out for Brussels, and received at once the recognition of the Western Powers.

The Dutch were far from sharing the complacency of the Belgians with the compromise of the Eighteen Articles. So

The Dutch invade Belgium. far from accepting them, King William, realising that he had nothing to hope from the Powers, determined to assert his own 'rights,' and in-

invaded Belgium. The Belgian army, not yet properly organised, was worsted in every encounter; and had the question been isolated, as the Tsar had at one time suggested, the reign of Leopold would not have been a long one. In his extremity, the King of the Belgians appealed for aid to France. The request, arriving on August 4, came just in time to save the Cabinet of Casimir Périer from collapse; and the French Government, only too glad to have a valid excuse for yielding to the warlike clamour of public opinion, responded to the appeal. The news that a French army was about to advance into the Netherlands created immense

The French enter Belgium. agitation in England, where it was feared that France had stolen a march on Europe, and would seek to undo all that had been accom-

plished by England at a cost of so much blood and treasure. As the French troops advanced, the Dutch retired; and it was hoped that, if the latter evacuated Belgian territory, the former would follow their example. But the French Government, with one eye always on the Parisian populace, felt that it could not withdraw without some tangible proof that the honour of France was safe in its hands. It proposed, therefore, to remain in Belgium until the fortresses, destined by the Protocol of April 17 to be destroyed, should be dismantled. To the French people it would be easy to represent this as a triumph of their arms, and Europe would take no harm from what would increase the stability of the French Ministry. Palmerston, however, was inexorable. The Powers fully intended, he said, to dismantle many of these fortresses; but France should not dictate

to them at the point of the bayonet the how and the when. The Périer Cabinet, he added unkindly, had no value to England save as a security for peace, and Europe could not be expected to fit its policy to the whims of the Paris mob. In fine, 'the French must go out of Belgium, or we have a general war, and a war within a given number of days.'¹ This very decided language had its effect. The French troops were withdrawn from Belgium; and, in return, the dismantling of the five border fortresses—Menin, Ath, Mons, Philippeville, and Marienbourg—was taken in hand.

The intervention of France had saved the Belgians; but the whole episode had none the less considerably modified the situation in a direction hostile to what they supposed were their interests. Their defeats by the Dutch had dashed the confidence inspired by the easy successes of the first period of the revolution. The realisation that they were less independent than they had imagined of the goodwill of the Powers made them more amenable to terms; and King Leopold seized the opportunity for coming to an arrangement which should definitely legalise the position of his kingdom. The result was the signature by all the plenipotentiaries of the Conference, on October 15, 1831, of 'the Twenty-four Articles,' by which Limburg and a part of Luxemburg were restored to Holland. Belgium, chastened by misfortune, accepted the settlement; but the king of Holland indignantly refused to give up territory over which he claimed to rule by right divine. His wrath turned more particularly against the plenipotentiaries of Russia. In vain Count Matuszewic argued that the 'legitimacy' of King William was based on power delegated by the Quadruple Alliance, and that what the Powers had given the Powers might take away. The king appealed, not in vain, from the representatives of the Tsar to the Tsar himself. The Treaty of London had been signed, on November 15, 1831, by the

¹ Bulwer, ii. 109.

Ministers of the five Great Powers and of Belgium¹; but, to the dismay of the Russian diplomats, Nicholas refused to ratify their act till the king of the Netherlands should have given his consent. He would never, he declared, place the revolutionary Government of Belgium on a level with the legitimate crown of Holland. Coercion might be used against the former, but never against the latter.² The Russian statesmen protested against an attitude which subordinated once more the interests of Russia to the assertion of a principle, and handed over to the obstinate ruler of Holland the destinies of Europe. Matters were not, however, to be driven to this extreme. Even the Emperor Nicholas wearied at last of the intractable temper of his kinsman, and agreed to a compromise which, while doing the least possible violence to his own principles, was sufficiently satisfactory to England. On May 4, 1832, the treaties of November were confirmed by the four Powers, and ratified by the Emperor of Russia, with the exception of three articles of minor importance which the latter wished to leave open for separate negotiation between the two countries. By this instrument the King of the Belgians was recognised, and the neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by the Great Powers. The Tsar, for the sake of consistency, refused to enter into diplomatic relations with the Court of Brussels, until it should have been recognised by the king of Holland.

Recognition
of Belgium
and her
neutrality.

King William seemed as far as ever from yielding, and nothing remained but to force him to do so. In view of the reluctance of the other Powers, the task was undertaken by France and England in concert. Antwerp, hitherto in the hands of the Dutch, was besieged and captured by a French force; while England blockaded the Scheldt and the coasts of Holland, and laid an embargo on all Dutch shipping. With the exception of a couple of forts on the Scheldt, the Dutch now held nothing in Belgium,

Coercion of
Holland.

¹ Hertslet, ii. 858.

² Martens, xi. 462.

while the Belgians continued in possession of Limburg and Luxemburg. It was not, however, till 1839 that King William could decide himself to demand an exchange. The Belgians showed signs of resenting the one-sided bargain; but the Powers threatened to force them to comply, and at last the Belgian Question was settled. King William, unable to bear the sense of humiliation caused by his defeat, and still firm in his assertion of principle, abdicated.

The attitude of the Eastern Powers during the critical years of the Belgian Question had been mainly determined by the fact of their being hampered by revolutionary movements nearer home: Russia being fully occupied in Poland, which also distracted the attention of Prussia and Austria, while the latter Power was further preoccupied with the unrest in Germany and in Italy. Neither north nor south of the Alps, indeed, was the situation, though disquieting, ever really serious. In Germany there were isolated risings, usually the result of conditions which even the *Revolutions* reactionary Powers were inclined to regard as *in Germany*, intolerable. The Duke of Brunswick was driven from his throne without a voice being raised in favour of his restoration. The egregious Elector of Hesse was forced to grant a Constitution, and the antiquated and anomalous political arrangements in Hanover and Saxony were overthrown. But, on the whole, Germany gave Metternich but little cause for uneasiness. Liberal opinion, unmuzzled for the time, echoed, especially in the South, the political platitudes of Paris. But the stolid mass of German feeling was not to be stirred by revolutionary catchwords. There was little risk in giving the 'Jacobins' their head so long as greater causes for alarm loomed beyond the frontiers. When these were removed there would be time enough quietly to reapply the curb of the Carlsbad Decrees.

It was for the security of Austrian rule in Italy that Metternich was most concerned. He was under no illusion as to its extreme unpopularity, and the ardent desire of

the Italians, increasing year by year, to throw it off. He had been relieved of his earlier nightmare, of intrigues of Russian agents among the Carbonari, by the assurance given by the Emperor Nicholas that he would come to the aid of Austria, if necessary, in suppressing Revolution in Italy. But the July revolution, apart from the danger of its spreading over the Alps, had created a new peril. It was possible that Louis Philippe, moved by the usual reasoning of royal parvenus, might seek prestige in reviving, under the pretext of coming to the aid of Liberalism, the ancient pretensions of France beyond the Alps. The Italian Liberals, indeed, hoped what Metternich feared; and their hope encouraged them to seize the opportunity offered by the vacancy of the Holy See, which coincided with the revolution in France. Leo XII., who had succeeded Pius VII. in 1824, had restored in Rome whatever abuses of clerical misrule had been abolished by his predecessor under the enlightened influence of Cardinal Consalvi (d. 1824). Leo died in 1829; and his successor, Pius VIII., reigned barely a year. The death of Pius, following on the news of the revolution in Paris, was the signal for a number of isolated risings throughout the Papal States, aimed against the hated clerical tyranny. At Bologna, and in all the other towns of the Romagna, in Umbria, in the Marches, everywhere save in the Patrimony of St. Peter, the laity, civil and military, united in deposing the ecclesiastical functionaries and proclaiming the abolition of the temporal power of the Pope. Left to itself, the Revolution might have held its own against the Holy See. With the active aid of the French, it might, as Metternich feared, have ended by embroiling all Italy. But Louis Philippe had little stomach for risking his crown in doubtful enterprises. In the absence of encouragement from France, revolutionary outbreaks occurred only in the smaller states, where the terror of the Austrian bayonets was not a constant presence. Modena and Parma revolted; but Lombardo-Venetia did not stir,

Louis Phil-
ippe and
Italian Re-
volutions.

and Tuscany slumbered content under the benign despotism of her Grand Duke. In Italy, as in Germany, there was as yet no great rallying cry to which the whole people would respond, no ideal toward which all effort could be directed. Italian unity was as yet little more than a dream in the minds of Mazzini, of Cavour, of Charles Albert. The people had risen here and there to cast off an intolerable incubus; but they were without enthusiasm for the conventional revolutionary Governments which had replaced what they had overthrown. The Austrian troops, advancing at the invitation of the new Pope, Gregory XVI., 'to restore order,' met with scarcely any resistance. The Duke of Modena returned in their train; and the revolutionists of the Romagna, at the terror of the Austrian advance, made what terms they could with the Holy Father.

Metternich had, so far, rightly gauged the timidity of the French Government. The revolutionary sympathies of Laffitte, leader of the war party in the ministry, had been outweighed by the caution of Louis Philippe. And now, after the retirement of Laffitte, the king had found in Casimir Périer a minister after his own heart, convinced, as he himself had been throughout, that the sole hope of the constitutional monarchy in France was to avoid a policy of adventure abroad, and to disarm the hostility of Europe by remaining true to its international obligations. As to the Austrian intervention in Rome, France was now prepared to accept the *fait accompli*, only stipulating that the Austrian forces should be speedily withdrawn, and that Austria should join with the other Powers in urging the most necessary reforms on the Papal Government. Austria, her immediate object attained, was willing to be obliging. A Conference of the Powers at Rome un-animously urged upon the Pope the introduction of some measure of constitutional liberty, and above all the necessity for giving the laity a share in the civil administration. This

Austria and
France in
Italy.
Occupation
of Ancona.

done, in July 1831, the Austrians evacuated the ecclesiastical states.

But Gregory XVI., who a year later was to fulminate against 'the absurd and erroneous maxim that liberty of conscience must be granted to all,' was hardly the man to carry through a programme of reform. The old clerical abuses were restored to full vigour; and bands of mercenaries, so-called *Sanfedisti*, were enrolled to suppress the discontent which soon began to show itself. A second insurrection was the result; and again, in January 1832, the Austrians, at the Pope's invitation, marched in to suppress the disorder, welcomed this time by the population as protectors against the ruffians who fought under the Papal standard. This second invasion of the States of the Church by Austria seemed to point to a change of permanent occupation; and Casimir Périer decided on a countermove. In February 1832 a French force occupied the citadel of Ancona before the Austrians could reach it; and for the moment it seemed as though the dreaded war were about to break out. The Pope and the ambassadors of the Powers alike protested against this French aggression. But Périer, while disclaiming any intention of encouraging revolutionary propaganda, or any desire for war, maintained that France had as good a right in Central Italy as Austria; and that it would depend upon Austria's attitude whether peace would be preserved or no. In the end Austria, to avoid a worse thing, consented to accept the situation. Périer himself died, and with him any thought of helping the Italians to a more tolerable government. Year after year the Austrians and French stood face to face in Italy; but they represented, not the opposition forces of revolution and stability, but that old-time rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg for preponderance in Italy. The occupation of Ancona was but 'an incident in the Balance of Power'; and when, in 1838, the Austrians finally withdrew, the French too followed their example.

Throughout the Belgian Question the attitude of the Emperor Nicholas had been determined mainly by the

progress of the insurrection in Poland, which assumed rather the character of a formal war between two nations than of a revolt of disaffected subjects against their Govern- Poland.
ment. Alexander I., in obtaining the recognition of Polish nationality and of the Polish Constitution by the Congress of Vienna, had excited without satisfying the aspirations of the Poles. Strictly speaking, indeed, there was not, and never had been, a Polish nation in the sense understood by the western Liberals, but only a numerous and turbulent aristocracy of great and small landowners, who felt themselves as alien to the mass of peasantry as to the Russians. It had been always, and remained, the fatal weakness of the Polish national movement that it was directed in the interests of a dominant caste rather than of a whole people; and the hatred of the Russian administration was due almost as much to its interference with the oppressive privileges of the noblesse as to its arbitrary methods. Alexander I. had made it evident that he was in earnest in his goodwill towards Poland; and when, on March 27, 1818, he had opened the Diet for the first time, with a speech brimming over with Liberal sentiment, he had thrown out a hope that some day he would enlarge his beloved Poland by restoring to her some of the provinces torn from her in the partitions of 1772 and 1795. Clearly, had the Poles cared more for the good of their country than the privileges of their caste, they could have used the tolerable liberties conceded to them to weld together, under the Russian crown, the severed interests of the people into a national force strong enough, if occasion should arise, to assert itself against the domination of the foreigner. But instead of trying to make the best of a not very bad bargain, the Diet proved by its attitude of indiscriminate obstruction that an organised conspiracy existed to make Russian rule impossible. The Tsar soon grew discouraged, and, urged by Metternich, who saw with alarm the exhibition of so evil an example on the Austrian frontiers, he began to take precautionary measures. From 1820 onward, the liberties

conceded to the Poles were gradually withdrawn, and at last, in 1823, the Constitution itself was suspended. It was, it is true, reintroduced in 1825, but with restrictions which proved the Tsar's distrust. Liberties threatened under Alexander could scarce survive under Nicholas. The Cesarevitch Constantine, who, as commander-in-chief in Poland, was virtual ruler of the kingdom, in spite of his Polish wife and Polish sympathies, was hated, and by reorganising the Polish national army had merely forged a weapon to be used against himself. Already, in 1828, a military plot had been hatched; but the outbreak had been postponed, and the favourable opportunity of the Russo-Turkish War lost. To the eager imagination of the Poles, however, the revolution in Paris seemed a call to arms that was not to be neglected. France had helped them before; and France, with a thousand voices, was again proclaiming to the world her revolutionary mission. Then came the rumour that the Tsar was about to declare war on the Revolution; that Poland was to be occupied by Russian troops destined for the suppression of liberty in France; and that the Polish army itself was to be employed in the unholy enterprise.

This was decisive. On the night of November 29 a military insurrection broke out in Warsaw; Constantine himself only escaped with great difficulty, and was obliged to withdraw from the city the remnant of troops that remained faithful to him. The die once cast, everything depended upon vigorous, united, and, above all, immediate action. But the insurrection was hampered from the outset by the disunion, the weakness, or the treachery of its leaders. After the flight of Constantine, the Government, which consisted entirely of Poles, under Prince Adam Czartorisky and General Chlopicki, accepted the situation, at the same time preparing to open negotiations with the Emperor. But even had they succeeded in obtaining terms, it was only too clear that they in no wise represented the

Suspension
of the Polish
Constitution,
1823-1825.

Revolution
in Warsaw,
Nov. 29, 1830.

underlying forces of the revolution. The insurrection, which had begun with the murder of the Grand Duke's adjutant and other officers, had culminated in a hideous massacre of defenceless Jews, which the Government had made no effort, or had been powerless, to prevent. Chlopicki, who, as an ex-officer of Napoleon, had been elected Commander-in-chief, accepted the post, not to fight, but to negotiate. Constantine, to gain time, promised to lay before the Tsar the demands of the Poles—the reunion of the provinces promised by Alexander I. and the faithful observance of the Constitution—and he hurried to St. Petersburg to counsel swift repression. The Poles felt secure in the certainty of French assistance perhaps also in that of England, and even of Austria. In the face of such odds the Tsar must surely yield their just demands. They had yet to learn that the cackle of the boulevards is not the voice of France, and that Nicholas might break, but would never bend.

On December 18 the Diet met; and as though to ruin the last hope of compromise, proclaimed 'the national Revolution.' Chlopicki, faithful to the Emperor, now resigned; but, as no one could be found to take his place, allowed himself to be re-elected two days later on condition of being granted dictatorial powers. When, however, on December 21, the Tsar issued a proclamation denouncing the 'odious crime' of the revolution, and calling on the Poles to unconditional submission, and at the same time a Russian army of 120,000 men, under General Diebitsch, marched into Lithuania, he again resigned his position.

The Poles replied to the Tsar's manifesto by an act of defiance. Chlopicki had been succeeded on January 20, 1831, by Prince Michel Radziwill, whose name would guarantee, it was hoped, the conservative character of the revolution. Five days later the Diet proclaimed the independence of Poland. On February 5 the Russians, 200,000 strong, crossed the frontier, and the Poles, who numbered only 40,000, retired on Warsaw. In a contest so unequal

the attitude of the Powers would alone determine the fate of Poland.

In Paris public opinion clamoured for intervention ; but the cautious Government of Louis Philippe would not move

without the co-operation of England. In England, too, there was little doubt as to the personal sympathy of the people or the Ministers. But

Palmerston adhered firmly to the principle of 'standing upon the treaties.' He consented to join France in remonstrating with Russia for destroying the liberties guaranteed to Poland by the Congress of Vienna ; but he refused to be a party to a breach of the treaty in helping to make Poland independent.¹ This policy met with the usual fate of half-measures. The remonstrance irritated the Tsar without helping the Poles. Nicholas expressed his surprise that England and France, the champions of the doctrine of non-intervention, should attempt to interfere in the internal concerns of an allied Power, and expressed his intention of dealing in his own way with his own subjects. Palmerston, in reply, hastened to disclaim any intention on the part of England to interfere in the affairs of Poland, and proceeded to dissociate himself from the policy of France.² While the 'good offices' of the Liberal Powers had merely lured the Poles on to their own destruction, the equivocal attitude of Austria, as it inspired less hope, so wrought less harm to their cause. The Austrian Government could not but welcome any blow to Russia which should dim the prestige

won in 1828. Moreover, in Metternich's opinion, 'a friendly and peaceable Poland' would be a more desirable neighbour than 'a rapacious and envious Russia.'³ If the Poles would accept a Hapsburg prince, if France and England would join, the prize might be worth the risk of a war with Russia. But in the end cautious counsels prevailed. The insurrection was too near the Austrian borders,

¹ Bulwer, *Life*, etc., ii. 61.

² Martens, xi. 448.

³ Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, i. 411.

the example of a national uprising too contagious. On the other hand, the Polish cause was too popular in the Austrian Empire for the Government to help Russia in a policy of repression. The Magyars already regarded the growing power of Russia, rightly, as a menace to their liberties. The Czechs were loud in their sympathy for a people struggling to be free. The Liberal enthusiasm for the Poles in western Germany might easily break through Metternich's police cordon into Austria. In the end, the Austrian Government decided to remain strictly neutral; and the Poles were left alone, face to face with the overwhelming might of the Russian Empire.

The war, of which under the circumstances the result could hardly be doubtful, exhibited once more the heroism and the undisciplined temper which have ever been the glory and the ruin of the Polish nation. Radzi-^{The War in Poland, 1831.} will, weak and incompetent, was, on February 25, defeated by Diebitsch at Grochow, and driven back behind the Vistula. He was succeeded by Skrzynecki, who, between March 30 and April 10, gained a series of successes, ending with the rout of the Russians at Iganie. But a third and more terrible combatant interfered at this point to enforce a suspension of hostilities. Asiatic cholera had followed in the train of the Russian armies, and had by them been communicated to the Poles. The Russian host, decimated by disease, was now exposed to a fresh danger by revolts in Lithuania, Podolia, Volhynia, and the Ukraine, which cut them off from their base. But the risings, in fact, proved fatal to the Poles by tempting them to scatter their forces. On April 27, General Dwernicki was forced to cross the Galician frontier and lay down his arms; and General Siera Sierawski, after two reverses, was compelled to retire. At this point, Skrzynecki, against his better judgment, was forced by public opinion to march into Lithuania. The force which, on May 21, he detached under Generals Chlopowski, Gielgul, and Dembinski, after suffering several

defeats, broke up owing to quarrels among the leaders. Chlopowski and Gielgul marched over the Prussian border and laid down their arms. Dembinski tried to regain Warsaw. An attempt had been made to bribe the peasants into joining the rising by a promise of liberty and grants of land, but the Diet declaring itself incompetent to ratify the grant, the movement died out. The end was now in sight. On May 26, Diebitsch inflicted a crushing defeat on the Poles at Ostrolenka, and prepared to lay siege to Warsaw. On the following June 20, however, he died of the cholera, and the blockade of Warsaw was not begun by his successor, General Paskievitch, until the beginning of September. Internal dissensions ruined the last hope of the Poles.

Skrzynecki, after appealing in vain for Austrian aid, had already retired. In Warsaw itself riots broke out, and accusations of treason were freely bandied. At last, on September 7, Kruckowiecki, Dictator and Governor of the city, after the second line of defences had been stormed by the Russians, sent to the Russian commander to offer the unconditional submission of Poland. An abortive attempt was made by the Diet to continue the struggle, but it was soon at an end. In the opinion of the Tsar, Poland had by its treason forfeited all claim to its Constitution. By the 'Organic Institution' of February 26, 1832, a Council of State was substituted for the Diet, and Poland was declared a province of the Russian Empire, though with a separate judicial and administrative machinery. Palmerston protested against this repudiation of the stipulations of the Vienna Treaty, and declared it to be the concern, not of the Poles only, but of all Europe.¹ But if the Tsar had rejected intervention while the issue of the war was yet doubtful, he was unlikely to listen to remonstrances in the hour of victory. Even the shadow of independence still left to the Poles was not suffered to remain long. By an Imperial *ukase*, dated December 1847,

The Polish
Constitution
abolished,
Feb. 26, 1832.

¹ Bulwer, ii. 127 ; Hertslet, ii. 900.

the Polish kingdom was suppressed, and the frontier between Russia and Poland done away with.

The Polish insurrection suppressed, and the tangled affairs of Belgium provisionally settled, the Emperor Nicholas was able to direct his undivided attention to the Ottoman Empire, where the eternal Eastern Question was once more entering into a new phase.

CHAPTER X

MEHEMET ALI AND THE PORTE

Reforms of Sultan Mahmud—Imperial designs of Mehemet Ali of Egypt—He invades Syria—Defeat of the Turks—Mahmud appeals to the Powers—Armed intervention of Russia—Active protest of France and England—Convention of Kiutayeh—Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—Rivalry of Russia and England in the East—Affairs of Portugal and Spain—Don Carlos and Don Miguel—Intervention of France and England—The Quadruple Alliance—Break-up of the Grand Alliance—Palmerston and the principle of nationalities—League of the three Eastern Powers against revolution—Meeting and Convention of Münchengrätz—Nicholas I. and England—Attempts at an understanding—Weakening of the Anglo-French *entente*—England and Mehemet Ali—Commercial treaty with Turkey—Occupation of Aden—Renewal of the war between Mehemet Ali and the Porte—Victories of Ibrahim—Attitude of the Powers—France supports Mehemet Ali—Russia approaches England—Quadruple Alliance and isolation of France—The Allies coerce Mehemet Ali—Convention of London—Closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—Reconstruction of the Concert of Europe.

THE long agony of the Greek revolt, and the outcome in 1829 of the struggle with Russia, had brought home even to the Turks themselves the anomalous character of their rule. In the days of their strength a Sultan Mahmud's reforms. menace and a terror to Christendom, their sole hope in their present weakness seemed to lie in borrowing the most obvious reforms from the civilisation of the West, in order to conciliate the European opinion which hitherto they had defied. Sultan Mahmud himself became the leader of the 'Young Turks,' and prepared to play in the Ottoman Empire the part of Peter the Great in Russia. The massacre of the Janissaries had removed the main danger of

armed opposition to his policy ; and he was supported by the friendly attitude of some at least of the Powers, by the advice of Ministers—Khosrew and Reshid—of more than average character and knowledge of affairs, and, above all, by his own indomitable will. Yet the task proved beyond his powers. He might banish the turban for the fez, the caftan for the coat, and drill and arm his *rediffs* after the fashion of the West ; he could make no impression upon that immemorial pride of religion and of race which still makes the Turks an army of conquerors camped upon foreign soil. In the polity of Europe there could be no place for a state of which the code and constitution was the Koran ; whose head was the successor of the Caliphs, the servant of Allah, the leader of the faithful in a perennial war against unbelievers. Mahmud recognised this, and boldly proposed to secularise the Ottoman Government. ‘Henceforth,’ he proclaimed, ‘I will only recognise Mussulmans in the mosque, Christians in church, Jews in the synagogue. Outside these places, where all alike worship God, it is my wish that they shall enjoy equally the same political rights and my fatherly protection.’¹ From the point of view of the international relations of the Porte, this policy was far-sighted ; but it none the less cut at the root of the Sultan’s authority within his empire. Without exciting any sentiment of loyalty among the Christian *rayahs*, it roused the bitter resentment of orthodox Mussulmans. A fanatic denounced the ‘infidel Sultan’ to his face. The man was put to death, but his tomb rapidly became a holy place of pilgrimage for the faithful.

Mahmud’s reforming zeal had been induced partly by the disquieting activity of his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Mehemet Ali Egypt. Advancing years seemed only to double of Egypt the ambition of the crafty Albanian who had carved out for himself an empire on the Nile. He had already, after

¹ Driault, *La Question d’Orient*, p. 136. Compare *Relation officielle de la maladie, &c., du Sultan Mahmoud II.*, by Drs. M’Carthy and Caratheodory (1841), p. 28.

mounting the throne of Egypt over the bodies of the slaughtered Mamelukes, conquered Nubia and Kordofan (1821-1823) and founded Khartoum, the capital of the Egyptian Soudan. He had taken advantage of the necessities of the Porte to effect a foothold in Europe, and but for the intervention of the Powers, would have made himself master at least of the Morea. The battle of Navarino had, for the time, shattered his hopes of extension northward, and the fleet which he had laboriously created had been destroyed. The indefatigable Pasha looked for compensation in another direction. Mahmud, jealous of his vassal's growing prestige, and resentful of the humiliation he had suffered in being forced to ask his aid, had refused to invest him with the pashaliks of Syria and Damascus, the stipulated price of his intervention, on the ground that this had failed. Hereupon Mehemet Ali, on pretext of a quarrel with the Pasha of Acre, ordered Ibrahim to invade Syria at the head of 30,000 men.

His immediate aim in going to war was probably no more than to force the Sultan to redeem his promise, and to compel the dismissal of his personal enemies, by whom Mahmud was surrounded. As for what lay beyond, that might be as fate should will it. Even in declaring war against his master, Mehemet Ali loudly protested his loyalty. He was attacking, he said, not the Sultan, but his evil counsellors; and to the British minister, who warned him against proclaiming the independence of Egypt, he replied that this communication argued ignorance of Mussulman conditions, since his own son would turn against him were he to cast off the authority of the Sultan. Meanwhile he had carefully calculated the risks of this dutiful revolt. Ibrahim's drilled troops might be trusted to make short work of the Ottoman armies, disorganised by reforms but half accomplished. The attitude of the Powers was a more doubtful factor, but the Pasha might well hope that the progress of his arms would be

more rapid than that of the diplomatic *pourparlers*, and that Europe would in the end once more recognise a *fait accompli*.

The success of Ibrahim was, indeed, rapid enough. On May 27, 1832, he captured Acre. Damascus fell on the following 14th of June. On the 9th of July the Pasha of Aleppo was beaten at Homs, and again on the 11th at Hama. A still more powerful Turkish army, under Hussein Pasha, sent to protect the defiles of the Taurus, was crushed at Beilan, between Antioch and Alexandretta; and Ibrahim was able to cross the mountain barrier which defended Asia Minor.

In these straits Mahmud looked round for aid to the Powers. From the ancient allies of Turkey, however, nothing was to be expected. France, by the recent conquest of Algiers, had joined in the attack on the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and was already under the influence of the rising star of Mehemet Ali; Great Britain refused to enter into an alliance with Turkey which would have entailed a breach with France and incalculable consequences beyond; Austria, since the Peace of Adrianople, was seeking salvation in a close understanding with Russia. Russia offers aid to Turkey. Russia alone, true to her new rôle of protector of the Ottoman Empire, spontaneously offered her armed intervention to stop the progress of Ibrahim. The magnanimous offer of the Tsar was too suspicious to be accepted save at the last extremity; and the Turks had still left to them the army with which Reshid Pasha, the conqueror of Missolonghi, had been pacifying Albania. But this last hope, too, was soon destroyed. Ibrahim met his old colleague and enemy at Konieh, on December 21, 1832, inflicted on him a crushing defeat, took him prisoner, and continued his march on Constantinople, which now seemed to lie at his mercy.

In this crisis of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, Count Muravieff arrived in Constantinople, and renewed the offers

of the Russian Government. Mahmud had now no choice but to yield. The claims of Mehemet Ali had grown with each fresh victory; the Mussulman population saw in Ibrahim the champion of Islam against the 'reforming' Sultan, in his unparalleled success the visible proof of the favour of Allah; at any moment a palace intrigue might prepare for Mahmud the fate of Selim III. 'A drowning man,' exclaimed the Sultan, 'will grasp at a serpent.' The Russian offer was accepted.

Mahmud possibly foresaw that the intervention of Russia would inevitably provoke that of the other Powers, and that the Porte would once more be able to find its own salvation in their discords. The views of the Powers were in fact sufficiently diverse. On first learning of Muravieff's mission, Palmerston had, indeed, expressed admiration of the Tsar's 'generous policy.'¹ But the true tendency of this policy soon became clear. Russia desired, indeed, as did England, to maintain the Turkish Empire; but she wished to keep it weak and dependent. England, on the other hand, aimed at revivifying the Ottoman Power, so as to render it an effective barrier to Russian advance; and Palmerston even declared that, were the Sultan overthrown, and a strong Government established under Ibrahim, England would accept the situation as consistent with her general views.² Even without this sharp divergence in the aims of the two Governments, it would have been impossible for Great Britain to forward the policy of Russia. Throughout the negotiations the latter had been using the Eastern Question as an instrument for shattering the *entente* between France and England. Russian statesmen pointed out, with perfect truth, that England had more to fear from the intrigues of France in Egypt than from the supposed preponderance of Russia at Constantinople. But the expansive ambitions of France in the Mediterranean, of which Mehemet Ali was to be the

¹ Report of Lieven (September 25 1832); Martens, xii. 39.

² Reports of Lieven and Pozzo, February 24, 1833; *Ibid.* 41.

instrument, had not yet become obvious; and, as Louis Philippe had personal as well as political reasons for desiring to thwart the Tsar, the Western Powers were, for the present, still able to take up a common attitude in opposition to the isolated influence of Russia in Turkey.

At one moment, indeed, it seemed likely that all diplomatic argumentation would be drowned in the thunder of a European war. Ibrahim, encouraged by irresponsible promises of French support, pushed on to Kiutayeh; and, in February 1833, his advance guard was at Brussa. Mahmud, in alarm, invited the Russian fleet to anchor in the Golden Horn; and only the violent threats of the French ambassador, and his promise to make Mehemet Ali accept the Turkish terms, secured its removal at the Sultan's request. But Mehemet refused to listen to the advice of France, and for only answer ordered Ibrahim to push on to Skutari, whence his guns could be trained on Constantinople itself. Once more, in response to the Sultan's Intervention of Russia. terrified appeal, the Russians appeared, landed 15,000 men at Buyukdere and Therapia, on the European shore of the Bosphorus, while with a still larger force they prepared to cross the Danube.

This alarming move drew England and France together in more vigorous co-operation. The squadrons of the two Powers appeared in the Archipelago; and Lord Ponsonby, who had but recently arrived at his post in Constantinople, joined with Admiral Roussin in pressing the Porte to come to terms with Mehemet Ali. The Pasha himself had little stomach for compromising what he had already gained by risking a war with Russia. The result was the Convention of Kiutayeh, which stipulated Convention of Kiutayeh, April 8, 1833. for the issue of a firman appointing Mehemet Ali to the coveted pashaliks and Ibrahim to the government of the district of Adana, commanding the passes over the Taurus mountains.

Russia triumphed. The Western Powers, in their terror

of Russian aggression, had forced the Sultan to a humiliating peace. The integrity of Turkey, that main article in the political creed of England and France, had been violated in all but name. The selfishness of Turkey's best friends had been revealed, and at the same time the disinterestedness of

Treaty of
Unkiar Ske-
lessi, July 8,
1833.

her worst enemy. The situation thus created was

soon revealed to the world. On July 8, 1833,

was signed the famous Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,

which, under the form of an offensive and defensive

alliance between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, virtually, in the words of Count Nesselrode himself, legalised for the future the armed intervention of Russia in Turkish affairs.¹ More important still, as it seemed, from the point of view of Russian interests, a secret article, the substance of which only gradually became known, stipulated that the Dardanelles were henceforth to be closed 'at need' (*au besoin*), *i.e.* on the demand of Russia, to the war-vessels of all nations.²

In France and England the news of the conclusion of this treaty roused immense excitement. Palmerston declared that it placed Turkey under Russian vassalage, and that, as far as England was concerned, it had no existence. Identical notes, protesting against its terms, were handed in at St. Petersburg by the French and English ambassadors, with a declaration that, in the event of war, neither Power would recognise its validity. The importance of the document was, in fact, grossly exaggerated on both sides. Russia's geographical position, as Palmerston himself admitted later, formed a better title for her influence in Turkey than any treaty; and as for the fancied immunity from attack given to the Russian coasts in the Black Sea by the secret article, the events of 1854 and 1876 proved that it is easy for a line of battle ship to sail through a protocol. It was not, however, these obvious arguments that prevented a rupture at the time. Palmerston's warlike tone found little echo in the most influential political circles in England, and still less in France,

¹ Martens, xii. 43.

² See *Camb. Mod. Hist.*, vol. x. pp. 554, etc.

where the king was intent on avoiding war. The Foreign Secretary had to accept with the best grace possible Russia's assurances of unaltered friendship, and vented his ill-humour in a quite unjustifiable protest against the fortification of the Isles of Aland in the Baltic, which, he declared, could have no other object than a menace to England.

Russia and Great Britain now, in fact, stood face to face as avowed rivals in the East. The Tsars had long since declared the affairs of Asia to belong to their domestic concerns; and, as long as no rival had appeared on the scene, the claim had been practically acknowledged. But, early in the 'thirties,' the diplomatic world had begun to foresee the rise of questions between Russia and England more difficult of settlement even than those which concerned the fate of Turkey. The expansion of the Russian Empire at the expense of the semi-barbarous tribes of Central Asia was, indeed, as inevitable as the similar extension of the Company's Raj in India, and no more the result of any deliberate plan of conquest.¹ So far no acute questions had arisen; but statesmen were beginning to ask what would happen when the two advancing tides should meet. In face of the complicated problems of the future, even Palmerston realised the importance of being on good terms with Russia. 'From the moment that Russia and England come to an understanding,' he exclaimed, in a burst of confidence, to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, 'the peace of Asia is assured.'² But the road to a good understanding was blocked by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; and though the accession to office in December 1834 of Peel's Tory Government, of which Wellington was a member, seemed to promise the renewal of cordial relations, even Wellington, though a firm believer in a Russian alliance, declared that the treaty, though in his opinion valueless to Russia, would form, as long as it lasted, a barrier to a sincere

¹ See Sir Robert Murchison, quoted in De Martens' *Russia and England in Central Asia*, 35.

² Martens' *Recueil*, etc., xii. 53.

friendship. This opinion, expressed by a statesman for whom Nicholas I. had a profound respect, was not without influence on later developments. For the present, however, the Russian Government did not see its way to a formal surrender of the treaty, though, so long as peace lasted, it allowed it to be shelved among the archives 'as an interesting and honourable historical relic.'¹

The Peel-Wellington ministry did not, in any case, survive long enough to restore permanently the cordial relations between England and Russia. In April 1835 Palmerston was again in office under the leadership of Lord Melbourne. For the moment the affairs of the East had fallen into the background, and the old question of the attitude of the Powers toward the forces of Revolution was uppermost. The Grand Alliance, as a conservative force, had been broken by the action of France and England in the Belgian Question; and the three 'free' Powers, as Metternich called them, had drawn away from the constitutional monarchies of the West. To the statesmen of the Holy Alliance, indeed, Palmerston, the 'Jacobin' and 'apostate,' was the main cause of the revolutionary unrest in Europe. He had openly proclaimed his contempt for international law,² and had taken under his protection the hated principle of nationalities. All uninvited, he put himself forward as the champion of 'oppressed peoples' against 'Russian aggressiveness' in particular; and to the remonstrances of the Russian ambassador he replied: 'When the sheep are dumb, the shepherd must speak!'³

Such pretensions were naturally offensive and alarming to shepherds by Divine right. They were aware, too, of an ominous agitation among their flocks. Some had even escaped from their pens, and, fleeing to safe harbours in France or Switzerland, had cast their fleeces and revealed the wolf beneath. In face of a

¹ Martens' *Recueil*, etc., xii. 57.

² Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, 57.

³ Martens, xii. 64.

revolutionary agitation carried on by Polish, Italian, and German refugees, the three conservative Powers had judged it expedient to draw together. As early as March 1832, the Tsar had approached Prussia, offering support in case of attack by France, and inviting the king to join 'the system of mutual assistance' which he wished to establish by the alliance of the three northern monarchies.¹ To the objection of Frederick William that no formal alliance was required amongst friends, the Tsar replied that, had there been such an alliance in 1830, the breach of the treaties through the French and Belgian revolutions might have been avoided.

Everything that has happened in Belgium between France and England,' he added, 'proves to me that if these two Powers have the courage to profess loudly rebellion and the overturn of all stability, we ought to have the right and the courage to support Divine right.'²

The first outcome of the Tsar's action was the Convention, signed at Berlin on March 9, 1833, by which the three Powers, in view of the coercion of Holland by France and England, agreed on common action in the Belgian Question, in order to prevent the king of Holland being forced to further concessions, especially in those matters reserved by Russia when adhering to the Treaty of London.³ The occasion for united action under this instrument never arose; but the cordial understanding of which it was the symbol was further strengthened by a meeting, in September 1833, at Münchengrätz, of the Emperors Nicholas and Francis and the Crown Prince of Prussia.

At the important meeting at Münchengrätz two main questions were discussed—the attitude of the Eastern Powers towards revolutionary movements in the West, and that of Europe at large, and of Austria and Russia in particular, in view of a possible break-up of the Ottoman Empire. As to the first of these, the three courts had already been corre-

¹ Martens, viii. 184.

² *Ibid.* 197.

³ For text, Martens, iv. (1.) 432, viii. 197.

sponding with regard to the revolutionary agitation of which the Free City of Cracow had become the centre, and the expediency of withdrawing the privileges so abused had already been mooted, though nothing had been settled. Prussia, too, fearful still of French invasion, shrank from the bold proposal of the Tsar publicly to reaffirm the doctrines of the Holy Alliance, as interpreted at Verona, and to warn France against encouraging revolutionary propaganda. Instead, by a secret Convention, which was signed afterwards at Berlin on October 15, 1833, was reaffirmed the right of the Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of an independent state at the request of its legitimate sovereign, a right with which no third Power would be allowed to interfere, such interference being regarded by the three sovereigns as an act of hostility directed against all of them. A third article, which alone was published, provided for the mutual extradition of political refugees.¹

The character of this formal renewal of the Holy Alliance, though its exact terms were kept secret, was sufficiently well known. It was otherwise with the agreement arrived at on the Eastern Question. It was believed in England that Russia and Austria had arranged to partition the Turkish Empire: and this belief was at once a sign and a cause of the suspicious attitude of the British Government at this time.² As a matter

of fact, the secret Convention of Münchengrätz, signed on September 18, 1833, was the first formal step in the Eastern policy of Russia which led to the Anglo-Russian *entente* and the Quadruple Alliance of 1840. Already, in 1829, a committee of Russian statesmen, appointed for the purpose, after an exhaustive discussion of the relations of Russia to the Ottoman Empire, had reported to the Tsar that the true interests of Russia lay in the preservation of Turkey rather than in its destruction; since it was better to have a weak and dependent state on Russia's borders than one possibly strong and independent.

¹ Martens, iv. (1.) 460.

² Bulwer, ii. 169.

The Emperor Nicholas, much against his will, had accepted this conclusion, the more readily, perhaps, since it enabled him to come to an understanding with Austria in the matter. By the Convention of Münchengrätz, then, it was decided that the three Powers were to combine, not to destroy but to uphold the Ottoman Empire; and, by separate articles, it was agreed that the contracting Powers would oppose any combination threatening the sovereign power of Turkey, either by a change of dynasty or by the extension of the Arab rule over the European provinces. Finally, in the event of their efforts to uphold the Ottoman power failing, Austria and Russia agreed to act in perfect accord in any settlement of the reversion.¹

In this Convention there was nothing which might not, with advantage, have been communicated to British Ministers, and which could not have been signed by them.

But, apart from more substantial points of difference, since 1832 the shadow of the Revolution stood between England and the Russian autocrat. King William IV., by using his personal influence to force the great Reform Bill through the House of Lords, had 'thrown his crown into the gutter.' The Russian ambassador sent home from London pessimistic reports of the prospects of royalty in England. The throne might stand during the lifetime of the present king; but the next heir was a young and inexperienced girl, and, even were the Princess Victoria ever to mount the throne—which was unlikely—she would be speedily swept off it again by the rising tide of republicanism. And to this internal corruption England's foreign policy remained a standing witness. She had taken the side of revolution in Belgium; she was taking the same side in Portugal and Spain.

The Belgian Question had not yet been settled when civil war broke out south of the Pyrenees. In Portugal, Don Pedro, after resigning the crown of Brazil, had arrived to

Russia and
the English
Monarchy.

¹ Martens, iv. (1.) 445.

uphold the rights of his daughter, Donna Maria la Gloria, against his brother Miguel, who had usurped the throne in 1828; and on July 28, 1833, he had made himself master of Lisbon. In Spain, King Ferdinand VII., just before his death, in September 1833, had issued, with the consent of the Cortes, a 'Pragmatic Sanction,' suspending the Salic law and settling the crown, to the exclusion of his brother Don Carlos, on his infant daughter Isabella, under the regency of the Queen-mother Christina. Under these circumstances Miguel and Carlos made common cause, supported by the clericals and legitimists in the Peninsula, and abroad by the somewhat Platonic sympathy of the three Eastern Powers. The Liberals and the two Western Powers declared in favour of Maria and Isabella.

To Talleyrand the occasion seemed highly opportune for making a permanent breach in the Grand Alliance by establishing a formal league between France and England. But Palmerston had no wish to break utterly and ostentatiously with Austria and Russia; and, so far from drawing closer relations with France, he even widened the breach already caused by his masterful tone during the Belgian crisis, and, pursuing the traditional English policy of distrust of France in Spanish affairs, formed, for the purpose of pacifying the Peninsula, an alliance with Spain and Portugal, from which France was excluded. This, however, the Government of Louis Philippe could never tolerate and live; for the need of France to be certain of the friendship of Spain had long been an axiom of French politics.¹ Talleyrand was directed

The Quad-
ruple Alli-
ance of 1834.

to demand the inclusion of France in the alliance on equal terms. This was, after some difficulty, arranged; and on April 22, 1834, the Triple became a Quadruple Alliance. But when it was proposed to make this effective, fresh misunderstandings arose. The Carlist revolt, suppressed for a time, broke out with renewed vigour in the spring of 1835; and Queen Christina appealed

¹ Berryer, quoted in Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, i. 279.

to the Allies for help. Thiers suggested, somewhat naively, a repetition of the French expedition of 1823. Palmerston refused to be a party to this, and proposed in his turn an English intervention, which France rejected. Once more, in 1836, Thiers returned to the suggestion of restoring order in Spain by French arms. He met this time with an insurmountable obstacle in the determination of Louis Philippe under no circumstances to intervene; and, refusing to yield his own opinion to that of the king, he resigned.

In spite of the Reform Bill and of Palmerston, the Emperor Nicholas had never entirely given up hope of breaking the unholy league between a legitimate Power, as Nicholas I. he still termed England, and the revolutionary and England. monarchy of France. To this end he was even ready to sacrifice much that Russia had gained, and to make a compromise with Great Britain in the East. There was much to encourage him. Affairs in Central Asia, it is true, were reaching a critical stage. England complained of Russian intrigues in Persia which, in 1838, were supposed to have caused the Shah's attack on Herat; and for the first time the alarm was raised of Russian designs on India. The Tsar thought it worth while to give a personal denial to both these rumours. Russia aimed at no more than a share in the British monopoly of Central Asian trade, and might in her turn complain of the intrigues of English agents in the border Khanates, and of the presence of a British armed force on Persian soil. But though clouds were gathering on the horizon of the further East, the storm was not yet to burst; and, meanwhile, in Europe, matters were progressing, from the Russian point of view, more satisfactorily.

The uncordial co-operation in Belgium, and afterwards in Spain and Portugal, had not drawn closer the ties of the Anglo-French *entente cordiale*. This had from the outset been a somewhat artificial product—^{Rift in the} Anglo-French ^{entente.} a 'card-board alliance,' as Wellington called it. The character, the traditions, the aims of the English and

French peoples were too utterly different to suffer a union to survive that was founded, not on common instincts and interests, but on a fancied identity of political system. Moreover, Louis Philippe himself had the hunger of the parvenu for the recognition of the 'legitimate' Powers, and felt that his dynasty would never be safe until he had fortified it by an alliance—if possible matrimonial—with the interests of the continental Powers. The rift in the Anglo-French *entente* Nicholas made it his study to widen. He turned from the English Government to the English people, appealing to them with a delicate flattery which touched them in their most susceptible spot. He sent the Cesarevitch on a visit to England, declaring that such was the confidence inspired in him by his own visit 'to that grand country—a memory which nothing could efface'—that he had no hesitation in 'trusting him to the honour and loyalty of the English people.'

The personal charm of the future emancipator of the serfs had its effect. The English were put into a good temper by the contemplation of their national virtue of hospitality. The Tsar took advantage of this momentary reaction in the tide of anti-Russian sentiment to send over Baron Brunnow to attempt a settlement with the British Government of all outstanding questions.

Of these, the relations between Turkey and Egypt had once more become by far the most acute. England could hardly view without misgiving the creation, under Mehemet Ali, of a vast Arab empire stretching from the Taurus to Khartoum, and commanding the two most important trade routes to India—the Euphrates Valley and the Isthmus of Suez. Moreover, the system of Government monopolies, by which the Pasha was gradually concentrating in his own hands all the trade of his dominions, seriously interfered with British commercial interests. A commercial treaty with the Porte, signed by England on August 16, 1838, and which applied to Egypt as a province

of the Ottoman Empire, dealt a severe blow at the commercial system on which the power of Mehemet Ali was based. The occupation of Aden, in 1839, was intended as a counter-move to French intrigues, and as a guarantee of the freedom of the trade route by way of Suez and the Red Sea.¹

It was, however, Sultan Mahmud's thirst for vengeance that quickened the crisis. For six years the reorganisation of the Ottoman army had been pushed on by a War renewed zeal inspired by hate. At last the Sultan thought between Tur- that the time to strike had come. On April 21, key and Me- hemet Ali, 1839, the Turks, who had been massed on the April 1839. banks of the Euphrates, crossed the stream, under the command of Hafiz Pasha, and invaded Syria. On June 7 the Sultan solemnly launched against Mehemet Ali the ban of the Empire. The campaign was even shorter, and, for the Turks, more disastrous than that of 1832. On June 24 Ibrahim met the Ottoman army at Nessib, and Battle of routed it. Once more the road to Constantinople Nessib. lay open to him. Disaster followed disaster, heralding, as it seemed, the downfall of the Turkish rule. On June 30 the old Sultan Mahmud died, leaving the throne to Abd-ul-Mejid, a lad of sixteen. And finally, as though to crown the edifice of ruin, the Capudan Pasha Ahmed sailed to Alexandria, and, on the plea that the Turkish ministers were sold to Russia, handed over the Ottoman fleet to Mehemet Ali.

Obviously, if the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi were to be more than 'an interesting historical relic,' the time had come for its application. In common alarm, the majority of the Powers, disunited on most points, combined Intervention of the Powers. to forestall any isolated action on the part of Russia, and by their ambassadors at Constantinople agreed to place the young Sultan under the protection of Europe.² At the same time they warned Mehemet Ali that the matter was now not for him, but for Europe, to decide. But at this point their agreement ceased. France now openly championed

¹ Prokesch-Osten, *Mehmed Ali*, 82.

² Bulwer, ii. 294.

Mehemet Ali, in whom she looked to find a valuable ally against the sea-power of England in the Mediterranean.¹ She proposed that the Pasha of Egypt should be left in the enjoyment of his conquests, and that France and England should come to an agreement as to common action in the event of the Russians meeting Ibrahim on the Bosphorus. The Alliance, in fact, was to be directed, not against Egypt, but against Russia. English diplomacy seemed set between the devil and the deep sea. It could lend unreserved support neither to Russia nor to France; and if it stood aside, there was always the risk that Russia and France might combine to partition the Turkish Empire into spheres of influence—to use a term not then invented—from which England would be altogether excluded. Nicholas I. saw his opportunity. He had never ceased to believe that there was no real conflict of interests between Russia and England in the East. In any case, a separate understanding with the despised Bourgeois Monarchy was for him out of the question, though its possibility might be used to overcome the coyness of the British Cabinet. That the Tsar would have sacrificed the traditional policy of Russia in the East to his prejudice against the Revolution is in the last degree improbable; but the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi represented but a snatch victory, the fruits of which could never be garnered in face of the united opposition of Europe, while its voluntary surrender would be amply repaid by a definitive breach in the understanding between France and England.²

Palmerston received the communication of the Tsar's offers, made through Baron Brunnow, with unaffected 'surprise and admiration.' Nicholas was prepared to agree with the views of England as to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt; to refrain from henceforth from isolated action in Turkey; to allow the Treaty of

Offers of the
Tsar to Eng-
land.

¹ Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 15, 1840; *Ibid.* ii. 350.

² The Tsar's attitude is fully analysed in *La Mer Noire et les Détroits de Constantinople*, par * * * (Paris, 1899).

Unkiar Skelessi to lapse; and, in return for an international agreement closing the Dardanelles to the war-ships of all nations, to extend the same principle to the Bosphorus, which Russia would undertake only to pass, should the defence of the Ottoman Empire demand it, as the mandatary of Europe.¹ The Russian ambassador was further instructed to arrange a coalition of the Great Powers for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, in which coalition the Tsar was willing, for political reasons, that France should be included, though personally he would prefer that she should be left out.²

For a while the English Cabinet wavered between conflicting opinions. Melbourne was willing to drop France; Palmerston still clung to the idea of the alliance of the two Liberal Powers. It was the policy of France herself that precipitated the event. Palmerston complained of the dilatory tactics of the French Cabinet. 'England,' he said, 'is willing to go on, but not to stand still with France.'³ He feared that, if the common agreement were much longer delayed, the Tsar might lose patience, retract his offers, and act alone.⁴ The discovery of the real object of the French procrastination decided the course of the English Government. Distracted between the necessity for humouring French public opinion, which violently favoured Mehemet Ali, and the views of the king, which were against any course that might embroil him with Europe, Thiers had endeavoured, while keeping the Powers in play, to come to a separate understanding with the Porte, which should secure at the same time Mehemet Ali's position and French influence in the Divan.⁵ The discovery of this intrigue removed the last

¹ Martens, xii. 110.

² *Ibid.* 112; and Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839; Bulwer, ii. 299.

³ Bulwer, ii. 297.

⁴ Very secret report of Brunnow; Martens, xii. 117.

⁵ Cf. Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de mon Temps*, v. 64. French policy was based on the belief in Mehemet Ali's power; also pp. 210, 229.

scruples of the British Government. On July 3, 1840, without the knowledge of the French ambassador, was signed the Convention of London, by which the four Powers, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, undertook to protect the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, and agreed upon the measures to be concerted for reducing the latter to submission. By a separate Article it was agreed that, should he yield within ten days, he was to receive the hereditary pashalik of Egypt and the administration of southern Syria, together with the pashalik of Acre for life. If, at the end of ten days, he still remained obdurate, the offer of Syria and Acre was to be withdrawn; and if at the close of yet another ten days he were still defiant, the whole proposal was to be taken back for the reconsideration of the Powers. By a protocol, signed at London on September 5, 1840, the allied Powers formally disclaimed any intention of deriving separate advantages from their intervention.

The news of this 'mortal affront,' as Guizot termed it, to the honour of France, was received in Paris with transports of rage. Thiers, loudly declaring that the alliance with England had been shattered, blustered and threatened. He would let loose on Europe the flood of revolution, and sweep away the flimsy barriers of the treaties of 1815. France would once again bid defiance to a coalition of Europe, and victoriously advance to her natural frontier of the Rhine. Even Louis Philippe, most civilian of monarchs, thought it expedient to be carried away by the tide of warlike sentiment, and to talk at large about 'unmuzzling the tiger of war.' From end to end the country was filled with the clang of warlike preparations; and, under the direction of Thiers, Paris was surrounded with a bulwark of forts. But not till thirty years later, in 1870, were these destined to come into use. Palmerston had from the first watched the storm with an equal mind. The France of Louis Philippe, he argued, was not that of Napoleon. The

War fever
in France.

rule of a military caste, which depended for its wealth on the plunder of Europe, was one thing; that of the bourgeois class, drawing a comfortable income from *rentes*, another.¹ But Lord Melbourne judged it expedient to hint to Louis Philippe, through the King of the Belgians, the inevitable consequences of the French war preparations. He took the hint, dismissed Thiers, and formed a ministry under Guizot; and, though the French mobilisation continued, the king was careful to explain that this was because the best way to turn a riotous *sansculottes* into a loyal Frenchman was to put him into red breeches.²

The Tsar had, meanwhile, used the crisis to draw closer the ties of the Anglo-Russian *entente*. The settlement of the Eastern Question he declared to be the affair of England and Russia;³ and, with equal generosity and wisdom, he spontaneously offered to send a Russian squadron to the assistance of the British in the event of aggressive action on the part of France. Meanwhile, the success of the joint intervention of the Powers in the East seemed to make an auspicious opening for the new era of good understanding between the two Governments. Mehemet Ali, trusting in the encouraging attitude of France, and in the effectiveness of Ibrahim's army, had defied the Coalition. But French help never went beyond stimulating phrases, and the Egyptian military power collapsed with surprising rapidity. The French had reckoned on Mehemet Ali being able to keep the Allies in check, at any rate for a time, until they were ready;⁴ and they used the unexpected revelation of his weakness as an excuse for once more beating their spears into pruning hooks. This, indeed, was not the only disillusion they suffered. They had vaunted the Pasha of Egypt to the skies as the champion of French ideas and of French enlightenment, whose mission it was to remove the barbarous yoke of the

The Allies
coerce Mehe-
met Ali.

¹ Bulwer, ii. 320.

² Report of Brunnow (MART. xii. 147).

³ Springer, *op. cit.* i. 462.

⁴ Driault, *op. cit.* 151.

Turks from the necks of oppressed peoples. But scarcely had the combined British, Austrian, and Turkish fleet appeared off Beirout on August 11, when the Syrian population rose as one man in revolt against the tyranny of that same Ibrahim who, six years before, had been welcomed as a liberator. Beirout fell on October 3; and Ibrahim, cut off amidst a hostile people, began a hurried retreat southwards. On November 2 the Allies captured Acre, and Mehemet Ali ordered the evacuation of Syria. From Acre, Admiral Napier sailed straight to Alexandria, and threatened to bombard it if the Pasha did not come to terms. On November 25 was signed a Convention by which Mehemet Ali resigned all claims to Syria, and agreed to restore the Ottoman fleet, the Powers on their part undertaking to use their influence with the Porte to procure for himself and his heirs the pashalik of Egypt. The Turco-Egyptian Question was settled.

Guizot still hoped to 'save the face' of France by obtaining a few concessions for Mehemet Ali, and even suggested a new treaty placing the integrity of Turkey under the guarantee of the five Great Powers. Metternich, too, disgusted at the affairs of the East having been settled at London and not at Vienna, supported the latter idea, and talked at large of the danger to Europe from the isolation of France. But Palmerston held firmly to the principle that it was not England's business to save the French Government from *émeutes*, and declined the plan of a European guarantee of Turkey as too obviously aimed at Russia. In one point only did England see her way to at once conciliating France, and settling once for all, as was supposed, a

difficult question. By a Convention signed in

The Straits
Convention,
July 1, 1842.

London on July 1, 1842, it was agreed to

extend the principle of the closure of the

Bosphorus to the Dardanelles, which were

henceforth to remain closed to the warships of all nations.

This Convention, renewed in 1879, was regarded at the time

as a great triumph for Russian diplomacy; and it secured, in fact, for Russia all the supposed advantages of the secret articles of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, of which it was considered, both in Russia and France, a revival. The hollowness of the belief that in war time it would prove a defence for the Russian coasts of the Black Sea has already been pointed out; and it was probably the belief that it might do some good, and could in war time do no harm, that induced Palmerston to sign it. Its immediate moral effect was certainly great. The Anglo-Russian rapprochement of 1839 had become, for the moment, an effective alliance full of possibilities, which were, unfortunately, not to be realised; and, more important still, the principle of the Concert of Europe had been reaffirmed, a bridge had been thrown over the gulf that had so long divided the Powers of the East and West and, in the words of Count Nesselrode, 'the federative system of the European states re-established on its old basis.'

CHAPTER XI

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

Increase of Russian and decrease of Austrian influence in Europe—The Zollverein—Accession of Frederick William IV.—Relations of Russia and France with Great Britain—Visits of Nicholas and Louis Philippe to England—Growth of revolutionary forces in Europe—Mazzini and 'Young Italy'—Election of Pius IX.—The Papacy and Liberalism—Charles Albert of Piedmont and the national movement—He grants a Constitution—Internal condition of Austria—The administrative system—Stagnation of the Government—Growth of nationalist movements—Hungary—Transylvania—Influence of Louis Kossuth—The Slav races—Czech movement in Bohemia—'Illyrism'—The Germans—Influence of agrarian grievances—The rising of 1846 in Galicia—Growth of Liberalism in Germany—The constitutional crisis in Hanover—Frederick William IV. grants a Constitution to Prussia—Attitude of Russia and Austria—Genesis of the Revolution of 1848 in France—The 'bourgeois monarchy' and the policy of 'resistance'—Growth of Socialism—Revival of the Napoleonic legend—The translation of Napoleon's body—Government of Guizot—The affair of the 'Spanish marriages'—France and the Sonderbund war in Switzerland—Agitation for reform—The revolution of February 25—The Provisional Government—The 'National Workshops'—The 'June Days'—Presidency of Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

If the assertion that the federative system of the European States had been re-established was enthusiastic hyperbole, there can be no doubt that Russia emerged from the latest phase of the Eastern Question with greatly increased prestige. The central figure of the European system was, in fact, no longer Metternich, but the Emperor Nicholas. Francis of Austria had died on March 2, 1835; and his successor, Ferdinand, without being absolutely deranged, was so feeble in mind that a veiled regency had to be instituted to carry on the govern-

ment, and in the constitution of this the Tsar had actually been consulted.¹ The influence thus conceded was increased by a meeting between the Emperors Nicholas and Ferdinand at Teplitz on September 19, 1835, when the compacts of Münchengrätz were renewed, and by a visit of the Tsar to Vienna immediately afterwards. The results were plainly revealed in the course of the complications in the East. Metternich tried hard to keep hold of the threads of the world's affairs, now slipping from his grasp. He eagerly seconded a proposal made by England for the assembly of a Conference at Vienna to settle the Eastern Question. The Tsar, however, refused to allow Europe to sit in judgment on Russia;² and in the end, throughout the course of events which had led to the Quadruple Alliance, Austria had been compelled meekly to follow his lead. In Germany, too, the reputation of Metternich was not what it had been. The rivalry of Prussia and Austria was a fact none the less real that it was not loudly proclaimed; and lately the methodical conscientiousness of Prussian officialism had won over the diplomatic finesse of the Austrian Court a victory which was not hidden from the world. At the beginning of 1834 Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and the Thuringian States had entered the Prussian Customs Union. In 1835 and 1836 Baden, Nassau, and the city of Frankfort followed suit. The whole of central and southern Germany was now bound together by the closest commercial ties; and though Hanover headed a rival union of the northern states, this was foredoomed to failure; and Metternich realised too late that, absorbed in pulling the wires of the puppet-show at Frankfort, he had allowed Prussia 'to consolidate on the firm foundation of material interests a political influence in Germany,'³ to which the present system of the Diet must inevitably succumb. And if, in spite of the timorous

Extension
of the
Zollverein.

¹ Springer, i. 445.

² Martens, iv. (1.) 481, etc.

³ Despatch of Maltitz, February 12, 1832; Martens, viii. 198.

character of Frederick William III., Prussia by the force of circumstances threatened to become supreme in Germany, Russia, since the Conference at Münchengrätz, had been supreme at Berlin. And in the intimate relations between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg the accession of Frederick William IV. altered nothing.¹ The enigmatic character and rumoured intentions of the new king, indeed, caused some misgivings in the minds of the other allies of Münchengrätz. He was a true child of the romantic movement, living in a world of dreams, of which the brightest to him was that of the mediæval Empire of the Hapsburgs. Talented, versatile, and warm-hearted, he had gained a reputation for Liberalism; though, as a matter of fact, he hated the Revolution as much as he disliked the prosaic bureaucracy of Prussia.² Meanwhile he shared to the full his father's reverence for the majestic autocrat of Russia; and if he ever fell into revolutionary sloughs, it would only be in pursuit of mediæval will-o'-the-wisps.

With Prussia, then, and the ever consistent Austria united with her in the holy bonds of the Triple Alliance, Russia and England. could look forward with a good hope; and if only the renewal of the broken relations between the western Liberal Powers could be prevented, the European alliance against the Revolution might yet be restored on its old basis. And to the Tsar the difficulties in the way seemed not insurmountable. He had made a successful bid for the goodwill of the British Government by his attitude in the Eastern Question. Old suspicions of Russian motives had been drowned in a chorus of admiration for the Imperial generosity. On his side, the Tsar had watched with astonished approval the attitude of the reformed Parliament. Of the universal ruin predicted as the result of the Reform Bill of 1832 there was no sign. The Queen still reigned. And now,

¹ Martens, viii. 241.

² Sybel, *The Founding of the German Empire*, i. 110.

in 1842, for the second time since the great catastrophe of ten years before, a Tory Government, that of Peel-Wellington, was in power. Clearly there was little in common between the law-abiding English and the turbulent folk on the banks of the Seine, who every year overset a Government. Only fear of the possible resentment of Austria prevented the Tsar from making England a party to the secrets of Münchengrätz;¹ and, short of this complete confidence, everything was done to draw closer the relations between the two countries. In 1842 a commercial treaty between Russia and England was signed, though the Tsar rejected Peel's advice to introduce Free Trade.² In 1843, on the dismissal of the last Polish officer serving in the Belgian army, diplomatic relations were established between Brussels and St. Petersburg, an event personally gratifying to Queen Victoria.

The king of the French watched with concern these efforts to complete his isolation, and in his turn began a diplomatic courtship of England. He was helped by the personal predilection of the Queen and Prince Albert for a prince connected with the House of Coburg; and a visit paid by them to Louis Philippe at the Château d'Eu threw the Russian diplomats into despair. Russia, however, had a good friend in Lord Aberdeen; and at his suggestion, at the beginning of June 1844, the Emperor Nicholas visited England, an event memorable for its later consequences. For it was now that the Tsar, in conversations with Prince Albert and the British ministers, tried to clear away those suspicions of his projects in the East

Visit of
Nicholas I.
to England,
1844.

which were the main obstacle to a cordial agreement. The result was the reverse of that hoped for. The Tsar's expressed belief in the speedy decease of the 'Sick Man'—as he called Turkey—was interpreted as his own intention to commit homicide. The personal communications of the emperor were repeated, after the end of his visit, by Count Nesselrode

¹ Martens, xi. 205.

² *Ibid.* xi. 210.

in a memorandum in which he urged that the English and Russian Governments should come to an agreement beforehand, in view of the possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.¹ But England, possessed rightly or wrongly of an incurable distrust of Russian diplomatic methods, refused to respond, and fell instead into that mood of suspicion which found expression, ten years later, in the Crimea.

Louis Philippe was prompt to profit by the discomfiture of his Russian rival. The grievances of England against France were, it is true, tangible, whereas those against Russia loomed large only in the prophetic imagination. The 'Affaire Pritchard,' an outcome of conflicting religious and material interests in the South Seas, had, it is true, been settled in England's favour. More serious were the greedy eyes which France, after absorbing Algiers, was casting on Morocco; and even the peaceful Aberdeen had thought it necessary to warn the French Government that any permanent occupation of the coast of Morocco would be looked upon by England as a *casus belli*.² But Louis Philippe knew how to distinguish between the possible and the impossible; and in spite of the angry clamour of the Opposition, preferred to sacrifice the shadowy chance of gaining the whole northern seaboard of Africa for France to the solid advantage of re-cementing the Anglo-French

Visit of Louis Philippe to England, 1845. Alliance. In October 1845 he in his turn visited England. None had studied to greater perfection the art of pleasing. In neatly turned speeches he flattered the pet virtues of the British, and enlarged on the natural brotherhood of the English and French. His task did not prove hard. The Russian sympathies of the Tory Government were not shared by the people; and when, in 1846, the Peel Ministry fell, Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary, began that policy of open opposition to Russia which culminated in the invasion of the Crimea.

¹ *Eastern Papers*, 1854, I.XXI. Part vi.

² Hillebrand, ii. 577.

That the relations of close cordiality between France and England were not maintained was due to the chief defect in Louis Philippe's character as a king: his incapacity to subordinate the interests of his family to those of France, which led him to wreck the Anglo-French *entente* by his double-faced attitude in the matter of the 'Spanish Marriages.'

But the fate of the 'Confederation of Europe,' and of the settlement of 1815, had, in fact, already passed out of the hands of the Cabinets and beyond the arena of diplomacy. The thirty years of peace, which at a price the Powers had secured for Europe, had produced their effect. Material prosperity had advanced by leaps and bounds. Even greater had been the progress in knowledge and in thought. The world, intoxicated with the vision of boundless possibilities of progress, pressed impatiently against the barriers erected by political systems, which seemed to it outworn and useless, and therefore intolerable. The Tsar, watching from the safe 'vantage ground of Holy Russia, marked the heaving of the surface, and warned in vain against the terrible developments to come.¹ As the dead weight of Metternich's system was the most oppressive, so it was that wherever Austria ruled, the forces of the Revolution gathered in greatest strength. Metternich himself had pointed out the peculiar peril of the revolutionary spirit in Germany, though he had drawn the wrong moral. The flightiness of the French, he had remarked, discounted the danger of their revolutionary movements. 'It would be otherwise when the Germans added to enthusiasm, perseverance.' As for the Italians, as a revolutionary force they were scarce worth mentioning. Yet it was precisely in Italy that this combination of enthusiasm with perseverance was displayed which made her, and not France, the focus of the movements which culminated in 1848.

Revolu-
tionary
unrest in
Europe.

Behind these movements there was no single aim, no

¹ Martens, viii. 368.

consistent principle. Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism, Socialism and Liberalism, jostled each other in a singular confusion of ideas. In Italy itself there was little in common between Mazzini's austere vision of an Italian Republic, Gioberti's dream of a federation of Italy under a reformed Papacy, and the belief of Charles Albert, melancholy and misunderstood, in the destiny of the House of Savoy. Yet beneath all these lay the common belief in the union of Italy, burned the common fire of hatred for the 'Germans,' which gave to the Italian movement its unity and its strength.

Mazzini. Mazzini, indeed, saw the inconsistency of this

ardent nationalism with the cosmopolitan ideals of the Revolution, and looked beyond Italy to mankind. A lever, he cried, was necessary to lift the world to the level of the cosmopolitan idea; and this lever was to be found in the idea of nationality. This may have been no more than a phrase; but in the mouth of a prophet a phrase is a power. And Mazzini was a prophet, who by his unquenchable enthusiasm and single-hearted devotion succeeded for the time in achieving the impossible and raising politics on to the plane of religion. It was this quality, perhaps, which had made the Italian agitator an international power. The Carbonari had extended their secret organisation beyond the borders of Italy; but their zeal had evaporated in a childish ceremonialism. In 'Young Italy,' the society founded by Mazzini to take their place, a new spirit was kindled; and though its aims were in the first instance purely patriotic and Italian, it was in touch with the democratic organisations of other countries.¹ The international propaganda of Mazzini and his disciples had in fact set up against the solidarity of the reactionary Powers that of the revolutionary parties of Europe. It was, however, a solidarity only for purposes of attack. With victory it vanished. But it needed the lesson of 1848 to teach the world that success must be sought in concentration. The time of Cavour and

¹ Mazzini, *Works*, Eng. ed., *passim*.

of Bismarck was not yet; and nationalism was still unequally mated with the cosmopolitan spirit of the Revolution.

In Italy affairs seemed rapidly ripening for violent change. In the States of the Church the presence of the French and Austrians had preserved matters in a condition of unstable equilibrium. But of the reforms ^{Italy, 1837-1848.} promised by Gregory XVI. nothing had been accomplished, and the venerable system of clerical misrule continued as unchecked as ever. When, in 1837, the French and Austrians simultaneously evacuated the Papal territories, they left the Holy See face to face with a daily gathering force of hatred. The secret societies, in spite of rigorous repression, increased apace. From 1843 onward the whole country fell into a chronic state of more or less veiled insurrection which, wherever it showed itself, was suppressed with merciless severity. At last the death of Gregory XVI., in 1846, brought a change, which was welcomed by all Italy with extravagant joy. Gioberti's dream of a Liberal Papacy, indeed, seemed about to be realised when, on June 17, 1846, ^{Pope} Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti mounted the Throne of ^{Pius IX.} St. Peter as Pius IX. Even the enemies of the ^{1846.} Papacy welcomed the election of the anti-Austrian and liberal-minded prelate as of hopeful augury; and the first acts of the good-natured pontiff seemed to belie Metternich's saying that no Pope could be a Liberal. In the enthusiasm of the moment it was not noticed that there was no change of principle involved in the moderate reforms conceded by Pius—the amnesty for political offenders, the creation of a Council of State to which laymen were eligible, the restoration of the municipality, and enrolling of a civic guard for Rome. A reforming Pope was in himself so great a miracle that the people, in their inexperience of men and things, looked for a new heaven and a new earth; and when the dawning of the Millennium was delayed, while still extolling the Pope, soon began to clamour against the 'evil counsellors'

by whom they supposed their final emancipation was being withheld.

The Powers interested in the maintenance in Italy of the *status quo*, Austria, Naples, and even France, watched with dismay the drift of events. The impossible seemed on the verge of realisation, and a reformed and reconstituted Italy to be shaping itself at the fiat of the Pope. In spite of the protests of England, Austria decided to intervene to prevent so undesirable a consummation. On July 27, 1847, on pretext of suppressing local disturbances, Austrian troops occupied Ferrara. This was an act not even sanctioned by the principles of Münchengrätz. In 1831 the Austrians had occupied Bologna at the invitation of the 'legitimate sovereign,' Gregory XVI.; but now, so far from the Pope desiring their presence, Cardinal Ferretti protested in his name against what he described as a provocation, not only to Rome, but to all Italy. The protest was taken as an appeal to the Powers. England and France responded by sending squadrons to the Bay of Naples. Piedmont, too, promised to support the Pope's resistance to

Austrian aggression by force of arms. Charles Albert and Italy. Charles Albert, indeed, a faithful son of the Church, saw in the attitude of the Holy Father his final justification for assuming that leadership of the Italian cause of which he had long dreamed in secret. Already, at the end of 1845, he had listened to Massimo d'Azeglio's report of the state of feeling throughout the Peninsula; and had promised that, 'when the time came,' he would spend his life, the life of his children, his army, his treasury, his all, in the cause of Italy.¹ And now that the hour seemed to have struck, he was not prepared to allow prejudice to stand in the way of success. Averse, in spite of his youthful reputation, from modern constitutional methods, he realised that, to lead Italy, he must place himself at the head of Italian Liberalism, and consented to sacrifice to his hatred

¹ d'Azeglio, *I miei ricordi*, cap. xxxiv.

of Austria his dislike of the Revolution. Already, in Piedmont, his tentative efforts at a moderate and conservative reform of the government had been greeted with boundless enthusiasm. But the time for half-measures was now past. The reforming tendencies of the Pope had stirred the waters throughout Italy. A successful revolution in Naples forced King Ferdinand II., in January 1848, to grant a Constitution. In Milan a riot against the Austrian authorities, though suppressed without much difficulty, showed the dangerous temper of the Lombards. Circumstances, at the same time, were forcing on Piedmont the conviction that she was destined to unite all these various elements of revolt in a common union against the foreigner. For Austria, in her suspicion of Sardinia, had aimed at checkmating her by crushing her commerce; and a tariff war had broken out between the two countries, which united all parties under Charles Albert as the representative of Italy's material interests.¹

Revolution
in Naples,
Jan. 1848.

Under these circumstances, Charles Albert decided to grant a Constitution to Piedmont; and in so doing, by breaking the engagement he had entered into with the Emperor Francis in 1825, to throw down the gage of defiance to Austria. On March 4, 1848, then, was published the Constitution which is still that of the Italian kingdom. All Italy seemed at last united in a common cause, under a common leader. A less thing would now have precipitated a crisis than the discovery, made by the 'May Days' in Vienna, that the threatening front of the hated Austrian power was only a façade, and that behind it the fabric of the Hapsburg dominion was crumbling to ruins.

Constitution
granted in
Piedmont,
March 1848.

In the character of the Austrian Empire lay the explanation, if not the justification, of the system which Metternich had imposed upon Europe. Under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, by one method or another, had been gradually gathered in the course of centuries a

Austria.

¹ Springer, ii. 142; Costa de Beauregard, *Charles Albert*, p. 13.

dozen nationalities, representing half as many distinct races, of every stage of culture, divided by language, by religion, by immemorial hatreds and rivalries.¹ In the eighteenth century the fierce racial and religious passions, which had once deluged the plains of Hungary and Bohemia with blood, had burned themselves out. By the policy of successive sovereigns the old national and local institutions had been overlaid, but not destroyed, by an administrative system, having its centre in Vienna, under which the races dwelt together in a peace, not of amity, but of indifference. The doctrinaire zeal of Joseph II. had roused some of the old spirit of opposition; but, with the reversal of his policy, the passions it had evoked died down, and the storms of the Revolution passed over the nations of the Austrian Empire without waking them from their slumber. But Metternich realised that the loosely knit structure of the Hapsburg rule could not long stand in a quaking world. To a state such as Austria all change was dangerous. Therefore, all change must be prevented, whether without or within. This policy of 'stability' admirably suited the temper of the Emperor Francis. The 'good Kaiser,' who had the virtues and vices of the better type of oriental despot, hated nothing so much as change; and it pleased him, while leaving foreign affairs to his chancellor, to gather all the threads of internal administration into his own hands. The result was that the policy of stability became the policy of slumber. 'Let us sleep upon it!' was the favourite comment of Francis on any fresh proposal. And so it came that, all individual initiative being frowned upon, and official responsibility being passed up through the bureaus till it was lost in the *oubliette* of the Imperial Cabinet, the machinery of the Austrian administration gradually ceased to work; not because it was in itself badly constructed, but because of the insufficiency of the

¹ See Auerbach, *Les Races et les Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*, and the excellent ethnographical map in Dr. Chavanne's *Physikalisch-statistischer Handatlas von Oesterreich-Ungarn*.

motive power derived from the centre.¹ It became important to guard the political vacuum created by the Emperor's policy of doing nothing against any inrush of dangerous forces. As Woden walled round Brynhild with fire, so Metternich guarded the sleep of Austria with a ring fence of censors and customs officers. He succeeded, indeed, in effectually cutting her off from the weightier intellectual life of Germany, and preparing thus for the political separation of 1866. But a censorship which laid an embargo on the weightier products of foreign philosophy and science was powerless to check the inflow of lighter works; and since the principles of the censors were notorious, Vienna thought nothing worth reading that had not been placed by them on the Index. The poison, then, in spite of all prophylactics, penetrated into the Austrian system; and the Government watched with growing uneasiness the symptoms of its spread.

The basis of social and economic life throughout the Austrian dominions was still feudal and mediæval. But the nobles, all but absolute over their peasants, were powerless against the Government. Here and there, indeed, provincial Estates carried on a shadowy, ceremonial existence, but without authority and without functions. Scarcely more substantial were the national Diets, where they survived. Even in Hungary, where the constitutional tradition and national feeling were strongest, the Diet was not called together for thirteen years; though the old Magyar love of liberty, suppressed at the centre, was kept alive in those turbulent county assemblies (*Comitatus*) of nobles and notables, which had from time immemorial been justly regarded as the centres of Magyar freedom. Still the instinct which had risen in revolt against Joseph's centralising reforms had preserved the old constitutional machinery which, though rusty and antiquated, might yet be modernised and furbished up for use under changed conditions—if the motive power could be found to work it. This motive power was to be discovered

¹ Count Hartig, *Genesis of the Revolution in Austria*.

in the growing self-assertion of the nationalities within the empire—a self-assertion which was itself in a large measure the result of the needs created by the gradual failure of the Austrian administrative system.

As was to be expected, Hungary was the first to assert her separate claims. In 1828 the Emperor Francis Hungary. had at last been forced to summon a meeting of the Diet. In the temper of this assembly there was nothing revolutionary. It demanded, and obtained, only the confirmation of the traditional Constitution of Hungary, with all its mediæval and feudal anomalies. But one new and ominous cry was heard: that Magyar should be substituted for the official Latin in documents and in debates. For Hungary it was the beginning of the claim for the 'Magyarization' of the subject races. For the Austrian Empire it was the beginning of that 'Language Question' which is the symbol of the race struggles which have troubled her peace ever since. From 1826 onward the Hungarian Diet was assembled, according to the Constitution, every three years. Meanwhile, under the influence of a wealthy magnate, Count Szechenyi, who had made a study of English institutions, western ideas were beginning to penetrate into Hungary; and its political history for the next few years is that of a double tendency—to assert the Magyar nationality, and to remodel the Constitution on the lines of the Liberal institutions of the West. In the first of these objects all parties were agreed. The second, in a nation so tenacious of its traditions and of its rights, was more difficult to accomplish. The nobles were exempt from taxation; and, save for a ridiculously inadequate representation of the royal boroughs, the nobles alone possessed political rights. Nothing short of a national enthusiasm which should sweep all before it could remove the barriers to reform thus raised by class privilege and material interests. Liberalism in Hungary could only win its victories by allying itself with the Magyar spirit. But by allying itself with this spirit, it at the same time prepared its own defeat,

forced as it was to belie its own principles by denying to other nationalities what it claimed for itself, and thus forging the weapons which were to be used for its own destruction.

The Magyar movement early extended itself to Transylvania, a country inhabited by a mixed population of Magyars, Szeklers, Saxons, and Roumanians. Here, too, the Government had trampled on traditional ^{Transylvanian} rights, and the Diet had not met since 1809. The Saxons had borne with placidity the curtailment of their liberties; and as for the Roumanian peasantry, the 'misera contribuens plebs,' they were as ill off under one system as the other. But the fiery Magyars, and their kinsmen the Szeklers, under the leadership of Baron Nicholas Wesselenyi, agitated for redress; and when, in May 1834, the Diet at last assembled, they used their preponderance to vote their union with Hungary, and assumed, in general, so defiant an attitude, that the Diet was speedily dissolved. Under these circumstances, Hungary proclaimed the cause of Transylvania her own, as that of a country which had been unjustly torn from the crown of St. Stephen, and the Magyar agitation received a fresh impetus. The labours of Szechenyi had, meanwhile, also been bearing fruit. The nobles had allowed themselves to be taxed to build the bridge over the Danube, connecting Buda with Pesth. The Diet of 1832 had passed laws ameliorating the status of the peasants. In that of 1839, the use of the Magyar tongue was officially recognised, and in the glow of victory the nobles showed a disposition to surrender the exclusive privileges which stood in the way of national development.

A new force now arose. Louis Kossuth, who had distinguished himself by the violence of his opposition to the Government, was, in 1839, imprisoned for four years. Amnestied in 1840, he became a power. ^{Kossuth.} The publication, in 1841, of his *Pesti Hirlap*, a journal devoted to the cause of reform, marks the opening of a new era—of the era which culminated in the events of

1848. In journalism had been raised up a rival to the influence of the county-assemblies. The latter had been powerful in the assertion of traditional liberties and rights; the former created a new force making for revolutionary change. The sweeping proposals for reform introduced in the Diet of 1843 marked the rapid growth of opinion. But the fate of these proposals, notably that for the taxation of the nobles, showed that no radical change could be accomplished under the old Constitution, or through a majority dependent on the votes of the peasant *noblesse* of the county-assemblies. If Hungary were to take her place side by side with the cultured nations, a public opinion would have to be created outside the limits of the Constitution. Kossuth, saturated with the Radical dogmas of the West, now exchanged the rôle of journalist for that of orator and agitator. His burning eloquence, which too often covered a want of a just perception of affairs, carried all before it. The Government watched with alarm the growth of the agitation. Hitherto all national movements in Hungary had split on the rock of class jealousy. But the nationalists had found a cause in which the interests of all were united. The Austrian tariff system, it was declared, pressed unduly upon Hungarian industry. In September 1844, a 'Protection League' was formed, which pledged its members to use only home-made wares. Hungary, too, was to find her first union in material interests which should unite all classes and accustom them to work together for national ends.

But the Magyar movement, meanwhile, had stirred up, as was to be expected, the national feelings of the races against which it was in part directed. Already the Slavonic national movement had begun, in Bohemia, with an attempt to revive the Czech language and literature; an attempt which had seemed to the Government so harmless, that it had been rather encouraged than not. It had proved, however, no long step from philology to politics. Clubs and institutions, formed

The Slav
peoples.

Bohemia.

for the encouragement of science or commerce, developed speedily into centres of nationalist agitation. Among the Slav portion of the population the exclusive use of the Czech tongue became the badge of patriotism. In the official *Czech Gazette* its editor, Carl Havlicek, who had returned from a visit to Russia full of democratic and Pan-Slavic enthusiasm, attacked the Magyar-German ascendancy under the disguise of the English administration in Ireland. 'Repeal' became the catchword of the Czech movement, which sought its material lever in the condition of the peasants, whose emancipation its leaders championed, and its moral force in attaching itself to the Liberal movement of Europe at large. The breach with the German element was as yet, indeed, not complete. Nor had the Pan-Slav ideal as yet gained over the scattered outposts of the race. Slovacks and Moravians resisted the attempts to absorb them into a Czech nationality; and the Slavs of the south had sought in 'Illyrism' a political ideal of their own.

The Serbs, Slovenes, Croatians, and Dalmatians were divided by customs, by religion, and by dialect; and though a movement towards union had begun in Croatia, it needed a strong impulse from without to give this effect. This was supplied by the Magyar attacks on the Croat language, and the national spirit stirred up by this. In 1836, Ljudevit Gaj started his *Illyrian National Gazette*—an attempt to unite all the Slav races inhabiting 'the triangle between Skutari, Varna, and Villach' in a common national sentiment. The Vienna Government, at first, saw nothing to alarm it in a movement as yet purely literary and sentimental, and which might even, it was hoped, lead to the reunion of the dissident Slavs with the Roman Church. But the Magyars were angry and suspicious; they saw in the attitude of the Imperial Government an attempt to use the Illyrian movement as a wedge to split up Hungarian unity; and this suspicion, unfounded though it was, led them, in the Diet of 1843, to take the measures

The South
Slavs and
'Illyrism.'

which precipitated the very perils they feared. 'Illyrism' only gained political importance when it identified itself with the resistance offered by the local Diet at Agram to the encroachments of the Hungarian Parliament. It immediately fell under the suspicion of Vienna. Gaj was forced, on March 9, 1844, to change the name of his paper to *The Croatian-Slavonic-Dalmatic Journal*. At the same time, the vague Pan-Slavonic programme it had championed was exchanged for one more definite—a reflex, in a contrary sense, of the Magyar movement. Henceforward, just as the Magyars asserted against Austria the traditional liberties and rights of their nation, so the Slavs of the south maintained against Hungary those of the 'Triune Kingdom,' on which the dominant Magyars had trampled.

As among the Hungarians, so among the Germans, a double movement, racial and constitutional, was apparent.

The Since the Germans were at once the most numerous and, socially and intellectually, the most influential of the races under the Hapsburg sceptre, their national feeling was rather a conservative than a revolutionary force. With the movement for the unification of Germany they sympathised only so far as it implied the strengthening and confirming of Austrian, that is of their own, authority over Germany at large. A Germany united under the House of Hapsburg would confirm for ever the ascendancy of German culture and German enterprise in the non-German dominions of the Kaiser. So far Austrian sentiment and Metternich's policy were at one. It was otherwise in respect of the political forms this ascendancy should assume. As long as the Emperor Francis had lived, personal affection for the 'good Kaiser' had blinded the easy-going Viennese to the evils of the system over which he presided. The accession of a monarch mentally incapacitated for rule, and the handing over of the personal government to a commission of regency in which there was neither harmony nor business capacity, made these evils all too

apparent. The singular fatuity of Metternich's protective system now became clear. In a society without experience, and where free discussion had been long forbidden, any quack remedy for political ills was welcomed with enthusiasm. The demon of constitutionalism had been cast out, only to return after many days into the house, officially swept and garnished, with seven devils of red revolution worse than the first. Not till, on May 13, 1848, the mob was thundering at the door of his cabinet, did Metternich realise the change that had come over the spirit of the good-natured Viennese. The incredible had happened; and, under the very eyes of his police and his press censors, a second Paris had sprung up on the banks of the Danube.

Again, however, it was not ideas but material circumstances which gave the actual impulse to the revolution in Austria. In Vienna, in Prague, in Buda-Pesth, the catch-words of the Revolution might act as the rallying cries of reform. The stolid mass of the peasantry could be moved, as in the France of 1789, only by the hope of casting off the burden of their feudal obligations. It was the misfortune of the Government to be compelled to be the first to set in motion this force of agrarian agitation which was to prove the greatest and most durable factor in the revolution.

Agrarian
question
in Austria.

The Polish conspiracy, which culminated in the Galician rising of 1846, had in itself no great importance. The Poles fought with their usual reckless courage, and more than their usual inconsequence. The incompetent Austrian General Collin was driven out of Crakow, which he had occupied, and across the Vistula. But the Poles, instead of following up their victory, preferred to play a republican comedy in Crakow. The precious moments, when they might have gained a decisive victory, were wasted. The Austrian organisation had completely broken down under the sudden strain of this danger. It was reserved for a single resolute officer to restore, without

Rising in
Galicia, 1846.

waiting for instructions, the honour and authority of Austria. Colonel Benedek, collecting a few troops, routed the rebels at Gdow (Feb. 26) and laid the foundations of that military reputation which ended so disastrously at Sadowa. On March 2 the revolutionary Government of Crakow surrendered. The Austrians had been aided by the hatred of the Ruthenian peasants for their Polish overlords; and in the fight of February 26 flail and scythe had wrought more havoc in the rebel ranks than the Austrian musketry. It was this revelation of class and race hatred which gives the Galician rising its importance in history. Not even the affair of Gdow could open the eyes of the Polish *noblesse*. By concessions and promises they sought to win over their peasantry, supplied them with arms, and hoped by this means to raise an army able to cope with the Austrian power. Under these circumstances a deputation of peasants waited on the captain of the district of Tarnow to ask what they should do. The Austrian local administration, accustomed to take no decision without consulting Vienna, was paralysed by the crisis; and the peasants were practically told to take the affair into their own hands. For the frightful *Jacquerie* that followed the Austrian Government was, through its servants, directly responsible. On February 18, a body of insurgents, marching on Tarnow, were fallen upon and mown down by a mob of peasants armed with scythes; and this was followed by a systematic massacre of all the Polish nobles on whom hands could be laid. For three or four days the slaughter continued, the peasants carrying the dead by cartloads to Tarnow, where they received a reward for each 'rebel' brought in. The number of nobles killed was reckoned at fourteen hundred. Apart from the hideous scandal of the affair, the Austrian Government was placed by it in a serious dilemma. The Ruthenians, elated by their victory, refused to work, and claimed the abolition of feudal dues as the reward of their loyalty. To refuse would be to prolong the crisis indefinitely; to agree would be to invite

the peasantry of all the empire to put forth similar demands on pain of a general rising. On April 13, 1846, the Emperor issued a decree abolishing some of the more burdensome feudal obligations. This, in the eyes of the world, of the conservative parties, above all of the Galician nobles, was tantamount to a formal endorsement by the Government of the atrocities. A great outcry arose; and the Government, helpless between two opinions, yielded. The concessions were revoked, the Austrian officials in Galicia responsible for the trouble dismissed, and Count Francis Stadion was sent as governor-general with full powers to restore order in the distracted province. The peasants, put off with illusory concessions, saw that though their wrongs were admitted, their sole hope for redress lay in a change of government, and added their dead weight to the forces making for revolution. It was the league between the agrarian and the nationalist movements which sealed the fate of the Austrian system.¹

In Germany, meanwhile, the fires kindled by the revolutionary movements of 1830 had been kept alive by the assiduous efforts of the reactionary Powers to blow them out. A Liberal festival, held at ^{Germany.} Hambach on May 27, 1832, had given the excuse. A few thousand honest burghers had met, made patriotic speeches, sung patriotic songs, and drunk confusion to the insidious designs of Prussia and her all-devouring Zollverein. A Bavarian army corps, under General Wrede, had marched into the Palatinate to suppress the 'Revolution'; and though, when he arrived, there was no revolution to suppress, it was judged expedient at Frankfort to tighten still further the hold of the Diet on the independence of the local Estates, and to sharpen the laws against sedition. A plot, in emulation of that of Guy Fawkes, against the Diet itself seemed to justify these precautions; and an armed attack on the guardhouse at Frankfort on April 3, 1833,

¹ Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*.

seemed so serious a symptom that it was the immediate cause of the conference of the reactionary Powers at Teplitz and Münchengrätz. Finally, at a meeting of German ministers held at Vienna, a common policy was agreed upon to meet the revolutionary danger, a policy which all the Governments agreed to follow even if contrary to the laws and Constitutions of their several states. This was the high-water mark of Metternich's influence. The Diet from this moment lost every vestige of claim to represent Germany as apart from the Governments, and became no more than the trades council of the federated princes. When, in 1837, the king of Hanover, for private purposes of his own, suspended the Hanoverian Constitution, the Diet, by eight votes to eight, rejected the petition for constitutional crisis in Hanover. federate intervention; and German Liberals saw that their first object must be to overthrow the Diet, and to replace it by a central government at once Liberal and national. From 1837 onwards, the German national and constitutional movement centred round this question of the Hanoverian Constitution; and the seven Göttingen professors, who had protested and passed into exile, won in Germany a fame and an influence comparable to that of the seven bishops who had uttered a similar protest under James II. in England. The Liberal agitation, not loud but persistent, spread in spite of, or because of, the efforts to suppress it. 'In Silesia,' reported the Russian ambassador in 1845, 'the bourgeois are revolutionists, the peasantry gangrened with communism';¹ and, to the excited imagination of Metternich, the very ministerial bureaus of Berlin were crowded with revolutionists!

And this, of all times, was the moment chosen by the imaginative king of Prussia for a constitutional experiment! On December 31, 1845, he wrote to the Tsar to explain his new project for uniting the provincial Diets in a central Assembly. This was to be no concession to the Revolution;

¹ Martens, viii. 364.

there was to be 'no charter, no constitution, no periodic meetings of States-General.' All he desired was 'to finish the building begun by Papa,' to do away for ever with the illusory hopes raised by the so-called promises of 1815 and 1823 and the whole policy of Hardenberg, by establishing the Prussian policy on a 'legal basis,' in accordance with the finance law of Jan. 17, 1820, by which state loans could only be guaranteed by the Central Estates.¹

Constitutional schemes of Frederick William IV.

Consternation reigned in the councils of Russia and Austria. Metternich declared that 'a central representation would be the signal for the dissolution of the kingdom';² and in a conversation with Frederick William himself, prophesied, with more truth, that the provincial deputies would return to their homes as representatives of the Estates of the realm.³ The Emperor Nicholas, 'as the depositary of the sacred wishes and of the intentions' of the late king, adopted towards the backsliding autocrat of Prussia a tone of lofty and paternal remonstrance. The king had utterly mistaken the ideas of his father of glorious memory. He was by his present action but stirring the ever-smouldering embers of revolution; but whatever he might do, Nicholas himself would be true to his trust, and fight in the breach to his last gasp.⁴

Neither the vaticinations of Metternich nor the remonstrances of the Tsar could, however, turn Frederick William from his purpose. He was, indeed, as Metternich had long since pointed out, 'beyond the limits of any system,' a mere wandering comet in the constellation of princes. On February 13, 1847, a patent was issued summoning the 'United Diet' of Prussia. Its functions were limited to the approval of new loans and taxes, or such other matters as the king might please to lay before it. Its composition was that of the mediæval Diets—

The 'United Diet' assembled.

¹ Martens, viii. 271, 365; cf. p. 78 *supra*.

³ *Ibid.* iv. pt. i. 540; vi. (1.) 541.

² *Ibid.* 540.

⁶ *Ibid.* viii. 366.

two 'curiae,' one of nobles and lords of manors, one of noblesse, burghers, and peasants. As for a Constitution in the modern sense, the king declared, in his speech from the throne, that no power on earth should ever induce him to allow 'to come between Almighty God in heaven and this land a blotted parchment, to rule us with paragraphs, and to replace the ancient, sacred bond of loyalty.'¹ This attitude was far from producing the effect intended. By the Liberals it was, of course, interpreted as a declaration of uncompromising absolutism, and as shutting the door against all hope of reform by royal concession. Even the Diet protested, and, as Metternich foretold, refused to sanction the new loans until their 'representative' character had been acknowledged. The firstfruits of the constitutional experiment were

Constitutional crisis in Prussia.

thus a constitutional deadlock. On one side stood the Liberal majority, basing its claims on the edicts of Frederick William III., defining the functions of the future representative body; on the other the king, denying to the Diet any functions beyond those conceded by his own gracious patent of February 3. When, on June 26, the king prorogued the Diet in disgust, nothing had been done but to reveal the hopeless gulf fixed between the Crown and the growing forces of Liberalism. In Prussia, too, as in the rest of central Europe, the materials had been piled high and dry for a conflagration which it needed only a spark from Paris to ignite.²

That France was about to become once more a centre of European disturbance there was as yet little sign. Certainly,

France.

on the very eve of the catastrophe of 1848, no Government felt more secure than that of Louis Philippe. The days were long past when the king had been forced to shake hands with *sansculottes* on the stairs of the Palais Royal. Since 1840 he had had in Guizot a minister

¹ Sybel, i. 133.

² Sybel, *Founding of the German Empire*; Bulle, *Geschichte der neuesten Zeit*, etc.

after his own heart, the leader of a docile majority in the Chambers, devoted to the policy of peace abroad and resistance to reform at home. Thiers, it is true, discredited by the fiasco of 1841, had passed into the ranks of the Opposition; but the thunder of his eloquence died away harmlessly in the corridors of the Palais Bourbon. Outside, public opinion, muzzled and cowed, dared not make itself heard; and the king interpreted the silence imposed by force from above as implying popular consent. Yet, for all this factitious appearance of strength, the bourgeois monarchy had never been weaker. One by one it had alienated all the forces on which it had been based, until there remained between it and destruction nothing but a sham parliamentary majority, maintained by ministerial and electoral corruption, and representative of nothing but the political shame of France.

It was the initial weakness of Louis Philippe's rule that he was, in spite of his style, king, not of the French, but of a class. What was ultimately fatal to him was that he failed to recognise this, either by moulding his policy accordingly, or by rising above it. Though he had erased the lilies from his shield, he remained a Bourbon at heart. It had been in his power to become the king of the nation: he preferred, with Louis XIV., to identify the State with himself rather than himself with the State; and the 'pays légal,' by whatever power controlled, was France for him, not because he believed in the unique capacity of the middle classes for constitutional rule, but because these served as the best barrier against those forces, whether legitimist or revolutionary, which threatened his throne. Outside the 'pays légal,' the narrow constituency of capitalist bourgeois, the economic changes which threatened to revolutionise society were suffered to work themselves out unguided, almost unnoticed. Even Casimir Périer, intent on asserting the principle that a Government must 'govern,' had failed to mark the true significance of the great *émeute* of

Character
of Louis
Philippe's
rule.

starving weavers which broke out in 1831 at Lyons; and he had missed a unique opportunity for attaching the mass of working men to the House of Orleans. The Government had, indeed, proved its strength. Order had been restored. But no one of the crying wrongs of the working classes had been redressed. The 'masses' turned from the revolutionary kingship to seek material salvation in the Social Revolution. Communism, which had scarce gathered any following under the Republic, suddenly grew into a popular force, and secret societies were formed to prepare insurrection with a view to that complete oversetting of the traditional bases of society of which the red flag was made the symbol. The visionary ideals of Saint-Simon and Fourier had, indeed, no influence among the labouring classes; but Louis Blanc, the eloquent apostle of Socialism, had borrowed from the former the title of the work which in 1839 gave the movement a new direction. Henceforward 'The Organisation of Labour' is the catchword of the party; and the cry is for 'national workshops, where man shall no longer be exploited by man, but the toilers shall share equally the proceeds of their toil.' 'The time for purely political movements in France is past,' wrote Stein in 1842; 'the coming revolution cannot but be a social revolution.'

For the king these movements beyond the limits of the constitutional machinery had no significance, save as symptoms of that revolutionary unrest which it was his mission to hold in check. His concern was with the Parliament, which it was assumed represented France; his aim to exercise personal rule under the disguise of constitutional forms. It was the gradual realisation by the constitutional parties of this fact, as well as the ill success of the Government's foreign policy, that sapped the foundations of the Orleans monarchy. From 1832 to 1836, Casimir Périer's policy of 'resistance' had been continued by the Government of the Duc de Broglie, Guizot, and Thiers. By the latter year, however, the undisguised

pretensions of the Crown had produced a division of opinion: Thiers maintaining the Whig view that 'the king reigns, but does not rule'; Guizot the Tory, that the monarch is at liberty to choose his ministry without regard to the views of the parliamentary majority. In February 1836, Thiers had been called upon to form a ministry; and the constitutional question was rapidly put to the test. A difference of opinion arose between king and minister in a question of foreign policy, and Thiers was forced to resign. The Molé ministry which took his place was known as that of the king's friends, and in the cafés of Paris men began to talk of 'personal rule' and the 'politics of the court.' The opposition in the Chambers was now no longer confined to the Legitimist Right or the veiled republicans of the 'dynastic Left.' The attempt of Molé to form a ministry in face of a hostile majority (1837) led to a coalition of political groups against the 'Ministry of the Court'; while, in the press, Duvergier de Hauranne organised an opposition of which the *mot d'ordre* was 'substitution of parliamentary for personal rule.' On March 8, 1839, Molé, finding himself, after fresh elections, in a hopeless minority, resigned; their end accomplished, the coalition of groups collapsed; and, after a month or two's interregnum, Marshal Soult was commissioned to form a Government, the Socialist insurrection of Blanqui and Barbès having provided the excuse for intrusting a soldier with the task. The Soult ministry fell in the attempt to force through the Chambers a large grant to the Duc de Nemours, and in May 1840 Thiers had once more assumed the reins of power. His position was one of singular difficulty. The bourgeois were angry with the complaisance of the Government for England; and Thiers attempted to distract their attention by patriotic demonstrations. It was now that the remains of Napoleon were brought back from St. Helena, and laid to rest with imposing pomp beneath the dome of the Invalides. The memory of the great soldier had been

Personal
rule of the
king.

Thiers
ministry,
May 1840.

revived at an unfortunate hour. The signal failure of French policy in the East, and the slap in the face dealt to France by her exclusion from the Quadruple Alliance, stood in bitter contrast with the glorious memories of the Empire. Thiers, realising this, declared in favour of war; but Louis Philippe again intervened in the interests of peace. Thiers resigned, and Guizot was called upon to form a new ministry.¹

The Government of Guizot continued from 1840, until it was overthrown, together with the Orleans dynasty, in February 1848. It made no pretence to court the favour of France as a whole. It based itself entirely on the 'pays légal'; and it was content as long as, by any means, it could secure a parliamentary majority. Under it the policy of the 'revolutionary monarchy' became frankly reactionary—a policy of resistance to all change at home, of alliance with the legitimist Powers abroad. Louis Philippe had stripped off the last vestige of his 'citizenship,' and launched out on a policy as purely dynastic as that of Louis XIV. Two questions of foreign policy—that of the 'Spanish marriages,' and of the attitude of France toward the affairs of Switzerland—revealed to all the world the change which had come over the July monarchy, and alienated from it the sympathies of the only class which had ever given it their cordial support.

For five years, in spite of numberless causes of friction, the 'cordial understanding' between the French and English Governments had been maintained. It had survived the 'Affaire Pritchard,' the question of the right of search, the Morocco crisis. It had been cemented by the visits of the Queen and Prince Consort to the Château d'Eu in 1843 and 1845, of Louis Philippe to Windsor in 1844. It could scarcely be matter for surprise if the French nation resented the sacrifice of an alliance, maintained at the cost of so many national interests, to the dynastic

¹ See p. 229.

and family ambitions of the House of Bourbon. The affair of the 'Spanish Marriages'¹ was briefly as follows: The young Queen Isabella, who in accordance with the terms of the 'Pragmatic Sanction' of Ferdinand VII. had come to the throne in 1833, was by the year 1846, together with her younger sister Luisa, of an age to marry. The Queen-Regent Christina, failing a prince of the House of Austria, desired to marry both Isabella and her sister to French princes. It was pointed out by the Powers, however, and notably by England, that the Treaty of Utrecht had by no means lost its force, and that Europe could never tolerate a close family union between the crowns of France and Spain. With this limitation the English Government showed every disposition to meet the wishes of the French king, who for his part saw in the present affair an excellent opportunity, not only of procuring a desirable settlement for the Duc de Montpensier, but for increasing the prestige of his throne by renewing the family compact of Louis XIV. The principles on which the question was to be settled were agreed on in *pour-parlers* between Guizot and Lord Aberdeen, and in private conversations between the royal friends at the Château d'Eu. The English Government would raise no objection to the marriage of Queen Isabella to one of the Bourbon descendants of Philip V., and would refrain from pressing any other candidate; and, in the event of the Queen having children, it would see no objection to the union of the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta Luisa.² On this basis an agreement was reached. Of the five available Bourbon princes, three were rejected for one reason or another, and the choice lay between two cousins of the Queen, Francis d'Assisi, duke of Cadiz, favoured by France, and his brother Henry, the candidate of England. Of these two the latter was in every way the most eligible. The young Queen loathed and despised Francis, who was by

¹ Cf. Bulwer's *Palmerston*, iii. *passim*; Hillebrand, *Geschichte Frankreichs*, ii. 617.

² Cf. Bulwer, iii. 215; Guizot, *Mémoires, etc.*, viii. 225.

universal consent incapable of having heirs. On the other hand, Don Enrique was hated by Christina for his relations with the Progressive party, and the Queen-mother made overtures to Prince Leopold of Coburg, in the hope of leading to a breach between France and England, and a French alliance for her daughters. The misguided zeal of M. de Bresson, the French ambassador in Madrid, hastened a crisis. While Sir Henry Bulwer was pressing the claims of Don Enrique, his French colleague insisted not only on the marriage with Francis, but on the simultaneous union of the Infanta with the Duc de Montpensier. Guizot, more zealous for the Bourbon dynasty than the king himself, was not unwilling to allow his hand to be forced. He complained to the British Government that Bulwer had not *protested against* the Coburg candidature; and Lord Aberdeen, anxious to preserve the *entente*, recalled the British ambassador. But meanwhile, in June 1846, Palmerston succeeded Aberdeen in the Foreign Office; Bulwer's recall was cancelled; and the English Government, while recommending Enrique, left the Spanish Government free to choose between any of the three candidates. At the same time Palmerston protested against the unconstitutional proceedings of the French party then in power. This alone would have thrown Christina and her partisans into the arms of France, had she not lain there already. Guizot could not resist profiting by the opportunity. He affected to regard the neutral attitude of England towards the Coburg candidature as a breach of the Convention, and persuaded Louis Philippe to back up the action of his ambassador, and secure the simultaneous marriage of the Queen with Don Francis, and the Infanta with the Duc de Montpensier. Christina, in her hatred of the English influence, consented to sacrifice her daughter. Isabella was forced, or cajoled, into giving her consent, and the two marriages were announced, and afterwards celebrated, at the same time.

The effect of this unscrupulous stroke was instantaneous. The *entente cordiale* of the Western Powers, the work of

sixteen years of laborious diplomacy, collapsed like a pricked bubble. In vain Louis Philippe explained. Queen Victoria replied in a tone of grieved and dignified remonstrance. In vain Guizot maintained that he had done no more than it was his right and duty to do. Palmerston declared that he would not speak of the *entente cordiale*, 'since it was only too clearly proved that there was no desire at Paris for either cordiality or *entente*.' In France, too, the effect was ruinous; and though Guizot boasted of the marriages as 'the first affair of European importance, since 1830, carried through by France alone,' Thiers rightly interpreted public opinion when he denounced the dynastic gain as not worth the price of the English Alliance which had been paid for it.¹ And, as Metternich, with a malicious side-glance at the July Revolution, pointed out, 'Public opinion might take back again what it had given.'² Nay more: this tragi-comedy, in which the Orleans monarchy had played so sorry a part, was to end by covering it with ridicule. The one touch of nature had been omitted from the factors in the situation allowed for by this wily diplomacy. Not many months had passed before it was clear that the French prince would never wear the crown of Spain. The young queen's husband left the royal palace; his place was taken by the handsome General Serrano; and it was soon apparent that the Spanish throne would not lack heirs of undoubted Spanish blood. Moreover, Isabella, filled with just resentment against France, placed the 'Progressistas' in power; and English influence once more reigned supreme in Madrid.

Breach of
the Anglo-
French
Entente.

Palmerston was not the man to sit down under a slight, and those who knew him prophesied that some day he would pay Louis Philippe off for the trick he had played him.³ The

¹ For Guizot's defence, see *Mémoires, etc.*, vol. viii., Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, vol. i., and Thureau-Dangin, v. 197, vi. caps. 4, 5.

² Normanby to Palmerston, Oct. 5; Hillebrand, ii. 637.

³ Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, one vol. ed., p. 129.

opportunity was presented by a crisis in the affairs of Switzerland; and the attitude of England in the matter of the 'Sonderbund' served the double end of driving one more nail into the coffin of the July Monarchy, and proving beyond dispute the hollowness of the 'European system' as established at Aix-la-Chapelle. The Constitution of the Swiss, like that of the German Confederation, had been settled by the Powers at Vienna, and incorporated in the final Act of the Congress. According to the Treaty, then, which was still acknowledged as the basis of the international polity of Europe, the Concert of the Powers had a special right of intervention to uphold the Constitution which had been established under their guarantee. And in the internal troubles of Switzerland, therefore, Louis Philippe and Guizot saw their opportunity for rescuing France from the isolation into which she had been betrayed by the affair of the Spanish marriages, and compensating for the loss of the English Alliance by bringing her into close touch with Austria and the other reactionary Powers.

The Vienna Congress had replaced the centralised organisation of the Swiss Republic, established by the Revolution, by the old system of a loose confederation, in which each canton was practically sovereign and independent. At the same time, within the cantons themselves the aristocratic and ecclesiastical privileges, which the Revolution had abolished, were restored. But in Switzerland, as in the east of Europe, a double movement, nationalist and democratic, had been progressing; and towards the middle of the century the irreconcilable strife between the conservative and revolutionary forces had come to a head. The political was complicated with a religious question. In the Catholic cantons, once distinguished by the independence of their attitude towards Rome, the ultramontane reaction had carried all before it; and the Jesuits, who had been the main instruments in this reaction, placed themselves at the same time at

the head of the opposition to the Liberal and centralising party. Meanwhile, in several of the cantons, Radical changes took place; and the Catholic party, the centre of whose power lay in the original cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, began to draw together. In 1843 Lucerne placed itself at the head of a separate league (Sonderbund) of seven Catholic cantons, which prepared to resist the Liberal reforms by force of arms. A war of parties, which raged round the question of the expulsion of the Jesuits, followed and, in March 1845, developed into an armed struggle. Radical revolutions in Berne, Basle, and Geneva resulted in a majority of the Federal Assembly, which met in 1847 at Berne, being in favour of the dispersal of the 'Sonderbund,' and the expulsion of the Jesuits; and the Catholic cantons now appealed to Europe against the violation of the cantonal liberties secured to them by the Treaty of Vienna.

The right of Europe, under the treaties, to intervene was assumed; and Guizot saw in the affairs of Switzerland a welcome opportunity for counteracting the ill effects of the breach with England by arriving at a cordial understanding with Austria, and restoring France to her due position in the European Concert. With this object Louis Philippe ostentatiously took the ultramontane and reactionary cause in Switzerland under his protection; and France joined the other Continental Powers in calling the attention of the Swiss Confederation to the obligations of the Vienna Treaties. A proposal of Metternich for identical notes of the five Powers, threatening armed intervention, was rejected by the caution of Louis Philippe, so long as the Swiss themselves should not have invited it. But the last effort to apply the rusty machinery of the collective control was frustrated by the diplomacy of Palmerston. In view of the treaties, he could not indeed meet the French proposal, for a European Conference to discuss intervention, with a direct refusal. On the other hand, he recognised the intolerable character of

The Powers
and Switzer-
land.

the Jesuit *régime* in Switzerland, and the right of the Swiss nation to regulate its own affairs. He replied, therefore, that he would 'consider' the French proposals, at the same time encouraging the Swiss Liberals by an elaborate display of diplomatic courtesies. On July 20 and September 3 decrees were passed by the Federal Assembly dissolving the Sonderbund and expelling the Jesuits. This was a direct defiance of the Powers. But France, under the cautious influence of the king, still hesitated to follow up her menaces with acts; and Austria would not move without her. While the *pour-parlers* resulting from this situation were still in progress, the Federal Assembly, on November 4, decreed 'execution' against the refractory cantons. These at once appealed to the Powers under the Treaty of Vienna. Guizot's opportunity had come; and he now made a formal proposal for a European Conference to settle the whole question. But Palmerston's opportunity had also come. He accurately gauged the relative strength of parties in Switzerland, and saw that, apart from outside interference, a speedy victory would lie with the Liberal arms. He left the French note, therefore, for ten days without an answer; then, on November 16, made counter-proposals which involved indefinite negotiation; while, through the English minister at Berne, he urged the Swiss Government to make quick work. Austria meanwhile had agreed to the French proposal; and Frederick William IV., irritated at the victory of the Radical 'sect' in his beloved principality of Neuchâtel, at once gave it his approval. At last, on November 26, Palmerston, too, announced the adhesion of England to the proposed joint note. But, two days earlier, Lucerne had fallen; and when, on the 30th, the note reached Berne, the Sonderbund was a thing of the past, and the Catholic party crushed.¹ The work of the Conference had been anticipated by the victory of Liberalism; and the sole result of Guizot's tortuous diplomacy had been to reveal to all the world the hollowness of the European Concert, and

¹ Ashley, *Life of Palmerston*, i, 1, etc., cf. *Parl. Papers*, 1847-48, lxx. 355, etc.

to expose the 'Liberal Monarchy' to the shame of betraying its principles, without having secured for it a single compensating advantage.

It would have required less than the fiasco of the 'Spanish marriages' and the self-revelation of the Swiss policy of Guizot to shake the foundations of the July Monarchy. 'France is sad!' Lamartine had exclaimed in 1843, and, more ominously: 'France is bored!' With the growth of railways, the social organism of France was rapidly expanding and changing; and, to meet this growth, the Government of 'resistance' had, for seven years, done—nothing. Three reforms, of municipal and district councils, of primary education, and of the prison system, represented the sum-total of the efforts made by the revolutionary monarchy to meet the needs of the times. And with the present electorate, and the present parliamentary majority, it was recognised that nothing further could be expected. In the Chambers, the 'dynastic Left' alone demanded reform, while protesting its devotion to the monarchy; and one leader only, Ledru-Rollin, represented the growing power of Socialism and the cry for universal suffrage. The king, secure in the apparent strength of a mechanical parliamentary majority, refused to listen to any suggestions for change; and, as the hope of obtaining this inside the Chambers became more and more obviously delusive, the reformers began to direct their appeal to public opinion outside. The result was the surprising discovery that the edifice of the Orleans monarchy, to all appearance so solidly established, was nothing but an empty shell, of which the foundations had been eaten away, and which one gust of popular passion would suffice to dissipate into space.

Agitation for
reform in
France, 1847.

With the 'reform banquets' organised by the party of the Left in 1847, the revolutionary movement which culminated in February 1848 began. The agitation had been commenced by bourgeois who, though ill content with the Government, were loyal to the Crown. But soon Republican

and Socialist voices were raised, and in place of the usual loyal toasts, glasses were emptied to 'the amelioration of the lot of the working classes.' The king remained obstinately blind to the signs of the times. On December 28, 1847, in the speech from the throne, he denounced 'agitations which foment blind and hostile passions'; but he refused to draw the sting of these agitations by conceding the slightest reform, and, on February, 18, 1848 the Chambers obediently endorsed this refusal. This attitude of the Chambers encouraged the Government to try repressive measures against the reformers. A 'reform banquet' had been announced for February 22, in Paris. The Government forbade it. The deputies of the Opposition protested, and promised to attend none the less; and the dinner-committee called a meeting of students and National Guards to escort the guests in procession to the banqueting hall. On February 21, the Government issued an order forbidding both meeting and procession. The deputies now yielded, but under protest; while the small nucleus of Republican leaders, whose headquarters was the office of the *Réforme*, decided to abstain from the demonstration, so as to avoid giving the Government any excuse for crushing them.

The populace, however, excited by rumour and counter-rumour, met, without leaders, at the appointed place. Tussles with the police developed into a riot. The National Guard was called out, but proved to be against the Government, and paraded with cries of 'Vive réforme! À bas Guizot!' The king, alarmed at the development of affairs, dismissed the unpopular minister, and entrusted Molé with the formation of a Government. The people, to celebrate their victory, indulged in a general illumination, and the crisis seemed to be over. But the Republicans were loth to let slip so favourable an opportunity. On the evening of the 23rd a mob from the east of Paris attacked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Guizot lived. The guard fired and killed several of the populace.

Opposition
of the king
to reform.

Outbreak
of the
Revolution.

The Republicans seized the chance. They loaded the 'victims of the massacre' on carts and carried them in procession round Paris, crying out that the Government had deceived the people in order to gain time to call in the soldiers to crush them. By the morning of February 24 cries of 'Vive la République!' drowned those for reform, and the revolution had assumed a new direction. Force and concession were alike unavailing to stem the torrent. The troops, under General Bugeaud, wearied and dispirited, fell back before the mob. Odillon Barrot, who, with Thiers, had quickly replaced Molé in the ministry, in vain published the concessions of the Government: the order to cease fire, the dissolution of the Chambers, the appointment of the popular Lamoricière to the command of the National Guard. The double tendency of the revolution had already become apparent, and eastern Paris was in the hands of a mob which clamoured for the 'Social Republic.' An attempt of the populace, after attacking the Palais Royal, to march on the Tuileries was frustrated by the soldiery; and the king made a last attempt to win over the citizen guard, drawn up in the Place du Carrousel, for his cause. His appearance was greeted with cries of 'Vive la réforme!' and, wearied and despairing, he re-entered the palace, signed an act of abdication in favour of his grandson, the Comte de Paris, and with his family left the Tuileries. The Duchess of Orleans, with her young son, sought refuge in the Chambers. The national representatives formally accepted the abdication of Louis Philippe, and proclaimed the Comte de Paris king. But whatever power they had ever possessed was transferred now to the mob and the halfpenny newspapers. Immediately after proclaiming the new king, the Chambers had adjourned; but before they could separate, they were invaded by an excited rabble shouting 'À bas la royauté!' The Republican deputies now proposed a provisional Government; a list already drawn up by the

The Republicans and Socialists take the lead.

Abdication of Louis Philippe, Feb. 24, 1848.

National was carried by acclamation of the mob; and the revolution, so far as the centre of government was concerned, was complete. But a rival Government had, meanwhile, been established in eastern Paris at the Hôtel de Ville, where the heads of the revolutionary secret societies, thrust into sudden importance, and the staff of the Radical *Réforme* had established themselves. To the list published by the *National* these added names taken from the ranks of the Socialists and Communists. The two provisional Governments were not long in arriving at an agreement. The seat of power was transferred from the Palais Bourbon to the Hôtel de Ville, and places were found in the Government for those democratic Republicans who had figured on the list of the *Réforme*. The Republic was now solemnly proclaimed; and the assembly of a National Convention, elected by universal suffrage, promised for March 5. The provinces, as usual, accepted the work of Paris without a murmur.

The Provisional Government at the Hôtel de Ville.

When the *bourgeoisie*, dazed by the rapid passage of events, at last awoke to what had happened, they found themselves face to face with a situation by no means welcome. The Liberals dreaded nothing so much as the Republic which they had unintentionally helped to set up. The bulk of the Republicans dreaded nothing so much as the Socialism which they were, presumably, helping to establish by organising universal suffrage. Inside the Government itself the Parliamentary Republicans, headed by Lamartine, and including Arago, Crémieux, Marie, and Garnier-Pagès, were opposed to the Socialist Republicans, represented by Flocon, Marrast, Louis Blanc, and Albert. It was the principle of a purely political against that of the social revolution; that of the tricolour against the red flag. For the moment the tricolour seemed in the ascendant. The Parliamentary Republicans boasted the weightier names, were entrenched, moreover, in most of the ministries. But the bulk of the more important executive offices, notably the portfolios of

the Interior and the Police, were held by the Socialists; and behind them stood, as an all-powerful argument, the armed mob of Paris. The realities of the position were soon apparent. On February 25, at the dictation of the populace, the Government, on the motion of Louis Blanc, proclaimed the principle of the 'right to work,' and next day decreed the immediate establishment of 'national workshops.' Only the ready wit of Lamartine, playing on the variable humour of the mob, saved the tricolour from being exchanged for the red flag of the Commune. A second *émeute*, on February 28, had for its object the 'organisation of Labour,' and the establishment of a 'Ministry of Progress'; and as a sop to appease the temper of the mob a Commission was established, under Louis Blanc, at the Luxembourg, charged to 'occupy itself with the lot of the workers.' But already the tide had begun to turn. The middle classes gradually realised that the Socialists were in a minority in the Government, and to remember that they too had arms. The bourgeois National Guard and the paid Guard Mobile began to be opposed to the proletariat Guard. A Socialist mob had forced the Government to postpone the elections from March 5 to April 23, 'to give time to the Socialists to convert the electors'! The Government had yielded to the pressure; but when, on April 16, another armed mob claimed 'the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the organisation of Labour,' Ledru-Rollin, who had thrown in his lot with the party of order, caused the *rappel* to be beaten; and the bourgeois Guard, with cries of 'Down with the Communists!' forced the mob to retire. It was the beginning of the ebb.

The result of the elections for the National Convention came as a surprise to a world which, according to its views, had looked forward with hope or with horror to the first experiment in universal suffrage. In the new Assembly, in spite of the time

National
workshops
established.

Socialist
Commission
at the
Luxem-
bourg.

Moderate
majority in
the National
Convention.

allowed for the conversion of electors, the Socialists were in an insignificant minority. A moderate Republicanism was the dominant note of the Chamber; but a large party was in favour of reaction, though uncertain as to the methods by which this should be accomplished. The Duke of Wellington, watching events in France with an experienced eye, declared the times ripe for a Napoleon, if only a Napoleon could be found.¹

The Socialists were in no humour to sit down under a defeat at the polls. So far, the revolution had given them two things: the Committee at the Luxembourg, and the national workshops; and these they would utilise to save the people in spite of themselves. On May 15 an attempt of the mob to scatter the Convention and proclaim a provisional Government had been defeated by the National Guard. For the month of June a more serious revolution was prepared, to be organised by the Luxembourg Committee, and carried out by the armies of the revolutionary sections and of the national workshops.

In these latter had rapidly collected a vast host of labourers out of work, professional or unfortunate, from all quarters of France. Between March and May their numbers had swollen from six to one hundred thousand. For this huge host it was impossible to find even unremunerative labour. Purposeless diggings and refillings on the Champ de Mars, at two francs a day, soon exhausted the possibilities of creating work; and before long an army of 100,000 men, subsisting precariously on a Government pension of a franc a day, all

discontented and all armed, was at the disposal of any agitator who chose to give voice to their grievances. The Government were awake to the gravity of the danger, and in June the Assembly summoned up courage to order the provincial workmen to leave Paris, and to pass a decree

Closing of
the national
workshops,
and insurrec-
tion of June
24-26.

¹ 'France needs a Napoleon! I cannot yet see him. . . . Where is he?'—Martens, xii. 248.

closing the 'Ateliers Nationaux.' The reply of the workmen was to barricade themselves in the eastern side of Paris, and to demand the dissolution of the Assembly and the reopening of the workshops. But the Assembly was firm, and General Cavaignac received dictatorial powers for dealing with the trouble. The result was a bloody civil war, which for three days, from the 24th to the 26th of June, raged in the streets of Paris. At last, the combined forces of the regular garrison of the capital and the National Guards gained the victory. The Socialists were crushed, and for the time being all the moderate parties rallied round the democratic Republic, associated now with the principle of law and order. The Constituent Assembly, freed from the incubus of the Red Terror, set to work in earnest on the framing of a Constitution. On November 4, 1848, this was published. As its basis the sovereignty of the people was, of course, proclaimed. More fruitful of results was the principle it enshrined that the division of powers is essential to a free Constitution. To the Legislature, elected by universal suffrage for four years, was opposed the President, also elected for four years by universal suffrage. It was hoped thus to hold the balance of power inside the Government even. It was forgotten that a system which worked smoothly enough in America might be less suitable to France, with its tradition of personal power and its rigid centralisation. As head of the army and of the bureaucracy, and equally with the legislature the elect of the nation, the President was in any case sure to wield an immense influence. If he should chance to add to this the prestige of a great name, his power would be irresistible. This latter danger had not been overlooked; and the election of Louis Napoleon, son of the king of Holland, to the Assembly by five departments gave it point. None the less, a proposal to exclude members of former reigning houses from the candidature was thrown out, and the path to supreme power was left open for that strange and enigmatic character

Constitution
of 1848. Principle of Uni-
versal Suffrage.

Prince Louis
Napoleon.

who, through years of exile and obscurity, had never lost hold of the conviction that some day destiny would call him to the throne of France. At last the shadowy 'Napoleonic idea,' which had been conceived by the fertile brain of the prisoner of Ham, was about to be born into the world of realities. In Napoleon the Revolution was incarnate, but the Revolution tamed and civilised. So, too, his nephew stepped before France as the bearer of a name which was 'the symbol of order and security.' 'I accept the candidature,' he said, 'because three successive elections and the unanimous decree of the National Assembly against the proscription of my family warrant me in believing that France regards the name I bear as one that may serve to consolidate society, which is shattered to its foundations.'¹ France, still frightened at the spectre of the Red Terror, took him at his word. The elections for the Presidency took place in December 1848; and when the poll was declared it was found that 5,400,000 votes had been given to Louis Napoleon, against only 1,400,000 cast for Cavaignac, and some 370,000 for Ledru-Rollin.

¹ Blanchard Jerrold, *Life of Napoleon III.*, ii. 27. Cf. *L'Idée Napoléonienne*, by Napoleon III.

CHAPTER XII

EUROPE IN REVOLT

Attitude of the Powers towards Louis Napoleon—Influence of the February Revolution outside France—Area of the revolutionary movements—Effect of the Paris Revolution in Austria-Hungary—Fall of Metternich—Effect in Hungary—The 'March Laws'—Revolution in Bohemia—Impotence of the Austrian Government—Situation in Italy—Effect of the Vienna Revolution—Radetzky driven from Milan—Piedmont declares war—Revolution in Venice—Attitude of the other Italian states—The Revolution in Germany—Demand for a national Parliament—Attitude of the princes—Effect of Metternich's fall—Revolution in Berlin—Frederick William and the national movement—The German Parliament at Frankfurt—Position of Austria—The Italian war—The Pope's Allocution—Movement for a united Northern Italy—Effect on the Powers—Battle of Custoza—Democratic rule in Vienna—Austrian Democracy and the German Parliament—Austrian Constitution—Insurrections in Vienna—Flight of the Emperor—The appeal to the Provinces.

THE accession of a Bonaparte to supreme power in France realised the worst fears of the Allies. The constitutional protestations of Louis Napoleon, and his interpretation of the 'Napoleonic idea' as the principle of peace and industrial progress, did not blind the Powers to the true facts of the situation.

Attitude of
the Powers
towards
Louis
Napoleon.

Beneath the thin disguise of the democratic Presidency they recognised the democratic Empire; and they had little reason to doubt that the second Empire would, should the opportunity present itself, follow the precedent set by the first. But the Powers were in no condition to be impressed by the apparent imminence of a peril against which for thirty years the anxious efforts of statesmen had been directed, still less to put in force the provisions of treaties which had suddenly

fallen obsolete. For, indeed, the trouble in France had become a mere episode in the general upheaval of Europe; and, by a strange irony, even the reactionary Powers were prepared for the moment to endorse the verdict of the French democracy, and see in Napoleon 'the saviour of Society.' When crowns were, every day, 'tumbling into the gutter,' any *de facto* government that promised to maintain the social order, threatened by new and alarming forces, gained a certain halo of legitimacy. When the monarchs by divine right were once more firmly seated on their thrones, it would be time enough to cavil at the title of the upstart who affected to carry on the traditions of a dynasty which had been placed under the ban of Europe.

The February Revolution in Paris was not the cause of the political upheaval which, in 1848, convulsed Europe from Ireland to the banks of the Danube. It had been preceded by the victory of Liberalism in Switzerland, by the successful revolutions in Naples and Palermo, and by the proclamation of a Constitution in Piedmont. But, flaming out in the very centre of the European system, it was, as it were, the beacon fire which gave the signal for the simultaneous outbreak of revolutionary movements which, though long prepared, might but for this have been detached and spasmodic. The shock of the political cataclysm was felt in the remotest corners of Europe. Republican agitations in Spain and Belgium, Chartist gatherings in England, the revolt of young Ireland, seemed for a time to threaten to emulate the revolutionary victories in France. But the true interest of the movements of 1848 was rapidly concentrated in central Europe, wherever Austrian diplomacy and Austrian arms had sought to throw a dam across the advancing tide of National and Liberal sentiment. The history of the revolutionary movements of 1848 is, in fact, not only in the Austrian Empire itself, but in Germany and in Italy, that of collapse of the Austrian system before the revolutionary forces it had sought to control, and of its

Influence of
the February
Revolution
in Europe.

marvellous recovery due to the irreconcilable divisions in the ranks of the forces by which it had been overthrown.

The scandal of the Galician rising had been but the most flagrant of a multitude of proofs of the utter bloodlessness of the Austrian administration. From the news of the February revolution the Government of the Hofburg could draw no better moral for the Viennese than the tendency of all constitutional government to degenerate into Communism. But the loyal Austrians were in a mood to accept the risk. 'Rather a constitutional hell than an absolutist paradise!' was the cry—and Austria in 1848 was by no means a heaven. The state was on the verge of bankruptcy; and, since no accounts were ever published, the popular imagination painted affairs even worse than they were. The proclamation of the Government, calling on the people to rally to the throne, was answered, on March 4, by a run on the banks, and a political would have followed the financial crisis, even without the impulse given to it by events in Hungary.¹

The news of the downfall of the July Monarchy found the Diet at Pressburg engaged in the discussion of a programme of moderate reform. The effect on the imaginative and excitable Magyars was electric. The cautious policy of conservative change seemed utterly inadequate to the greatness of the crisis; and Kossuth, in his famous speech of March 3, gave voice to the new and wider aspirations of the Magyar race, whose liberties could never be secure so long as the nations beyond the Leitha groaned under absolute rule. 'From the charnel-house of the Vienna cabinet a pestilential air breathes on us, which dulls our nerves, and paralyses the flight of our spirit!' Hungary, then, must have a truly national Government, with a ministry responsible to the people; and, herself free, must become the guarantee of

Effect of the
February
revolution in
Austria.

In Hungary.

Kossuth's
speech of
March 3.

¹ Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, ii. 165, etc.

freedom for all the Austrian races.¹ The effect of this speech in Hungary and beyond was immense. 'To replace the bad cement of bayonets and official oppression by the firm mortar of a free Constitution' was an object which appealed to the enlightened sentiment of every race in the Austrian dominions. It was less easy to reconcile conflicting views as to the exact position to be occupied by the various nationalities in this new 'fraternisation of the Austrian peoples.' Hitherto Germanism had formed the basis of the Austrian system, not as a national ideal, but because 'it formed a sort of unnational, mediating, and common element among the contradictory and clamorous racial tendencies.' But with the growth of the idea of national unity in Germany itself, Germanism had established a new ideal, having its centre outside the boundaries of the Austrian Empire, and which brought it into direct antagonism with the aspirations of the other races. Between the traditional German ascendancy, strengthened by the new sentiment of a united Germany, and this new doctrine of the fraternisation of the Austrian nationalities, a conflict was inevitable.

For the moment, however, the divergent tendencies of the popular ideals were overlooked in the general enthusiasm. It was not in Pressburg only that the spark from Paris had fallen on inflammable material, though the agitation for reform did not at once assume a violent form.

In Bohemia. In Prague, on March 11, a great meeting convened by the 'young Czechs' agreed on a petition to the Crown, embodying Nationalist and Liberal demands; and, on the same day, at Vienna, the Diet of Lower Austria passed an address to the Emperor praying for the convocation of delegates of the provincial Diets to set order into the tangled affairs of the Austrian finances. In this moderate demand of the Diet the Government, next day, timidly acquiesced. But the slightest concession from above was perilous in the present temper of the Viennese, roused as

¹ Full text in A. Frey's *Ludwig Kossuth*, etc., i. p. 39.

they were at last from their 'sleep of hibernating beasts.' A mob of students and workmen invaded the hall of the Diet; Kossuth's speech was read; its proposals were accepted as the popular programme; and the members of the Diet were forced to lead the crowd in tumultuous procession to the Hofburg, to force from the Government its assent to a petition based on all the catchwords of the Revolution. The authorities had made no preparation for dealing with a popular *émeute*, and the petition was received with the promise that it should be laid before the Emperor. Meanwhile a riot had broken out in and about the hall of the Diet, and this had ended in the intervention of the military and in bloodshed. The middle classes now threw in their lot with the rebels, and the riot had become a revolution. Not till the mob was thundering at the door of his cabinet did Metternich believe that the incredible had happened, and loyal Vienna become a second Paris. Hastily placing his resignation in the hands of the Emperor, the old chancellor escaped from the palace, and passed into exile.

Fall of
Metternich,
May 13, 1848.

The effect produced by the news of Metternich's fall was stupendous. It was not that an experienced hand had been suddenly removed from the helm of state. The natural indolence of the chancellor had grown upon him with age, and he was no longer the shrewd statesman of former years. Of his diplomatic talent little survived but his capacity for more or less impressive phrase-making. The ship of the state was no more helpless without than with this pilot. But his name had become associated indissolubly with a system; and just as in 1789 the fall of the Bastille had been hailed as the symbol of the opening of a new era, so that of Metternich was welcomed in 1848 as marking the collapse of the combination of the reactionary Powers against liberty.

The reaction upon affairs in Hungary was immediate. The centre of political influence was transferred suddenly from constitutional Pressburg to revolutionary Pesth. On

March 14 a mass meeting, held in the Hungarian capital, passed the 'twelve points,' which practically involved the entire remodelling of the old Magyar Constitution on the lines of modern Liberalism; and at the same time a 'Committee of Public Safety' was appointed to watch over the interests of the revolution. Kossuth threw himself with ardour into the Radical cause; and the Diet, divided within, and intimidated from without, did no more than register the decrees of the revolutionary party, hoping to preserve in this way at least the semblance of power. On March 15 were passed those 'March Laws' which formed henceforward the basis of the Magyar demands, and exhibited the twofold tendency of Hungarian Liberalism: on the one hand, revolutionary commonplaces such as the appointment of a responsible ministry, the annual convocation of the Diet at Pesth, the abolition of the mediæval anomalies of the old Constitution, the establishment of a National Church, and of the system of trial by jury; and, on the other hand, the demand for the garrisoning of Hungary with Magyar troops only, and for the union of Transylvania with Hungary—indications of that national exclusiveness on which the revolution was in the end to suffer shipwreck. So rapid had been the development of affairs that, by March 22, the list of the new Hungarian ministry had been completed; and the consent of the Vienna Government was alone lacking to what practically constituted a complete separation of Hungary from Austria. For a few days the Imperial ministers wavered and procrastinated. Modifications were suggested in the internal reforms, and the ministries of war and of finance were to be retained in Austrian hands. But the Government had no means of enforcing its will, and the temper of the Hungarian Radicals would endure no compromise. The 'Committee of Public Safety' at Pesth even headed an armed agitation directed against the personal union under the Hapsburg Crown; and the Palatine, an arch-

Revolution
in Hungary.
The 'March
Laws.'

duke of the House of Austria, urged the necessity of yielding. At the end of the month (March 31) the Government at last gave way; Count Batthyány was confirmed as head of a Hungarian Cabinet containing names so variously representative as Kossuth, Szechenyi, Eötvös, Deák, and Paul Esterhazy; and Hungary had become, to all intents and purposes, a separate state bound to Austria only by the fact that its Palatine chanced to be a Hapsburg archduke.

The example of Hungary was speedily followed by Bohemia. The situation here was complicated not only by the antagonism between the aristocratic Estates and the revolutionary party, but also by that Revolution in Bohemia. between the Czechs and Germans. The terrorism of the Prague populace, however, served for the time to weld the several parties together; and a joint petition asking for an independent Constitution for Bohemia, with a responsible ministry, and the recognition of the equality of the Czech and German languages, was presented at Vienna, and accepted without modification by the Government. The new Constitution took no time in the making, and on April 8 was solemnly proclaimed at Prague. A deputation from Croatia, demanding separation from Hungary and an independent Constitution, was less successful. The Austrian ministry, solely occupied in maintaining a precarious balance on the perilous edge of affairs, was incapable of initiating any policy such as that developed later of playing off the Slavs against the Magyars. The democracy of Vienna, moreover, had declared itself enthusiastically on the side of the Hungarians, and Batthyány and Kossuth had been received in the capital with an ovation which proved unmistakably the trend of popular opinion. And what the armed democracy of Vienna decreed, the Government had for the present to carry out.

This utter impotence of the central Government was due mainly to the critical situation in Italy. In August 1847, in reply to the remonstrances of Palmerston at the Austrian

misrule, Metternich had defined the position and the claims of Austria in the peninsula. 'Italy,' he said, 'is a geographical expression; her states independent under the common law of Europe. The Emperor makes no claim to be an Italian Power; he wishes only to preserve his hereditary Empire, of which part lies beyond the Alps, intact.'¹ The efforts of 'Sects' to turn Italy into a federal republic had long engaged the attention of the Austrian Government; and now, owing to the revolutionary movements in the south and in Piedmont, and the growing unrest in Lombardy, the other parts of the Austrian dominions had been largely drained of troops in order to garrison northern Italy. When the outbreak of troubles at home seemed to render their return imperative, the development of events 'beyond the Alps' made this impossible, without sacrificing the Italian provinces. Upon the success or failure of the Austrian arms in Italy, then, ultimately hung the issue of the contest between the Imperial Government and the forces of Revolution throughout the Empire; and the patriots who, in Italy, took up arms for the cause of Italian unity, were at the same time fighting the battle of constitutional liberty for Magyars, Czechs, and Germans.

In Italy, too, it was the news of the fall of Metternich that precipitated the national uprising. This had, it is true, been expected for months; and the Austrian commander-in-chief, Marshal Radetzky, had made preparations for dealing with it. None the less, when, on March 18, the news of the Vienna revolution reached Milan, and the Lombards rose, the Austrians were taken by surprise. Radetzky, unable to hold his own in the city, withdrew his troops, and retired on Verona. At last the hour seemed to have come to strike a decisive blow for the emancipation of Italy; and, at the invitation of the Milanese, Charles Albert determined to

The Italian states unite against Austria, March, 1848.

¹ Summary of two letters in *Parliamentary Papers*, lxx., 1847, pp. 21, 22.

come to their aid. On March 23, Piedmont formally declared war on Austria, and the Piedmontese troops crossed the frontier into Lombardy. All Italy seemed at last united in a common enthusiasm for the expulsion of the foreigner. All the Governments, either willingly, or coerced by public opinion, sent contingents to fight for the Italian cause. The Neapolitan army marched northward under the command of the veteran Pepe; and even the Pope blessed the standards which were to float in the national army over the soldiers of the Church.

While all Italy was advancing to expel the Austrians from Lombardy, Daniele Manin, on March 22, had, after a bloodless revolution, ousted them from Venice, and proclaimed on the great Piazza the Republic of Saint Mark. In the Italian Tyrol, too, an agitation was rising for union with Italy. Threatened from so many sides, and unsupported from the centre, the Austrian rule in Italy seemed doomed; and voices were raised in the councils of the Empire for cutting off the Italian provinces, and concentrating the efforts of the Government on the preservation of Austria as a league of federated states. That the Italian provinces were, for a time, preserved to Austria was due to the indomitable character and keen vision of the veteran Radetzky, who saw clearly the numerous elements of weakness on the Italian side, and realised that, if Austria were content to wait, she would be victorious. But, meanwhile, the conviction which Radetzky had succeeded in impressing on the Vienna Cabinet that the fate of Austria would be decided in Italy, by depleting the north of troops, gave free play to the forces of Revolution.

Nowhere was the crippling of the Austrian power more fruitful of results than in Germany. Liberal opinion was organised before the February revolution; and as early as September 12, 1847, a meeting of representative Liberals at Heppenheim had drawn up a political programme on revolutionary lines. When,

The Revolution in Germany.

therefore, the news of the revolution in Paris excited popular fervour to fever pitch, the Governments of the separate states found themselves powerless, face to face with a united public opinion. Accustomed to look for support to Vienna, the preoccupation of Austria left them helpless, and they had to yield with the best grace possible. As usual, the South was the cradle of the revolutionary movement, whence it rapidly spread to the smaller states of central Germany. On March 5 a meeting of influential men at Heidelberg assembled to concert measures for giving the revolution a definite direction; and though serious differences of aim became at once apparent, it was agreed to sink these for the present and unite in demanding the convocation of a German National Parliament, elected by a popular suffrage. For this purpose a committee of seven was elected to devise ways and means. It accepted a scheme, drawn up by von Gagern, the prime minister of Darmstadt, for establishing a central Constitution, consisting of a president, a senate representing the several states, and a popular chamber elected by the nation, which should have supreme control over all matters, such as military and diplomatic business, commercial questions and the like, affecting the whole Confederation.

It remained to be seen how far this idea was capable of realisation. The smaller states had not to be reckoned with; and of the 'middle' states, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Baden at once gave their assent. But the king of Bavaria was stubborn; and Frederick William of Prussia, on whose attitude everything ultimately depended, gave no sign. Then suddenly came the news of the revolution of March 13 in Vienna, and of the fall of Metternich. Prussia at once caught the revolutionary infection.¹ On March 15 barricades began to appear in the streets of Berlin, and next day a riot was suppressed by the troops with some loss of life. The king, kind-hearted, and agonised at being at odds with his beloved Berliners, realising, too, that the collapse of Austria had

¹ Sybel, i. 154.

made impossible the plans for the reform of the Confederation which he had been negotiating at Vienna, consented to open negotiations with the Liberal leaders on the basis of the recognition of German 'nationality,' accepted the greater part of Gagern's programme, and summoned the United Diet for April 3, with a view to discussing the Constitution. Next day, on March 18, a great crowd surrounded the palace. Its demeanour on the whole was loyal enough, but certain less reputable elements in it raised seditious cries, and the king ordered the courtyard to be cleared. In course of doing this a couple of shots were fired, intentionally or by accident. Instantly the loyal crowd was turned into a revolutionary mob. Cries of 'Treason!' were raised, and a sanguinary battle began between citizens and soldiery. It would now have been easily possible to crush the revolution; and had the king been capable of a politic severity, Prussia could have taken in 1848 the position which it cost her two sanguinary wars to achieve; for no Power, least of all Austria, was in a position to dispute her assumption of the leadership of Germany.¹ But Frederick William's heart was stronger than his head. The continuous rattle of the musketry during the night unnerved him; he ordered General von Prittwitz to check the advance of his troops, and entered into negotiations with the insurgents, which ended in the absolute evacuation of Berlin by the regulars, and in leaving the king at the mercy of the revolutionary forces. Having thus at a stroke deprived himself of the power to make Prussia supreme in Germany, the king proceeded to awaken the jealous suspicions of the other Governments by the characteristic thoroughness with which he acted the new, and not altogether uncongenial, rôle thrust upon him. His imagination saw infinite theatrical possibilities in the leadership of the German nation. On March 21, after his brother, the future Emperor William, nicknamed now by popular hate 'The Cartridge-Prince,' had gone into exile, he headed a procession through the streets

¹ Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, i. 45.

of Berlin, wearing over his uniform a red, gold, and black sash, the colours of the Holy Empire; and, not content with this, issued the same evening a proclamation solemnly assuming the leadership of Germany. 'I have assumed to-day,' he said, 'the old German colours, and have placed my people under the revered banner of the German Empire. Prussia's interests shall henceforth be those of Germany.' The attitude of Frederick William was at the time probably sincere, though he himself afterwards denied its sincerity. Certainly nothing but the imperious necessity for feeling himself in the right could explain the extraordinary letter in which, to the indignant Tsar, he extolled 'the glorious German Revolution!'¹ Sincere or not, however, the new pose of the versatile king of Prussia was not greeted with the unanimous chorus of approval that he had expected. It needed more than a procession and a proclamation to conquer the antagonism of the South; and some of the Governments took advantage of the outburst of ridicule and suspicion that greeted the king's action to modify the consent which they had given to the revolutionising of the Federal Constitution; while Austria, with a view to the future, protested in advance against a Prussian hegemony of Germany.

For the moment, indeed, the German movement was as little under the control of Prussia as of Austria. The revolutionary forces were in the ascendant; and even the Diet was carried away by their impulse, hoisted the German tricolour, and on March 30 gave its consent to the convocation of a German National Parliament. The general constitution of this body had already been decided by the National Convention, which had met, on the initiative of the Liberal leaders, without any authorisation from the Governments. This was now accepted by the Diet in the name of the German princes, and on May 18 the first German National Parliament met at Frankfort. Thus, scarce

Frederick
William as
a German
'Nationalist.'

German
Parliament
opened,
May 18, 1848.

¹ Martens, viii. 376.

two months after the fall of Metternich, the Revolution was to all appearance everywhere triumphant. But in the very ease and completeness of the triumph lay the seeds of failure. The conflicting elements of the Liberal forces which, in a more bitter and protracted struggle might have learned to bear and forbear, had no stomach for compromise in view of the utter collapse of the common foe. Extremists and moderates alike over-estimated the defeat of the reactionary Powers, and fell to quarrelling over the spoils before the victory had been rendered really secure. The reactionary Powers had, in effect, been taken by surprise, and stunned rather than crushed. Austria especially, after the first staggering blows, was beginning to show signs of unexpected vitality; and it was recognised that, as her collapse had made the success of the revolutionary movements possible, so her recovery would involve their ultimate failure. Two things contributed mainly to the surprising power of resistance of Austria—her imperial tradition and her army. The former saved the crown of the Hapsburgs from going under in the chaos of national rivalries within their own dominions, and, by casting its spell over the deliberations of the German Parliament and the mind of the king of Prussia, postponed for eighteen years the creation, at Austria's expense, of a united Germany. The latter, shaped in the mould of an iron discipline, and for the most part untouched by revolutionary or nationalist sentiment, once released from its entanglement in Italy, would form a formidable weapon in the hands of the reaction. With the fortunes of Italy, then, those of the revolution were bound up.

The war had begun under the happiest auspices for the Italian cause. For the moment all local jealousies and particularist ambitions seemed swallowed up in a common enthusiasm for the liberation of Italy; and when, at the invitation of the Milanese, Charles Albert crossed the Ticino, it was as the acknowledged leader of the Italian princes and peoples. The position of Radetzky,

indeed, seemed desperate. The Piedmontese army, swelled by the volunteers of Lombardy and Tuscany, was advancing from the west; the papal troops under General Durando and the Neapolitans under Pepe from the south; republican Venice threatened from the east; while to the north the Tyrolese were in revolt, and all but cut off his communications with Austria. His army, demoralised by five days of wearisome and abortive fighting in the streets of Milan, inferior in numbers to the enemy, and largely consisting of Italian troops, who could not be relied upon, could scarcely have held its own against a vigorous and skilfully directed attack. But the Lombards neglected to harass the straggling retreat of the Austrians from Milan; and the leisurely advance of the Piedmontese troops allowed him time to concentrate sixty thousand men in the famous fortresses of the Quadrilateral. The capture of Goito on April 8 raised the spirits of the Italian troops, and a united and vigorous offensive would probably have carried all before it. But the very successes of the Italians, as at Santa Lucia on May 6, were turned into defeats by the incompetence of their leaders. Vacillation, divided counsels, utter lack of organisation wasted the precious days, till the arrival of reinforcements allowed Radetzky to take the offensive. Once more the Italian cause seemed about to triumph through the courage and good fortune of its champions. At Curtatone, on May 29, a force of six thousand Tuscans were defeated by an army of thirty-five thousand Austrians only after six hours' desperate fighting; next day the Italians gained a second victory at Goito; and the news reached the Piedmontese camp that Peschiera had fallen. The double victory seemed the end of the struggle, and the troops hailed Charles Albert King of Italy. The Viennese Cabinet, panic-stricken, and anxious to save at least some remnant of Austrian Italy, were now prepared to sacrifice Lombardy, and appealed for the good offices of Lord Palmerston.¹ But

¹ Ashley's *Palmerston*, i. 99; *Parl. Papers*, lxii. 891; lviii. 29.

Radetzky, entrenched at Verona, besought the Emperor to have patience, and promised success. And he had not miscalculated the weakness of the foe with whom he had to deal. Once more the strange neglect of Charles Albert and his generals to follow up their victory robbed them of its fruits. The new-born union of the Italians began to give way under the strain of these perpetual disappointments. The princes had followed but unwillingly the lead of Piedmont, whose aims seemed inconsistent with their rights, and still less with their ambitions. They waited but for the opportunity to draw back.

The Pope had set the example of defection. For a time the mind of Pius had oscillated between his sentiments as an Italian prince and his duty as head of the Catholic Church. In the first capacity he desired to see Italy rid of the Germans; in the second, he was averse from a war with a great Catholic state. A natural distrust and dislike of Piedmont, and a threatened stirring up of the still smouldering embers of German-Catholic schism, determined him; and on April 29 he issued the famous Allocution, in which he declared that war with Austria was 'wholly abhorrent from the counsels' of a Pope who 'regarded and loved with equal affection all peoples, races, and nations.'¹ This marked the end of the Pope's nationalism and of his popularity. In view of the temper of the Roman people, the papal troops were not, indeed, withdrawn from the front; but their action was hampered by the knowledge of the Pope's views. The defection of Pius was rapidly followed by that of Naples. An insensate attempt by some Radical extremists to provoke a new revolution gave the king an excuse for using military force to crush not only the *émouée*, but the Constitution which he had already granted; and the first act of the restored despotism was to recall the troops which, under General Pepe, were on their way to the front. Only two thousand disobeyed the order

Allocution of
Pius IX.,
April 29, 1848.

¹ Bolton King, *Italian Unity*, i. 236.

to return, and, with their general, joined the Piedmontese army.

So far the defections might merely have rendered easier the problem that Charles Albert was called upon to solve. Throughout northern and central Italy an agitation had been going on for fusion under the crown of Piedmont; and even Sicily had offered her crown to the Duke of Genoa, Charles Albert's second son. Had the king boldly assumed the crown of Italy, he might have anticipated the work of 1860 by rallying behind him all the nationalist sentiment throughout the peninsula. But he was constitutionally incapable of rising to so daring a height, and looked no further than the expansion of Piedmont into a kingdom of northern Italy. This was accomplished, as far as votes could do so, by a series of plebiscites on the question of fusion with Piedmont.

Plebiscites
in favour
of union. Early in May, by an overwhelming majority, Lombardy, Parma and Piacenza, and Modena, declared for incorporation in the north Italian kingdom; and on June 4, Venice followed suit. There was little in the military situation to proclaim this policy as rash; and had Charles Albert been as good a general as he was a brave soldier, it might have proved successful. As it was, it proved a great political blunder; for it offended France and Switzerland, both opposed to a strong state in northern Italy; it completed the alienation of the Pope and of Naples; it increased the already lively suspicions of the Tuscan Government, and, finally, so far from welding the peoples of northern Italy closer together, it raised so many difficult problems for solution, demanded so many sacrifices of prejudice or privilege on one side or the other, that nothing short of absolute mutual confidence could have prevented a rupture. And this confidence the conduct of the war was well calculated to destroy. The activity of Radetzky in spite of defeat stood in glaring contrast to the immobility of Charles Albert in spite of victory. On June 9 Vicenza fell; the Papal troops under Durando

Italian
reverses.

were put out of action for three months; and the Venetian mainland passed under the control of the Austrians, whose base at Verona had not been shaken. Suspicion of Charles Albert's sincerity grew clamorous among the Lombards, and Mazzini again cursed the hour when Italy put her trust in princes. And while the Italian forces, disheartened and disillusioned, were wearing away in inactivity, reinforcements were pouring over the Alps into the camp of the Austrians, until at last Radetzky was able to take the offensive with superior forces. The result was the defeat of the Piedmontese at Custozza on July 25. Charles Albert, with his dispirited troops, followed by the Austrians, retired on Milan. He was in no condition to hold the city, and on August 5 it was decided to capitulate. During the night the Piedmontese army, followed by the curses and bullets of the Milanese, evacuated the place, and next day the Austrians reoccupied a city more than half deserted. On August 9, Charles Albert agreed to an armistice of six weeks.

Battle of
Custozza,
and armistice
of Vigevano,
1848.

The unsuspected power of Austria in Italy stood in curious contrast with the impotence of the Imperial Government at the centre. In Vienna, indeed, during the first half of the year, the rise and fall of the feeble authority of the ministry marked, as in a political barometer, the fluctuations of the fortunes of the Austrian arms in the south. Very early the conflict of the ideals of nationalism and constitutional Liberalism had brought invaluable aid to the depressed forces of the reaction. Vienna was ruled since March 15 by a mixed committee of citizens and undergraduates, very Jacobin, but also very German. True to the Paris model, this had from the first claimed a decisive voice in imperial politics; and, utterly unversed in affairs, it had failed to see that the interests of the Vienna democracy were identical with those of the Italians; but, in the ardour of a new-born German nationalism, had lent its patriotic aid to the Government in its efforts to hold the Italian provinces.

Democratic
government
in Vienna.

The March revolution of Berlin and the new attitude of Frederick William had, in fact, stirred the latent Germanism of the Austrian capital; and an outcry arose that Austria must not abandon her position in Germany to the upstart ambitions of Prussia. Reluctantly the Government yielded to the popular clamour, and ordered arrangements to be made for the election of Austrian members for the Parliament at Frankfurt; at the same time, it announced that 'the sovereignty and integrity of Austria could never be sacrificed to the unity of Germany.'¹ The concession merely assuaged one trouble at the cost of inflaming another. Bohemia, as part of the German Confederation, was to return members to the new central Parliament. But the Czech majority in the country had no intention of being swallowed up in a great German nation; and the donning of the German tricolour by the Germans of Prague was the signal for disturbances which threatened to become serious. The conservative German element joined the Slavs in a protest against a policy which would destroy the traditional form and function of the Austrian monarchy; and, in the end, though the Government, under pressure of the Viennese democracy, declared that the elections must proceed, these proved a complete fiasco. In Prague itself only three electors appeared at the Town Hall.

The elections for the German Parliament took place between April 24 and 29. At the same time, on April 25, with a significance that could not be mistaken, the Viennese Government issued a Constitution for the Austrian monarchy, with the sole exception of Hungary and the Italian provinces. Czechs and Poles promptly protested against a scheme of centralisation which would involve German ascendancy, and sneered, not without reason, at 'mob rule' in Vienna. The inflammable Viennese, suspecting an unholy alliance between Government and Slavs, took fire. A proposal to appoint a Czech

¹ Springer, ii. 261.

Minister of Education served as pretext for a new *émeute*. Already, on May 3, Count Ficquelmont, the prime minister, had resigned at the 'polite request' of the students! His successor, Pillersdorf, supported by the military governor, Count Hoyos, tried to stem the tide by forbidding the participation of members of the National Guard in a new central committee set up on May 13 with the aid of the students. But they had no force to back their authority, all the trustworthy troops having been sent to Italy. On May 15 a fresh insurrection on a large scale broke out; the Government was forced to yield; and, next day, an imperial proclamation recognised the usurped authority of the National Guard, and convoked a Constituent Assembly, which was to consist of one Chamber elected by universal suffrage. Immediately after the issue of these decrees, the Emperor left Vienna for Innsbruck 'for the benefit of his health,' and there published a proclamation confirming the concessions of April, but protesting against those forced from him by mob violence. The Viennese, sobered by the prospects of loss involved in the flight of the Court, made an effort to restore order, and begged the Emperor to return; and the ministry tried to take advantage of this chastened spirit to close the university, that *fons et origo malorum*, and disarm the students. The attempt failed. The students, utterly demoralised by weeks of unchecked licence, broke out in revolt, and were aided by crowds of workmen and riffraff. The Government, wearied out, threw upon the city the task of restoring order; and, on May 26, sanctioned the establishment of a Committee of Public Safety, by which its own authority was completely overshadowed. The high tide of the revolution had been reached; and the democracy, supreme in Vienna, aspired to impose its will upon the Empire. But Austria was not France, to bow meekly to the whims of the capital. The subject races saw in the disorders of Vienna their chance for satisfying

Fresh
émeutes in
Vienna.

Flight of the
emperor to
Innsbruck.

old ambitions and paying off old grudges. Deputation after deputation streamed to Innsbruck with petitions and addresses; and the Emperor, with a good hope, was able to appeal from the turbulence of the capital to 'the loyalty of his beloved provinces.'

CHAPTER XIII

THE REACTION

The Pan-Slav Congress—Windischgrätz ends the revolution at Prague—The Austrian Reichsrath—Influence of national rivalries on the Revolution—Jellacic and the South Slavs—Attitude of the Army—Effect of Custoza—Murder of Lemberg and Latour—Windischgrätz reduces Vienna—Prince Schwarzenberg—Accession of the Emperor Francis Joseph—The war in Hungary—The intervention of Russia—Italy after Custoza—Piedmont renews the war—Battle of Novara—The revolution in Germany—The German Parliament—The Provisional Government—The Schleswig-Holstein Question—Intervention of Prussia—Attitude of the Powers—Prussia and the German Parliament—Reaction in Berlin—Frederick William and the Imperial Crown—Rivalry of Austria and Prussia in Germany—The Prussian League of the North—Policy of Schwarzenberg—The Federal Constitution revived—Isolation of Prussia—The Hesse incident—The Convention of Olmütz.

THE appeal of the Emperor against the terrorised central Government seemed for the moment to legitimise the anti-German and anti-Magyar nationalist movements.

A Pan-Slav Congress, attended by not a few reactionary German aristocrats, had been assembled at Prague, on May 1, as a counter-demonstration

Pan-Slav
Congress at
Prague,
May 1848.

to the Parliament of Frankfort. Its immediate object was to repudiate in Bohemia the authority of the German Parliament, its ultimate aim to unite all the Slav races from Russia to the Balkans in a mighty league. The Austrian authorities, to save a remnant of the imperial power, were willing to use so convenient a weapon for chastising the German democracy of Vienna. On May 29, Count Thun, supported by Prince Windischgrätz, proclaimed the severance of Bohemia from the Government at Vienna, and the establishment of a

separate Government at Prague ; and three days later, in the teeth of the declaration of the Austrian Minister of the Interior that these proceedings were null and void, the Emperor confirmed the independence of Bohemia. But the

unnatural alliance between the military conservatives and the Slav nationalists was of short duration. The atmosphere of the Congress was charged with democratic sentiment, in which the reactionary grandees found it difficult to breathe. Strained relations developed into active hostilities when, on June 10, the new president, Palazky, was commissioned to draw up a 'manifesto to the peoples,' affirming the adhesion of the Slav race to all the articles of the Liberal creed. A petition embodying the claims of the Slav nations was in course of being drawn up, when the impatience of the turbulent lower elements of the Prague population precipitated a crisis. On June 12 an insurrection broke out, headed by the Czech National Guard and the students, eager to emulate their Vienna rivals, and 'save the State from reaction.'

Prince Windischgrätz, the incarnation of strait-laced Austrian militarism, saw his opportunity, and seized it. After desultory street-fighting and inconclusive negotiations, he led his troops, on June 15, out of the city, and from the surrounding heights bombarded it into submission. Slav Congress, National Committee, democratic clubs, collapsed like pricked bubbles. Windischgrätz, entering Prague at the head of his troops, established martial law, and ruled in the Emperor's name as a military dictator. The reaction had won its first signal victory.

The results of Windischgrätz's victory were momentous and immediate. Its first effect was to precipitate the war of races which had been on the verge of breaking out. The Germans, in their joy at the laying of the Pan-Slav spectre, forgot the Liberalism which they had in common with the Prague Congress, and hailed Windischgrätz as a national

Independence of Bohemia.

Windischgrätz crushes the Revolution at Prague, June 15, 1848.

hero. The Frankfort Parliament even suggested sending troops to his aid. His answer was significant. It was not, he said, an affair of nationalities, but of an ordinary revolt against lawful authority. Its first result was, indeed, to check the nationalist movement in Bohemia. But if the Bohemian Diet, which was to have met on June 19, was suspended, and writs issued for elections to the Vienna Reichsrath, this was a victory, not for German nationalism, but for the unnational imperial idea. Above all, it was a victory for militarism pure and simple, inspiring the 'Kaiserlichen,' as the troops were called, with fresh courage and a confidence which was increased just now by the success of the Austrian arms in Italy. The Slavs, worsted in their attempt at union, were quick to recognise the new situation; and in their hatred of the German democracy, which had helped to ruin their ideals, they were prepared to sacrifice their Liberalism to their nationalism, and to join hand in hand with the forces of reaction, in the hope of building up some measure of national independence out of the ruins of the Revolution.

Growing
importance
of the army

No violent counter-revolution was the result of the June days in Prague and of the Italian victories. Vienna remained in the hands of the democracy, and on July 10 the first session of the Austrian Reichsrath was opened. But the victory of Windischgrätz had stiffened the back of the Government; and the cause of authority was still more helped by the spectacle afforded by the first Austrian constitutional experiment. Universal suffrage, as might have been expected, had returned to the Diet a Slav majority; but the German democrats, disgusted at this logical outcome of their principles, endeavoured, not without success, to make up for their numerical inferiority by enlisting the services of the Vienna populace on their side. The result was a parliamentary chaos, out of which there slowly shaped itself only one all-important reform, the sole permanent outcome of the revolution. The emancipation of the

Opening of
the Austrian
Reichsrath.

peasants was, indeed, recognised as a necessity by Radical Agrarian and Conservative alike. The deep-seated discontent of the peasants alone had rendered the revolution possible; the removal of this discontent alone would secure the triumph of the reaction. When, on September 7, the bill for the abolition of feudal services was presented for the Emperor's sanction, the back of the revolution was broken. The peasant deputies, untouched by the nebulous idealism of the middle classes, returned to their constituencies, prepared to support authority as the best guarantee of their newly-won liberties. The Imperial Government had behind it not only troops flushed with victory, but a loyal and grateful peasantry, when the time came to combat Magyar nationalism and German Liberalism with the aid of the southern Slavs.

The interest of the part played by the Slav nationalities in determining the fate of the revolutionary movements of 1848 in Austria centres round the person of Baron Jellacic. Jellacic, who was appointed, on April 14, Ban or Viceroy of Croatia. Jellacic from the first was devoted to the restoration of the military and imperial power of Austria; and if at moments his loyalty was more than doubted at Innsbruck, it was that he had realised that he could best break the revolutionary power of the Magyars and Germans by identifying himself with those Slav national ideals which were equally hostile to both. To the Magyar-German Dualism he would oppose the Federalism advocated by the Slavs, and so restore that principle of *Divide et impera*, which had been the traditional rule of Hapsburg government. He pursued his aim with consummate skill. He no sooner entered the Banate than he threw down the gage of defiance to the Diet of Pesth by forbidding all administrative bodies to take orders from any authority save that emanating from himself, and by replacing the Magyar officials by ardent 'Illyrians.' At the same time he issued what was practically a declaration of war against Hungary, by proclaiming martial

law in Croatia and Slavonia. The Magyar Government was swift to take up the challenge. Palatine and Ministry complained to Innsbruck; and on May 7 an imperial edict ordered the Ban to desist from his separatist plans, and submit in all matters to the Hungarian Government. Jellacic not only refused to obey, but summoned the Croatian National Diet to meet at Agram on June 5. Its first act was to decree the separation of the 'Triune Kingdom' from Hungary, and to vote for the annexation to it of Görz, Carniola, Carinthia, Istria, and Lower Styria. With Austria the only union was to be for purposes of finance, foreign policy, and war. The imperial court at Innsbruck saw with alarm this new separatist movement. In view of the May revolution in Vienna, too, Magyar aid seemed indispensable to crush the democratic anarchy in the capital, and Jellacic's inopportune action seemed the main obstacle to the realisation of this idea. On June 10, at the instance of Batthyány, the Emperor issued an edict, condemning the Illyrian movement in passionate terms, and deposing Jellacic. The latter had already set out for Innsbruck at the head of a deputation. On his arrival he knew how, with admirable tact, to turn the critical state of the imperial fortunes to the advantage of his own policy. Everything, he knew, depended on the army; and the army meant the war in Italy. Were the Croat and Magyar regiments withdrawn from Lombardy, the Austrian cause would collapse. And the Magyar Government took this opportunity to tamper with the relation of the Hungarian army to the crown! On May 14 a scuffle between the regular troops and the nationalist Radicals at Pesth had led to the victory of the latter; a National Guard was created; and the disaffected soldiery were bribed by higher pay to desert their colours and join this. On June 1 the garrison of Pesth took the oath to the Constitution; and all hope of leading the Magyars against the Vienna revolutionists vanished. Jellacic saw

Separation
of the
'Triune
Kingdom
from
Hungary.

Alliance of
Jellacic and
the south
Slavs with
the army.

his opportunity and seized it. On June 20 he issued a proclamation to the Croat regiments in Italy, bidding them remain and fight for the common fatherland. From this moment the alliance between the army and the Slav nationalities of the south was cemented.

Hostilities between insurgent Serbs, under Stratemirovic, and Magyars had already broken out on the southern border.

The Diet of Agram, too, enraged at the proclamation of June 10, decided to send an ultimatum to Innsbruck demanding the reinstatement of the Ban. The Imperial Cabinet, however, dared not as yet openly flout the Magyars. Jellacic returned, indeed, to his post without opposition, and allayed the excitement while he matured his plans. At his instance the Diet passed a resolution denouncing the dual system and calling for the restoration of the unity of the Empire. A visit to Vienna, on July 26, to negotiate a compromise with the Palatine and Batthyány, under the mediation of the Archduke John, still further defined the situation. No agreement was reached, but Jellacic was received and fêted by the troops as the champion of army and Empire; and under the impression of this demonstration the Government mustered courage to declare that the basis of the Austrian state was 'the recognition of the equal rights of all nationalities.' It was a concession to the Slav race; a defiance of the proud exclusiveness of German and Magyar; and the beginning of the end. Jellacic had still for a while to curb the impatience of his Croats; but not for long. The Magyar appeal to the arbitrament of arms in its controversy with the united Empire was soon to give him a free hand.

The Hungarian Diet met on July 2, and in no mood for compromise. The voices of moderate men were drowned in the nationalist clamour; and the conservative Cabinet was overshadowed by the personality of Kossuth, who used his vast influence to pour oil on the fire of racial strife. The Croatian question

Jellacic
declares for
a united
empire.

The Hun-
garian Diet
prepares to
crush the
Croats.

was uppermost. The Diet refused to vote supplies for the troops of the Ban; and a motion for sending reinforcements to Radetzky was opposed, and only carried on the condition that Hungary should be first 'pacified.'¹ At the same time, a levy of two hundred thousand men was decreed, a war-tax passed, and the constitution of the army still further modified in a national direction.

Meanwhile, actual hostilities had again broken out in the south; and Austrian officers, by tacit consent of the War Minister, joined the insurgents. But, openly, the Austrian Government still preserved an attitude of neutrality; and the Emperor gave an evasively friendly answer to the request that he should come to Pesth. But the irreconcilable attitude of Kossuth, his efforts to widen the breach between Austria and Hungary by his exclusive financial policy, and the generally suspicious temper of the Pesth Government, hastened a crisis. Again this was determined by events in Italy. On July 25 the victory of Custozza set free an army, exalted by victory, devoted to its officers and Effect of Custozza. to the imperial house. Once more the hope revived of the possibility of re-establishing a strong, centralised, military state. Even in the Austrian Parliament voices were raised against Magyar separation; and the ministers dared to protest against the attempts of the Pesth Government to crush the Slavs. The claims of the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian kingdom seemed irreconcilable, and a situation to have arisen which only force could clear. Jellacic invades Hungary. On September 4, the Imperial Government threw down the gauntlet by reinstating Jellacic in all his honours. Seven days later the Ban declared open war on Hungary by crossing the Drav at the head of his Croatian troops.

From this moment the lesser issues of the revolution were forgotten, and the attention of all the races of Austria centred in the Hungarian crisis. With the Magyar nationalists

¹ Springer, ii. 478.

the German democracy of Vienna loudly expressed its sympathy. The ascendancy of Germanism was threatened by a resolution, passed by the Slav majority of the Austrian Reichsrath, placing all languages on a footing of equality in debates. Two riots, stirred up by the Socialist demagogues, had in turn been suppressed by the Government with little difficulty; and the Radical leaders saw their power slipping from them. Under these circumstances the deputation sent by Kossuth to the Austrian people, and which reached Vienna on September 15, gave them a welcome opportunity of strengthening their position. Refused an audience by the Slav majority of the Reichsrath, it was accorded an ovation by the populace of Vienna. It was the declaration of war between the Government, supported by the Slavs, and the Magyars, supported by the German Democrats. In Pesth itself the crisis, as was to be expected, emphasised the extreme party in the Government. Szechenyi had lost his reason some days before. Of the rest, the more moderate men, such as Eötvös or Deák, retired into private life. Only Batthyány, to his undoing, allowed himself to be persuaded to keep his place at the head of affairs.

For a few days the situation remained in suspense. The attitude of the Magyar army was doubtful; and the Palatine, the Austrian Archduke Stephen, was still at its head. But Jellacic's hope that some of the Magyar regular troops would join him was disappointed; and, after a fruitless attempt at negotiation, on September 24, the Palatine laid down his command and fled. A last effort was made to heal the breach; and General Lamberg was sent to take command of all the troops, Slav or Magyar, in Hungary, in order to arrange an armistice. His appointment was a slight to Jellacic, a concession to the Magyars, and as such Batthyány conceived it. But Lamberg, unfortunately, instead of waiting for the Prime Minister, who had gone to meet him, hurried on to Pesth,

Alliance of
German
Liberals and
Magyars
against the
Slavs.

Revolution-
ists in power
at Pesth.

the centre of all the most violent revolutionary forces. On September 27 the Rump of the Diet, on Kossuth's motion, passed a decree calling on the Magyar soldiery to refuse obedience to Lamberg.¹ Next day the Austrian general was torn to pieces by a frantic mob on the bridge of Buda. A peaceful settlement was henceforward impossible; and though Batthyány hurried to Vienna to try and arrange matters, hostilities in fact at once began. On October 3 a proclamation, signed by Batthyány's successor Recsey, placed Hungary under martial law, and made Jellacic viceroy and commander of all the forces. At the same time, General Latour, the Minister of War, ordered certain regiments of the garrison of Vienna to march to his aid. But the soldiery, demoralised by the long licence of the last few months, proved utterly untrustworthy. Adjured by the mob and the Radical leaders not to march against the Magyars, several regiments mutinied; mob and military hurled themselves once more against the Hofburg; and Latour, who with misplaced magnanimity refused to allow the cannon to be used against them, was barbarously murdered. The weak Emperor once more yielded to mob violence, and consented to withdraw the proclamation of October 3. But four days later he again fled from the neighbourhood of the capital and sought refuge at Olmütz, a Slav district, whence he issued an appeal to all loyal subjects to rally round the throne. The Slav majority of the Reichsrath followed the example of their sovereign and, retiring to Prague, fulminated against the German Rump that remained at Vienna and formed from this time a mere pitiful appendix to the Radical clubs and committees.

Murder of
General
Lamberg.

Murder of
Latour and
second flight
of the
emperor.

The opportunity had now come for the military party to

¹ With characteristic care for constitutional forms, on the ground that Lamberg's commission had not been countersigned by a minister resident at Pesth (A. Frey, ii. 114).

throw the sword into the scale. On October 11 Windischgrätz, who had so effectively restored order in Prague, issued a proclamation praising the loyalty of the Czechs, and stating his intention of at once marching on Vienna to restore the authority of the Emperor. On October 16 an imperial rescript made him commander-in-chief of all Austrian armies, except that of Italy; and, without delay, he began his march on the capital. In the absence of hoped-for relief from Hungary, the issue was a foregone conclusion. Windischgrätz haughtily rejected all the offers of 'the rebels' to negotiate; and on October 20 summoned the Viennese to surrender themselves to the imperial clemency. On October 28 the attack on the city began; and on the 30th all seemed over, and the city capitulated. But during the negotiations a report was brought in that a Hungarian army was approaching to its relief, and the rebel leaders repudiated the capitulation. The hope of succour proved delusive; the Magyars were hurled back at Schwechat; and on November 1 Windischgrätz, still further embittered by the bad faith of the defenders, entered the city. The hand of military vengeance fell heavily on the conquered Radicals. Especially significant were the executions of Robert Blum, a member of the Frankfort Parliament, who had shared in the defence, and of Messenhäusser, who had acted under the authority of the Diet; for these were recognised as blows dealt at German nationalism and at constitutional liberty, whether German or Austrian. Magyars and Germans realised when too late that the fall of Vienna might involve that of Frankfort and Pesth also.

The fall of Vienna, in fact, marked the opening of a new phase in the struggle, in which the army was all in all. Radetzky, from Italy, sent his congratulations to Windischgrätz; and the Emperor Nicholas, breaking a haughty silence of months, wrote to commend alike Windischgrätz and Jellacic. The new Austrian ministry represented the changed

situation. Prince Schwarzenberg, a diplomatist of the school of Metternich, stood at the head of affairs; and his character was sufficient guarantee that these would be conducted henceforth without weakness and without scruple. It was, indeed, impossible to break utterly with the Revolution, while the unbroken strength of Hungary still blocked the path of reaction; and on November 27 a proclamation was issued stating the intention of the Government to uphold constitutional principles. But at the same time the determination to preserve Austria as a united empire was announced, even if this should involve her severance from 'rejuvenated Germany.' To this end it was necessary to crush the Magyar revolt.

Prince
Schwarzen-
berg.

The very first measures of the new Government proved its uncompromising temper. The Austrian Diet had been prorogued on October 22. It was summoned to meet again on November 15 at Kremsier, a place thickly populated by—pigs; where it could talk undisturbed and unnoticed. A still more fateful step was taken on December 2, when the Emperor Ferdinand was persuaded to abdicate in favour of his nephew, the Archduke Francis Joseph, a lad of eighteen. This, which might seem to be justified by the incapacity of Ferdinand to deal with the national crisis, was in effect, and was intended to be, a direct challenge to the Magyars. Ferdinand had indeed before his abdication fulminated against Kossuth and the revolutionary party in Pesth; but, none the less, every step of the Hungarian revolution had received his personal sanction. His successor was bound by no such obligations; and the very first act of the new reign was to issue a proclamation stating the intention of the Emperor to sanction a Constitution for the whole Empire. The Hungarians at once took up the challenge. They declared the abdication null and void, the new Emperor to have no rights in Hungary until he should have taken the oath to

The Reichs-
rath trans-
ferred to
Kremsier.

Abdication
of Ferdinand
and acces-
sion of
Francis
Joseph,
Dec. 2, 1848.

the Constitution and been crowned with the crown of St. Stephen. In the war that immediately broke out they proclaimed, with their usual instinct for constitutional right, that they were fighting for Magyar liberties and their legitimate king, the Emperor Ferdinand.

At the outset fortune seemed to declare overwhelmingly in favour of the Austrians. The Magyars, ill prepared and disorganised, were beset by enemies within their own borders as well. In the south the Serbs were in full revolt and, as the Magyar troops were withdrawn to face the Austrians, inflicted on those remaining defeat after defeat. In Transylvania the Roumanian peasantry threw themselves heart and soul into the Austrian cause; and the Saxons also, alienated by the uncompromising nationalism of Kossuth, joined them against the Magyar domination. On December 15 Jellacic, after a temporary withdrawal, again crossed the Drave; and in a series of engagements the Magyars, under Perczel and Görgei, were defeated and driven back on Pesth. Panic seized on the Hungarian capital, and a deputation of the more moderate leaders went to meet Prince Windischgrätz to attempt to arrange terms. The prince haughtily refused to negotiate with rebels, and the advance continued. On January 4, 1849, the Hungarian Diet fled from the capital to Debreczin, and next day the Austrians occupied Pesth. Batthyány and a number of other prominent Magyars were placed under arrest, the city itself given over to martial law, and all the world believed that the war was at an end. As a matter of fact, it had only begun. On January 31 a victory of General Klapka over the Austrians under Count Schlick revived the courage of the Magyars. But dissensions among the Hungarian generals robbed them of the fruits of their success. Schlick was able to effect a junction with Windischgrätz, and on February 27 their united forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Magyars under the Pole Dembinski at Kapolna.

Battle of
Kapolna,
Feb. 27, 1849.

The victory of Kapolna seemed to the Austrians the end of the war, and Schwarzenberg unmasked his political batteries. He had once stated his political principle to be 'to speak one's mind straight out, and have 40,000 men to back it.' The Austrian success had provided the backing, so he declared his hand. On March 7 the Diet of Kremsier, which had passed an interesting session in debating 'fundamental rights,' was dissolved; a new Constitution was issued for the whole Empire, including Hungary; and at the same time the formal demand was made for the inclusion of this new, centralised Austrian Empire, in its entirety, in the Confederation of Germany. The effect of this disturbing proposal at Frankfurt will be dealt with elsewhere. In Austria itself it was scarcely less momentous. The southern Slavs, who had been fighting, as they supposed, for some measure of autonomy, believed themselves betrayed, and relaxed their efforts. The Magyars, on the other hand, seeing the fate in store for them, were spurred on to redoubled exertion. From this moment the fortune of the war completely changed. In Transylvania, Bem, 'the always defeated, yet ever victorious,' a master of the art of guerilla warfare, who had unsuccessfully defended Vienna against Windischgrätz, had, since the beginning of January, more than held the Austrians in check. Along the border the Russian troops were watching, lest any spray from storm-waves of the Revolution should fall upon the soil of Holy Russia. In despair, the Austrian general besought their aid, and by permission of the Tsar this was accorded. But Bem, though defeated again and again, ended by driving Austrians and Russians pellmell over the frontier of Wallachia. This was toward the middle of March. Two months later a fresh series of operations had ended in the same way. Meanwhile, in the Servian Banate, Perczel was emulating the example of Bem; while in the main theatre of the war Görgei, in victory after victory, was undoing all that the Austrians had laboriously achieved. For three

A centralised
Constitution
issued.

Magyar
victories.

months Windischgrätz had held Pesth. But his severity had done no more than bank up the fires of disaffection which glowed in the capital; his political vision was incapable of penetrating beyond the limits of the military code; and the first reverses of the Austrian arms left him counselless. He had gone out to meet the Magyars advancing under Görgei. Defeated on April 4 at Tapio Bacze, and on the 6th at Gödölloe, he had fallen back on Pesth, his reputation, founded more by good fortune than merit, irreparably damaged. General Welden was sent to Pesth to supersede him. Görgei, meanwhile, had hurried on to the relief of the important fortress of Komorn. He defeated the Austrians under Goetz at Waitzen, and again under Wohlgemüth at Nagy Sarlo, and on April 22 was able to enter Komorn. The Austrian position at Pesth now became untenable; and Welden withdrew, not only from the capital, but from Hungary altogether, in order to cover Vienna, threatened by the Magyar advance. The tables were now completely turned, and it might have been possible for the Magyar leaders to negotiate an honourable peace. But all counsels of moderation had long since been drowned in the turmoil of the war. The Radical leaders, Kossuth at their head, saw before them only the defeated and dispirited forces of the hated Austrians. With their faces set resolutely westwards, towards the vanquished enemy, and, beyond them, towards the Liberal sympathy of Europe, they were blind to the shadow from the east which had already fallen across their battlefields—the shadow of the iron Tsar, who was but waiting for a legitimate excuse to intervene in the interests of the divine right of sovereigns. And in their blindness they hastened to supply the excuse. On April 14, on the motion of Kossuth, the independence of Hungary was formally proclaimed at Debreczin, and the House of Hapsburg, as false and perjured, declared for ever excluded from the throne.¹ It was a gage

The inde-
pendence of
Hungary
proclaimed,
April 14, 1849.

¹ Text in Frey, *Ludwig Kossuth*, iii. 11.

of defiance flung in the face of the legitimate dynasties of Europe; and as such it was taken.

Already, in the doubtful days of November 1848, Schwarzenberg had asked the Tsar to 'restore order' in Galicia. Nicholas had refused, on the plea that Russia could make no alliance with Austria so long as she possessed no settled government. Since then, however, the Government of Vienna had sufficiently proved the firmness of its principles; and when Francis Joseph once more turned to Russia in his straits, the Tsar consented to come to his aid. The decision sealed the fate of Hungary. Görgei had made the mistake of returning to Buda-Pesth, instead of pressing on and laying siege to Vienna, a false move which gave the enemy time to concert measures and crush the Magyars by sheer weight of numbers. While the Austrians advanced again from the west, 200,000 Russians poured over the eastern frontiers. The Hungarians, stimulated by the burning eloquence of Kossuth, who had been elected dictator, fought with all their accustomed reckless bravery. In their desperation they appealed in vain for help to the Turks, to the Slav races whom they had oppressed, and which now failed to respond to the offers of those rights which would never have been conceded of free will. The Government, driven from Pesth once more by the Austrian advance, wandered from place to place, until Kossuth, realising that the sole hope for Hungary lay in the army, resigned his dictatorship in favour of Görgei. This last hope was extinguished when, on August 14, Görgei, with all his army, capitulated at Vilagos to General Paskievitch, and the fortunes of Hungary were laid at the feet of the Tsar. Nicholas, true to his stern code of honour, handed over the country conquered by his arms to the Emperor Francis Joseph, without compensation or conditions. The fate of Hungary roused the pity of Europe. The cynical statecraft of Schwarzenberg could tolerate no half-measures, and he determined to crush where it was

Intervention
of Russia.

Capitulation
of Vilagos,
Aug. 14, 1849.

impossible to conciliate. In General Haynau, whose blood-lust almost amounted to madness, he found a too willing instrument. Every vestige of the Magyar liberties was abolished, the country placed under martial law, and the tribunals at Pesth and Arad set to work with gallows and firing parties. Those of the leaders who escaped sought refuge with the more merciful Turk, whose refusal, supported by England and France, to deliver them up all but led to a European war.¹

The collapse of Hungary made it possible for Schwarzenberg to restore the centralised bureaucratic system which had been overthrown by the March revolution of the year before. The Austrian Empire, after so many trials, was once more united in the bonds of Metternich's system; and to lend a religious sanction to so blessed a consummation, a synod of the Austrian bishops solemnly condemned nationality as the work of the devil. With Russia friendly, and France floating, under the pilotage of its Prince-President, on the ebb-tide of reaction, nothing but the affairs of Italy and Germany intervened between Austria and the complete restoration of her ascendancy in the councils of central Europe. In Italy Austria again found her best allies in her worst enemies—the

Italy after
Custozza. Radical extremists. After the disaster of Custoza the only chance for the Italians was to keep calm and to unite in an effort to repair the defects which had led to their undoing. But the revolutionary elements which had been with difficulty restrained while the issue of the war was yet doubtful burst out with the more uncontrolled violence, now that 'moderation' had been tried and found wanting. Rome set the example. Rossi, the Pope's French prime minister, hated as a 'moderate' by Radicals and reactionaries alike, was murdered as he was entering the Parliament House. A revolutionary mob, with which the police and soldiery fraternised, held the streets of Rome, and

¹ See Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, ii. 246.

even attacked the Quirinal. The Pope, in alarm, fled from the city in disguise, crossed into Neapolitan territory, and took up his residence at Gaeta, where, under the sinister influence of Cardinal Antonelli, he surrendered himself heart and soul to the reaction. The exile of the Pope had raised the 'Roman Question' from one of local to one of international importance. Spain and Austria proposed to intervene to restore the head of the Church to his see. Piedmont, supported by France for the time being, protested against the intervention of outside Powers in the affairs of Italy. The international coil thus created was still further complicated when, on February 9, the Roman Chambers cut off the last chance of compromise by decreeing the abolition of the temporal power of the Pope, and proclaiming the Roman Republic. It was a breach, moreover, with the Italian monarchical powers.

Roman
Republic
proclaimed,
1849.

Tuscany alone was prepared to follow the example of Rome and set up a republic. On February 8 the democrats of Florence, stimulated by the presence of Mazzini, declared the Grand Duke deposed, and set up a provisional Government. Ten days later the Republic was solemnly proclaimed. For a day or two the Grand Duke hesitated whether to throw himself on the support of monarchical Piedmont, or to return to the Hapsburg fold. Letters from Ferdinand of Naples and the Pope decided him, and on February 21 he sailed to join the Pope at Gaeta. A fresh apple of discord had been thrown into the already distracted councils of Italy, just when union in face of the common enemy was more than ever necessary.

Tuscan
Republic.

Piedmont, in spite of the democratic majority which, in the February elections, was returned to the Chambers, had no sympathy for the republicanism of central Italy. Gioberti, whose reputation as a patriot and a political philosopher had placed him in office, laboured indeed to smooth over differences, and form a federation of the Italian states. But once more it was proved that for a statesman an ounce

of common sense is worth a ton of theory. The democratic majority hated him for his opportunism and his arrogance; and when, on February 21st, he was driven from office, Piedmont stood isolated in Italy, face to face with Austria. Nor was help to be expected from abroad. The sympathy of England had been alienated by the uncompromising temper of the Piedmontese. Napoleon, though memories of his own earlier share in the Liberal movements of Italy made him sympathetic, could not have carried his ministry with him in any plan of intervention. Yet, in

Piedmont
renews the
war, March
1849.

Piedmont, an overwhelming public opinion declared in favour of a renewal of the war. The bloody rule of Radetzky in Lombardy kept patriotic excitement at fever heat; thousands of refugees pouring over the frontier fed the flames; and it was felt that there could be no peace for Italy until the Austrians had been finally expelled. Charles Albert, too, was burning to wipe out the stain of his former failure. In spite, therefore, of the warnings of Cavour, who clearly foresaw the inevitable end, the truce of Vigevano was denounced on March 12, 1849, and the appeal to arms once more began. Within a fortnight all was over. The Piedmontese troops were still formidable in numbers; but the buoyant confidence of the year before had been replaced by distrust and misgiving. Moreover, the king and all his generals had been discredited by their former defeats; and it was judged necessary to give the chief command to a foreign soldier of fortune, the Polish General Chrzanowsky, who proved no more capable than the others. Outmanœuvred during the short campaign at every point by Radetzky, the Piedmontese army was at last brought face to face with the Austrians at Novara; and in the pitched battle that followed, the last hopes of the Italians were dashed. On the evening of the defeat, the Piedmontese generals refused to continue the unequal struggle; and Charles Albert, rather than sign a humiliating peace, abdicated his crown in favour of his

Novara,
March 23.

son Victor Emmanuel, and riding in disguise through the Austrian lines, passed into exile. The defeat of Novara seemed to rivet the yoke of Austria once more firmly on the neck of Italy. Yet it was none the less the dawn of a new era of hope for the Italian cause. For the heroic self-sacrifice of Charles Albert in the final, unequal struggle blotted out from the minds of the Italians the memory of his former offences. His weakness, his autocratic temper, his seeming duplicity, were forgotten; and men saw only the hero-king, the martyr for the cause of Italian unity.¹ Henceforward, what Mazzini had pronounced impossible could come to pass; and the sentiment of Italian nationalism could gather round an Italian princely house. Italy, in fact, had, to use Cavour's expression, found one thing which compensated her for all her losses—a national flag. For the present, however, the triumph of Austria was complete; and Schwarzenberg was able to devote his undivided attention to the affairs of Germany.

When, on May 18, 1848, the German Parliament met at Frankfort, the necessity for the reorganisation of Germany was universally admitted, and the principle of The German national unity generally conceded. But the Parliament. insuperable difficulties of the problems to be solved before this ideal could be realised had in no way diminished on closer consideration. What were to be the limits of united Germany? Above all, how were the relations between the rival Powers, Austria and Prussia, within the new state to be determined? Was its government to be republican or imperial? Even before the Parliament met, these questions had been discussed without bringing a solution within sight. Austria, on April 1st, had protested in advance against any measures of the Parliament which might conflict with her own interests as a federal state; and the historian Dahlmann, chairman of the committee for

¹ See the dramatic scene in the Italian Chamber on the receipt of the news in Ollivier, ii. 208.

framing the Constitution, had replied by suggesting a plan which would have led to the exclusion of Austria from Germany altogether, and the establishment of an Empire under the leadership of Prussia. The 'Idealist' party, however, supported of course by the Austrian democrats, would hear of no union of Germany without the Austrian-German provinces. So far from consenting to the exclusion of any members of the German race, they were eager to extend the borders of the new state so as to include a fringe of non-German peoples. Not only Bohemia, as part of the old *Reich*, but Schleswig and the Slav eastern provinces of Prussia were to be embraced. The mediævalism of King Frederick William, no less than the weakness which, in the March days, had led him to fritter away the military power of Prussia, played into the hands of the Austrian party. He dreamed of a revived Holy Empire, hereditary in the House of Hapsburg, while the kings of Prussia were to be content with the title of German King, and the hereditary command of the non-Austrian troops. In spite of the revolt of the Poles of Posen against the threatened Germanisation, he consented to the inclusion of the whole of the Prussian monarchy in the new German state, surrendering thus his position as an independent European Power, and establishing a dangerous precedent, should Austria ever demand a like inclusion of her own dominions. For the moment the refusal of the Czechs of Bohemia to take any part in the work of the Parliament seemed, however, to point to an exactly contrary danger; and the attempt to annex Schleswig threatened to involve united Germany, as yet scarcely hatched, in a conflict with the European Powers. Such were a few of the insoluble problems which several hundred German professors and lawyers, utterly unversed in politics, were summoned to Frankfort to solve.

Under the circumstances, their obvious policy was to provide a working Constitution for Germany as quickly as possible. It was, however, nearly six weeks before, on June 28th, an

agreement was reached as to the form of the provisional Government. This was to consist of an Executive exercising supreme power over all matters, whether diplomatic, military, or commercial, connected with the common welfare of the Confederation. This executive power, which was to have no voice in the framing of the Constitution, was to be in the hands of a Regent of the Empire, elected by the Parliament, irresponsible, but acting through responsible ministers. Next day, after the name of King Frederick William had been proposed without finding a seconder, the Archduke John of Austria was elected Regent. On July 11th the Archduke arrived at Frankfort. He had already been acknowledged, more or less willingly, by all the sovereigns of Germany; the Diet of the Confederation too, which still carried on a shadowy existence alongside the Parliament, informed him that the princes also had elected him; so that his authority rested upon a double basis, and was safe against all contingencies. The Diet, meanwhile, had decided that it could only be constitutionally dissolved by its own action; and, unnoticed, it took a decision which proved momentous—not formally to cease to be till the future Constitution of the Empire should have been established, and meanwhile, to hand over its functions to the Regent.

With an imposing central Government apparently firmly established, and no voice raised in opposition, the Parliament thought itself justified in getting to the serious work of Constitution-building. It was considered necessary first to define 'the fundamental rights of the German people.' Never was abstract theme debated with a greater wealth of learning and eloquence on one side or the other. The members fairly revelled in a discussion so admirably suited to their genius; and for week after week, and month after month, the brilliant intellectual warfare continued; while, outside, the dragging on of the crisis, and consequent perishing of trade and industry,

The Provisional Government, June 1848.

The Parliament and the Powers.

was alienating the people from the Constitution, and the successful crushing of isolated revolts was restoring the confidence of the military Powers. The latter fact was the most ominous. Nominally, to quote the dictum of Gagern, the president of the Parliament, Prussia was as much bound to obey the Regency as was Schaumburg-Lippe. To say this was to give away the whole position. As early as July 16th, Frederick William had, in fact, forbidden his troops to pledge themselves to obey the Regent; and the Archduke John, as Regent of Austria, had even protested against his own action as Regent of Germany. The Regency and the Parliament were, in fact, in spite of all their appearance of strength, without any force to back their authority, which would last just so long as it should suit the military Powers to lend them support. On the attitude of Prussia, and the fortunes of Austria, then, the fate of Germany rested. It was the opening up of the Schleswig-Holstein Question which revealed this truth to the Germans themselves.

The union of the duchies of Holstein and Schleswig with the Danish Crown dated from as far back as 1460; but in spite of occasional attempts to merge them in the Danish monarchy, their independence had throughout been more or less maintained. The position was singularly complicated; for whereas Holstein formed part of the Holy Roman Empire, Schleswig, though bound to the sister duchy by indissoluble ties, did not. Moreover, the Salic law of succession, which had long since been repealed in Denmark, was still in force in the duchies. Frederick VI., on the break-up of the Empire, attempted to simplify matters by incorporating the duchies absolutely with Denmark; and in this he was supported by the new-born nationalist spirit of the so-called Eider-Danish party.¹ The attempt failed, owing to a protest of the heirs of the House of Augustenburg. But the question did not grow acute

¹ The party, that is, that aimed at making the river Eider the boundary of Danish nationality.

till the accession, in 1839, of Christian VIII., when it became almost certain that the male line of the House of Denmark must shortly fail. In 1846 the king issued an open letter, in which he claimed to have proved the right of his sister Charlotte and her heirs to succeed to the duchies of Schleswig and Lauenburg. But, meanwhile, German nationalism in the duchies had been keeping pace with that of the Eider-Danes, and the Estates of Holstein appealed to the German Diet. The Diet pursued its accustomed policy of doing nothing. In January 1848 Christian VIII. died; and his successor, Frederick VII., yielding to the importunity of the Eider-Danish party, issued a Constitution for the whole realm, including the duchies. The whole question was now inflamed by the popular passions aroused by the revolutionary movements in Europe. The people of Holstein protested and, the king being unable or unwilling to listen, broke out into insurrection. Popular sentiment throughout Germany declared itself enthusiastically in favour of intervention in favour of a kindred people struggling to be free. The Duke of Augustenburg had hurried to Berlin to ask the intervention of Prussia. This was on March 18, the very crisis of the Revolution. No time could have seemed less, or been in fact more, propitious for his petition. An armed intervention in Denmark, in so popular a cause, seemed to the Prussian ministers an opportunity not to be missed for restoring the damaged prestige of the Prussian arms. Frederick William, though loth to coerce a legitimate monarch, was willing enough to pledge himself not to desert the interests of Germany. He made a last attempt to negotiate in the interests of common kingship; but, this failing, the Prussian troops crossed the frontier of the duchies. On April 12, the Diet formally recognised the provisional Government of Schleswig, and ordered Prussia to see that its decrees were executed. General Wrangel was, accordingly, ordered to occupy Schleswig also.

Intervention
of Prussia,
1848.

At this point, however, the European Powers intervened.

Neither Russia, nor France, nor England, was prepared to see Denmark dismembered in favour of Germany. Sweden threatened from the north, and Austria declared that, whatever her feelings as a German Power might be, as a European Power she was in favour of the *status quo*. Prussia being thus as isolated in Germany as Germany was in Europe, had no choice but to yield. The arbitration of England, accepted by Prussia, was rejected by the Danes. Swedish troops had meanwhile landed in Jutland; and Russia spoke ominously of the results of stubbornness. Frederick William ordered General Wrangel to withdraw his troops. But, in the meantime, the Parliament of Frankfort had taken up the affair; Wrangel, pleading that he was the officer, not of the king of Prussia, but of the Regent of Germany, refused to obey; and proposed that at least any treaty made should be presented for ratification by the central Power. This the Danes refused; and, to the joy of Germany, negotiations were broken off. Prussia was now between the devil and the deep sea. On the one side were the Powers, threatening with united front the direst consequences if she continued her aggressive policy; on the other side was the German nation, since the March days scornful of Powers, urging her clamorously to action. Frederick William for a time was as a reed shaken by the wind. At last he summoned up courage to take the only course possible under the circumstances: to flout the Regent and the Parliament, and act as an independent Power.

Interven-
tion of the
Powers.

Convention
of Malmoe,
Aug. 26, 1848. On August 26, Prussia signed at Malmoe a Convention with Denmark, yielding practically all the Danish points. The Prussian troops were ordered finally to withdraw.

The full significance of this episode was not at once seen. To the indignant German patriots it seemed no more than a piece of perfidy for which Prussia might be called to account by united Germany. The provisional Government of the duchies appealed from Prussia to the German Regent; and

the Parliament of Frankfort hotly took up its cause. An order countermanding the withdrawal of the Prussian troops was carried by a large majority, in spite of the protest of the ministry, who saw that it would be impossible to make it effective. The ministry resigned ; but it was found impossible to construct another. The majority began to see the seriousness of the situation. The Regent and the Government depended for support on the armed forces supplied by the two Great Powers. To fall out with these might be to bring the whole structure of the Constitution down with a crash, or, at best, to play into the hands of the Radical extremists. On September 14 began an angry debate on the question whether the Convention of Malmoe should be rejected or confirmed. The democrats summoned their adherents to arms against the 'traitors' who were preparing to sell the Schleswig-Holsteiners. The moderate majority took alarm. They had no stomach for open war with the Governments ; and, in the end, the Convention was confirmed by a sufficient majority. The immediate result was an outburst of popular rage against the Parliament itself, which was only saved from the fury of the mob by the Prussian troops. Civil war raged in the streets of Frankfort ; two deputies were murdered ; and the Parliament itself could think of no better way of meeting the crisis than to continue 'with imposing calm' the discussion on 'fundamental rights.' But the destinies of the German people had, in fact, ceased to depend on the debates of an assembly whose prestige had vanished for ever.

The Parli-
ment and
Prussia.

Not till October 19, five months after its opening, did the Parliament begin to discuss the actual Constitution. It was immediately confronted with the burning question of Austria's place in Germany. On October 27 a motion was carried which incorporated the German provinces of Austria in the new German state, and virtually cut the Hapsburg monarchy in half. But, meanwhile, Windischgrätz had crushed the democracy

Question of
Austria in
Germany.

of Vienna, and Schwarzenberg was preparing counter-proposals of his own. The Constitution of Kremsier, issued on November 27, proclaimed the intention of the Austrian Government to accept no settlement of Germany which should imperil the integrity and the free action of Austria. This attitude of Austria threw the majority of the Parliament into the arms of Prussia. Gagern, the advocate of the exclusion of Austria from Germany, succeeded the Austrian Schmerling in the ministry (December 18). But the decision, in fact, no longer lay in the hands of the Parliament at all. In Berlin, too, the appointment of Count Brandenburg as head of the ministry marked the opening of a period of reaction (November 2). The democratic majority of the Prussian Diet had insulted and attempted to remodel the army in the direction of a national militia. On October 30 the patience of the king gave way, when his palace was surrounded by a mob clamouring for him to send aid to the Viennese democrats. He ordered the troops under Wrangel to occupy Berlin. The ministry resigned; and Count Brandenburg, a scion of the royal house, and a Prussian of the old school, was ordered to form a Cabinet.¹ On November 8, the Diet was prorogued and ordered to reassemble on the 27th at Brandenburg; and on its refusal to obey, was dispersed by troops; Berlin was declared in a state of siege; and, on December 5, the Diet was formally dissolved. With surprising ease Prussia had reverted to its normal type of a military monarchy.

Encouraged by his victory, the king turned his attention to the affairs of Germany. He disliked the Frankfort Parliament, and dismissed unheard a deputation which came to Berlin to inquire into the crisis there. He once again opened negotiations with the sovereigns for the settlement from above of the affairs of the Confederation; this time on the basis of a College of Kings. But the old suspicions of Prussia were still too

Brandenburg
Ministry and
reaction in
Berlin.

Frederick
William and
Germany,
1849.

¹ For this *coup d'état*, see Bismarck, i. 55.

strong to permit of an understanding. On December 13, moreover, Schwarzenberg had shown his hand by demanding the dissolution of the Frankfort Parliament, and the re-arrangement of Germany as a federation of states, in which Austria in her entirety should be included. This, for the moment, made the interests of Prussia and the Parliament identical. The latter, moreover, was at this time beginning to sound Frederick William as to his willingness to accept the imperial crown; and though he had no intention of accepting the offer if made, he liked to play with the idea. In the diplomatic game the Prussian king was no match for the Austrian minister. Schwarzenberg pretended to humour Prussia by accepting the idea of a college of kings; but at the same time he drew the kings to his side by stimulating their suspicions of Prussian ambition and promising them an increase of territory through the absorption of the smaller states. Frederick William protested pitifully against a policy which threatened to divide the two Powers which were 'the instruments of Providence for the purification of Germany.' On January 19, 1849, Schwarzenberg replied by suggesting that the six kings should meet by proxy at Frankfort, after a Bavarian and Prussian division had scattered the Parliament to the winds. But Frederick William was not yet prepared to go so far, and allowed his minister Camphausen to send a circular note to the smaller courts stating his willingness to accept the imperial crown, if offered to him by the united voice of the princes. But he was incapable of any consistent policy; and the passing, on February 20, of a law by which the elections were to be by universal suffrage and by ballot, was enough once more to turn him against the united Constitution. Six days later, the victory of Kopolna emboldened Austria to formulate her real views. On March 4, a Constitution had been proclaimed for the whole Austrian Empire. Schwarzenberg now demanded the inclusion of the whole of this in the Confederation, and the remodelling of the Constitution in the interests of Austria.

Plan of
Schwarzen-
berg.

i.e. that a Directory of seven should replace the Emperor, and that instead of a popularly elected Parliament there should be a central Commission of delegates of the Governments and Diets, in which Commission Austria was to command the majority of votes. The Prussian party in the Parliament proposed to answer this manifesto by at once passing the Constitution and electing Frederick William Emperor. But the Austrians, with the aid of the irreconcilable factions, were still strong enough to delay the issue; and when, on March 28, the Prussian King was elected German Emperor, it was by no overwhelming majority.

To the German people it seemed as though the object of so much labour and suffering had been at last obtained, when a deputation of their Parliament went to Berlin to lay the crown of united Germany at the feet of the Prussian king. But the dream was soon dissipated. Austria protested; for her sovereign could never consent to accept a subordinate position. Her protest, it is true, was discounted at the time by the unexpected successes of the Magyar arms. But Frederick William disliked the 'revolutionaries'; his pride revolted against 'picking up a crown out of the mud'; and the grudging and forced assent of some of the greater German sovereigns could not be interpreted as an election by the princes. After some days' hesitation, on April 21, he formally announced his refusal to accept the crown.

The imperial crown was the keystone of the arch of the German Constitution; and failing this, the whole structure collapsed. Austria had already withdrawn her deputies, ninety-five in number, from Frankfort. On the king of Prussia's decision being made known, the bulk of the moderate members of the Parliament left also in despair, and the assembly gradually melted away. The decision which blighted so many hopes has not been condemned by the judgment of later opinion. The acceptance of the crown would have involved

The Imperial
Crown
refused by
Frederick
William.

End of the
German
Parliament.

a frank alliance of the Emperor with the popular party against the kings on one side and the republicans on the other; and Frederick William had neither the taste nor the talent for such a rôle. It would, moreover, have certainly involved a war with Austria, and this, not as a preparation for, but as a consequence of, the constitution of the Empire, which would thus have seemed the symbol, not of the union, but of the division of the German nation.¹

The rejection of the Constitution by Prussia was the signal for the outbreak of revolutionary troubles, more especially in Dresden and in Baden. The Governments appealed to Prussia for help, and the Prussian troops had little difficulty in restoring order. At the same time, the obstinacy of the Lower Chamber of the new Prussian Diet in clinging to the German Constitution was punished by its dissolution. Once more, as in the March days of 1848, the occasion was favourable for using the military strength of Prussia 'in a national sense,' and once more it was lost by the want of clearness of vision and the vacillation which characterised the king.²

Frederick William, the failure of the Frankfort Parliament being assured, set to work to devise a Constitution for Germany more in accord with his own principles of divine right. His suggestion for a frank division of control between Prussia and Austria was rejected by Schwarzenberg, whose aim now was simply to galvanise the old Federal Diet into life again, and by its means to re-establish Austrian ascendancy. On May 17, 1849, Frederick William summoned a Conference, to discuss a new Constitution based on his old idea of a College of Kings. Austria, however, withdrew after the first sitting; and, failing an agreement with the Cabinet of Vienna, the king of Prussia determined to act on his own account. On May 26, an agreement was reached between Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony, as to the draft of a Constitution and an electoral law; and an offensive and defensive League was signed by the three

Prussian
League of
the North.

¹ Bismarck, i. 62.

² *Ibid.* i. 65.

Powers, which it was hoped the other states would gradually join. The alliance was from the first insincere. Hanover and Saxony at once protested that their adhesion was conditional on that of the other states, and informed the Tsar privately of their intention to withdraw. At the same time relations between Prussia and Austria were becoming daily more strained. The Archduke John and the Imperial Ministry, in spite of the collapse of the Parliament, were still established at Frankfort, pleading, in reply to Prussia's refusal to continue to recognise their authority, that this was based on election by the Federal Diet. The Regent now made no disguise of his purely Austrian attitude. He attempted to thwart Prussia's efforts to crush the revolution in Baden, and protested against the independent action which she had resumed in the matter of the Danish duchies. But, for the time, Prussia's star was in the ascendant. While the Magyars were worsting the Austrians in battle after battle, Prussian regiments stamped out the last embers of the revolution in Germany, and Prussia arrived on her individual initiative at a provisional settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein Question. Had Frederick William at this time pressed his Constitution of May 26 on the German states, none would have been in a position to resist. But the Prussian king, in the genuine spirit of chivalry, would have none but willing allies. Schwarzenberg had no such scruples, and intrigued against the Prussian proposals until, at the end of August, the collapse of the Magyar revolt put Austria in a position to exercise effective pressure. Bavaria and Würtemberg now definitely rejected Frederick William's scheme.

Austria, in spite of her victory, was however still too exhausted with her long struggle to measure herself against Prussia; and, on September 30, was signed between the two Powers the so-called 'Compact of the Interim,' according to which the Archduke John was to resign the regency, which was to be put into commission until the following

May, Austria and Prussia having each two votes on the board. This was so far a victory for Austria, that it involved the recognition by Prussia of the old Confederation. But the latter none the less persisted in the idea of the league based on the Constitution of May 26. This had been joined by the great majority of the smaller states, and Prussia proposed that it should be made effective by the election of a Federal Diet. But Hanover, supported by Saxony, opposed the proposal on the plea that the draft of the Constitution recognised the continuance of the Confederation, the Constitution of which could not be altered save by the unanimous consent of its members, including Austria and Bavaria. The Federal Council decided, in spite of this protest, to fix the elections for January 15, 1850; and as a result of this, Hanover and Saxony withdrew from the League, which without the kings became an impossibility.

The 'Compact of the Interim,'
Sept. 30, 1849.

Saxony and
Hanover
leave the
Prussian
League.

Germany was now divided into two unequal halves: the great mass of the small states grouped under the protection of Prussia, and the four kingdoms backed by Austria. The whole situation seemed rapidly drifting into an *impasse*. Schwarzenberg protested against the Prussian programme as contrary to the Constitution of the Confederation on which it professed to be based. He renewed once more his demand that the whole of the Austrian Empire should be admitted to the Confederation; and basing himself upon the League of the four kings, of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and Würtemberg, which had been concluded in December 1849 against Prussia, again suggested a practical partition of Germany among the greater states, whose rulers should constitute a central Directory in which Austria would have the leading voice. As a countermove, Prussia determined to consolidate her League into a close union, and to summon its Parliament to meet at Erfurt in March 1850. But Frederick William was beginning to waver. He desired to

avoid a breach with Austria, and dreaded the results of a fresh experiment in constitutional government. At Berlin, too, the old Prussian party were now in the ascendant, and disliked a policy which threatened to subordinate the interests of Prussia to those of a miscellaneous collection of German states. Under these circumstances the king, though he suffered the Erfurt Parliament to deliberate on and pass the Constitution, threatened to withdraw from the League if it were not revised according to his wishes. This would have meant the immediate collapse of the whole scheme. The Parliament bowed to the inevitable, passed the Constitution *en bloc* on April 15, and by April 29 had accepted all the amendments proposed by Prussia. But their complaisance only postponed their fate. Schwarzenberg had no intention of sitting by while Prussia absorbed the German states politically, as she had already done commercially. The 'Interim' was on the eve of expiring; and he seized the excuse of no new agreement having been concluded with Prussia to reassert the position of Austria as head of the Confederation under the Constitution of 1815, and to summon a Congress of princes to revise the Constitution of Germany in accordance with the Act of Confederation and the Treaties of Vienna. It was a signal slight to Prussia, for under the 'Interim' such an invitation could only be issued by the two Powers jointly. But Frederick William had not the courage to pick up the gage thus flung down. He offered to accept the invitation if the recognition of the Prussian League were made a basis of the negotiations; and, when Austria refused to consider this, he announced his intention of strengthening the northern Union. But it was judged impossible, owing to the disorder of the finances, to do this in the only manner which would have been effective—the placing of the Prussian army on a war footing. A conference of princes, which met at Berlin on May 18, only revealed the elements of disruption within the League itself. It was determined, indeed, to

The Erfurt
Parliament,
March 1850.

Austria
revives the
Federal
Constitution
of 1815.

place the Union under the government of a college of princes for the time being, and to offer to send plenipotentiaries to Frankfort on the terms already offered by Prussia. But the Elector of Hesse already showed his uncompromising temper by consistent opposition, and signs of revolt were apparent also among some of the other states. Schwarzenberg rightly gauged the strength of the League, and refused to budge an inch. The representatives of Austria, of the four kingdoms, of Luxemburg, and of Denmark, met at Frankfort, constituted themselves as a 'Plenum' of the old Diet, and refused to admit the other states except under the terms of the Act of 1815. Germany was divided into two halves, and the issue was uncertain.

At this crisis of the affairs of Germany the attitude of the Emperor Nicholas became of supreme importance. Frederick William's rejection of 'the old and tried Attitude of the Tsar. traditions of Prussia' in favour of revolutionary dreams had seriously offended him; and, in answer to the king's appeal for aid, made in September 1848, he had declared that there would be no intimate union between them, until Prussia had become again as the king's 'late adored Papa' had transmitted it to him.¹ The reactionary policy of the later months had done little to reconcile the Tsar. He compared the restless scheming of Prussia, unfavourably, with the consistent policy of Austria. He could never aid Prussia to oust Austria from Germany, nor indeed stand by and see it done; for 'Austria had placed herself on the ground of the Treaties, while Prussia was on that of the Revolution.'² If, then, Prussia were to precipitate a war, she would have against her not only Austria, but Russia.

It was again in the matter of the Schleswig-Holstein Question that the attitude of the Powers to Germany had been defined. Nicholas, as heir of the elder line of the House of Gottorp, was directly interested in the question of the

¹ Martens, viii. 378.

² Meyendorff to Manteuffel, Sept. 27. *Ibid.* p. 381.

succession in the Duchies and their relation to the Danish crown. England, too, was by sentiment and interest inclined to support the Danish claims. A Conference was opened in London, in October 1848, to arrive at a settlement; and a compromise, based on the separation of the duchies, was proposed by Denmark, supported by Russia and England, and agreed to by Prussia. According to this, Holstein, as a member of the German Confederation, was to receive a Constitution separate from that of Schleswig. But, at the last moment, Denmark demanded that both duchies should be 'indissolubly connected' with the Danish crown. Prussia refused to sacrifice the rights of the German heirs, and on April 3, 1849, the war was renewed. But Prussia was at one with the Powers in desiring peace, and resented the forcing of her hand by the irreconcilable Parliament of Frankfort. In defiance of the Regent and of German sentiment, Frederick William once more opened negotiations with Denmark; and on July 10 the truce was renewed. To the Germans this appeared a deliberate betrayal of the interests of the *Reich* and of the trust of the Germans of the Duchies. It seemed impossible to arrive at a definitive settlement; and at last Prussia, on April 17, 1850, proposed to conclude peace on the basis of leaving all controverted points for future solution. To the Tsar a settlement seemed worse than useless that would leave the affairs of Denmark 'in a tangle'; to him the Holsteiners were frankly rebels, the Duke of Augustenburg a Jacobin; and he failed to understand on what principle Prussia refused to acknowledge the just rights of the Danish crown. If the king of Denmark proved unequal to 'restoring order' in Holstein, he threatened to intervene himself; and to Prussia's declaration that the Confederation would never submit to a violation of German territory by a foreign Power, replied that, in that case, the Confederation should see to it that the 'great principles' of

Conference
of London
and 'the
Duchies,'
Oct. 1848.

War
renewed,
April 1849.

Nicholas I.
and
Schleswig-
Holstein.

1815 were maintained. In view of the state of European relations, Prussia seemed to have no choice but to yield. Austria, 'to avoid a fratricidal war,' urged this upon her. Alone of all the Powers Napoleon, seeing an opportunity for breaking the Holy Alliance, made overtures to Prussia, hinting at compensations for French aid on the left bank of the Rhine. This suggestion of an alliance with the devil's nephew, paid for with German lands and lives, revealed to Frederick William the depths into which he was being dragged.¹ In his horror and perplexity he threw himself unreservedly at last into the arms of Russia; and on July 2, 1850, was signed a definitive peace, according to which the Danish king, as duke of Holstein, was authorised, with or without the participation of the Confederation, to restore order in the duchy.

Peace
between
Prussia and
Denmark,
July 2, 1850.

This outcome of the Danish imbroglio was a decided humiliation for Prussia, and a proportionate success for Austria, backed as she now was by the decisive influence of Russia. Schwarzenberg was urged by the hotter-headed of the lesser German Powers to follow up his advantage and make an end. But he had no intention of taking the chances of war until he exhausted the resources of diplomacy. He felt himself strong enough even to modify the attitude of Austria in the German Question, and to offer to dissolve the resuscitated Diet, and to set up a new central Government on the basis of the equality of Austria and Prussia, if Prussia on her side would abandon the Constitution of May 26. But Frederick William clung tenaciously to his Prussian League; and Schwarzenberg, to force his hand, sent a circular to the German Powers, announcing the immediate reconstitution of the executive body of the Diet, the Close Council. Once more relations threatened to become more than strained. But an open rupture was saved by the developments of the Schleswig-Holstein troubles and the equivocal attitude of

¹ Sybel, i. 454.

Russia. The Tsar, in his impatience to crush the 'Revolution,' complained of the inaction of the Confederation, and laid the blame for this on Austria, whose refusal to ratify the Peace he resented. The Peace, in fact, could only constitutionally be ratified by a 'plenum' of the Diet; and the smaller states, sympathising with the Duchies, were careful to point this out. Schwarzenberg resented their action in thus making

him lose Russia's favour, and turned once more to Prussia with a proposal for a compromise, by which the Prussian League would be recognised and included in the Confederation. His object was, however, no more than to humour Prussia until he could restore the cordial relations with the Tsar. The Schleswig-Holstein Question gave him his chance. A Conference of Russia, France, and England had met at London to arrive at a definitive settlement, and had drawn up a treaty declaring the indissoluble integrity of the Danish monarchy, which was laid for signature before the representatives of Prussia and Austria. Both refused: Prussia, because the claims of the heirs supported by German opinion had been absolutely ignored; Austria, because no mention was made of the relations of Holstein to the Confederation. The latter omission, on being pointed out, was rectified, whereupon Austria signed, and once more found herself in line with the great Powers against an isolated Prussia. To follow up his diplomatic victory, Schwarzenberg promised the Tsar that the Close Council of the Diet should meet on September 1 and at once proceed to the 'pacification' of Holstein. On September 2 the Council actually began the discussion of the measures to be adopted.

Schwarzenberg had taken the precaution to warn the Diet not to touch the question of the Prussian League; and Frederick William, for his part, simply ignored the existence of the Diet; and this state of unstable equilibrium might have continued indefinitely, had not a question arisen which once more made the crisis acute. The Elector of

Hesse had been from the first a very unwilling member of the Prussian League; and he saw in the policy of Austria in reviving the Diet an opportunity, not only of breaking away from the Prussian trammels, but of getting rid of the hated Constitution which had been forced on him sixteen years before. He found in Herr von Hassenpflug, an ex-Prussian official, a willing instrument. The latter, from February to December, had levied taxes without presenting a budget to the Estates, until at length these refused to pay, and were backed in their refusal by the civil and military authorities. On September 12 the Elector and his minister fled to Frankfort, to appeal to the Diet for aid against the 'rebellion'; and in this the southern states saw an excellent opportunity for humiliating and embarrassing Prussia. Electoral Hesse lay between the dissevered halves of the Prussian monarchy; and, by Convention, Prussia had the right to use the military roads passing through it. She could never view with indifference their occupation by a Power or Powers of doubtful friendship to herself. Radowitz, the Prussian minister, saw this, and urged on the king the necessity for forestalling the action of the Diet. But Frederick William, as usual, was drawn this way and that by conflicting motives. In the Elector's unconstitutional action he saw nothing to condemn, and rejected all idea of using the League to force him back into the paths of legality. He was equally averse from throwing up the League, joining the Diet, and taking the wind out of Austria's sails by taking the lead at Frankfort. The alternatives that remained were war, for which Prussia, 'preoccupied with public opinion, speeches, newspapers, and Constitution-mongering,'¹ was unprepared, or a submission which would damage her prestige for years. Schwarzenberg had fully fathomed the position. To the protests, the offers, the threats of Prussia he replied by an uncompromising assertion of the exclusive

Austria,
Prussia,
and Hesse.

League
against
Prussia,
Oct. 1850.

¹ Bismarck, i. 76.

authority of the Diet, and, assured of the Tsar's support, declared his intention of supporting this by force. To give effect to this threat, on October 11 a league of Austria, Bavaria, and Württemberg was concluded against Prussia.

On October 26 the Diet ordered the Bavarian troops to occupy Hesse. Prussian troops, in response, had also marched in, and the outposts had come into collision. But the threatened war did not break out. In face of the hostile attitude of the Powers and of her own unpreparedness, Prussia had no choice but to yield. On October 28 the Emperor Francis Joseph, the Prince of Prussia (afterwards the Emperor William I.), Count Brandenburg, and Prince Schwarzenberg met at Warsaw to attempt an arrangement, in the presence and under the mediation of the Tsar. Brandenburg realised overwhelmingly the helplessness of Prussia's position, and returned to Berlin to die, so it was said, of a broken heart. For some days the war clouds still hung over Germany. Schwarzenberg, backed by the Tsar, demanded the break-up of the Prussian League, and Prussia began to mobilise. But the times were not ripe for the final struggle for the dominion of Germany. On November 15 Frederick William announced to the Diet of Princes the dissolution of the Northern League; and an Austrian ultimatum demanding the instant evacuation of Hesse was answered by the despatch of Baron Manteuffel to Olmütz, where, on

Convention
of Olmütz,
November
29, 1850.

November 29, he signed with Schwarzenberg a Convention which at the time was regarded as a signal victory all along the line for Austrian diplomacy. Prussia was forced to recognise Austria's right to protect the Elector of Hesse, withdrawing the bulk of her troops from the Electorate, and retaining only a single battalion at Cassel; she agreed to stultify all her action in the Duchies by helping Austria to force the Holsteiners to evacuate Schleswig; and, finally, the Prussian League of the North was definitely broken up. Yet 'Olmütz

was not a Prussian humiliation, but an Austrian weakness.¹ Schwarzenberg, in view of the demoralisation of the Cabinet of Berlin, might have imposed what terms he chose for the settlement of Germany, and set bounds for ever to the ambitions of Prussia. But he neglected the opportunity. The future Constitution of Germany was to be settled by free Conferences, to be held at Dresden, and for which invitations were issued by Austria and Prussia jointly. Trusting, perhaps, in Austria's recovered preponderance, Schwarzenberg laid down no restrictions or stipulations as to the principles which should guide this meeting. At the Conference itself, indeed, he made no disguise of the unbounded pretensions of Austria. The Empire was to be admitted whole into the German Confederation, and was to receive such a preponderating voice in the Diet, that Prussia would have sunk to the position of a second-rate Power. This was Prussia's opportunity. France and England were equally opposed to so immense an accession to the Austrian power. The Emperor Nicholas, too, had only supported Austria as the champion of 'the treaties,' and was prepared, on proof of her perfidy, to turn against her. Under these circumstances, Prussia was swift to see wherein lay her own advantage. Supported by the jealous fears of the lesser states, she boldly combated at the Conference every subversive proposal of Austria, and carried the majority with her; until, in the end, the only possible way out of the *impasse* was to restore the old, loose Confederation of 1815. When, on May 15, 1851, the last session of the Conference was held, the most that Schwarzenberg could say of its labours was that it had 'collected much valuable material for future negotiations.' The agony and stress of two years of revolution had produced in Germany no more than the restoration of the *status quo*. At Frankfort, in May, the rusty machinery of the old Federal Diet was once more set in motion.

¹ Beust, i. 96.

CHAPTER XIV

NAPOLEON III. AND THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1851-1856

Louis Napoleon and the 'Napoleonic Idea'—Electoral law of May 31, 1850—Napoleon and the Assembly—The *Coup d'état* of Dec. 1, 1851—The Second Empire—Relations of England and Russia after 1848—Nicholas I. and Napoleon III.—Question of the Holy Places—Nicholas I. and the Eastern Question—Mission of Menschikoff—Conference of Vienna—Attitude of the Powers—The Crimean War—The Treaty of Paris of 1856.

WHEN the smoke and dust of the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 had finally cleared away, two Powers were revealed, conspicuous above the level of the rest—Louis Napoleon and the Emperor Nicholas. Nothing could be more sharp than the contrast between these two in temperament, in principles, in policy. Yet both represented the forces of reaction; both had gained a victory over the monster of Revolution. But the methods of Nicholas were those of the lion-tamer; he had conquered by terror, and his trust was in steel whips and iron bars. Napoleon had charmed the monster's ear with soothing phrases, had slipped a bit between its teeth and blinkers over its eyes, and harnessed it in triumph to the car of Empire.¹ Reactionary Europe watched, half in alarm, half in admiration, the progress of the portentous equipage.

Under the Constitution of 1848, Louis Napoleon had been elected President of the Republic for four years by universal suffrage, that is to say, by the same constituency as that to

¹ Persigny to Malmesbury (*Mem.* p. 218): 'France is a great democracy which needs discipline, and no element is so fitted to represent it as the Napoleonic.'

which the Chambers owed their authority. As head of the Executive, moreover, he held in his own hands the threads of that centralised administrative system which was, and is, all-powerful in France. As head of the army, he could legally make use of the immense influence over the soldiery which his name already commanded. Between such a Presidency and Empire there was but a short step. Napoleon had waited so long that he could afford to wait a little longer, and he advanced towards his objective with extreme caution. He was determined never to sink from the sovereignty of France back into poverty and obscurity; but he had three years in which to mature his plans, and, above all, in which to make himself indispensable to the country and to Europe. Briefly, his policy was to persuade the world that the social and political order was bound up with his person; that, were he, the representative of 'the Napoleonic idea,' removed, principles and institutions would once more be thrown back into the revolutionary crucible, whence would emerge—the Unknown. France, as did the world in part, believed him, and, when it came to open war between the President and the Constitution, was found on the side of the former. The Chambers, with singular fatuity, played into his hands. Republican and Socialist continued, spasmodically, to agitate the country; and, in June 1849, a Radical *émeute*, directed against the Chambers, was with some difficulty suppressed. The parties of order took alarm, and Napoleon seized the opportunity, on October 31, to dismiss the ministry, and to replace it by one on which he thought he could more firmly rely. Still more significant than this action was the language by which it was accompanied. He declared that France, restless for want of guidance, was looking to him whom it had elected on December 10, an election which had not been of his own person alone, but of all that system which was associated with the name of Napoleon.¹ The new ministry continued

Louis
Napoleon
and the
'Napoleonic
Idea.'

¹ Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, ii. 258.

the work of combating the Radicals; but Napoleon was careful, as far as possible, to dissociate himself from a policy so unpopular in Paris. At the very moment when the rebels of June were being condemned, he amnestied 1500 of those of 1848, and this in the teeth of a recently passed vote of the Chambers. It was, however, the electoral law passed by the latter, on May 31, 1850, which gave him the opportunity for which he had been waiting, and which he was prompt to seize. By this law the Chambers, in their fear of the red spectre, had, without realising what they had done, so narrowed the franchise as to exclude some three million Frenchmen from the suffrage. Napoleon, elected by universal suffrage, could now appeal from the Chambers, which had so violated the trust reposed in them by the electors, to the country. In a tour through the provinces after the close of the session in August, he openly spoke of a revision of the Constitution with a view to his own re-election to the Presidency. He even allowed himself, from time to time, to be hailed as Emperor by the troops. When, therefore, on November 11, 1850, the Chambers reassembled, their temper was extremely hostile to the President, whose ambitions were no longer disguised.

Napoleon still waited, with consummate patience, for the right moment, calculating, diagnosing, with his finger on the pulse of the nation. If he could obtain the revision of the Constitution by constitutional means, there would be no need for a *coup d'état*; but, should the Chambers fail him, he had in that unfortunate law of May 31 a trump card which he could throw down on the table at the last moment. Meanwhile, he shuffled his ministries until, on April 10, he obtained one which suited his game. The proposal for the revision of the Constitution was laid before the Chambers, and passed, but not by the necessary two-thirds majority. The whole machinery of the administration was now set to work on behalf of the Government; and, of eighty-six depart-

Contest
between
President
and
Chambers,
1851.

ments, eighty actually petitioned in favour of revision. The President now felt himself strong enough to break with the Parliament, and for this purpose to propose the repeal of the electoral law of May 31. It was an astute policy, for in either event it seemed to secure him success. If, with the aid of the Radicals, the proposal should be carried, three million votes would be gained for his cause; if it should be thrown out, its rejection would serve as an excuse for the violence which he meditated against the Assembly. That he was unable to carry even his subservient ministry with him was of slight moment. He had taken the precaution of surrounding himself with agents whose fortunes were bound up with his own: the Count de Morny, his half-brother, a hero of the salons and the Bourse; Fleury, who looked to Napoleon to mend his shattered fortunes; Persigny, who had followed the star of Napoleon through good and evil fortune to the land of promise; St. Arnaud, whose ruined reputation had been but ill patched in the Algerian wars; Maupas, ex-prefect of the Upper Garonne, whose unscrupulousness had already brought him within the clutches of the law, whence he had been rescued by the President for his own ends. Of this morally plastic material the President determined to form his Government. On October 26, the ministry was dismissed, and a new Cabinet was formed, in which St. Arnaud took his seat as minister of war, and Maupas as prefect of police. On November 4, the Chambers met, and were greeted by the President in a speech, in which he drew attention to the political unrest in the country, and declared that salvation could be found alone in repealing the law of May 31 and reverting to the saving principle of universal suffrage. The Assembly saw the coils into which they had been betrayed. They attempted to secure themselves by issuing proclamations, posted in the barracks, commanding the troops to take orders from none but the Parliament. St. Arnaud caused the placards to be torn down. On November 15, by a majority of only seven, the

Chamber threw out the proposal to return to universal suffrage; and, as Napoleon had expected, the Radicals in their anger at this result joined the partisans of the President in defeating a motion reaffirming the authority of the Chambers over the army. The Parliament stood, disarmed and discredited, at the mercy of Napoleon. He was not slow to seize the moment so long and so carefully prepared. General Magnan, commander of the troops in Paris, had been won over, and he had no difficulty in gaining his subordinates. General Perrot, commanding the National Guard, a sincere republican, was induced by an unworthy trick The 'Coup d'état,' Dec. 1, 1851. to resign, and a commander appointed who would guarantee to keep the citizen army neutral. All was ready for the *coup d'état*, which was fixed for the night of December 1, 1851. The details of the plot had been carefully thought out, and were executed without a hitch. In the dead of night, while the police, under Maupas' direction, were arresting and carrying off to prison seventy-eight of the most conspicuous deputies, Morny was telegraphing to the provinces to inform them with what joy Paris had hailed the change of government; and, in the Government printing offices, compositors were at work, under the bayonets of the soldiers, setting up the proclamation which, next morning, was to justify Napoleon to the French nation.

On December 2, Paris, surprised and bewildered, woke up to the realisation of the accomplished fact. A remnant of the Chambers had the courage to meet, and pass in haste a motion impeaching the President, under the Constitution, before the High Court. But Chambers and High Court were surrounded by soldiers and speedily dispersed. Ardent Radicals, with Victor Hugo and Jules Favre at their head, appealed to the tribunal of the streets; barricades were hastily thrown up, and more or less desultory fighting began. But here, too, the troops were easily victorious. By the afternoon of December 4 all armed resistance was at an end.

The programme of the President, announced in his proclamation, amounted practically to a restoration of the Consulate which had immediately preceded the first Empire. The President was to be elected for ten years; he was to be assisted by a Ministry of State responsible to him alone; there was to be a Council of State for the preparation of laws; and a Legislative Chamber and Senate, whose function would be to watch over the preservation of the established order. Meanwhile, the Chambers were dissolved, a state of siege proclaimed in Paris and the neighbouring departments, universal suffrage restored, and the primary assemblies of the French people summoned for December 20 and 21 to confirm these arrangements. It was significant, however, that the vote of the army was first taken; and this, on December 4, was given unanimously in favour of the change. A fortnight later, the French people, by 7,500,000 votes to little more than 640,000, confirmed this decision. Napoleon was now Emperor in all but name. Immediately after the election he had taken up his residence in the Tuileries, whence, on January 14, 1852, he issued, as the mouthpiece of the people, the Constitution which was henceforth to suffice for France. It was, in fact, a scarcely veiled despotism. The deputies of the Lower House, were, indeed, to be elected by universal suffrage; but the President retained the right of nominating candidates agreeable to himself, and in any case they were deprived of all initiative in legislation. As for the Senate, it was to be composed of nominees of the President, dismissible at will. No one, then, was surprised when, within the year, the Empire was established in name as well as in fact. On November 7 the Senate, with but a single dissentient voice, agreed to the proposal to convert the ten years' presidency into an hereditary Empire. According to the Constitution and the Napoleonic principle, however, the ultimate decision lay with the people. On November 21 and 22, 7,800,000

Constitution
of Jan. 14,
1852.

Proclama-
tion of the
Empire,
Dec. 2, 1852.

Frenchmen voted in favour of the Empire, as against barely a quarter of a million votes given against it. On December 2, the Empire was solemnly proclaimed; and by February 14, 1853, Napoleon was able to announce to the Legislative Assembly that, with a few insignificant exceptions, his title had been recognised by all foreign states.

The ease with which Napoleon had secured the recognition of Europe was the measure of the weakness of the European Concert. The Great Alliance survived, indeed, in name; and it was even proposed to renew and strengthen it in view of possible aggressions of the new Empire. But the interests of the Powers had fallen too far asunder for them to be brought again into line. Austria was absorbed in consolidating her victory over the forces of disruption within her own borders; Prussia, under Frederick William IV., had ceased to be an effective European force; and the attitude of Palmerston during the crisis of 1848 had changed the feeling of Nicholas for England into one of suspicion and dislike. Palmerston's championship of the revolutionary cause had seemed a Machiavellian device for troubling the world's waters to favour England's fishing. This impression had been increased by the 'Pacifico incident' of 1850, when, without consulting Russia or France, the other guarantors of the Hellenic kingdom, Palmerston ordered a blockade of the Greek coast, to exact reparation for an outrage to a British subject. To the Tsar and his advisers this had seemed to mark the deliberate intention of England 'to disengage itself from all common obligations . . . and to authorise every great power . . . to recognise against the weak no law but its own will, no right but material force.'¹ The enforced resignation of Palmerston, in December 1851, had for a moment opened some prospect of a restoration of cordial relations. But the hope was soon dashed. The fall of the Russell ministry in the following February proved

Relations of
England and
Russia.

The 'Pacifico
incident.'

¹ Desp. of Nesselrode, Martens, xii. 263.

that Palmerston truly interpreted the feelings of the English electorate; and when, in December 1852, the short-lived ministry of Lord Derby was succeeded by that of Lord Aberdeen, Palmerston, though nominally excluded from foreign affairs, once more set the tone of the Government in a direction hostile to Russia. Under these circumstances, Nicholas realised that to refuse his recognition to Napoleon would merely be to play into the hands of England, and possibly to cause a renewal of that *entente* of the western Liberal Powers which had once before proved so fatal to the wellbeing of Europe. But the inflexible mind of the Tsar refused to concede one iota more than 'for reasons of state and from love of peace seemed expedient.' He would recognise the 'Emperor of the French,' but never the dynastic claims implied in the number III. which Napoleon had added to his name.¹ He refused to address the French usurper with the usual formula of 'my brother,' substituting 'my friend'; and sacrificed to his unbending pride that cordial understanding of Russia with France which it had been the one object of Russian diplomacy to maintain. For Napoleon, with the sensitiveness of the *parvenu*, bitterly resented the Tsar's attitude, and was prepared to retaliate on the first opportunity. In the East, meanwhile, circumstances were so shaping themselves that the personal animus of the French Emperor soon squared with his policy.

Nicholas I.
and
Napoleon
'III.'

It was in May 1850 that the English Government first received the news that a question had arisen in the East that was likely to give trouble, though for the present trivial enough. France, under the 'Capitulations' of 1740, had obtained the right of protecting the Latin Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and her claims to certain holy places and things in Jerusalem had

The question
of the Holy
Places.

¹ 'Which would mean denouncing all the treaties of 1815, on which the international system of Europe was based' (Martens, xiii. 289, etc.; comp. *Malmesbury*, p. 276).

at the same time been recognised. The age of Voltaire and of the Revolution had intervened ; and, the attention of the Latin Church being distracted by greater cares, the Greek clergy at Jerusalem had, under the ægis of Russia, encroached on the preserves of their rivals. But now the ultramontane reaction was at the flood, and on the throne of France sat a prince who, though he could hardly be credited with crusading zeal, was anxious to propitiate the French clergy and to humiliate Russia. A formal demand was handed in by the French ambassador to the Porte, requiring the restitution to the Latins of all their property and rights. In reply, the Ottoman Government, true to its policy of procrastination, proposed a 'mixed commission' of inquiry.¹ France agreed, on condition that no documents later than 1740 should be considered, which would have excluded the treaty of Kainardji of 1774. The Tsar replied by haughtily demanding that nothing should be changed from its present condition. By November 1851 the question had 'assumed a character of extreme gravity.'² The immediate questions at issue seemed, to English eyes, absurdly trivial and easy of adjustment ; but now, through the smoke, the flames were at last appearing, and it was beginning to be realised that nothing less was involved than a struggle between France and Russia for paramount influence in the East, a struggle from which it would be impossible for England to hold aloof. The Turkish Government wavered in hopeless bewilderment. England, intent on keeping the peace, pressed counsels of moderation ; and, in March 1852, a *firman* announced a compromise which to Protestant or Mohammedan eyes, doubtless, seemed satisfactory enough. But the fatal factor in the situation was that neither of the main parties concerned was in a mood for compromise at all. Napoleon would perhaps have viewed with equanimity the pollution of the cupola of the Ascension by the presence in it, once a year, of a Greek priest celebrating mass ; but he needed a

¹ *Eastern Papers*, 1854, lxxi. ; Pt. I. p. 4.

² *Ibid.* p. 19.

war, and was determined to have one.¹ Nicholas, to whom the religious side of the question was all-important, was not prepared to make a single concession to avoid a war, which, he hoped, would end by the expulsion of the infidels from Europe and the final settlement of the Eastern Question. The times, indeed, seemed to him very propitious for the last great crusade of Holy Russia. A league of France and Turkey he did not fear; and on the neutrality of the other Powers, if not on their co-operation, he believed he could reckon. Austria would be bound to him by 'gratitude' for his decisive help in 1849. The piety of Frederick William IV. could be counted on to support so holy a cause. England was the one doubtful factor; but the reports of Baron Brunnow were reassuring. Since the International Exhibition of 1851—a centre of revolutionary infection to be avoided of all good Russians²—the British lion, turned ruminant, had been browsing in the pleasant pastures of peace to the melodious piping of Bright and Cobden. Never again would he unsheath his claws. None the less, the Tsar made one more attempt to vanquish the invincible prejudice of the English and draw them over to his point of view; for, whatever Russia alone might hope to accomplish, Russia and England united could settle the question of the nearer East for ages to come. In Lord Aberdeen, now premier, he seemed to have a potent ally. Aberdeen made no secret of his dislike for the Turks and of the distaste he felt for that policy of propping up the Ottoman Power which he felt it his duty to pursue. The Tsar, conscious of his own lofty aims, may be excused for not realising that British dislike of Ottoman methods was quite overshadowed by British distrust of Russian motives. On January 9 and 14, 1853, Nicholas opened his heart to Sir Hamilton Seymour, British ambassador in St. Petersburg. The conversation was,

¹ Martens, xii. 302; Nesselrode to Brunnow, Feb. 14, 1853.

² See Brunnow's despatch and the Tsar's comment in Martens, xii. p. 269.

in effect, but a repetition of that which he had held, in 1844, in England. He compared Turkey to a sick man; enlarged on the necessity for coming to an agreement as to the division of his inheritance; and sketched in outline the basis of such agreement—the erection in the Balkan peninsula of Christian states on the model of the Danubian Principalities under Russian protection, and the compensation of England in Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete. Constantinople was to be held permanently by neither Power; for Russia had long since relinquished Catherine II.'s dream of re-establishing the Empire of the East. The frankness of the Tsar produced in 1853 much the same effect as it had done nine years before. English ministers saw in it only a calculated hypocrisy, and lost thereby what was perhaps the best chance of arriving at some settlement of differences which to this day keep the relations of Russia and England unpleasantly strained. Lord John Russell, in reply to the Imperial confidences, denied that Turkey was on the point of dissolution, and reaffirmed the doctrine that differences with the Porte should be settled only by the common action of the Powers.¹ The old suspicion of an agreement of Austria and Russia to partition Turkey awoke again.² In vain the Russian diplomats tried to undo the effect of the Tsar's indiscretion, and affirmed the desire of Russia to assist the European Powers in the task of preserving the Ottoman Empire. Contradictions so obvious undermined even Aberdeen's confidence in Russian good faith, and to the mass of English opinion the aims of the Tsar were too clear to be mistaken.

While the diplomatic *pourparlers* resulting from the Tsar's confidences were still in progress, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was, in February 1853, once more sent as ambassador to Constantinople, with instructions to avert a war, by persuad-

¹ For the conversation and subsequent correspondence, see *Eastern Papers*, lxxi., Pt. v. i. Cf. Martens, xii. 306, etc.

² Martens, iv. ; Pt. I. p. 437; Bulwer, ii. 169.

ing France to moderate her demands, and Turkey to reform her most obvious abuses, and so to deprive Russia of all excuse for going to extremes. But the impatient temper of Nicholas would brook no further delay. Early in 1853 he ordered the mobilisation of the Russian army; and, at the beginning of March, Prince Menschikoff, a bluff soldier, devoted to his imperial master and the great ideal of Holy Russia, and scornful of diplomatic conventions, arrived at Constantinople as the bearer of the Tsar's final and peremptory demands—the maintenance of the *status quo* in the matter of the Holy Places, and the formal acknowledgment, based on the Treaty of Kainardji, of Russia's right to protect the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. The second of these demands would, if conceded, have practically deprived the Sultan of his sovereignty over more than half his subjects in Europe. It was not, however, the matter so much as the manner of the Russian demands that alarmed the Porte. Menschikoff's attitude was from the first studiously insolent. He refused to pay the customary visit of courtesy to the Foreign Minister, Fuad Effendi, whose resignation was at once accepted by the Sultan; and his bearing in the imperial presence was far from conciliatory. The Turkish ministers turned in despair to England. Stratford de Redcliffe had not yet reached his post; but the British Chargé d'affaires, Colonel Rose, summoned the squadron under Admiral Dundas at Malta to the Bay of Vourla. The situation had become extremely critical; but the British Government did not despair of averting war. The personal assurances of the Tsar that he had no designs against the integrity of Turkey seemed to Lord Clarendon to justify him in reversing the order to the fleet; but he was unable to dissuade the French Government from ordering a naval demonstration in the Archipelago.

Menschikoff
and Strat-
ford de
Redcliffe at
Constantin-
ople.

Such was the position of affairs when, at the beginning of April, Lord Stratford reached Constantinople. He at

once grasped the essential facts of the situation, and determined on the policy which English interests dictated. The first thing to do was to separate what was reasonable in the Russian demands from what was unreasonable and inadmissible. England was profoundly indifferent to the quarrels of Roman and Greek priests in the shrines of Palestine. Religiously, the French Government, too, was indifferent; politically, it might find consolation elsewhere. Russia alone was in deadly earnest; and sound policy therefore dictated that in the matter of the Holy Places she should have her will. It was otherwise with the protectorate claimed over the Christians in Turkey. In vain Count Nesselrode urged that England was 'fighting a phantom,' since Russia claimed no more than a clearer definition of rights already vaguely conceded by the Treaty of Kainardji; claimed, moreover, no more than the same rights over the Greeks that France had for a century exercised over the Latins.¹ The British ambassador, of old the uncompromising enemy of Russia, saw, what the Tsar's ministers themselves were beginning to realise, that, in attempting to define her rights in Turkey, Russia had made a false move. The right of Russia to intervene, as Nesselrode urged, rested on the impossibility of fifty million Russian Orthodox Christians remaining indifferent to the fate of twelve million Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.² Russian influence in Turkey, based on this stupendous and 'indisputable fact,' could not be increased by a piece of parchment, and might be destroyed by a war which, even if successful, would tear the Treaty of Kainardji to shreds and set up, in place of a weak Turkey, a number of independent states, whose instinct of self-preservation would render them hostile to Russia.³ The Powers, too, might combine to withstand a defined claim to special rights in Turkey, where they would have no excuse for resenting an

¹ Desp. of Nesselrode (Martens, xii. 315, 318).

² *Ibid.* p. 318; E. P. lxxi. p. 244. Cf. Redcliffe to Clarendon, lxxi. p. 176.

³ Brunnow in Martens, xii. p. 324.

influence, vague but equally effective. This point Lord Stratford thoroughly appreciated, and he devoted himself to revealing to the world the Russian claims stripped of the lesser issues by which they were surrounded and obscured. Menschikoff, no match for the seasoned diplomat with whom he had to deal, played into his hands. He allowed himself to be persuaded to present the Russian demands separately to the Porte. On the question of the Holy Places it was not difficult for the French, Russian, and British ministers to come to an agreement (April 22); and the just grievances of Russia being disposed of, Lord Stratford was able to devote all his energies to supporting the Ottoman Government 'in withholding any concessions dangerous to its independence,'¹ and to urging it to cut away the sole excuse for Russia's attitude by placing the civil rights of the 'rayahs' on a firm footing by the Sultan's own authority. In this attitude he was, as he had expected, supported by the ambassadors of all the other Powers; and Menschikoff realised too late that he had been outwitted. His instructions, however, were clear. On May 5 he presented the demand of Russia for a right of protection, defined by treaty, over the Sultan's Orthodox subjects. The Ottoman Government, on the advice of the British minister, replied by a temperate, but firm, refusal, and offered to lay the whole matter before the signatory Powers of the Treaty of 1841. The offer of Russia to accept an 'official note' in place of the 'Convention' was equally rejected, with the consent of the ambassadors of the four remaining Great Powers. But Russia, though ominously isolated, could not turn back. Immediately after the rejection of the ultimatum, on May 22, Menschikoff and the whole of the Russian diplomatic staff left Constantinople; and it was announced that, at the end of the month, the Tsar's troops would enter the Principalities.²

Russian
ultimatum
to the Porte.
May 5, 1853..

¹ E. P. 1854, lxxi. p. 157.

² Despatch of Nesselrode (Martens, xii. 318; E. P. lxxi. 241).

The news of Gortschakoff's invasion of the Principalities, which occurred in the middle of June, roused immense excitement in England. Even Aberdeen, struggling and protesting, was carried away by the flood of warlike feeling, and declared that he would no longer be able to oppose the passage of the Dardanelles by the French and English fleets; but he still made strenuous efforts to avert a war, which he believed would be 'subversive of all social order'; he affirmed his belief that Turkey could not last long; and that, if the present crisis could be tided over, England and Russia might come to some peaceful understanding as to a partition.¹ But, in the excited temper of the times, the difficulty was to postpone a rupture. An English draft of an alternative Convention was rejected at St. Petersburg; and, on July 2, a Russian circular note formally announced the occupation of the Principalities. Lord Clarendon, on June 26, had written to Stratford de Redcliffe to advise the Turkish Government not to resist the Russian aggression by force of arms, 'in order to exhaust all the resources of patience.' This passive attitude had its effect; and the Russian advance was met by the unanimous protest of Europe. The Powers affirmed, and Russia denied, that by the Treaty of 1841 Turkey had been placed under the guarantee of the Concert of Europe;² and the idea of a Congress was only rejected through fear of driving Russia to anticipate its action. The attitude of Austria and Prussia had been a severe disillusionment to the Tsar. Frederick William, as usual, wavered and hesitated; he disapproved of Menschikoff's violence; he feared a demonstration of France on the Rhine, of which Prussia would bear the brunt; he felt bound to act in harmony with Austria, the other great German Power. And Austria's action was shaped, not by her gratitude, but by her fears. She trembled for the safety of the

The
Russians
occupy the
Principalities,
June
22, 1853.

Attitude of
Austria and
Prussia.

¹ Martens, xii. 332. To this the Tsar had added in pencil, 'ENFIN !'

² Martens, xii. 62; E.P. lxxi. p. 300. Westmorland to Clarendon.

great trade route of the Danube, and met the announcement of the Russian occupation of the Principalities with a strong protest and a concentration of troops on the Servian border. She had, indeed, no desire for war, and Count Buol offered her mediation. In August 1853 a Conference of the four Powers actually assembled in Vienna, under Austria's auspices, and agreed on the draft of a note to be submitted by the Porte to the Tsar as a basis of settlement. This document, which the Powers agreed to press on the Porte, solemnly confirmed the rights conceded by the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, and the *firman* of 1852. The Greek rite was to enjoy all the privileges conceded, under the Capitulations, to other churches; and the religious establishments at Jerusalem were, by special act, to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Russian consuls.¹

Conference
at Vienna,
and the
Vienna
Note,
August 1853.

The 'Vienna Note' practically conceded all that Russia could hope to acquire; and, urged by Prussia, the Tsar accepted it. For a moment it seemed as though the crisis were past. But the Powers had reckoned without calculating the factor of Turkish stubbornness. The invasion of the Principalities had stirred up deep resentment among the Moslem population; the attitude of France, at least, proved that, in the event of war, Turkey would not be without allies; and there was no need of the 'bellicose influence' of Stratford de Redcliffe to make the Porte reject terms which were humiliating to its pride. The British ambassador, indeed, urged the Sultan to accept the Note and reserve merely the right of 'interpretation'; but the utmost he could achieve was that, on August 19, Reschid Pasha agreed to the draft, with a single modification reserving the duty of protecting the 'rayahs' to the Sultan. The whole question was thereby once more reopened. Austria and Prussia, indeed, combined to urge the Tsar to accept the amended Note; but Nicholas haughtily refused 'to place Russia in a position of inferiority'

¹ E. P. 1854, lxxi. Pt. II. p. 25.

by agreeing to changes in an instrument which had received the sanction of her emperor. This uncompromising attitude of Russia more or less reconciled English statesmen to the failure of the negotiations. It was clear that the Note would have settled nothing, since the objections of Russia seemed to imply an 'intention of interpreting it in favour of her extreme claims.'¹ War now seemed inevitable.

The problem for Russia was now to limit as far as possible the number of enemies ranged against her. On the active sympathy of her old allies of the Triple Alliance of the North she had ceased to reckon; but their active hostility must at all costs be averted. On the attitude of Prussia especially would depend that of the Scandinavian states; nay, on her benevolent neutrality alone Russia could count on being supplied with the first essentials of war. One more meeting of the allied monarchs was held at Olmütz on October 4, 1853. Frederick William went with doubt and misgiving; but the upshot made for peace. It was determined to prepare yet another note of the Powers, on the lines of that of Vienna, but guaranteeing the independence of Turkey.² Aberdeen

British and French fleets hailed this decision with enthusiasm. The allied French and British fleets had, indeed, passed the Dardanelles, ostensibly 'to protect the Sultan against a possible Mussulman rising,' really as a counter-move to the Russian aggression. But, in Aberdeen's view, peace had been, and might still be, maintained. So long as Russia did not pass the Danube, England would do nothing to disturb her military positions; so long as Russia refrained from attacking a port on the Black Sea, she would give no material aid to the Turks. But the English Government could not stand by and see the Ottoman Empire destroyed. To the Tsar this was tantamount to a declaration of war.³ The actual *casus belli*, however, would not arise

¹ Clarendon to Cowley (E. P. lxxi. ii. 124).

² E. P. lxxi. ii. p. 128; Martens, xii. 326; viii. 430.

³ He noted on the margin of the report: 'Ainsi c'est la guerre! Soit!' (Martens, xii. 331.)

till the allied fleets should pass the Bosphorus into the Black Sea.

Such was the general situation when the news reached England that, on November 30, the Russian fleet had attacked and destroyed a Turkish squadron in the harbour of Sinope with circumstances, as it seemed, of exceptional barbarity.¹ Napoleon, through his minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, at once renewed the proposal, which he had made as early as October 4, that the allied fleets should pass the Bosphorus; should, as long as Russia occupied the Principalities, hold the Black Sea, and 'invite' all Russian ships to return to Sebastopol. Lord Clarendon, in view of the fact that England had guaranteed the Sultan's territory against attack, had no choice but to agree; but at the same time he expressed his desire to take no action calculated to break up the cordial understanding of the four Powers based on the Vienna Conferences.² Russia, too, in spite of the Tsar's outburst, was loth to accept the action of the allied fleets as a declaration of war. If the allied admirals were instructed to do no more than maintain neutrality on the high seas, and to protect *Russian* as well as *Turkish* ports from attack, Russia would be content to accept the situation, reserving her freedom to act on land; but if the intervention was to be in favour of the Turks only, the ambassadors of the Tsar in London and Paris were to demand their passports. In January 1854 the fateful questions were put at London and Paris, and the answers revealed the fact that France and England were in active alliance with Turkey against Russia.³ At the beginning of February diplomatic relations between Russia and the two western Courts were broken off; and on March 27 France and England formally declared war.

The allied squadrons enter the Black Sea, Jan. 3, 1854.

England and France declare war, March 27, 1854.

After the outbreak of the war Russian diplomacy was mainly occupied in preventing a general alliance of the

¹ E. P. lxxi. ii. 306.

² E. P. lxxi. ii. 323.

³ Martens, xii. 338-342.

Powers against Russia. The situation was, indeed, a singular one. All the four Great Powers were united on one point—the necessity for procuring the withdrawal of Russia from the Danubian Principalities; for Prussia was as interested as Austria in securing the free navigation of the Danube. Both Powers were, moreover, prepared to press Russia to recede from her extreme claims over the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to uphold the independence and integrity of Turkey. They had joined with France and England in presenting, on December 12, 1853, an identical note drawn up at the Conference of Vienna, reaffirming the principles of the treaty of 1841, a note which, after being accepted by the Porte, was rejected by Russia. On April 9, and again on May 23, protocols reasserting these principles, and undertaking if necessary to enforce them by arms, were once more signed. But the attitude of Prussia was, at best, half-hearted. Frederick William dreaded a revolutionary rearrangement of the map of Europe; he shrank from an alliance with Napoleon for any purposes whatever, or with infidels against the majestic champion of Orthodoxy whom he had been brought up to revere. Nor were the sober counsels of Prussia united. If Bunsen, under the influence of the English Court, urged the king to join actively the alliance against Russia, Otto von Bismarck, who could be suspected of no sentimental motives, declared that it mattered not a pin to Prussia whether or no Russia made conquests in Turkey, since Prussia was not Austria; and that Frederick William's true policy would be to concentrate 100,000 men in Upper Silesia so as to be able to dictate terms at her own convenience to either combatant.¹ Not Russia, but Austria, was the rival that Prussia had to dread, and whose influence he set himself to combat in the Diet of Frankfort. It seemed, in fact, no hopeless task, by timely concessions, to detach the two German Powers from the European Alliance. Napoleon and England were at one

¹ Martens, viii. 441.

in desiring to go beyond the mere letter of the pretexts for the war, and by crippling the power of Russia, to render her harmless for some time to come. To this policy neither Austria nor Prussia had committed, nor were likely to commit, themselves. Whatever the ultimate attitude of the two Powers might be, for the present France and England were embarked upon the struggle alone.

The Crimean war has formed the subject of one of the few historical works which have become literary classics; and for such a work it was a fitting subject, in the mighty issues seemingly involved, in the heroic incidents in the struggle, in the tragic irony of its ultimate results. Into this complex history it is impossible here to enter in any detail. Its broad outlines are clearly enough defined, and are sufficient for our purpose. At the outset, Russians and Ottomans face to face, with the Danube between; and on the Russian flank Austria watching under arms. Turkey had declared war on October 5, 1853; and, during the winter, indecisive fighting proceeded along the banks of the Danube. Then, following the entrance of the allied fleet into the Black Sea, came the advance of the Russians across the Danube, their unexpected check before the fortress of Silistria, followed by the landing of British and French troops at Varna, and the presentation, on June 3, of an Austrian summons to Russia to evacuate the Principalities. On June 22 the Russians were forced to raise the siege of Silistria; and, driven back step by step by the Turks, during the following weeks retired finally across the Pruth. As the Russians retired, the Austrians, by special arrangement with the Porte, advanced and occupied the Principalities, of which they guaranteed the protection.

The evacuation of the Principalities created a new situation. The one object on which all the four Powers had been united had been attained; and any further prosecution of the war threatened to break up the Quadruple understanding. But the revelation of Russia's weakness encouraged France

and England to proceed, in order to secure a settlement of the Eastern Question, as it was hoped, once for all; and Austria's scruples at sharing in the adventure faded with each reverse to the Russian arms. The western Powers now defined their objects in the so-called 'Four Points'—
 The 'Four Points.' the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and Servia was to be abolished; the navigation of the Danube was to be freed; the Treaty of July 1841, relating to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, was 'to be revised in the interests of the balance of power'; and, lastly, the Tsar was to withdraw his claim to a special right of protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. To these conditions Austria, in August 1854, assented; and could she have carried Prussia and the German Confederation with her, she would at this time have entered into the offensive alliance against Russia. But Prussia, though she had bound herself by a convention signed on April 20, to assist Austria if attacked, refused to be a party to a purely aggressive movement; and the attitude of Frederick William and of the German Diet was so far doubtful that Austria dared not take the offensive without them. Bismarck, indeed, watching from his coign of 'vantage at Frankfort, suggested that Prussia should mobilise 200,000 troops on the Silesian frontier, and dictate terms of peace by the threat of joining against whichever party proved refractory.¹ A policy so bold was, however, quite beyond Frederick William's capacity to understand, far more to execute. He contented himself with securing the neutrality of the Confederation; and at the same time persistently urged the Tsar to accept the Four Points, and so disarm the hostility of Austria and deprive the Western allies of all excuse for continuing the war. Toward the end of 1854 his urgency attained its object, and Austria was informed on November 28 that the Tsar had accepted the 'Four Points.' But it was too late. The same material forces which had induced the Tsar to yield had encouraged the timid policy of Austria to

¹ Bismarck, i. 106.

take another step forward. On December 2, Austria signed a formal defensive alliance against Russia.¹

Austria had been encouraged to take this step by the developments of the war. The destruction of the Russian sea-power in the Black Sea, as the nearest way to save the Porte from Russian pressure, was the common object of Napoleon and of the British Government. The English plan of sweeping the seas of the Tsar's war vessels was not enough; for these could always seek refuge in the strong harbour of Sebastopol, by the reduction of which alone the Russian sea-power could be effectively destroyed. Napoleon, therefore, who was, moreover, anxious for the French troops to have an opportunity of displaying their powers on land, suggested that the forces of the allies should be used against Sebastopol. The English Government agreed; and, on September 14, the allied armies landed in the Crimea. Their advance was opposed by a Russian army under Prince Menschikoff; and, on September 20, was fought the battle of the Alma, which resulted in the retreat of Menschikoff, first into Sebastopol, and afterwards into the centre of the Crimea.

Before evacuating the city, Menschikoff had caused the ships of the Russian squadron, after landing their men and guns, to be sunk at the mouth of the harbour; and to the Russian sailors was intrusted the main defence of the fortifications. A direct attack on the city, of which the defences were not completed, would at this time probably have been successful. But Lord Raglan was persuaded by Marshal St. Arnaud to postpone the assault until the armies could take up a more favourable position to the south of the city, and until the siege train had been landed. In these dispositions three weeks were spent, during which the Russian commanders Korniloff and Todleben had time to perfect the arrangements for defence; and when, on October 17, the bombardment which was to prelude the

The invasion of the Crimea.

Siege of Sebastopol.

¹ Martens, viii. 452.

attack began, it proved wholly ineffective. Menschikoff, meanwhile, having received reinforcements, advanced once more against the allied positions. On October 25 was fought the memorable battle of Balaclava, followed, on November 5, by that of Inkermann. The invincible courage of the British soldiery and their allies had been proved; but the end of the war had been brought no nearer by victories too dearly purchased; and when, on November 14, the winter broke on the besiegers with a hurricane which wrecked twenty-one vessels laden with stores and clothes for the troops, the allies found themselves face to face with the prospect of a winter siege which had neither been expected nor prepared for. The sufferings, many of them unnecessary, endured by the English troops before Sebastopol during the winter of 1854-1855, have never been forgotten by the English people. As the fearful reality dawned on their minds at the time, a wave of patriotic indignation swept the weak-kneed ministry of Aberdeen from office; and Palmerston, who, whatever his defects of temper, at least had the merit of knowing his own mind, was called to the conduct of affairs. Russia, indeed, suffered, in the course of this titanic struggle, more than the allies. These had at least free communication with the sea by means of which, when the necessity was realised, supplies and reinforcements in plenty could be easily forwarded. Those of the Russians, on the other hand, were forced to traverse, in the depth of winter, thousands of miles of desolate steppe. It was this fact which determined the character and upshot of the war. The invaders had settled, as it were, like some malignant vampire on the toe of the country, and sucked out its life-blood. It

Death of the
Emperor
Nicholas,
March 2,
1855.

was the realisation of this process that broke the stubborn spirit of the Emperor Nicholas, and made him willing to offer terms. He had grimly remarked that 'Generals January and February' would prove his best ally. These had come and gone, but their weapons had been directed impartially; and, if whole

brigades perished in the trenches before Sebastopol, the roads leading from the centre of Russia into the Crimea were marked by the bones of Russian dead. The proud soul of the Tsar could endure no longer the agony of his failure, the shame of a humiliation undergone in vain; and, on March 2, 1855, he threw away the life which a little ordinary care would have saved.

The accession of Alexander II., though the new Tsar proclaimed his intention of treading in the footsteps of Peter the Great, Catherine, and Nicholas, brightened the prospects of peace, and gave the opportunity for reopening negotiations. Russia was in fact threatened with a new development of the alliance against her. While Prussia had definitely settled down into an attitude of neutrality, Austria had drawn a step nearer to France and England and promised, in the event of peace not being secured on the accepted basis by the end of the year, to concert measures with the allies for its attainment. Under these circumstances Russia thought it expedient to accept the invitation of the allied Powers to a Conference at Vienna. Prussia, which refused to pledge itself to help in enforcing the terms of the allies in case the negotiations should break down, was excluded from the deliberations, which began in March 1855. On the first two of the 'Four Points'—the relinquishment of the Russian protectorate over Servia and the Principalities, and the free navigation of the Danube—an agreement was reached with little difficulty. But in respect of the third article, that dealt with the revision of the treaty of 1841 relating to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, a hopeless divergence of view soon became apparent. France and England insisted that the Black Sea should be neutralised, no warships, whether of Russia or any other nation, being allowed in its waters; Prince Alexander Gortschakoff, on the other hand, declared that the utmost that could be required or conceded, was that all Powers should have an equal right to send their war-vessels through

Conference
at Vienna,
March 1855.

the straits. On this point the negotiations broke down. Austria, which had so far supported the view of Gortschakoff as to suggest a compromise, declared when this was rejected by the western Powers that its obligations under the treaty of December 2, 1854, had been fulfilled, and relapsed once more into the attitude of a neutral. The Conference had produced little effect, save on the position of Austria herself. Whatever excuse might legitimately be urged for her policy, the western Powers resented it as a desertion on the eve of battle; while Russia had been too deeply wounded by the Power on whose gratitude she had reckoned lightly to forget and forgive. From this moment Austria was isolated in Europe; and when, eleven years later, her own fate befell, she looked round in vain for help and sympathy.

The vacillating policy of Austria during the war had been largely due to fear of an attack by Sardinia on the side of Lombardy if she were to become entangled in the East; and to remove this obstacle the western Powers brought pressure to bear on the Piedmontese Government to join the alliance. Cavour, seeing in this course the best means, if not of earning the gratitude of France and England, at least of preventing the threatened isolation of Sardinia, agreed, and succeeded in carrying the country with him.¹ On January 7, 1855, Sardinia joined in the offensive alliance against Russia, without conditions; and a few weeks later, 15,000 Italian troops landed in the Crimea. This accession of strength, combined with other causes, hastened the end. This had been delayed by Napoleon's idea of putting off the final blow, till he could come out in person to reap the laurels of victory. St. Arnaud's successor, Marshal Canrobert, thwarted and hampered by the political wire-pullers of the Tuileries, resigned; and his successor, General Pélissier, refusing to tolerate a like treatment, determined to push the siege. On June 18 a great assault of the allied armies was repulsed; and, ten

Intervention
of Sardinia,
Jan. 1855.

¹ Bolton King, *Italy*, ii. 5, etc.

days later, Lord Raglan died, worn out with the strain and disappointment of the terrible campaign. The end was not to be delayed many weeks. An attempt to relieve the city was defeated by the combined French and Italians at the battle of the Tchernaya, fought on August 16. Three weeks later, on September 8, the Malakoff, the fort commanding the position, was carried by the French; and the next day Sebastopol had fallen. The war, indeed, dragged on a few weeks longer; and on November 8, the fall of Kars shed a gleam of lustre on the Russian arms; but, saving the English, who were thirsting to retrieve their somewhat damaged reputation as a military nation, all parties to the dispute were now anxious for a settlement. The crowning glory of the Malakoff had shed sufficient lustre on the arms of the French to satisfy Napoleon for the present; and when Austria, behind the back of England, whose sympathy she could not hope to gain, proposed to him to enter into a negotiation from which England was to be excluded, he consented. As the result of this it was agreed that Austria was to present, as its own ultimatum to St. Petersburg, a note containing the preliminaries of peace, after Napoleon should have secured the assent of England to its terms without alteration. The note embodied the Four Points which had been the ostensible object of the war; but it was impossible for the British Government to accept an arrangement which amounted to a diplomatic snub, and Palmerston only agreed to the instrument on certain points involved being more clearly defined and a new clause added, by which England reserved the right of adding further conditions, those conditions being understood to be that Russia should abstain from fortifying the islands of

Åland in the Baltic.

Austrian
ultimatum
to Russia,
Dec. 1855.

Thus modified, the Austrian note was presented to the Tsar at the close of December, with the intimation that if, by January 16, it had not been accepted, Austria would declare war. One Russian statesman alone,

Prince Gortschakoff, ventured to dissuade the Emperor from accepting the ultimatum. It was accepted; and, on February 25, 1856, the envoys of all the Powers, except Prussia, met at Paris to frame a definitive treaty of peace. A month later, on March 30, this was signed. By the Treaty of Paris the Black Sea was declared neutral water. Merchant vessels of all nations were to be admitted, war-vessels excluded. Even the countries holding its shores were to come under this rule, and to raise neither arsenals nor naval stations. The free navigation of the Danube was to be secured under the supervision of a European Commission; and Russia was to retire from that part of Bessarabia which gave her command of the mouths of the river. Lastly, the most important article of all was that which extended the principles of the treaty of 1841, the Powers declaring the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and concert of Europe, and pledging the Powers collectively to resist, as a matter of common concern, any act tending to violate this engagement. In return, the Sultan communicated to the Powers a *firman* 'recording his generous intentions towards his Christian subjects,' of which the Powers 'recognised the high value,' declaring at the same time 'that it could not, in any case, give to them the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of the Sultan to his subjects, or in the internal administration of the Empire.'¹

The terms of the Treaty of Paris, bought at the cost of so much blood and treasure, seemed at the time to have achieved all and more than all that had been aimed at by those who had pressed on the war. The southward flow of the Russian tide had been rolled back; and the Ottoman Empire, saved from this menace from without, and about to be reinvigorated by a policy of thorough internal reform, had to all appearance entered on a new lease of life. Yet

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.* ii. 1250.

history has condemned the policy of the war and stultified its triumphs. Turkey remained unreformed and irreformable; and the Powers were not long before they were forced to ignore the fiction by which she had been accounted a nation on the same footing with the civilised peoples of Europe. As for the neutralisation of the Black Sea, it was certain that Russia would take advantage of the first European complication to repudiate an arrangement intolerable to any great Power. Only fifteen years later her chance came; and Bismarck conceded the consent of triumphant Prussia to the repudiation of the treaty, as the price of Russia's neutrality during the crisis of the siege of Paris. Meanwhile the expansive energy of the empire of the Tsar, dammed back in one direction, sought outlets elsewhere; and it may be doubted whether British interests gained by postponing the break-up of the Ottoman dominion in Europe at the cost of hastening the conquering march of Russia, across central Asia, towards the Indian frontier. Even had the Tsar succeeded in his policy of ousting the Turk from Europe, and dividing the Balkan peninsula among a number of Christian states, this would only have anticipated what was, sooner or later, inevitable and, moreover, as Russian statesmen at the time pointed out, by no means so obviously to Russia's interests as might appear. The record of emancipated Greece had not been such as to encourage the Tsar to expect perennial gratitude from any peoples he might help to a free existence; and in place of a weak Turkey, he might merely be setting up on his borders a league of suspicious and hostile Christian states. The process, indeed, began on the very morrow of the Con-
gress. Napoleon III., who had already startled The union of Roumania. the world by a proposal to revise the treaties of 1815, and who regarded the principle of nationality as the most powerful instrument for this end, had suggested at Paris that the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia should be united into a single Roumanian state, under a

prince elected by themselves. The project had been approved by Russia; but owing to the strenuous opposition of England, intolerant of any curtailment of the Sultan's authority, and of Austria, fearful of the effect on her own Rouman peasantry in Transylvania, the settlement of the question had been reserved for the consideration of a future Conference. Before this could meet, elections held in October 1857 resulted in the return of representative bodies at Jassy and Bucharest which, almost without a dissentient voice, voted for the union of the two states. But the Conference, which met at Paris early in 1858, to settle the question, was unable to accept an arrangement so revolutionary. It decided that in each principality there was to be a Hospodar, elected for life, a separate judicature, and a separate legislative assembly, before which a central commission, formed of delegates of both provinces, should lay projects of law on matters of common concern. The comment of the Roumanians on this arrangement was to elect Prince Alexander Couza Hospodar both at Jassy and Bucharest; and three years later, in 1862, the union was quietly effected, without any one taking much notice. In 1866 Prince Couza was expelled, and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected Hereditary Prince, and received the recognition of all Europe. To the not very disinterested sympathy of Napoleon it was due, more or less directly, that this Italic race in the east, descended from Diocletian's legionaries, received a national existence. Still more important was the effect of the same influence in the original cradle of their tongue, if not their race, in Italy itself.

CHAPTER XV

THE UNION OF ITALY

Italy and the Crimean War—Affairs of Piedmont—Policy of Cavour—Attitude towards Austria—Attitude of the Powers—Isolation of Piedmont—Cavour at the Congress of Paris—Napoleon III. and Italy—Meeting at Plombières—A Congress suggested—Austrian ultimatum—The war of 1859 in Italy—Armistice of Villafranca—'Italia fara da si'—Movements towards unity in the central states—Ricasoli and Farini—The Military League—Napoleon vetoes intervention—'Le Pape et le Congrès'—Cavour returns to office—Annexation of the central states to Piedmont—The Roman Question—Insurrection in Sicily—Expedition of Garibaldi—The question of Naples—Cavour and Garibaldi—Garibaldi at Naples—The Piedmontese invade Umbria and the Marches—Annexation of the South to the Italian kingdom.

THE part played by Sardinia in the Crimean war had been a singular one. Without any ostensible cause of quarrel with the Tsar's Government, and in all but open hostility to one of the allies, she had been pressed into the service of the coalition by the urgent need of not being outbidden by Austria for the goodwill of the western Powers. Ever since the downfall of 1849, Piedmont, under the State of guidance of Count Cavour, who had come into Piedmont. office in October 1852, had been preparing to renew the struggle for the expulsion of the Austrians from Italian soil. As far as the development of the internal resources of the state were concerned, Cavour's policy had met with singular success. Bit by bit the antiquated system which had hampered the natural development of trade and industry had been swept away; and under the influence of an enlightened commercial policy and of the development of roads and railways, the prosperity of the country had

advanced by leaps and bounds. But even with all possible progress and preparation, Piedmont alone was not equal to coping with the power of Austria; and Cavour early saw the necessity for obtaining at least one powerful ally. Of all the Governments of Europe, that of Napoleon alone seemed likely to respond to his advances. The British Government, though public feeling in England ran high in favour of the Italian patriots, was still inclined to support 'the honourable policy' of maintaining the treaties.¹ But apart from the traditional rivalry of France and Austria in Italy, Napoleon was known to contemplate the break-up of the settlement of 1815, in order that he might win something for himself in the scramble. The French Emperor, moreover, was not unmindful of his Italian lineage, and in the days of his exile had fought in the Italian cause. It was those considerations that determined the attitude of Cavour at the Congress of Paris. Piedmont had earned her place in the councils of Europe; it behoved her to throw such weight as she possessed into the balance that would most incline to her own interests; and there was little doubt as to which this was. The tortuous diplomacy of Napoleon had strained the *entente cordiale* between France and England; and the former was coquetting with Russia. Austria, distrusted by all, but for the moment ranged with England, watched with gloomy forebodings the developments of the fateful intrigue. In a divided Europe it was necessary to take sides; and Cavour did not hesitate. Austria was the declared enemy; England might talk, but would never act; and in the controversy that ranged round the question of the Danubian Principalities, he therefore supported France at the Congress through thick and thin, in the hope that she might prove not ungrateful. He was helped by an event which might easily have had an opposite effect. In January 1858 an attempt, by means of an explosive bomb, was made on the life of Napoleon by an Italian fanatic named Orsini.

¹ Malmesbury to Cowley, Jan. 10, 1859, *Parl. Papers*, 1859, xxxii. 34, etc.

Though the Emperor escaped, a hundred and fifty people were killed and injured by the explosion; public feeling in France ran high against Italy, the hotbed of revolutionary violence; and Napoleon himself pressed the Piedmontese Government to sharper measures against the forces of disorder. But in the end the result of the outrage was to draw closer the ties which it had threatened to sever. At the Congress of Paris Cavour had urged upon assembled Europe the danger to its peace of the perennial unrest in Italy, and had been supported by France and England in his demand for those concessions, at the expense of Austria, by which alone that unrest could be permanently calmed. Orsini himself had urged on the Emperor, on the eve of his execution, the necessity for redressing the wrongs of Italy, without which neither the established order of Europe nor his own life would ever be safe. Napoleon's fears combined with his inclinations and his policy to make him take up the Italian cause with fresh vigour. On July 20, 1858, he had a secret meeting with Cavour at Plombières, a watering-place in the Vosges, and here were arranged the terms of an alliance for the liberation of Italy. At the first favourable opportunity Napoleon promised to attack Austria with an army of 200,000 men, co-operating with a Piedmontese army of half the number. No peace was to be made until the Austrians should have been expelled from Italian soil; and, if necessary, the allies were to dictate terms at Vienna itself. As for the other Powers, Russia, he hoped, would be actively friendly, England and Prussia at least neutral. As a result of the war, if successful, the Italian states' system was to be entirely rearranged. Napoleon's reluctance to offend clerical opinion in France by tampering with the Pope's dominions was overcome by the firmness of Cavour; and it was decided that not only Lombardo-Venetia and the duchies, but the Legations, and perhaps the Marches, should be added to the crown of Piedmont to form a united kingdom of northern

The Com-
pact of
Plombières,
1858.

Italy. Umbria and Tuscany were to form a kingdom of central Italy under the duchess-regent of Parma; while Naples, where a Muratist revolution was certain to result from the overthrow of the Austrian power in the north, was to be left to itself. The government of Rome and the district of Comarca was to be retained by the Pope under the protection of a French garrison. Finally, the four states thus constituted were to form an Italian federation. In return, no light price was to be paid by emancipated Italy to her ally. That a daughter of the proud house of Savoy should be demanded for a scion of the parvenu Bonapartes, and a young princess of sixteen compelled to marry an elderly rake, was from the point of view of the higher diplomacy a small matter. The stipulated cession of Nice and of Savoy, the cradle of the royal house of Piedmont, was on another plane. France, insisting on her pound of flesh, could hardly claim a debt of gratitude. Napoleon, indeed, saw in the acquisition at least of Savoy his justification in the eyes of France for undertaking the war; for not only would it restore to France her 'natural boundary' of the Alps, but it would be the first breach in those treaties of 1815 which had been framed and upheld in despite of France, and might lead to her recovery of that frontier of the Rhine which the Great Alliance had torn from her, and towards which she had never ceased to aspire.

The compact of Plombières, though a triumph for Cavour's diplomacy, placed him in a position of extreme War clouds difficulty. Napoleon had stipulated that the in Italy. ostensible motives of the war should not be 'revolutionary,' and that Europe should be satisfied by a decent diplomatic excuse. The best would, of course, be if Austria could be, not too obviously, provoked to a breach of the peace; and this Cavour endeavoured to achieve. But, at any moment, the pressure of internal forces—clerical opposition and the like—in France might compel Napoleon to retract his promises; and it was necessary,

therefore, to hasten the crisis. Meanwhile, however, the European Powers were watching with growing misgiving the gathering war-clouds in Italy. England, especially, protested against the swelling armaments of Piedmont as a wanton challenge to Austria—a challenge all the less called for since the Austrian Government had at last decided to reform its system in Lombardo-Venetia; and under the mild rule of the popular Archduke Maximilian the golden age of Leopold seemed about to dawn once more for northern Italy. The fears of Cavour as to the possible effect of the Austrian reforms on the attitude of the Lombardo-Venetians themselves to the Italian movement proved groundless. A couple of new laws, widening the area of the conscription and debasing the currency by bringing it into line with that of the rest of the Empire, more than undid all that the milder rule of Maximilian had achieved. As regards foreign relations, too, the shortsightedness of the Austrian Government played into the hands of Cavour.

That a war between Piedmont, aided by France, and Austria was impending was soon an open secret. At the reception at the Tuileries on New Year's Day 1859, Napoleon's Napoleon addressed the Austrian ambassador attitude. with a regret that 'the relations between the two empires were not as good as they had been'; and, in spite of official explanations, the words were taken by Europe as a threat of war.¹ Piedmont followed with a still more unequivocal expression of her resolution. On January 7 Victor Emmanuel opened the Parliament at Turin with a speech from the throne, in which he declared that he 'was not insensible to the cry of woe that reached him from so many parts of Italy'; and the enthusiasm with which this statement of the intention of Piedmont to champion the cause of Italy was received, proved that in the struggle with Austria all Italy would be united under the leadership of the House of Savoy. Already the National Society had drawn

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1859, xxxii. 31.

into its ranks all but a comparatively small group of republicans; and now, when it was clear that Victor Emmanuel and Napoleon were in earnest, the majority even of these irreconcilables consented to forego their dreams for the cause of the liberation of Italy. Mazzini alone, obstinately true to his ideal, would march under no banner save that of Italian unity, maintained that this should be won by Italian arms alone, and preferred, rather than countenance the sinister aid of the author of the *coup d'état*, to sulk, with a faithful remnant of his followers, in his tent. But the work of Mazzini was done. Italy no longer needed prophets, but warriors and statesmen.

Events were now rapidly approaching a crisis; and, the intentions of Napoleon being notorious, Austria began to mass troops in Lombardy. On January 13 Prince Napoleon started for Turin to claim his bride, the Princess Clotilde; and here, on the 18th of the same month, he signed an offensive alliance with Piedmont by which, in the event of victory, Lombardo-Venetia and the duchies, if possible with Romagna and the Marches, were to be added to the dominions of the House of Savoy, France in return taking Savoy. The destination of Nice remained for the present undecided.¹ A military Convention, signed at the same time, provided that war should be declared between mid-April and the end of July, France undertaking to send 200,000 men. Napoleon, meanwhile, was preparing the world for his grand stroke. On February 4 a pamphlet, written by the Emperor's friend, La Guéronnière, but avowedly inspired by Napoleon himself, was published at Paris. In this was proclaimed the absolute necessity for putting an end to the unrest in Italy by satisfying Italian nationality and saving the Pope from an impossible position. This was to be done by a scheme of federation; and since Austria was the most obvious bar to this, it was hinted that she would have to be expelled. If war came, France would be found on the side of the 'Mother of Nations.'

¹ Bolton King, ii. 56, note.

In Italy all was now ready. Even Tuscany, which, of all the northern states, had the strongest separatist traditions, had, under the far-seeing leadership of Ricasoli, consented to lose her individuality in the larger life of Piedmont and of Italy. The open defiance of Austria in the king's speech had kindled enthusiasm far beyond the borders of Piedmont, and thousands of volunteers crowded across to join the armies of Italy. In Piedmont the criticism and the cries of party rancour at last were hushed in the awful calm that preceded the storm of war; and Cavour, the greatness of his policy at length recognised, was all in all. One more agony of doubt and fear he had to pass through, however, before success crowned his superhuman efforts. In February, Napoleon had seemed bent on war; in March, his resolution began to waver. The risks were great, the outcome at least doubtful. What if the German Diet, despite Prussia's antagonism to Austria, and fearful of French designs on the Rhine, were to side with Austria? If Russia could be moved to make a diversion in the East, all might be well; but, in that case, what would be the attitude of England, her nightmare of a Franco-Russian alliance grown reality? Or, if France took up arms in the name of nationality, would not a new European coalition arise against her? The English Government, intent on playing the part of peacemaker worked on his fears, and busied itself in the attempt to arrive at an 'amicable agreement' between Austria and Piedmont on what seemed to it the main questions at issue.¹ The English mediation, and Napoleon's tentative efforts to effect a compromise, split on the rock of Piedmont's resolution. Victor Emmanuel threatened to abdicate if Napoleon were to withdraw from his engagements; and this would mean the unleashing of Revolution unguided and unchecked. One way out of the imbroglio yet remained. On March 18, at

Cavour
opposes a
Congress.

¹ See 'Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy,'

Parl. Papers, 1859, xxxii.

the instigation of Russia, Napoleon proposed that the Italian Question should be laid before a Congress of the Powers.¹

Proposed The assembly of the Congress would have meant
European the ruin of Cavour's plans and of the hopes of
Congress. Italy. Even the goodwill of England went no

further than a recognition of the misrule in the Papal States and of the evils resulting from the strained relations of Austria and Piedmont. Italy's only salvation lay in the destruction of the Treaties, to which a Congress would give a new lease of life. Yet Cavour did not dare defy the Powers. One by one these consented to Russia's proposal, Prussia following the lead of England, and Austria consenting on condition that Piedmont should first disarm. Cavour determined not to relinquish the fruits of all his years of effort without a struggle. He plied Napoleon with prayers and threats, and Napoleon was too deeply involved to be able to despise either. He gave the Italian statesman the impression that the Congress was a mere blind, war sooner or later inevitable. But it was not the wavering will of Napoleon, but the clumsiness of Austrian diplomacy, which determined the issue sooner than he would have hoped. Austria had consented to the Congress unwillingly. She had no mind to be put on her trial before the high court of Europe, still less to have repeated the diatribe of Cavour at the Congress of Paris. Emperor and army, moreover, were burning to chastise the insolence of Piedmont, and in no mood for unconditional concession. Austria would only take part in the Congress if Piedmont disarmed, and on condition that Piedmont's representative should be excluded from the sittings. Malmesbury urged the Sardinian Government to yield, pleading that its interests would be safe in the hands of the five Great Powers.² But Cavour saw his chance. He refused to disarm, or to be a party to the

¹ See 'Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy,' *Parl. Papers*, xxxii. 136.

² Malmesbury to Hudson, March 21, 1859; *ib.* xxxii. 141.

Congress, unless Piedmont were admitted by the Powers on equal terms. Thus, neither Piedmont nor Austria being inclined to give way, the idea of the Congress had to be abandoned; and Lord Malmesbury, as a last resource, suggested that all three Powers should disarm simultaneously, and that, following the precedent of Laibach, the Italian states should be allowed to plead their cause at the bar of the Great Powers.¹ Austria herself had suggested this course, and Napoleon felt compelled to give it at least his outward consent. Cavour was in despair, until a false move on the part of Austria placed the game in his hands. In Vienna the war party was now in the ascendant, and Buol in vain laboured to hold it back. The signature of the Convention for disarmament was not seriously meant; and on the very day, April 12, when this was concluded, the reserves were called out. Cavour, on the other hand, urged by a peremptory message from Napoleon, at last recognised the necessity of bowing to the will of Europe, of disbanding the volunteers and reducing the army to a peace footing. On April 19, a telegram from Turin announced this decision to the British Government. Peace seemed assured, and the hopes of Italy once more quenched. But the Austrian Government had meanwhile grown tired of waiting, and on April 23, before Cavour's decision had been made known at Vienna, an ultimatum summoning Piedmont to disarm on pain of invasion reached Turin. Cavour was wild with joy. Austria had made war inevitable, and had hopelessly compromised herself in the eyes of Europe, whose sympathies now would be with Piedmont, the Power which had consented to forego its dearest ambitions for the sake of the world's peace, and which by no law, human or divine, could be blamed for defending itself against wanton aggression. 'The die is cast,' cried Cavour exultantly, 'and we have made history.'

Austrian
ultimatum
to Sardinia,
April 23, 1859.

Napoleon now had the diplomatic pretext for which he had

¹ Malmesbury to Loftus, April 13, 1859, *Parl. Papers*, xxxii. 290.

been waiting, and on April 29 formally declared war. Austria, on the other hand, as the first consequence of her diplomatic blunder, found herself completely isolated. Prussia held sullenly aloof; England and Russia exerted all their efforts to confine the area of the war and to hold in check the Austrian sympathisers among the small German states. Austria had to meet alone the united power of France and Piedmont. Yet, at the outset, the chances were in her favour, and by a bold initiative the forces of Italy might have been crushed before the French could come to their aid. But fate favoured Piedmont. A state of war had existed since April 26, but it was not till the 29th that the Austrians crossed the Ticino; and then, instead of concentrating his forces to deliver a crushing blow, their incompetent commander, General Giulay, spent three weeks in seemingly purposeless marches and counter-marches, while the French troops poured into Italy through Genoa and over the passes of the Alps. Napoleon himself was in supreme command of his army, and on May 20 the allies won in his presence the first victory of the war at Montebello, a name already glorious in the annals of the French army. The allied armies now advanced eastwards on Milan, while an irregular force under Garibaldi carried the war into the country round the northern lakes. On May 30 the victory of Palestro, won almost solely by Italian arms, added fresh fuel to the fire of patriotic feeling, which was further fed by the accounts of the exploits of Garibaldi and his volunteers. On June 4 was fought the battle of Magenta, a victory more glorious to the French soldiers than the French generals. The road to Milan lay open, and on the 7th the allied sovereigns made their entrance into the city amid the wild ovation of the inhabitants.

Napoleon
declares war
on Austria,
April 29.

Campaign
in Italy.

The effect of the capture of Milan was immediate. Napoleon, under the impression of the moment, had issued a proclamation declaring his intention of refraining from interference

with the legitimate aspirations of the Italians ; and these took him at his word. Tuscany had driven out her Grand-duke on the outbreak of war, and had declared for the king. Victor Emmanuel now declared Lombardy annexed to Piedmont ; the dukes of Modena and Parma fled with their Austrian garrisons ; and, on June 13, both states renewed the annexation decrees of 1848. The Austrians had evacuated Bologna on the 11th ; and, within a week, the revolution spread through Romagna, the Marches, and Umbria. In the two latter provinces it was, indeed, suppressed by the Pope's mercenaries ; but Romagna was able to proclaim Victor Emmanuel dictator, pending the final settlement.

Giulay, meanwhile, had retreated on the Quadrilateral ; and by June 18 the whole Austrian army was behind the Mincio. Giulay, whose incompetence had been more than proved, was now removed from the command, which was assumed by the Emperor Francis Joseph in person, with General Hess as chief of the staff. On June 23 the Austrians again advanced over the Mincio, in the hope of defeating the allies before their reinforcements arrived. The attempt was all but successful ; but the hard-fought battle of Solferino (June 24) ended once more in the victory of the allies. Nothing now seemed to prevent these from driving the Austrians before them, purging Venetia as well as Lombardy of their presence, and even perhaps from dictating a peace at Vienna itself. But the problem of Italian liberation was to have no such easy solution. A dozen complex motives combined to make Napoleon anxious for the termination of the war. His kindly and unmilitary nature revolted from the carnage of battle ; his timidity had not been turned into confidence by victories which had barely missed being defeats. It seemed to him, too, that he had done enough for the Italians, whose independent spirit offended him. With each advance of the allied arms his vision of an Italian Federation under the patronage of France faded, and the dream of united Italy assumed new shape and substance ;

and he had not made war in order to create upon the flank of his Empire a vigorous and united military Power which might, in after days, resent her debt to France. Then, too, the victories of France threatened to involve her in other and more perilous complications. In Germany public opinion was being deeply stirred by the misfortunes of a German Power ; and even Prussia was growing alarmed lest Napoleon, after vanquishing Austria, should advance upon the Rhine. It was, in fact, the changed attitude of Prussia that determined Napoleon to make peace. Prussia had, indeed, no reason to resent the weakening of Austria, though she had cause to fear the strengthening of France. Under those circumstances she pursued the policy which Bismarck had advocated during the Crimean war ; she mobilised part of her army, and then offered her mediation to Austria, on condition that the latter would allow her to assume the control of the Federal Diet, and would satisfy the public opinion of Europe by abrogating the treaties which gave her the right of military interference in the affairs of the Italian duchies. The Austrians refused the offer ; but, on June 24, Prussia called out the four Federal army corps, and proceeded to invite Russia and England to join her in a peaceful mediation. To this Russia, fearful of the consequences of the triumph of the Revolution in Italy, agreed ; and the Cabinet of Berlin continued its efforts to secure peace. This policy gained its end. Prussia, indeed, after Solferino had again informed Austria that she could expect no aid from Germany ; but the mobilisation of Prussian troops on the Rhine none the less alarmed Napoleon and made him anxious for peace. His first move was to sound England as to the possibility of securing her good offices. But, in June, the Derby Ministry had given place to that of Palmerston, who with his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Russell, desired to see Italy erected into a strong kingdom, capable of holding both Austria and France in check ; and Palmerston refused to exercise a mediation which he knew would prove

abortive.¹ In the end, Napoleon decided to approach the Emperor Francis Joseph direct, and on July 6 delivered to him a message proposing an armistice. Two days later this was signed, and on the 9th the two emperors had a personal interview at Villafranca. Armistice of Villafranca, July 9.

Napoleon had made preparations to overawe the Austrians by a show of irresistible force; but the firm will of Francis Joseph had little difficulty in asserting its superiority over the impressionable nature of Napoleon. The Austrian Emperor was willing to surrender Lombardy to Napoleon, on the understanding that it was to be handed over to Piedmont; he was willing to connive at the annexation of Parma also; but Tuscany and Modena were to be restored to their dukes; Romagna was to be left to the Pope; and, above all, Venice, with the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, was to remain an integral part of the Austrian dominions. Finally, both emperors pledged themselves to promote a scheme of Italian federation under the presidency of the Pope.

The news of the armistice of Villafranca was a crushing blow to the Italians. Insult, moreover, had been added to injury, for Victor Emmanuel had not been consulted, and had only been presented with the accomplished fact.² At first the king had talked of carrying on the fight alone; but his strong patriotic common sense prevailed over his personal feelings, and he saw the necessity of accepting the 'infamous treaty.' It was otherwise with Cavour. Worn out with the vast burden of work and responsibility he had borne so long, his mind gave way under the strain of this bitter disappointment, and for once he lost his self-control and clear grasp of affairs. He hurried to the camp; and when the king refused to listen to his desperate counsels, upbraided him in a torrent of hot and insolent invective.

When the Italians awoke from the first stupefying effect of the blow that had fallen on them, it was to realise that their situation was more full of hope than could have

¹ Ashley, *Palmerston*, ii. 158.

² Della Rocca, *Autobiography*, i. 461.

been expected. Cavour, indeed, on whose diplomacy they had largely built their hopes, retired, heartbroken for the moment, into private life; and his resignation symbolised the abandonment of his policy of working out the salvation of Italy by foreign alliances. Yet that policy had been far from a failure. If nothing else had been gained by the war but the flag of united Italy, the war would not have been in vain. But, as a matter of fact, far more than this had been won. By the union of Lombardy and Parma with Piedmont the nucleus of the Italian kingdom had received the recognition of Europe; the strongest links had been broken of the fetters forged for Italy at Vienna; and no international principle now stood between the Italians and the realisation of their hopes. This was soon made clear by the attitude of the Powers. By the terms of the agreement of Villafranca, the dispossessed dukes were to be restored in Tuscany and Modena, and the authority of the Pope in the Romagna; but no measures had been agreed on for the enforcement of this arrangement should the Italians refuse to accept it. As a matter of fact it was soon realised that it would remain a dead letter. The only Power really interested in restoring the exiled princes was Austria; and Austria was in no case to risk a renewal of the war. Napoleon, however much he might dread the rise of a strong Italian state, was not likely to take up arms against his late allies in a cause which would be of immediate benefit to Austria alone; the most he would do would be to demand a price for conniving at a breach of the treaty he had so recently signed. Finally, England, the only other Power whose intervention could weigh one way or the other, was now, under the guidance of Palmerston, in active sympathy with Italian aspirations, and openly hostile to a settlement which, by leaving Austria mistress of Venice, had in fact settled nothing.¹ With the gradual realisation of these facts, the Italians took

¹ See Russell to Cowley, July 25, 1859, *Parl. Papers*, 1860, lxviii. 30; Fane to Russell, *ib.* 50; Russell to Crampton, *ib.* 66; to Fane, *ib.* 83.

heart of grace ; and the cry went up from a united people, ' Italy will do her own work ! '

The dream of Napoleon III. had been a kingdom of central Italy, the crown of which was to be worn by his cousin Prince Napoleon, the son-in-law of Victor Emmanuel. But the development of popular feeling during the war had soon proved to him that this was impossible. On the flight of the princes at the outset of the war, Piedmontese commissioners had been sent to Florence, to Modena, and into the Romagna. An almost unanimous movement had immediately begun for union, not so much with Piedmont as with the Italian kingdom, of which Piedmont was regarded as the nucleus. This was strengthened rather than weakened by the catastrophe of Villafranca. The most determined defenders of local liberties realised then that a more or less loose federation would be powerless against Austria established at Venice, the Papal army threatening at La Cattolica, and the duke of Modena waiting with his troops for an opportunity to cross the Po and assert his rights. The Italian kingdom alone would avail to establish Italian liberty. Immediately after Villafranca the Government of Turin had telegraphed orders to the commissioners at Florence, Parma, Modena, and Bologna to resign and return. Officially this course was imperative ; but, privately, measures could be taken to nullify it. Both Cavour and Victor Emmanuel made it sufficiently clear that a too literal obedience would not be construed as zeal, and their hints were readily taken. Boncompagni, the commissioner in Florence, indeed, resigned, but he left the Tuscan statesman Ricasoli in his place to work for his ideal of Italian unity. D'Azeglio at Bologna refused to obey the order of recall ; and, at Modena, Farini resigned his commissionership only to be elected next day, on July 28, dictator of Modena. A few days later Parma too elected him to the same office. The next move was to back their defiance by a respectable display of armed strength,

Unionist
movement
of the central
states.

and, at d'Azeglio's suggestion, a military league was formed between the four states of Tuscany, Modena, Romagna, and Parma. General Fanti, with Garibaldi as his second in command, was sent by the Turin Government to organise the forces of the League.

The armed organisation of the central states sufficed to secure them from interference from without. The question of the right of Austria to intervene had purposely been left vague at Villafranca; and Napoleon, who still had 50,000 troops established in Lombardy, used the attitude of the duchies as an excuse for placing his veto on Austrian interference. His own intentions, meanwhile, were hopelessly confused. Swayed by a dozen conflicting influences, he could for the present decide on no policy save the maintenance of the present condition of unstable equilibrium by forbidding the annexation of the central states to Piedmont. The Turin ministry, in the absence of Cavour timidly bowed to the will of the French Emperor; and, for the present, nothing was left for the leaders of the central states but to attempt to weld them together by a political as well as a military fusion, and by assimilating their institutions as far as possible to those of Piedmont, to pave the way for their ultimate absorption in united Italy.

The development of affairs was, however, rapidly forcing on Napoleon the conviction that the question must be settled one way or the other. It was increasingly clear that force alone would prevent the central states from consummating their union with Piedmont; the risk of alienating the clerical party by allowing a partition of the Papal territories seemed less than that of Italy continuing for years a hotbed of revolutionary passions, or, what seemed the only alternative, Austria regaining her ascendancy in the peninsula. On November 11 the definitive peace had been signed at Zürich, and the Emperor's hand was more free as regards Austria. Once again, then, he determined to have recourse to that Napoleonic principle which had helped him in political difficulties before.

If a plebiscite of the central states decided on annexation, he was prepared to give his consent; but if, by this means, Italy were to come into existence as a considerable Power, France was to receive compensation by the cession to her of Savoy and Nice, the price she had failed to earn when she broke her promises to Italy at Villafranca. This new idea called for a reversal of the policy he had so far pursued. For some time he had been pressing for the assembling of a Congress by which the whole Italian Question could be settled; and, by the middle of December, the formal invitations sent out in the name of the French Emperor had been accepted more or less reluctantly by all the Powers. But no Congress would ever consent to the expansion of the frontiers of France, and the Catholic Powers would certainly oppose the curtailment of the Papal states. At the last moment, then, Napoleon's mind misgave him, and he determined deliberately to wreck the scheme he had himself proposed. Under the disguise of a pamphlet he issued a manifesto of his views on the Roman Question which was sure to make an agreement impossible. 'The Pope and the Congress' was, ostensibly, intended to advocate the placing of the temporal power under the guarantee of Europe; but at the same time it proclaimed the impossibility either for France or Austria of reversing the *de facto* severance of Romagna, and proposed in effect to confine the guarantee to Rome and the surrounding district. This pronouncement was followed on January 4, 1860, by the dismissal of Walewski, who, as Foreign Minister, had done his best to restrain the Emperor, and the appointment in his place of the Liberal Thouvenel. The ruse succeeded perfectly. Austria, the intentions of the French Emperor being clear, refused to take part in the Congress; and the whole plan broke up.¹

Meanwhile, from his retirement at Leri, Cavour had been watching the political developments in Italy and in Europe. Italian public opinion wearied fast of the weak and short-

¹ Cowley to Russell, *Parl. Papers*, 1860, lxviii. 284

sighted policy of the Rattazzi ministry, with its feeble truckling to Napoleon and its harsh efforts to recast Lombardy in the mould of Piedmont, and was clamouring for the return of Cavour. Cavour himself clearly saw that Italy was in a critical condition, and could be saved only by strong men and strong measures. On December 23, the king and ministry had so far yielded to public opinion as to appoint Cavour representative of Piedmont at the coming Congress. The Congress never met; but, before a month was out, on January 16, 1860, the Rattazzi Cabinet had fallen, and Cavour was once more in office. He returned prepared to profit to the uttermost by the favourable conjunction of the political stars; by the high courage of the Italian people and the changed attitude of Napoleon. His immediate aim was to make an end of an intolerable situation by carrying through the union of central Italy with the crown of Piedmont; and for this purpose he saw that it was necessary to brave public opinion in Italy and the anger of the Powers by surrendering Savoy and Nice. As for Napoleon, if a fresh plebiscite of the central provinces declared for annexation, he could hardly refuse to accept the same popular mandate on which his own authority was based; while England and other obstructive Powers could be hoodwinked until the deal had been completed. If the worst came to the worst, Italy could stake all again on the fortunes of a war, single-handed, with Austria.

Napoleon, between his oft-proclaimed principles and his diplomatic obligations, was on the horns of a dilemma. On the whole, it seemed expedient to throw over the latter, and he consented to abide by the result of the plebiscite on condition that Piedmont should first bind herself by treaty to cede Savoy and Nice. The result of the plebiscite, held on March 11 and 12, was an overwhelming vote in favour of annexation. On March 24 Cavour signed a public treaty surrendering

Cavour
returns
to office,
Jan. 16, 1860.

Treaty of
March 24,
1860. Cession
of Savoy and
Nice.

to France both Savoy and Nice. To save appearances, those, too, were to decide their destiny by a plebiscite. A week later 'Emilia,' *i.e.* Romagna, Bologna, and Modena, and Tuscany were formally proclaimed parts of the Italian kingdom; and on April 2 the first Italian Parliament met at Turin. A fortnight later the price was paid. The plebiscite on the question of the cession to France was held in Savoy and Nice on April 15-22, and resulted in an almost unanimous vote in favour of the change. The voting had been notoriously engineered by the Government, and, in Nice at least, popular opinion was strongly against union with France; but, in spite of embittered protests in the Italian Chambers, which at one moment threatened to overwhelm Cavour and his work, the sacrifice was recognised as a necessary one. At any rate, from henceforth France, having exacted her pound of flesh, had no claim on the gratitude of Italy.

The annexation of the central states was, in spite of the suspicions of Mazzini and the hotter headed patriots, far from satisfying Cavour's ambition: was, in fact, but a stepping-stone towards the ultimate union of all Italy under a single crown. Cavour, though realising the danger, had learned also to recognise the value, of revolutionary zeal; and, in the actual state of Italian affairs and of European relations, this seemed likely to prove a more effective weapon than the diplomatic combinations on which he had hitherto mainly relied. 'They have stopped me from making Italy by diplomacy from the North,' he had said after Villafranca; 'I will make it with the revolution from the South.' The settlement of the southern states and, above all, of the Roman Question, seemed, indeed, for the moment the supreme need of Italy. Venice, it is true, crushed and despairing under the iron heel of Austria, held out appealing hands to her brethren over the border; but her wrongs created no serious menace to the new Italian kingdom, and she could afford to wait for their redress. It was otherwise with Rome. Under the baneful

Cavour in
alliance with
'the Revolution.'

rule of Antonelli the condition of the Papal states had gone from bad to worse, and it had become clear that the reforming promises of a Pope were but words and wind. Yet the Papal Government, weak in itself, was strong in its international position and its religious prestige. The miseries of clerical misrule and, but a year before, the atrocities accompanying the sack of revolted Perugia, had indeed opened the eyes of Catholic Italy to the true nature of theocratic government; but Catholic Europe, outside Italy, saw only the Holy Father sore pressed by the forces of an impious Liberalism; and thousands of enthusiastic volunteers, from Ireland, from Belgium, or from France, flocked to defend the throne of St. Peter. Rome itself, ever since, in July 1849, Pius had been restored by the troops of the Prince-President, had been occupied by a French garrison. A considerable armed force was thus free, not only to prevent any further curtailment of the Papal territories, but even to assume the offensive with a view to the recovery of what had been lost. And behind the Papal armies, as a second line of defence, possibly as an ally in an active policy of aggression, stood the unbroken power of the Bourbon monarchy of the South, with its traditional friendship for Austria, its traditional subservience to Rome, and its new-born jealousy of the rising power of the House of Savoy. The security of what had already been gained, the hope of gaining what was yet to be won, pointed to the necessity for overthrowing the Neapolitan power, and thus at least neutralising, if not at once destroying, the capacity for military mischief possessed by Papal Rome.

Since May 22, 1859, the throne of Naples had been occupied by Francis II., a well-meaning prince, but weak, and brought up in entire ignorance of affairs. The few reforms which, under the guidance of his minister Falangieri, he was able to affect, only threw into blacker relief the evils that remained; and when, early in 1860, the military and clerical opposition forced Falangieri to resign, all hope of amelioration by constitutional

Unionist
movement
in Naples.

means seemed to be lost. On Liberal opinion, thus excited only to be plunged back into despair, the stirring events in the north necessarily had a great influence; and in Sicily and Naples, too, a movement began in the direction of Italian unity. Since the betrayal of Villafranca the Napoleonic tradition, represented by the Muratist party, had all but ceased to influence opinion; and it was being universally realised that, for Naples and Sicily, liberty was only to be found by merging their existence in a larger unity.

The seething discontent found its earliest expression, as usual, in Sicily. The destruction of the old Sicilian Constitution by the Bourbons had not welded the country closer to the crown; but, in the end, had only removed what might have proved the greatest bar to the inclusion of Sicily in united Italy. Branches of the National Society had been established; and, after Villafranca, a slight revolutionary outbreak at Palermo revealed the fires beneath the surface. A more serious insurrection, organised by Mazzini's lieutenant Crispi, was in preparation for the spring of 1860; and Garibaldi was urged to place himself at its head. After much hesitation, due to the intractable and uncompromising temper of the democrats who were organising the revolt, and which he feared would ruin its chances of throwing royalist Piedmont into opposition, he consented, on the sole condition that the Sicilians should rise spontaneously in the name of Victor Emmanuel. On April 4 the insurrection, headed by the Mazzinian Rosalino Pilo, broke out near Messina; but, after a momentary gleam of success, it was crushed, with barbarous cruelty, by Francis' Swiss and German mercenaries. Garibaldi, however, had received news only of the hopeful beginnings of the rising when, on April 7, he renewed his promise to intervene. Without the aid of the Piedmontese Government, indeed, he recognised that final success was impossible, and he applied both to the king and Cavour for authorisation and help. It was necessary for Cavour to play once more

Insurrection
in Sicily,
April 1860.

a diplomatic game. To have openly vetoed the expedition would have been to strike a serious blow at the popularity of the Italian crown, and even, perhaps, in the event of the victory of the revolutionists, to risk the loss to Italy of the southern states. Besides, Naples was threatening to join the Pope in wresting Romagna from the new kingdom, and a flank attack on the Bourbon monarchy would just now be highly convenient. On the other hand, to authorise an irregular raid on a friendly Power in time of peace would be to condemn Piedmont utterly in the eyes of Europe and, perhaps, to bring down upon her the chastisement of the Powers. Once more, then, it was necessary to assume a double rôle. Outwardly, Cavour's attitude was wholly 'correct'; secretly, he encouraged Garibaldi to persevere, allowed him to obtain arms from the arsenal of the National Society at Milan, directed the authorities at Genoa to connive at his embarkation, and ordered Persano, the Piedmontese admiral, 'to keep between Garibaldi's ships and the Neapolitan fleet.'¹

Garibaldi with his 'Thousand' sailed from Genoa on May 5, and, landing at Marsala on the 11th, pressed on straight for Palermo. The campaign that followed is one of the most extraordinary feats of arms in history.

Garibaldi in Sicily, May 1860. Sicily was garrisoned by 24,000 disciplined Neapolitan troops. Garibaldi landed with but a thousand red-shirted volunteers. Yet, within a month, the island had been won and the revolution had triumphed. The storming of the heights of Calatafimi on May 15 opened the road to Palermo; a series of brilliant and audacious strategic movements followed; and, on May 29, the red-shirts stormed a gate of the city. The cowardice and incompetence of the Neapolitan general did the rest. After some days of furious and destructive hand-to-hand fighting in the streets, the mediation of the English admiral was invoked, and a Convention was concluded by which, on June 20, the Neapolitan garrison, some 20,000 strong, was withdrawn and

¹ N. Bianchi, *Cavour*, 94.

carried over to the mainland. Except Messina and Syracuse, and the forts of Milazzo and Agosta, all Sicily was now at the feet of Garibaldi.

The extraordinary success of the 'Expedition of the Thousand' forced the hand of Cavour and the Piedmontese Government. Garibaldi had fought in the name of Victor Emmanuel; he had proclaimed himself dictator on landing in Sicily; and, now that the island was won, there was no one, seemingly, to dispute his power or to prevent him from disposing of his conquest in the way he had originally intended. But Garibaldi, a genius in war, was a child in politics; and the task of creating order out of the chaos resulting from the revolution fell into the hands of his deputy Crispi and the extreme democrats of Mazzini's school. If southern Italy was to be saved for the monarchy, it was plain that Piedmont must take the movement in hand before it was too late. The diplomatic situation was not unfavourable. Russia, indeed, blustered from afar, but England was enthusiastically friendly; the French Emperor replied, to the urgent appeals of the Neapolitan Government, that the 'national idea' must triumph, and that he would suffer Italy to work out her own destiny; and as long as Napoleon was sympathetic, Italy had little to fear from Austria. The time had not come, indeed, for Cavour to unmask his batteries; the magnitude of his plans would have shaken Napoleon out of his dreams; but he did all that he could, short of an open declaration in favour of Garibaldi, to aid, and at the same time to control, his enterprise.

That Garibaldi, his work in Sicily done, would turn his attention to Naples was certain; and beyond the borders of Naples lay Umbria and the Marches, and, as Cavour and Garibaldi. the goal of all, the Eternal City. It was important that whatever success he might achieve should be won for the Italian kingdom; all-important that the intervention of the Powers should not be made inevitable by any ill-timed attack on Rome. The first thing was to

secure the annexation of Sicily. 'If once the Italian flag flies at Taranto,' wrote Cavour to Ricasoli, 'it means the end of the Temporal Power and the liberation of Venice.' The Sicilians themselves were overwhelmingly in favour of union, and Cavour sent La Farina to Palermo to intrigue and negotiate in this sense. But though he secured the dismissal of Crispi, Garibaldi refused to consider the question of annexation. It would be time to consider that when the flag of Italy floated over Rome. As yet he was too distrustful of Cavour and his methods, and fearful lest the Powers should interpose between him and Naples if his plans were prematurely revealed. Cavour, foiled for the moment, pitted his Machiavellian statecraft against Garibaldi's impetuosity. Since the dictator was stubborn, a public opinion must be created in favour of Piedmont, both in Sicily and Naples, strong enough to force his hand. Before Garibaldi crossed the straits, Cavour's agents were at work in Naples spreading disaffection and stirring up a sentiment in favour of a united Italy. The Piedmontese admiral, Persano, was even instructed to attempt to win over the Neapolitan fleet. Towards a friendly Government this policy was worse than unfriendly, but it worked.

By the end of July the last of the Neapolitan garrisons in Sicily had been expelled or neutralised, and Garibaldi was free to prepare for the invasion of Calabria and the attack on Naples. King Francis II. now fully realised the imminence of the peril that threatened him, and made despairing appeals to the Powers, and even to Piedmont, for help. Of the Powers none seemed able or willing to intervene. Lord John Russell, on behalf of England, even addressed a circular letter to the ambassadors formally insisting on the doctrine of non-intervention and the right of the Italians to settle their own affairs. As for Piedmont, it was easy for her to decline to help a state which, only a year before, had refused to share in the life and death struggle with Austria. The Bourbons of Naples were left to face their fate alone.

Garibaldi passed the straits of Messina in August, occupied Reggio on the 21st, and marched thence direct on Naples, without meeting with any serious opposition. On September 6, the king left Naples with his troops and took up a position on the Volturno, covered by the fortress of Gaeta. Next day Garibaldi made his entrance into the capital. He now issued a proclamation assuming the dictatorship of the kingdom, and in this capacity handed over the Neapolitan fleet to the Piedmontese admiral Persano. His rapid success, meanwhile, was inspiring both the French Emperor and the Piedmontese Government with serious misgivings. Napoleon advised King Francis to make large concessions in order to buy Garibaldi off, or at least to put him hopelessly in the wrong. Victor Emmanuel and Cavour urged the dictator not to spoil all by aiming at too much. But compromise was a word not understood by Garibaldi, and he scornfully swept all diplomatic obstacles from his path. He poured contempt on this 'hypocritical but terrible pretext of necessity; the necessity of being cowards; the necessity of grovelling in the mud before an image of transitory power,' of which the onrush of a people, 'determined at any cost to acquire a real existence,' would scatter the fragments 'in the dust-heap whence they came.' With such a temper it was impossible to argue, and Cavour saw that the time had come for Piedmont to act. 'Italy,' he wrote to Admiral Persano, 'must be saved from foreigners, evil principles, and—madmen.'

Garibaldi
in Naples,
Sept. 1860.

The situation, indeed, was extremely critical. The unrest in Naples had spread into Umbria and the Marches; and the Papal troops, under General Lamoricière, were preparing to suppress it, after which they would doubtless go to the assistance of the king of Naples. Their victory would necessarily imperil the position of Piedmont in Romagna; their defeat would leave the road to Rome open to Garibaldi, who made no secret of his intention of following it. But an attack on Rome, still garrisoned by French troops, would mean a war

with France ; and if, as Garibaldi intended, this were followed by an invasion of Venetia, a second war with Austria would follow. Moreover, though Garibaldi still professed his loyalty to the monarchy, he was beginning to show that he valued the realisation of his own ideals more highly. He had already demanded the dismissal of Cavour, as the chief obstacle to the carrying out of his plans, and Mazzini was at his elbow urging him to violent courses, that Italy might shake herself free of the coil woven about her by diplomatists and kings.

Under these circumstances Cavour decided that Piedmont must anticipate the action of Garibaldi, occupy Umbria and the Marches, and so place Italy between the red-shirts and Rome. The activity of the Papal troops gave him the necessary excuse. On

Cavour in-
vades the
Papal States,
Sept. 1860.

September 7 he requested the Pope to dismiss his foreign levies, and on his refusal ordered the Italian army to cross the frontier of the Papal states. It was now an obstacle race between the Piedmontese and the Garibaldians. 'If we do not arrive at the Volturno before Garibaldi reaches La Cattolica,' said Cavour, 'the monarchy is lost, and Italy will remain in the prison-house of the Revolution.'¹ Luckily for his policy, the northward march of the red-shirts was delayed by a barrier against which even their impetuous valour broke in vain. The king of Naples with his army lay entrenched on the right bank of the Volturno, and under the guns of the strong fortress of Capua ; and when, on September 19, the Garibaldians came into touch with them, they found themselves opposed by force superior in numbers, in artillery, and in discipline. For nearly a fortnight, in fight after fight, they attempted in vain to make headway. At last, on October 1, the Neapolitans in their turn took the offensive, and for a time it seemed as though the king of Naples would succeed in forcing his way back to his capital. The day was saved by the brilliant generalship

¹ N. Bianchi, *Cavour*, 118.

of Garibaldi and the extraordinary valour of his volunteers ; but the victory of the Volturno, though glorious in Italian military annals, was not decisive. Capua and Gaeta still held out for the Bourbon cause ; and it had been made clear that the Garibaldians alone would have no chance of reducing them.

Meanwhile, the Italian troops, pouring in overwhelming force into the Papal states, met with little serious opposition from the scattered strength of the Papalists. One by one the strongholds fell ; and, on September 18, the remnant of Lamoricière's army was utterly dispersed at Castelfidardo. On the 9th Ancona, whither the Papal commander had fled, also capitulated. Within three weeks the campaign was at an end, and all the Papal states, with the exception of the small portion immediately round Rome—known as the Patrimony of St. Peter—were in the hands of the Italian Government. Cavour was now master of the game. Immediately after the successful issue of the campaign in the Papal states, the Italian Parliament was summoned, and the question of the destiny of the southern states was laid before it. On October 4 the Chamber, by an almost unanimous vote, gave power to the ministry to annex any of the central or southern states which should declare by plebiscite for annexation. Plebiscites were at once held in Sicily and Naples, and showed an overwhelming majority for union. As a result of this, Cavour's political position was immensely strengthened, and at the same time the military situation was entirely in favour of his policy. Capua and Gaeta still held out ; and, without the aid of the Italian troops, Garibaldi was helpless against them. Under these circumstances it was decided that the Italian army should be pushed on as rapidly as possible, in order to assist and to restrain him. Victor Emmanuel, whose open and soldierly character appealed to Garibaldi as much as that of Cavour revolted him, was to take the command. On October 15 the king led his troops over the Neapolitan

border; on the 20th a strong force of Bourbonists was defeated at Macerone; and on the 27th the king of Naples withdrew his troops beyond the Garigliano. On the 26th Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi met at Teano, and the dictator, surrendering his own opinion and his personal ambitions to what he now saw was the good of Italy, laid down his authority at the feet of the king. The united forces now pressed the Bourbonists hard; Capua fell; and Francis withdrew with 20,000 men into Gaeta, of which the siege was begun on November 5. The tenacious courage with which the last Bourbon king of Naples held this fortress for more than three months earned him the respect of Europe, but did not modify the course of events. On November 9 Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi entered Naples side by side in the same carriage; and the dictator, in laying down his office, called on the people, now happily reunited with their brethren, from whom for so many centuries they had been separated, to join in consummating the great work of Italian unity 'under the "re galantuomo," who is the symbol of our regeneration and of the prosperity of our country.'

Italian patriots had, indeed, every reason to be satisfied with the progress of their cause. Within two years of the apparently fatal surrender of Villafranca, the Italian kingdom had emerged as a new Power in Europe. Venice, it is true, still lay under the yoke of the Austrian; and as long as Rome held aloof, the kingdom seemed to lack its crown. But even the most cautious diplomatists believed, with Cavour, that their acquisition was only a question of time and opportunity. Garibaldi, whose impetuosity had already won so much, would have snatched at the prize at once. Cavour preferred to wait and make sure. Events proved the wisdom of his patient policy. Italy had not to wait long. But Cavour himself never saw the end which justified his life. On June 6, 1861, he died, worn out in the service of Italy. 'Italy as

a nation is the legacy, the life-work of Cavour. . . . Others have been devoted to the cause of national liberation; he knew how to bring it into the sphere of possibilities; he made it pure of any factious spirit; he led it away from barren utopias; kept it clear of reckless conspiracies; steered straight between revolution and reaction; and gave it an organised force, a flag, a government, and foreign allies.'

CHAPTER XVI

THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

Regency of Prince William—Relations of Prussia and Austria—Military Reform and Constitutional Crisis in Prussia—Bismarck Ministry—Austria and the Zollverein—Prussia and the Powers—Revolt in Poland—Effect on the relations of the Powers—The Assembly of Princes at Frankfort—The Schleswig-Holstein Question—The Conference of London, 1852—The Danish War of 1864—The Convention of Gastein.

THAT Italy had been allowed to work out her own salvation without interference from outside was mainly due to the pre-occupation of Austria with her own affairs and with the rapidly approaching crisis in her relations with Prussia. As long as Frederick William IV. continued to reign, there had been little serious prospect of any alteration of the *status quo* in the German Confederation. The king's mind was possessed by a horror of the Revolution; and to this feeling he subordinated the obvious interests of Prussia, preferring a hollow alliance with Austria and the German states, whose interests were in flat opposition to Prussia's legitimate ambitions, to any understanding with the western Liberal Powers, France and England, which alone would have given him a free hand for carrying out a clear and consistent, and, above all, a Prussian, policy.¹ In Bismarck's judgment, Prussia had for a hundred years, save during the evil times between 1806 and 1813, never taken so low a place in Europe as during the ten years that followed the Revolution of 1848. The unstatesmanlike temper of the king, indeed, together with his headstrong insistence on unconditional obedience to his

¹ Bismarck, Correspondence with von Gerlach. In *Memoirs*, i. 170, etc.

royal fancies, made it clear that, under him, even a strong minister would be unable to carry through a strong policy, and Bismarck, for one, had once and again refused to exchange his diplomatic activity at Frankfort for a ministerial portfolio.¹ But in 1858 Frederick William's unbalanced mind gave way utterly, never to be restored; and William, the Prince of Prussia, assumed the regency.

All parties realised that the accession to power of the new regent meant a change of system. William had none of the imaginative brilliance of his brother, which had led him so often to sacrifice realities to abstractions. His temper was pre-eminently practical, and the reputation he brought with him to the throne was that of a brave, piously orthodox, honest Prussian soldier. The nickname of 'Cartridge-Prince,' given to him during the troubles of '48, was doubtless undeserved; but his attitude towards Liberalism was, none the less, sufficiently notorious; and, if he could have had his way, the first act of his reign would have been to modify the Constitution in a reactionary sense. Luckily, Bismarck was already at his elbow with his half-cynical counsels of expediency. Prussian interests, he urged, had been too often already sacrificed to an abstract idea. To threaten the Constitution would be to stir up antagonism throughout Liberal Germany and produce universal unrest; and all this for no sufficient cause, since the question might be dealt with later should urgent necessity arise.² William's capacity for choosing his advisers, and taking their advice, was not the least of his kingly qualities. He listened, and was convinced.

William,
Prince of
Prussia,
Regent.

The 'urgent necessity' was not slow in growing out of the changed tendencies of Prussian policy. The regent not only left the Constitution intact, but dismissed Manteuffel's 'feudal' ministry, and summoned the moderate Liberals to

¹ Bismarck, *Memoirs*, i. 306. He said of Frederick William, 'His rich fantasy lacked wings as soon as it entered on the domain of resolve.'

² *Ibid.* i. 215.

office—a thing without precedent in Prussia. The change, however, was no proof of William's political conversion. The fall of Manteuffel, who had held the portfolio of foreign affairs, symbolised, as far as he was concerned, not the triumph of Liberalism, but the reversal of the policy associated with his name and with the humiliation of Olmütz. For the regent believed with his whole heart in the unity of Germany, and in the destiny of Prussia as its instrument. If he doubted, it was only as to the when and the how. And of one thing he was certain—that whoever aspired to rule over Germany must seize it for himself.¹ There was little enough in all this of the Liberal belief in the voice of the people. Such a revolutionary foundation might be a good enough forcing-bed for the mushroom-empires of France. The appeal of Prussia should be to the God of battles alone.

Austria had had unpleasant experience of this change of temper at Berlin before and during the war in Italy. In the affairs of Germany the intercourse of the two Great Powers was becoming unpleasantly strained. Austria was awake at last to the importance of Prussia's Zollverein, and clamoured for admittance—on her own terms. The irrepressible Elector of Hesse had been giving trouble again, and Berlin and Vienna took opposite sides. Lastly, the perennial question of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had again grown acute; and Prussia, in despite of Austria, had urged the Diet to make Frederick VII., duke of Holstein, the whipping-boy of Frederick VII., king of Denmark. Austria used high language; but Napoleon's calculated indiscretion of January 1, 1859, intervened, and her bullying tone died away in a quaver. At the outset of the Italian war, Prussia's position was at once strong and delicate. Austria was moving heaven and earth for allies; and in Germany, especially in the south,

¹ Prince William to von Natzmer, May 20, 1849.
Natzmer, *Unter den Hohenzollern*, iv. 64.

there was some disposition to go to her aid. But Prussia had no intention of sacrificing her own advantage to any sentimental sympathy for a 'German' Power in difficulties. She armed; but only as a measure of precaution, or in order, at the proper moment, to cast her sword into the scale wherein her own interests might for the time being lie. The armistice of Villafranca—a defeat for Austria, a humiliation for Napoleon, a disappointment for Italy—was a triumph for Prussia. At the menace of her armaments, Napoleon had stopped dead in his career of victory. Austria, whatever her own feelings, had in the eyes of Germany been placed under an obligation to her rival. Italy, for all her resentment, had learned that a new Power had arisen, whose interests, equally with her own in antagonism to Austria, might in the future bring her into alliance with herself.

Francis Joseph had preferred to lose a province at once to risking the spectacle of William marching to his aid at the head of the armies of Germany; and Prussia was well aware that it was Austria's terror of her rival's growing military prestige that had forced her so rapidly to terms.¹ The moral was not lost upon the regent. To reform, strengthen, and develop the Prussian army, as the first essential step toward the realisation of his ambitions for Prussia and for Germany, became more than ever his chief care. The Prussian military system had remained unaltered since its organisation by Scharnhorst in 1814. It was still based on the universal obligation to serve: three years with the colours, two years in the war reserve, and seven years each in the first and second levies of the militia (*Landwehr*). But since 1814 the population had nearly doubled; and, since the regiments were still calculated on the old basis, nearly 25,000 men every year escaped military service altogether. To remedy this, it was proposed to raise thirty-nine new infantry and ten new cavalry regiments; and at the same time to divide the first levy of the

Military reform in Prussia.

¹ See Regent William to King of Bavaria, Sybel, ii. 425.

Landwehr, distributing the men composing it, according to age, between the war reserve and the garrisons. For the purpose of superintending these reforms, General von Roon was called to the Ministry of War.

It was at this point that the Constitution became a rock of stumbling in the path of the monarchy. A Liberal ministry was in power, supported by a Liberal majority in the Chamber; and, apart from its instinctive distrust of militarism, Liberalism, in spite of the lessons of '48, still put its trust in votes and speech-making rather than in arms. Had Prussia, it was argued, used the military strength she already possessed to such good purpose in Germany that patriotic Germans should care to increase it? The chaos of the *Bund* was as formless as ever; and whose the fault? The attitude of Denmark was shameful proof enough that the unwieldy giant Germany was an easy butt for the insults of any agile dwarf among states. The pulses of German men were beating high with noble shame and lofty resolve, and a dozen schemes for the reform of the Confederation were under discussion. Was this the time for Prussia to menace the other German Powers by adding to her separate armaments? The regent, moreover, had taken too much upon himself, had forestalled the action of the Parliament and begun the military changes on the assumption that the Chambers would not boggle at the bill. The time had evidently come to prove that Germany too could produce Hampdens.

On January 12, 1860, the regent opened Parliament with a speech in which he explained and justified the new military policy. The necessary bills for carrying it through were introduced on February 10; but they met with so strenuous an opposition that they were withdrawn, and the Crown determined to take the reorganisation of the army into its own hands under the old law. Supplies were now granted for fourteen months; and the regent, interpreting this as some sort of assent to the

The Liberals
and army
reform.

Constitu-
tional crisis
in Prussia.

principle of army reform, declared himself justified in proceeding with his plans. On New Year's Day, 1861, the standards of the new regiments were solemnly consecrated. Next day Frederick William iv. died, and the new king stood face to face with a constitutional crisis.

The situation was now rapidly developing into a veritable comedy of errors. While Prussia, with the most far-sighted and 'German' of motives, was seemingly taking an attitude wholly Prussian and reactionary, Austria, for reasons of her own, had suddenly posed as the champion of Liberalism. One result of the Italian war had been to reveal the hopeless breakdown of Schwarzenberg's centralised system in the Austrian Empire. Once more the administration was in disorder, the state all but bankrupt, the Government paralysed. To shift the responsibility on to some sort of popular representation seemed the only way out of a hopeless imbroglio; and in March 1860 the Emperor had nominated a Central Council for the whole Empire, as a first instalment of constitutional concession. This became at once the arena of a battle between irreconcilable principles and tendencies. The 'German Liberals,' with their ideal of a united Empire based on provincial liberties, found themselves face to face with the Slavs and the Magyars, with their fierce and aggressive nationalism. The Emperor at first inclined to the latter; and on October 20, 1860, he restored her ancient Constitution to Hungary, at the same time granting local legislatures to the other states, and placing the whole under the Central Council. But the Magyars would be content with nothing short of the Constitution of 1848, and rose in revolt. Francis Joseph was thrown back on the support of the German party; Hungary was placed under martial law; and in May 1861 a Parliament for the whole Empire met at Vienna.

Austria as
the champion
of German
Liberalism.

The triumph of the German idea at Vienna made Austria very popular for the moment among the Liberals in Germany, and she made every effort to confirm this feeling and turn it

to her advantage. An opportunity, which she could not allow Prussia to exploit alone, of posing as the champion of Constitutionalism and German patriotism, was offered by the affairs of Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein. On May 30, 1860, the Elector of Hesse, after an interlude of arbitrary rule, had issued a new Constitution modelled on that of 1852; but the Estates had met only to present a united demand for the restoration of the more Liberal Constitution of 1831, and the whole question had ultimately been laid before the Diet of the Confederation. The Diet, true to its traditions, upheld the authority of the Elector. But Prussia had her own reasons for objecting to his attitude; and Austria, newly baptized into the constitutional fold, sought to prove the sincerity of her conversion by joining her in pressing the Diet to reconsider the case on its merits. This new-born zeal was a mere feint, as the sequel proved. It was no more or less real than the cordial understanding arrived at, about the same time, with the Court of Berlin in the matter of the Duchies. Its root lay solely in the anxiety not to give points to Prussia. But it was, none the less, successful; and German opinion once more compared the enlightened policy of Austria with the reactionary doings at Berlin, and drew conclusions entirely misguided.

The Prussian Parliament of 1862 proved no whit more amenable to reason than its predecessor—possibly because no reasons could be offered to it. The armaments were directed consciously against Austria, a fact it was difficult to admit. The Liberal majority, increased in numbers and in confidence by the last elections, talked at large, therefore, and little to the point. So far from showing any disposition to meet the views of the Government, they fell to attacking the professional army, quite in the old Liberal spirit, suggesting the reduction of the term of service by a year, and the extension rather than the curtailment of the *Landwehr*. On March 11

Continued
constitu-
tional crisis
in Prussia.

the king dissolved the Chambers in despair, only just in time to prevent a debate on the burning question of the reorganisation of the *Bund*. The Liberal ministry resigned immediately after, and a Conservative Cabinet took its place under Prince Hohenlohe. Public opinion was now violently excited against the Government; and the new elections resulted, on May 6, in the return of a House still more violently Liberal. On August 22 the Chamber decided by an overwhelming majority to strike out of the budget the estimates for the army reforms. The ministers now declared that, in face of the persistent opposition of the House, it would be impossible for them to continue to support the new army organisation. King William thereupon accepted their resignation, and, no whit shaken in his resolution, summoned Bismarck to his aid. Thus, at last, was brought on to the stage of European politics the character which was to hold it, more or less, for a quarter of a century.

King
William
calls
Bismarck
into office,
Sept. 1862.

Bismarck was a statesman of the school of Machiavelli, sharing to the full the great Florentine's contempt for those brain-spun fogs of fancy which are apt to obscure the path of practical politics. Yet there was in his character none of the Italian suppleness. Its main trait was, in fact, rather a brutal forthrightness, as though he could afford to be frank, his goal being so clear, and his power to reach it beyond dispute. And this impression he was able to produce, because he knew so well how to calculate the means to his ends, to gauge the obstacles in his path; above all, when to keep silence and when to speak. In choosing this man of iron will for his instrument at the present crisis, King William's instinct had not betrayed him. And, apart from Bismarck's character and his general sympathy with the king's ambitions for Prussia, his whole recent training had marked him out for the position he was now called on to fill. During the nine years he had spent at the Diet of Frankfort, as the

Bismarck
and his
policy.

delegate of Prussia, he had not only formed an intimate acquaintance with every court and every statesman of the German Confederation, but he had followed with keen eye all the tortuous doublings of Austrian intrigue since Schwarzenberg had once more brought Germany under the yoke of Vienna. He had long since realised that Austria was 'the enemy,' and that, until she should be thrust out of Germany, neither Prussia nor Germany could be strong. To make Prussia strong enough to exclude Austria from the Confederation became, therefore, the great aim of his policy.

Bismarck, with his usual candour, did not disguise his views, though he found it necessary to disguise the methods by which he hoped to enforce them. It had already been made sufficiently clear, in the matter of the Zollverein, that Prussia was no longer inclined to subordinate her own interests, or those of Germany, to any fiction of political union with Austria. It had been found impossible to admit

Austria to the Zollverein in 1841, on account of the difficulty of either including or excluding Italy and Hungary.¹ In 1853 a commercial treaty had been arranged between the Prussian Customs Union and Austria for seven years, at the end of which time the question was to be reopened. But time did not make the solution of an insoluble problem any simpler. In 1860 the Zollverein had been remodelled on the basis of free trade; the Austrian customs system was still rigorously protectionist. This change, made when, according to the understanding with Austria, her relations to the Zollverein were about to be reconsidered, was taken by Austria and by all the world as an indication that Prussia had no intention of altering her commercial system in order to meet the views of the Viennese Government. And this impression was strengthened by the fact that the alteration was made in order to facilitate the negotiation of a commercial treaty with France. In other words, cordial relations with a sister-state

Austria
and the
Zollverein,
1853-1862.

¹ Springer, i. 556.

of the Confederation were to be sacrificed to an alliance with a foreign Power. Austria vigorously protested, and her protest was echoed by a strong body of opinion within the Customs Union. Prussia, in the confident hope that, in the end, material interests would once more outweigh the sentimental or jealous objections of the lesser states, persevered; and, on March 29, 1862, her commercial treaty with France was signed. Her reply to the renewed protests of Austria was distinctly 'unfriendly' and significant. It took the form of the recognition of the new kingdom of Italy.

This episode, together with the despatch, in May, of a Prussian ultimatum to Cassel, whereby the Elector had been brought very promptly to reason in the matter of the Constitution, proved the vigour of the new *régime* at Berlin. It was not likely to grow less vigorous after the advent of Bismarck to power. True to his principle of not giving needless provocation, indeed, he began by an attempt to come to an understanding with the 'Old Liberals.' The attempt failed; but the budget, with its omission of the credits necessary for the military reforms, was thrown out by the House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*), and the Government policy approved by a large majority. The Lower Chamber challenged the action of the Upper House as unconstitutional, but it gave the Government some semblance of right; and, the session being promptly closed, Bismarck declared that, after the vote of the Lords, the Government must carry on the administration without the grant prescribed by the Constitution.

Bismarck had none of Metternich's shallow contempt for public opinion as a factor in politics. It was, indeed, a blind and easily gullible monster, but strong and serviceable, if properly bitted and bridled, and dangerous, if unduly irritated. Nothing, then, but 'urgent necessity' would have led him to flout the united sentiment of Liberal Germany. But he knew the tremendous issues involved in the policy on which Prussia

Bismarck
defies the
Liberal
majority in
the matter of
army reform.

was embarked—issues so great that, even now, he would have welcomed any understanding with Austria that could be proved to be more than a mere postponement of the conflict. ‘Our relations with Austria,’ he said to Count Karolyi, the Austrian delegate at the Diet, ‘must become better or worse,’ and added, ‘We sincerely desire the former of the two alternatives.’¹ But he saw, and said, that unless Austria were content to resign her influence at the German Courts, and to move ‘her centre of gravity towards Buda-Pesth,’ Prussia would inevitably be found in alliance with Austria’s enemies. And since Austria showed no disposition to follow this hint, the only alternative was for Prussia to arm. ‘The German problem,’ he said, on September 30, 1862, to the Committee on the budget, ‘cannot be solved by Parliamentary decrees, but only by blood and iron!’²

The policy of ‘blood and iron’ demanded not only the forcing through, at any risk, of the army reforms, but also such a delicate handling of the Powers that Prussia might count on the absence of unwelcome interference from without in the final settlement of Germany’s domestic concerns. In many ways the diplomatic outlook was disconcerting. Ever since the Congress of Paris Napoleon had been trying to draw closer the ties between France and Russia. An alliance between the two empires had, for half a century, been to the statesman of Europe, mindful of Tilsit and its consequences, a crowning peril to be guarded against at all hazards. To Prussia, at the present crisis, it would have been fatal. Not that either Napoleon or Alexander realised the goal of Prussia’s ambitions. But such an alliance, even should Prussia profit by it in overturning the power of Austria, would have prevented her reaping the fruits of her victory. Opportunely for Bismarck’s plans, the outbreak, at the beginning of 1863, of the great rising in Poland, ruined any chance of a cordial understanding

Prussia and
the Powers.
Danger of a
Franco-
Russian
entente.

¹ Sybel, ii. 522.

² Hahn, i. 66.

between France and Russia, and produced a division of forces on the Continent, in which Prussia and Russia stood on one side, Austria and France on the other.

The Poles had never acquiesced in the removal of the last vestiges of their independence by the Ukase of December 1845, and their discontent had been increased by the policy followed by the Russian Government in its endeavour to consolidate its rule. This was, briefly, to play off the subject peasant population against the dominant caste, and, by bettering their condition at the cost of the landowners, to bind the mass of the people to the Tsar. For the whilom governing classes a social war was thus added to political grievances. So long as Nicholas reigned, the iron hand of Russia lay too heavy upon them for them to dream of resistance; but with the accession of Alexander the worst rigour of the Government relaxed, and, as usual, hope did what despair seldom effects, and Polish nationalism began once more to stir. The amnesty proclaimed on the accession of the new Emperor had brought back to Poland crowds of refugees fresh from the noisy sympathy of the boulevards, and once more the hopes of Poland were built on the certainty of French help. The patriotic agitation found a centre in the 'Agricultural Society,' founded in 1857 with the Tsar's sanction, which, from a purely economic, rapidly developed into a powerful political organisation. The importance of weaning the peasantry from their allegiance to Russia was now realised; and the Society, in 1861, after a meeting in which the question of the liberation of Poland was discussed, petitioned the Tsar to complete the emancipation of the serfs. The Russian Government was disquieted by the growing signs of political agitation. The Ukase of February 19, 1861, by which the serfs in Russia were freed, was not extended to Poland; and a few weeks later the Agricultural Society was dissolved. At the same time, the Russian garrisons in Poland were greatly strengthened.

Insurrection
in Poland,
1863.

For over a year the situation in Poland remained outwardly unchanged; and, in May 1862, the Tsar sent his brother Constantine to Warsaw as viceroy, with the Marquis Wielopolski as chief of the civil administration, to inaugurate a policy of firmness tempered by concession. But the Poles were in no mood for compromise. Though divided themselves into 'Whites' and 'Reds,' partisans of a conservative nationalism and of Radical revolution, they were united in their refusal to accept anything less than the full satisfaction of their national ambitions. To a proclamation of the viceroy, calling on the more enlightened Poles to aid in the work of pacification, the reply was a petition, signed by a long list of representative nobles, praying for the restoration of the Constitution and of the severed provinces. For the Russian Government nothing remained but to resort once more to force.

In October 1862 the Tsar promulgated a new recruiting law, under which it was hoped to quell the disaffection by bringing all suspected persons under military discipline. The attempt, made in January 1863, to enforce the law only precipitated the crisis. The bulk of those liable to conscription had received timely warning and fled to the forests. In Warsaw the recruits actually seized turned on the soldiery. The scuffle developed into a riot, the riot into a general insurrection; and the Poles, unarmed and unorganised, were launched on their last struggle for an independent national existence.

The outlook for the Poles was far less hopeful in 1863 than it had been in 1831. Then it had been a trial of strength between one military nation and another; now it was but the desperate revolt of a subject population. Yet the European situation seemed not altogether unfavourable; and the insurgents hoped that, if they could hold the forces of the Tsar at bay for a while, the Powers might be induced to intervene. There was much to prove this hope reasonable. In France the Clericals were loud in sympathy for Catholics in revolt against

Europe and
the revolt of
Poland.

Orthodox persecution, the Liberals for a people struggling for freedom. In England popular sentiment in favour of the Poles found vent in a hundred meetings. Finally, Austria watched with ill-disguised satisfaction the growing embarrassments of her too powerful neighbour. The isolation of Russia, on the other hand, gave Bismarck the opportunity for which he had been waiting, of breaking the Franco-Russian *entente*, and substituting a close alliance between Russia and Prussia. The Poles had been little concerned, indeed, to avert this danger. The 'Reds' had laid claim to all West Prussia, to Posen, and Pomerania as far as the Oder, formerly portions of the Polish kingdom, and recruits were being collected by the insurgents in Prussian territory. In Bismarck's words, then, to suppress the insurrection became for Prussia too 'a matter of life and death'; so that, even if Russia were driven out of Poland, Prussia would be forced to march in.¹ 'In our view,' wrote King William to the Tsar, 'the position of the two Courts with regard to the Polish revolution is substantially that of two allies threatened by a common danger.' Under these circumstances, it was not difficult to agree on common action; and, on February 8, a Convention was signed by which Prussia concentrated three army corps on the western frontier, which frontier was at the same time declared to form no barrier to the military operations of either Power.

Prussia and
the Polish
revolt.

Russo-
Prussian
Alliance.

The Russo-Prussian Convention filled the other Powers with uneasiness. To Napoleon, of course, it was especially offensive, the more so, since he saw himself obliged to take action which would yet further widen the breach between himself and the Court of St. Petersburg. For him, in fact, the Polish rising was in the highest degree inopportune. He was busy with great schemes of French ambition in Mexico, schemes which were to end so disastrously for his own reputation and that of France.² He had, moreover, plenty to occupy him in

Napoleon
III. and
Poland.

¹ Sybel, ii. 574; Hahn, i. 102, etc.

² See p. 450.

Italy, where Garibaldi and his red-shirts—like hungry wolves prowling round a sheepfold—were threatening the sanctity of Rome. But, with the clamour of Clericals and Liberals alike in his ears, it was clear that he must do something for Poland. On February 17, accordingly, a despatch was forwarded by Drouyn de Lhuys to Berlin declaring that the Convention of February 8 had raised the Polish Question into one of European interest; and next day a formal note was sent to St. Petersburg to complain of the conduct of Russia in Poland as an infraction of the terms of the Treaty of Vienna. The sudden appearance of Napoleon as the champion of ‘the treaties’ was somewhat of a surprise to Europe, and perhaps it was a not unnatural distrust of his sincerity that led Austria to refuse to second his argument. ‘If England. it was proposed to restore to Poland the engagements taken by the Powers in 1815,’ argued Count Rechberg, with disconcerting logic, ‘why should not all the other stipulations of that time be insisted on?’¹ Yet it was distinctly to Austria’s interest to help widen the breach between France and Russia. It would put an end to the nightmare visions which had for some time troubled her rest—visions of Italy in Napoleon’s grasp, the Mediterranean a French lake, and the Ottoman Empire partitioned between Russia and France. Clearly it was the business of Austria at least to hold the sponge if France should be moved to do battle with Russia. To take a more active part on the one side or the other was not in her nature. For the intervention of England, apart from the perennial desire to tap the veins of Russia, the motives were less selfish. Public opinion was genuinely stirred on behalf of the Poles, and the ministry found it necessary to throw a sop to the importunity of the electorate. In their case also the Treaty of 1815 formed a convenient excuse for intervention.

All three Powers were thus agreed as to the expediency of intervention, but at this point their agreement stopped.

¹ Bloomfield to Russell, *Parl. Papers*, 1863, lxxv. 85.

Austria would do no more than call the attention of the Russian Government to the ill effects to herself of the anarchy in Poland; England was content to refer to the treaties; France, once involved, outbid both, and hinted that the peace of Europe could be secured by nothing short of the absolute independence of Poland. Under the circumstances, Austria objected to signing a joint note; and, June 17 and 18, the views of the three Powers were handed in separately to the Russian Government. The reply was decisive. Prince Gortschakoff, on behalf of Russia, refused to discuss a settlement until the insurgents should have laid down their arms, denied the right of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Vienna to intervene, refused to continue negotiations which could lead to nothing, and, in any case, to recognise the right of any Powers to interfere save those implicated in the partition.¹ This vigorous ultimatum, as had been expected, found the protesting Powers quite unprepared to back their opinions by force. Napoleon, every day more deeply involved in the Mexican imbroglio, declared his intention of laying the Polish Question before 'the tribunal of Europe,' adding, with what to the other Powers seemed sinister significance, that the treaties of 1815 had ceased to exist. This hint from Paris of a possible rearrangement of boundaries, not in Poland only, gave pause to England and Austria. England sympathised with Poland, but not to the extent of risking serious European complications on her behalf. Austria, wavering between her terror of nationalism and her fear of Russia, began to feel that the former, of which Napoleon had over and over again proclaimed himself the champion, was the more pressing peril. The short-lived alliance broke up. England and France watched from afar, with passive sympathy, the death-struggle of Poland; Austria began to make half-hearted advances to Russia; and the Poles were left

Russia
rejects the
intervention
of Austria,
France, and
England,
July 1, 1863.

¹ Gortschakoff to Brunnow, July 1, 1863, *Parl. Papers*, 1863, lxxv. 287. Cf. Correspondence, *ibid.*, 1864, lxvi. 575.

alone in the face of overwhelming odds. Under these conditions, the issue could in the long run not be doubtful. For more than a year, however, it was not finally decided. The first phase of the war was, indeed, soon over. At the very outset of the revolution General Langiewicz had been appointed dictator and commander-in-chief, and five days later the army under his command met the Russians at Grokowiska. For three days the battle raged; but, on March 19, the Poles were routed, and Langiewicz himself fled over the Austrian border. The direction of the struggle was now assumed by a secret committee of government seated at Warsaw; so secret, that its own subordinates did not know the names of those who composed it. Terror was its instrument, and no one was bold enough to disobey its commands. On April 1 the Russian Government, in order to disarm the resentment of Europe, issued a proclamation promising a general amnesty on certain conditions. Not a single Pole dared to submit. The ruthless temper of the secret Government impressed itself on the character of the war, which became one of frightful barbarity on both sides. It was a war less of pitched battles than of ambushes, of massacres, of raids and surprises. The fire, stamped out in one place, flamed up in another. But at last even the conflagration fed by such fierce passions died away, and by the end of March 1864 the last flame had flickered out.

The Polish revolt, though ending as far as Poland herself was concerned in a dismal return to the *status quo*, had a very notable effect on the relations of the European Powers. Napoleon III., who since the Crimean war had taken up so large a space on the stage of Europe, had cut but a sorry figure in this Polish interlude. He had mortally offended Russia by his ostentatious patronage of the Poles, only by abandoning them to wound the vanity and the genuine feeling of his own people. By his tergiversations and ambiguities he had forfeited the trust of England, hitherto

Effect of the
Polish
rising on the
relations of
the Powers.

the staunchest of his friends. On the eve of events which were destined to alter the whole face of Europe he found himself without allies. Austria had fared little, if any, better, and for much the same reason. At the outset of the affair she had one of two courses open to her, either of which might have strengthened her position in Europe indefinitely. She might have wiped out the memories of 1854 by co-operating with Russia in the suppression of the revolt, or she might frankly have joined the western Powers in restoring Poland. She preferred the 'safe middle course,' oblivious of the peril of 'half-measures,' and the result was that she pleased no one.¹ Austria, too, was without friends and without allies. Prussia alone had emerged from the crisis with increased prestige. For the second time within five years her intervention at a critical moment had been decisive; and if Austria felt under little obligation for Prussia's action in 1859, Russia was conscious of no such antagonism to Prussian aims as would debar her from feeling gratitude. The Tsar's suggestion of an offensive alliance, and an immediate combined attack on Austria and France, Prussia was too prudent to accept. But in the coming struggle with Austria she was assured at least of the neutrality of Russia; and this assurance was 'the first, and not the least important, step in Bismarck's advance against Austria.'² Meanwhile, the affairs of Germany, and notably the developments of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, were hurrying on the inevitable conflict.

It was the action of Austria, during the summer of 1863, that revealed to all the world the full extent of the gulf between the two great German Powers. On August 2 the Emperor Francis Joseph had pro-^{The Assembly of Princes at Frankfort, 1863.} posed to King William, during a meeting at Gastein, to summon a Congress of the German princes in order to lay before them a scheme for the reform of the Federal Constitution. William had replied by a polite

¹ Beust, i. 220.

² *Ibid.* i. 223.

evasion. But in spite of the Prussian king's obvious hesitation, the invitations were sent out to all the other German princes; and, on August 14, the Congress was opened at Frankfort. Of all the German sovereign states only four were unrepresented—Anhalt-Bernburg, Holstein, Lippe, and Prussia. It was felt at once that the absence of Prussia would stultify the whole proceeding; and an invitation to King William, signed by all the princes present, was taken to Berlin by the king of Saxony in person. But Bismarck saw in the Congress a blow aimed at Prussia, to which Austria had been emboldened by her cordial understanding with the western Powers; and he threatened that, if the king accepted the invitation, he would resign. The threat had its effect, not for the last time, and the Congress had to do the best it could without Prussia's co-operation.¹ The Austrian proposal was for the reconstitution of the Confederation under a supreme Directory, with an assembly of delegates from the various parliaments, a federal court of appeal, and an arrangement for periodical conferences of the sovereigns. On September 1 these proposals were passed with slight modifications. Everything, however, depended on the attitude towards them of Prussia; for if Prussia refused to share in the project, the whole scheme was bound to collapse. It was only by playing off the two great Powers against each other that the lesser princes could hope to retain their independent authority within the Confederation; and they objected as strongly to the exclusion of Prussia from the *Bund* as to that of Austria.² On September 22 the answer of Prussia was received. 'In any reform of the Confederation,' it ran, 'Prussia, equally with Austria, must have the right of vetoing war; she must be admitted, in the matter of the presidency, to absolute equality with Austria; and, finally, she would yield no tittle of her rights save to a Parliament representing the whole German nation.' The last clause, a bid for the alliance of the democracy, and a declaration of war against

¹ Bismarck, i. 370; Hahn, i. 142, etc.

² *Ibid.* i. 372.

the dynasties, was surprising enough from the Prussian Strafford. It was to be repeated, with greater emphasis, on a later occasion. For the present, the overwhelming fact was, that Prussia had refused to consider a proposal seconded by the all but unanimous voice of the German sovereigns, and that her refusal was tantamount to an absolute veto. Austria's blow had failed. Nay more, it even recoiled upon herself. For Napoleon had watched with undisguised misgiving this attempt to create at Frankfort an 'empire of 70,000,000.' In Prussia's action, on the other hand, he read no more than her determination, for selfish reasons of her own, to maintain the divisions and weakness of Germany; and this misconception influenced his attitude towards her throughout the complications of the next two years.

The reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, which had once more reached an acute stage, found Prussia, then, in a position of great strength; and Bismarck was determined to take advantage of the situation to settle, not only the affair of the Duchies, but the whole German Question in accordance with Prussian views. The collapse of Prussia's intervention in 1849 had resulted in a dead-lock. The Holsteiners, supported by German public opinion, still defied Denmark. The 'Eider-Danes' still refused to abate an iota of their extreme claims. After the Convention of Olmütz, Austria undertook to 'restore order' in Holstein in the name of the *Bund*; but Austria was as little disposed as any other German Power to surrender the rights of Germany in the Duchies to Denmark. The Powers, too, were being gradually alienated by the violence of the Copenhagen Radicals, and by their refusal to take any steps towards a settlement until the Federal troops should have evacuated the Duchy.¹ In the end, the whole question was laid before a Conference of the Powers, which met in London, in March 1852. Denmark had already yielded so

The Schles-
wig-Holstein
Question.

¹ For the views of Austria, Prussia, and Denmark, see *Parl. Papers*, 1864, lxiii. 3, etc.

far to the pressure of the Powers as to concede a modified form of Home Rule to the Duchies under the Danish crown. The burning question of the succession, too, seemed to have been settled by the renunciation, on March 31, 1852, of his rights by the duke of Augustenburg. On May 8, then, a Treaty was signed by the Conference at London, which affirmed the European necessity for maintaining the integrity of Denmark, and therefore for the recognition of the right of the female heirs of Christian to the succession. At the same time, the rights of the German Confederation in Holstein and Lauenburg were to remain unaffected.¹

This settlement had the usual weakness of compromises, that it, in fact, settled nothing. The German Diet had been unrepresented at London; the terms of the Protocol, therefore, if 'a necessity for Europe, were a humiliation for Germany.' Nor was Denmark much better satisfied, except in so far as the wording of the Protocol gave openings for further aggression, of which the weakness of Germany would enable her to take advantage. This she was not slow to do. On July 31, 1854, a new Constitution was issued for the whole kingdom, and imposed on the Duchies without their consent. But even this was considered by the Danish nationalists too favourable to the Germans; and, on October 2, 1855, another Constitution was published, by which in all matters of national concern the Estates of the Duchies were completely subordinated to the Danish majority at Copenhagen; while the revenues of the domains in Schleswig and Holstein, hitherto reserved for local uses, were swept into the common treasury of the realm. The Holsteiners now appealed to the German Diet which, in February 1858, decided that the Constitution of 1855 could not be considered effective in Holstein or Lauenburg. At the same time, it demanded a statement by the king of Denmark of his intentions under the compact of 1852 and,

¹ Hertslet, ii. 1151.

on the motion of Bismarck, threatened Federal intervention. Frederick VII. now modified his attitude as far as Holstein was concerned; and the Diet, having subjects of anxiety enough to occupy it nearer home, determined to abstain from further action until the Danish Parliament should make another effort to pass a law or a budget affecting the whole kingdom without the consent of the German Estates. This situation arose in the summer of 1860, and by the spring of the next year the Estates of the Duchies were once more at open issue with the Danish Parliament. The German Confederation now prepared for armed intervention. It was, however, in no condition for effective action; and Denmark, following the advice of England, decided to ignore its attitude and open negotiations direct with Prussia and Austria as independent Powers. The result was hardly grateful to her. The reply of Austria and Prussia was to take up a question beyond the competence of the *Bund*, and to demand the restoration of the 'indissoluble union' of Schleswig with Holstein. The answer of Denmark was a repudiation of the right of any interference from outside in her relations with Schleswig; to which Austria, anxious just now to conciliate the goodwill of the lesser courts, replied by a vigorous protest against Danish infringements of the compacts of 1852. At this point, on September 24, 1862, Lord John Russell intervened with a proposal for the settlement of the question on the basis of the independence of the Duchies under the Danish crown, with a decennial budget for common expenses to be agreed on by the four assemblies, and a supreme Council of State consisting of a relative proportion of Danes and Germans.¹ This suggestion was accepted by the German Powers and by Russia; and Denmark found herself face to face with a combination of the German Confederation and four European states of the first rank. Yet the situation was not so desperate as it looked. The revolt in Poland was

¹ For diplomatic correspondence on the Duchies, see *Parl. Papers*, lxxiv., 1863.

at its height; France was threatening the flank of Prussia; Austria and the western Powers were engaged in a diplomatic campaign against Russia. None of them would care just now for a European war; and to threaten this seemed, if a bold policy, the best that was open to Denmark to pursue. She met the representations of the Powers, then, with a flat defiance. The retention of Schleswig, she maintained, was to her a matter of life and death. The German Confederation had made the terms of the Patent of 1852, defining the intimate relations between the Duchies, the excuse for interfering without warrant in the internal concerns of Denmark. On March 30, 1863, therefore, a royal proclamation was issued at Copenhagen, repudiating the compacts of 1852, and, by defining the separate position of Holstein in the Danish Monarchy, negating once for all the claims of Germany upon Schleswig.¹

It was impossible for Germany to ignore a gage of battle so ostentatiously thrown down; and, on July 9, the Diet forwarded a note to Copenhagen demanding, on pain of Federal execution, the withdrawal of the proclamation of March 30, and the granting of a fresh Constitution based on the agreements of 1852, or on the recommendations of the English circular of September 24, 1862.² The answer of the Danish king was the proclamation, on September 28, of a new Constitution for 'our kingdom of Denmark-Schleswig.' Three days later the Diet resolved on Federal execution; but action was delayed, owing partly to English attempts at mediation, partly to the opinion of Bismarck that the time was not quite ripe for a satisfactory solution of the whole question. In view of this hesitation, the Danes gained confidence; and, on Accession of Christian IX., Nov. 15, 1863. November 13, 1863, the new Constitution, which 'blew the compacts of 1852 to the winds,' was passed by the Danish General Council.³ Two days later King

¹ For this and subsequent correspondence, *Parl. Papers*, lxiv., 1864, p. 40, etc.

² See p. 411.

³ Hahn, i. 165, etc.

Frederick VII. died, and the 'Protocol-king' Christian IX. reigned in his stead.

Never did monarch mount a throne under more awkward conditions. The very first sovereign act he was called upon to perform was to sign the new Constitution, and refusal or consent clearly meant but a choice between two evils. If he signed, he consented to a violation of the very Protocol under which alone he held his crown. If he refused, he placed himself in intolerable antagonism to the united opinion of his own people. He chose the remoter evil, and on November 18 set his name to the Constitution. The news was received throughout Germany with a violent outburst of rage and excitement. Frederick, duke of Augustenburg, son of the prince who, in 1852, had renounced the succession of the Duchies, now claimed his rights, on the plea that he had had no share in the renunciation. In Holstein itself an agitation in his favour had begun from the first; and immediately the signature of the new Constitution became known, this was extended to Schleswig. His claim was vehemently taken up by the German princes and people. At Frankfort, even the weight of Austria and Prussia could not stem the flood of feeling; and the Diet decided not to proceed with the Federal execution already decreed against the duke of Holstein, lest this should be read as an admission of Christian's claim, but to occupy the duchy 'pending the settlement of the succession.'

On December 24, Saxon and Hanoverian troops actually occupied Holstein in the name of the German Confederation; and, supported by their presence and the loyalty of the Holsteiners, the prince of Augustenburg, under the style of Duke Frederick VIII., assumed the government.

From this 'folly' the two great Powers had, in the teeth of a violent public opinion, held rigorously aloof. Whatever their ultimate differences of aim, both were united in the determination to give no excuse for the intervention of foreign Powers in the affairs of Germany and the consequent risk of a European war. For

*Attitude of
Austria and
Prussia, 1863.*

this reason, and as parties to the Conference of London, Bismarck saw that Austria and Prussia must uphold the succession as fixed by the Protocol of 1852; and that whatever action they might take in view of the violation of that agreement by Denmark must be so 'correct' as to deprive Europe of all excuse for interference. That, under these conditions, the publication of the Constitution by Christian ix. was a sufficient *casus belli* was clear; and the other Powers could raise no objection to the intervention of the two Powers as parties to the signature of the Protocol. What would follow, the joint intervention once having been effective, might be left to circumstances to decide. To Austria the outcome was yet vague; King William wavered between his devotion to Prussia and a sentimental sympathy with Augustenburg; Bismarck alone knew clearly what he wanted, and how to attain it.¹ For the present his method was a discreet reticence.

The cordial alliance of Austria and Prussia, in opposition to the united opinion of the other German states, was a phenomenon without precedent, and owed its possibility, indeed, to the chance interplay of diplomatic forces which occurred very opportunely for Bismarck's plans. It was the refusal of the secondary states at Frankfort to entertain the idea of a separate Confederation under Austrian leadership which had driven Austria, in a huff, to make advances to Prussia. A new move on the part of Napoleon had brought her in alarm still closer to her rival. The French Emperor, feeling his prestige sadly eclipsed by the fiascos in Mexico and Poland, determined to revive it by a pronouncement to which all the world would have to listen. On November 5, 1863, therefore, in his speech from the throne, Napoleon III. proposes a Congress. he declared that the treaties of 1815 no longer existed, and stated his intention of inviting the European Powers to a Congress which 'should act as a supreme tribunal concerning all the questions at issue.' This declara-

¹ 'From the beginning I kept annexation steadily before my eyes' (Bismarck, ii. 10).

tion produced something like a panic in the chancelleries of Europe. It was taken as an official intimation that France was once more preparing to realise her dreams of expansion. To Austria especially it meant that she was preparing to cover her diplomatic defeat in Poland by reopening the Italian Question. She looked round for help. From Russia she could certainly expect none; England would be liberal of words only; Prussia alone could give her effective aid. Prussia, in fact, reaped a double harvest. In the first alarm, with its wild talk of a renewed Quadruple Alliance against France, Bismarck had kept his head. He saw clearly enough the true inwardness of Napoleon's pose, and quietly intimated Prussia's willingness to take part in the Congress. He thereby won not only the alliance of Austria, but also the goodwill of France.

Prussia had begun her mobilisation in November; and Austria, too, soon realised that action must speedily be taken if the lesser German Powers were not to be allowed to get out of hand. Russia and England had already protested against the occupation of Holstein and the support given to Augustenburg; and now Count Beust, the Saxon minister, was proposing that Bavaria should bring forward in the Diet a proposal for the recognition of the prince's claims. Under these circumstances, it was easy for Bismarck to persuade Austria that the time for immediate action had come. A last attempt was made to carry the Diet with them. On December 28, 1863, a motion was introduced by Austria and Prussia, calling on the Confederation to occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the observance by Denmark of the compacts of 1852. When this motion, with its implied recognition of the rights of Christian IX., was indignantly rejected, the Austrian and Prussian delegates were instructed to inform the Diet that their Governments would act in the matter as independent European Powers. On January 16, the agreement between the Powers was signed. At the instance of

Joint action
of Austria
and Prussia
in the
Schleswig-
Holstein
Question,
Jan. 1864.

Prussia an article drafted by Austria, intended to safeguard the settlement of 1852, was replaced by another, which merely stated that the two contracting Powers would decide only in concert upon the relations of the Duchies, and that they would in no case determine the succession save by mutual consent. Bismarck, indeed, thought it safe, a few days later, to agree to a provisional recognition of the integrity of Denmark. He knew that the first cannon-shot would blow all treaties to pieces.

Bismarck's main fear was, indeed, that the Danes at the last moment would refuse to fight. Had they withdrawn from Schleswig under protest, the Powers would probably have intervened; and a European Congress would have restored Schleswig to the Danish crown, while Austria and Prussia, as European Powers, would have been forced to prevent any attempt on it by the duke of Holstein. To prevent this possibility, Bismarck made the Copenhagen Cabinet believe that England had threatened Prussia with intervention in the event of hostilities being opened, 'though, as a matter of fact, England did nothing of the kind.' The ruse succeeded; Denmark remained defiant; and on February 1, 1864, the Austrian and Prussian forces crossed the Eider.

The result of the campaign was, of course, never doubtful. Within a fortnight the Danes had been driven from the Duchies, and the allied troops stood on the frontier of Jutland. The perils of the situation were not military, but diplomatic. England and Sweden were loud in their sympathy with the Danes. Napoleon was wavering. Russia urged a close adherence to the Protocol, lest those three Powers should join in. But the Protocol had already cost the allies the goodwill of the German lesser states; and Prussian troops had actually had to march into Holstein to overawe the hostility of the officials of the Confederation. Under the circumstances, the question arose whether the invasion should be limited to the Duchies or

Campaign
in Denmark,
1864.

carried into Denmark proper. Austria, fearing European complications, cried halt; and Prussia, to avoid a breach, concurred. The chances of war, however, decided otherwise. On February 18 some Prussian hussars, in the heat of a cavalry skirmish, crossed the frontier and occupied the village of Kolding, and Bismarck decided to use the circumstance to revise the whole situation. Austria, harassed by Magyar disaffection and by alarms in Italy, was anxious for peace; but Bismarck urged that a strong policy was necessary in order to settle once for all not only the affair of the Duchies, but the wider question of the German Confederation; and Austria, with some reluctance, consented to press the war. On March 5 a fresh agreement was signed between the two Powers. The Protocol of 1852 was now declared to be no longer valid, and the position of the Duchies within the Danish monarchy as a whole was to be made the subject of a future friendly understanding. The invasion of Jutland was to be continued, and vigorous siege to be laid to the fortress of Düppel.

Meanwhile, Lord John Russell, supported by Russia, France, and Sweden, had intervened with a suggestion that the whole question should once more be submitted to a European Conference.¹ The German Powers had no choice but to agree, stipulating only that the Protocol of 1852 should not be taken as a basis, and that the Duchies should be bound to the Danish crown by a personal tie only. Meanwhile, the war was pressed with vigour; the fortress of Düppel fell on April 18, and the Danes withdrew to the island of Alsen. The Conference opened at London on April 25. It was soon apparent how tangled was the knot it had undertaken to unravel. Count Beust, the delegate of the German Diet, represented the united voice of the lesser German states in favour of Augustenburg. Austria, but for the pressure of Federal opinion, would have preferred a settlement on the lines of 1852. Prussia, as was becoming

Conference
at London,
April 1864.

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1864, lxx. 124, etc.

increasingly clear, was aiming at the absorption of the Duchies into herself. Her ambition was backed by Napoleon, who pointed out, not for the first time, the value of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussian sea-power. The national question, he suggested, might be settled by the simple expedient of a plebiscite. The Schleswig Danes would thus be winnowed from the German element, which latter could be easily digested by Prussia. Both Bismarck and Beust, for various reasons, were prepared to play with this idea. To Austria, with agitated eyes fixed on Venice, it was anathema. The Danes watched the growing rift in the Austro-Prussian alliance, and set their face as flint. Only in the last extremity would they yield the absolute integrity of their country.

These antagonisms were not so brutally defined in the Conference, though sufficiently clear. Austria dared not risk open opposition to Prussia's plans, for even tacitly to oppose the severance of the Duchies from Denmark would be to forfeit her whole influence in Germany. The two Powers, then, agreed to demand the complete political independence of the two duchies bound together by common institutions. It was not obvious what was to be the next step. Prussia, in spite of petitions clamouring for annexation, would leave that matter open; but, meanwhile, she would expect the military affairs of Schleswig-Holstein to be subordinated to her. Austria took alarm, and, looking round for help, her eyes fell on Augustenburg. Better another duke in the Diet than an increase of Prussia's already overgrown strength. But Bismarck had forestalled this danger too, and offered to support the claims of the duke at the Conference if he would undertake to subordinate himself in all naval and military matters to Prussia, to erect Rendsburg into a Federal fortress, to surrender Kiel for the purposes of a Prussian war-harbour, to give to Prussia the control of the projected North Sea canal, and to enter the Prussian Customs Union. The development of Prussian military power beyond the Elbe

Attitude of
Prussia and
Austria.

would have been no serious menace to Austria, and had she now combined with Prussia to press this settlement upon Augustenburg the whole matter might have been arranged.¹ Fortunately for Bismarck's plans, Austria's extreme jealousy and distrust of Prussia blinded her to the true issues at stake, and her opposition encouraged Augustenburg to reject the terms offered by Prussia.²

Bismarck
and Augustenburg.

Bismarck had already put the duke's claims before the Conference, well knowing, probably, that in view of the Protocol of 1852 they were certain to be rejected. Henceforth, whatever the feelings of the German people, Prussia would be acting in the eyes of Europe perfectly 'legally' in opposing his pretensions. And, since the Conference on June 25 broke up without having arrived at any conclusion, Prussia was free to follow her own policy without having to fear any concerted intervention of the Powers. On June 24, 1864, the agreement between Austria and Prussia was renewed, in view of the ending of the truce; and it was decided that the aim of the war was now to be the complete separation of the Duchies from Denmark. The new campaign was soon decided; on June 12 the irreconcilable ministry of Monrad fell, and Bluhme, the head of the new Danish Government, made overtures for peace. The conferences opened on July 25, and on August 1 the preliminaries were signed, by which the king of Denmark renounced all his rights in favour of the Emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia, and pledged himself to recognise any dispositions that they should make of them. The definitive treaty of peace was signed at Vienna on October 30.

Cession of
the Duchies
to the two
Powers,
Aug. 1864.

The situation had now been simplified as far as the Danish claims were concerned; but it was still complicated enough. Of the two duchies wrested from Denmark, Schleswig was now occupied by the Austrians and Prussians jointly, while Holstein was held by the troops of the German Confedera-

¹ So Beust, i. 272.

² Bismarck, ii. 31.

tion in the interests of Duke Frederick. Prussia now insisted that the country should be freed of these 'foreign' troops; and by bringing pressure to bear on the lesser courts, and by adroit diplomacy at Vienna, succeeded, on December 5, in obtaining a decree of the Federal Diet, passed on the motion of Austria, ordering the withdrawal of the Federal troops from the duchy. This, as the Saxon and Hanoverian forces marched out, was immediately occupied by the Prussians. Austria and Prussia were now, *de jure* and *de facto*, in joint possession of the Duchies, whose fate depended on the agreement they should reach.

Austria at this point was beginning dimly to realise that she had been used by Prussia as a cat's-paw. She had incurred more than her due share of the odium of ousting a German prince from his legitimate inheritance, and it seemed likely that Prussia would reap all the profit. With the removal of the immediate preoccupation of the war, moreover, she was growing once more conscious of grievances of old standing against the Prussian Government, notably in the matter of her continued exclusion from the Zollverein. At Vienna, too, a change of ministry had replaced the conciliatory Rechberg by Count Mensdorff, whose aim was to recover the lost influence of Austria in the Confederation by conciliating German sentiment in the matter of the Augustenburg succession. Fortunately for Bismarck's plans, Austria's anxiety for her Italian possessions acted as a drag on her policy. Mensdorff was planning a league of the four 'legitimate' Powers against France, and for this purpose he had need of Prussia's goodwill. He proposed a bargain. Prussia should be allowed to incorporate the Duchies, if she would cede to Austria a portion of Lower Silesia and guarantee her non-German territories. But Bismarck intended to gain his ends without sacrificing a yard of Prussian territory or entering into entangling engagements, and he refused to listen to any suggestion for an exchange. Upon this, Austria

Increasing
tension
between
Austria and
Prussia.

discovered a sudden zeal for the rights of the Confederation, and once more took up the cause of the prince of Augustenburg. It was clear that the time was rapidly approaching when Prussia must either surrender all that she had gained in the Danish war or exorcise for ever this spectre of 'Federal rights.' For the present, indeed, Bismarck was still prepared to play a waiting game. On the whole, the joint occupation of the Duchies was likely to work out in favour of Prussia; and, in any case, the time was not ripe for a breach with the Confederation or with Austria. Before this could be safely adventured it was necessary to make sure of the temper of the European Powers; above all, to secure the neutrality of France and the co-operation of Italy. The action of Italy would depend upon the attitude of Napoleon; and Napoleon, though friendly, had not yet declared himself. The Austrian alliance, for all its hollowness, was still useful; for it enabled Bismarck to bring a gentle pressure to bear at Paris, where nothing was more feared than the possibility of a Germany at one within itself.

Meanwhile, this spectre of German unity, so terrifying to France, was rapidly revealing itself as, in fact, the most artificial of diplomatic bogies. Germany was divided on the Schleswig-Holstein Question into three camps. The lesser princes, and the Holsteiners themselves, pressed ardently for the recognition of the duke of Augustenburg. Prussia, recognising the title of Christian IX., maintained that, as the result of the war, this had been made over legally to herself and Austria. Austria, while bound by her actions to the latter view, was beginning, from motives of expediency, to support the claims of the duke. Prussia, to strengthen her position, submitted the rival claims to a committee of jurists, who in due course reported in favour of Christian IX. But, meanwhile, in Holstein itself a violent agitation was being carried on in favour of 'Frederick VIII.,' who had established his court at Kiel; and Prussia complained that the Austrian commissioner,

Augustenburg agitation in Germany and the Duchies.

so far from helping to suppress these manifestations, encouraged them to the best of his ability; while, by refusing his consent to the measures considered necessary by his Prussian colleague, he, in fact, made the joint government of the allies unworkable. The reply of Austria was to support a motion of Bavaria and Saxony in the Diet expressing the 'confident hope' that the two Powers would now proceed to establish the hereditary prince as duke. On April 6, 1865, the vote was taken, Prussia not only protesting, but lodging in her turn a claim, on behalf of the House of Brandenburg, to the inheritance of nearly half the duchies. Austria, for her part, still bound by the alliance, declared that she would recognise the duke as soon as Prussia should do so.

Affairs had now reached an extremely critical stage. As early as December 1864, Bismarck, in reply to a peremptory note, had sent to Vienna a despatch embodying the minimum demands of Prussia in respect of the Duchies. Prussia, he declared, would be content with nothing short of their complete incorporation in her military, postal, and commercial system. In January and February of the following year he had repeated his terms, which were practically those which had been rejected by the duke of Augustenburg. Austria had met this frank revelation of Prussia's aims with an absolute refusal to consider them; and Count Karolyi, in a private conversation with Bismarck, had openly stated that, should they not be modified, Austria would have to join the league of the lesser states against Prussia; and this, as Bismarck had pointed out, would mean war. The chances of peace had certainly not been increased by the vote of the Diet in favour of Augustenburg. The feeling in Germany against the Prussian Government, and especially against Bismarck, was intensely bitter. Even in Prussia itself, where the constitutional deadlock continued, public opinion declared loudly in favour of the Augustenburg claims, which, at the court, found a champion also in the Crown Prince Frederick. It was Bismarck *contra mundum*.

Now, if ever, was the time for Austria to take the tide of opportunity at the flood, and, at the head of an all but united German sentiment, to sweep Prussian ambitions for ever from her path. But Austria was in no condition to take advantage of the situation. Her treasury was empty; her army existed in great part only on paper; her cavalry lacked horses, her artillery guns. In Venetia, which was likely to bear the first brunt of attack, she had been compelled to reduce her troops to a peace footing. And if, for these reasons, Austria was unwilling to take the initiative, Bismarck was equally willing to allow matters to rest a while longer. He needed time to complete his arrangements with Napoleon and with Italy. He needed time also for Austria's misdemeanours to work their effect on the mind of King William, whose conscience, less robust than his own, was apt to make him somewhat of a drag upon his policy.¹ But, meanwhile, Moltke had declared Prussia ready for war; and this, together with the revealed weakness of Austria, materially modified the diplomatic situation. Prussia, without risking an immediate breach of the peace, was able to use high language at Vienna; and Austria, to avoid a worse thing, was forced bit by bit to concede the most important of Prussia's demands with regard to the Duchies. It was, however, too late for paper concessions materially to improve the situation. In the Duchies themselves, where Austria was compensating herself for her humiliation by continuing her policy of obstruction, matters had gone steadily from bad to worse, until Prussian patience gave out, and King William himself wrote to the Austrian Emperor that if Austria would not help to maintain order in Schleswig-Holstein, Prussia must, come what might, take measures to that end alone. This ultimatum found Austria once more in the throes of a ministerial crisis, and in no condition to send an answer that would spell war. Under these circumstances, she proposed a

Austria
unprepared
for war.

¹ Bismarck, ii. 13.

compromise, by which the Duchies should be partitioned between the two Powers. Bismarck, in view of the evasive answers of Italy to his overtures, and of the still doubtful attitude of France, was willing to agree to a temporary settlement. Accordingly, on August 20, 1865, the Emperor Francis Joseph and King William, who had met at the baths of Gastein, set their signatures to a Convention, by which Schleswig was to be administered by Prussia, Holstein by Austria. At the same time, the little duchy of Lauenburg was made over absolutely to Prussia in return for a money payment.¹

The Convention of Gastein was a diplomatic victory for Prussia; for in it Austria acknowledged that the sovereignty of the Duchies was vested in the two Powers, thus repudiating the claims of the duke of Augustenburg, and at the same time once more opening the breach between herself and the lesser German princes. No one, of course, regarded it as a final settlement. Bismarck himself, with his usual cynical force, summed up the situation in a single sentence. 'We have,' said he, 'papered over the cracks.'

¹ Hahn, i. 317, etc.

CHAPTER XVII

THE PRUSSO-AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1866

Napoleon and the German Question—Austria and Prussia in the Duchies—Prussia and Italy—Treaty of April 8, 1866—Prussian proposal for the reform of the *Bund*—Napoleon suggests a Congress—Prussia leaves the Confederation—Outbreak of the War—Battle of Sadowa—Preliminaries of Nikolsburg—Peace of Prague—'Dualism' in Austria-Hungary.

THE structure of the Austro-Prussian Alliance was too fundamentally rotten for the paper of the Gastein Convention long to conceal its condition. The artifice, however, served to gain a few months' delay, which was invaluable to the completion of Bismarck's plans. There was, indeed, no time to be lost. Without Italy, Prussia would play too high a stake in risking a war with Austria; and the Convention of Gastein, necessary in view of other considerations, had made the Government of Turin highly suspicious of Prussia's sincerity. Italy could not afford to embark on a policy openly hostile to Austria, only to find herself deserted at the critical moment. It was Bismarck's task to persuade her of the genuineness of the Prussian proposals, while allowing nothing to transpire that might hasten the inevitable breach with Austria. The moods of the Emperor Napoleon, too, had to be studied; for the intervention of France in the coming war would be, whatever its issue, fatal to Bismarck's plans. Lastly, the conscience of King William, though since the acquisition of Lauenburg he had 'developed a taste for conquest,' was still uneasy at the idea of provoking a war with a German Power.

Bismarck first turned his attention to France, for it was upon the attitude of Napoleon that the action of Italy would depend. However vacillating in its expression, the principle of Napoleon's diplomacy in the German Question was perfectly clear. He desired to keep Germany weak and divided in order to restore the preponderance of France as protector of the lesser states against the great Powers, and, ultimately, to use this preponderance to tear up the treaties of 1815 and restore to France the frontier of the Rhine. To this end a war between Austria and Prussia seemed highly desirable. Whether Prussia succumbed quickly, or the struggle were long drawn out—and no third alternative was entertained—France could intervene at the right moment, and, at a single blow, mould Germany to the desired pattern, and, at the same time, 'complete her creation' in Italy by adding Venice to the Italian kingdom. Under these circumstances, the news of the signing of the Gastein Convention was doubly unwelcome at Paris; for not only did it seem to re-cement that alliance between the German Powers which, if upheld, would be so fatal to French plans, but, by partitioning the Duchies, it aimed a blow at the doctrine of nationality, of which Napoleon had constituted himself the champion. A loud and angry agitation at Paris warned the Emperor that this last consideration was not lightly to be neglected. On August 29, accordingly, a circular note was issued by the French Government denouncing the Convention as an unparalleled outrage on national liberty and European law, a protest which was backed, in a note of September 14, by Lord John Russell on behalf of the British Government. The French circular had, indeed, been sent out more as a sop to the clamorous sentiment of Paris than as a final indication of the Emperor's views; and, on Bismarck's explaining the provisional character of the Convention, Napoleon replied by a private message stating his satisfaction at this explanation, and by a public

Napoleon III.
and the
German
Question.

Bismarck
and
Napoleon.

expression of regret for the violent tone of the circular, which had been sent without his approval. Bismarck was swift to follow up this success. On September 30, 1865, he travelled to Biarritz, and placed the whole question personally before the Emperor. On what passed during the interviews Bismarck, in his memoirs, has not chosen to throw any new light; and, though the accusation brought against him of having made definite promises of a cession of German territory to France is probably unfounded, it is likely enough that Napoleon received the impression that some slight 'rectification of frontier' would be conceded by Prussia as the price of his neutrality in the coming war. In any case, he expressed himself as favourable to the aggrandisement of Prussia in north Germany, a development which he supposed would make his own protection indispensable to the states of the south.

Meanwhile, in the Duchies themselves, the compromise effected by the Convention had worked at first fairly well. It is true that the opposing tendencies of the two Powers were at once revealed in the character of the provisional governments established. While Manteuffel, the Prussian governor, ruled Schleswig with military rigour, Gablenz, the Austrian, had established in Holstein some semblance of the old ducal Government. In neither case, however, was any recognition of the Augustenburg claimant conceded or allowed, and the two governors remained upon the best of terms. It was a modification in the attitude of Italy to Germany which changed this harmonious situation.

Austrian and Prussian rule in the Duchies.

After the apparent breakdown of all efforts to arrive at a common understanding with Prussia, the Italian Government turned to Vienna, and attempted to obtain the cession of Venetia in return for a payment of 100,000,000 lire. The reply of Austria was conclusive. The Emperor would never cede Venetia except as the result of war. On the other hand, Austria was

Reaction of affairs in Italy on the question of the duchies.

prepared to negotiate with a view to a commercial *rapprochement*. In this, however, she was forestalled by Prussia. Bavaria, Saxony, and the lesser states generally, had been angered by Austria's betrayal of their interests at Gastein; and, with the exception of Hesse and Nassau, they willingly agreed to Prussia's suggestion for a commercial treaty between Italy and the Zollverein, and, at the same time, consented to recognise the Italian kingdom.

The reply of Austria was to attempt to embarrass Prussia by allowing full play in Holstein to the agitation in favour of Augustenburg. Manteuffel, to prevent the spread of the contagion, forbade the circulation in Schleswig of the Holstein papers. Gablenz replied by a speech in which he declared that *he* would not rule like a Turkish pasha! The relations between the governors, once cordial, were soon strained to breaking point; and, in December, Manteuffel wrote to Bismarck to tell him that the time had come to ask Austria whether she intended to break with Augustenburg or with Prussia. In answer to Bismarck's complaints at Vienna, the Austrian Government replied, on December 31, that Augustenburg lawfully bore the title of duke, and that if Prussia objected to the tone of the Holstein papers, Austria had equal reason to complain of those Schleswig papers which were clamouring for annexation to Prussia. As for Austria's position in the Duchies, she would not relax her hold on them, except in return for compensation elsewhere.¹ This was enough to make Bismarck realise that, if Prussia were not to suffer a second Olmütz, war with Austria was inevitable, and that the question of the Duchies had, in fact, become subordinated to that of the whole position of the two Great Powers in the Confederation. To win Schleswig-Holstein, Prussia must, in fact, aim at winning all Germany.

On January 13, 1866, directions were sent to the Prussian ambassador at Turin to approach Italy once more with a

¹ Sybel, iv. 294.

view to common action. Ten days later, events in Holstein precipitated the crisis. On January 23 a mass meeting was held at Altona, with the tacit consent of the Austrian governor, at which the Prussian Government was denounced and the convocation of the Estates demanded. At the same time Austria, through her ambassador at Berlin, declared that she still adhered to the declaration of the princes, made on May 28, 1864, in favour of Augustenburg. This 'perfidy' removed the last scruples of the king at supporting Bismarck's policy; and, on January 26, a despatch was sent to Vienna in which Bismarck denounced the 'revolutionary agitation' carried on, under Austrian auspices, in Holstein; and declared that, should it prove impossible to attain the intimate union of the policies of the two Powers with regard to Germany, Prussia 'must win full freedom for her own entire policy.'

The reply of Austria was a repudiation of the right of Prussia to criticise the measures she might choose to adopt in Holstein. Bismarck now refused to continue the discussion, and the alliance between the two Powers was at an end.

End of the
Austro-
Prussian
Alliance.

But though war seemed inevitable, neither Power was ready to begin. The military preparations of Austria were, as usual, lamentably behindhand. Prussia, on the other hand, had still to come to an agreement with Italy, and to justify her action to Germany and the world by putting her views clearly before the princes of the Confederation. For a moment the Italian Government had hoped that Venice might still be obtained without a war. On February 24, 1866, Prince Couza of Roumania was deposed; and, with the approval of Napoleon, Italy suggested that Austria should cede Venetia to her, and receive the Danubian Principalities as compensation. The project broke down on the opposition of Russia, England, and Austria herself; and the Prussian alliance, recommended by the French Emperor, seemed to offer the only hope for completing the work of Italian unity. The trend of events in Germany seemed guarantee enough

that Prussia would not come to terms with Austria and leave her ally in the lurch. From the beginning of March Austria made feverish preparations for war; and, on the 16th, these were so far advanced that Mensdorff thought it safe to send a peremptory demand to Berlin asking whether it was the intention of Prussia to break the Gastein Convention, and to disturb the peace of the Confederation. At the same time he sent a circular letter to the German princes stating that, in the event of Prussia returning an evasive answer, Austria would move in the Diet for the mobilisation of the Federal forces. To this note Bismarck replied with an emphatic 'No!'; but a few days later, on March 24, he in his turn issued a circular note describing the Austrian war preparations, and stating that, in view of these, Prussia must take measures for her defence. At the same time he presented to the astonished princes an outline of the Prussian scheme for the reform of the Confederation, the most notable provision of which was that for a German National Parliament, to be elected by universal suffrage, 'as offering surer guarantees of conservative action than limitations which seek to determine the majority beforehand.'

In view of these facts, Govone, the Italian ambassador at Berlin, thought himself justified in laying before his Govern-
The Treaty of April 8, 1866, between Prussia and Italy. ment a treaty of alliance arranged by him with Bismarck. In this it was stipulated that Prussia should, if her proposals for the reform of the Federal Constitution 'demanded by the needs of the German nation' should be rejected by the princes, take the initiative in declaring war 'in order to give effect to her proposals'; and that, in this case, Italy would also declare war against Austria. This agreement was, however, only to hold good in the event of Prussia declaring war within three months from the ratification of the treaty. As a result of the war, if successful, Venetia was to be ceded to the Italian kingdom, and an equivalent amount of territory annexed to Prussia in northern Germany. On April 8, 1866, the treaty was signed.

Bismarck's object was now to secure the outbreak of the inevitable war before the lapse of the three months stipulated in the treaty. At the same time it was essential not to compromise the 'correctness' of Prussia's attitude in the eyes of the European Powers by any false move. On April 9, the very day after the signature of the treaty with Italy, the Prussian project for the reform of the Confederation was introduced in the Diet.¹ It served, however, and was probably intended to serve, no purpose beyond showing that 'German unity was to be founded, under Prussia's leadership, upon the basis of political freedom.' For, while the German Constitution was being discussed, a heated correspondence was passing between Berlin and Vienna on the subject of the war preparations; and on the very day, April 21, when the Prussian reform proposals were referred to a committee, the Austrian Council of War decided, in defiance of an agreement just arrived at with Prussia for a partial disarmament, to mobilise the army of the south.

This apparently wantonly inconsistent action of Austria was due to the alarming news from Italy, where Garibaldi was once more on the move, and whence ominous concentrations of troops had been reported. It was followed, on April 26, by the despatch of an ultimatum to Berlin, demanding that, in spite of the Austrian mobilisation in the south, Prussia should still disarm, and

Austrian
Ultimatum,
April 26.

requiring the Prussian Government to accept a settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, which Austria would, otherwise, present in its entirety for the decision of the Federal Diet. All hopes of a peaceful settlement seemed now at an end. On the very day of the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum (April 26), La Marmora ordered the mobilisation of the Italian army; on May 3 Prussia followed with fresh measures for placing her troops in readiness for war.²

A fresh development of Napoleon's ever-varying policy postponed the supreme issue for a few weeks longer. A large

¹ Hahn, i. 389.

² *Ibid.* i. 402, etc.

section of Frenchmen viewed with misgiving what they believed, and with truth, to be the sacrifice of French interests to visionary schemes which could only end in the aggrandisement of Italy and Prussia. On May 3 Napoleon III. proposes a Congress. Thiers gave voice in the Chamber to this feeling. 'Never,' he cried, 'must Germany succeed in reaching political unity. Prussia's aim manifestly lies in the line of creating German unity by means of a victorious war against Austria. To make this war impossible is the duty of every French patriot.'¹ Napoleon himself could not but realise the fatuity of pursuing a policy which might only end in strengthening Prussia, without any equivalent gain for France. On the other hand, he was bent on settling the Roman and Italian Question once for all by obtaining the cession of Venetia; and, since Prussia had consistently refused to promise a rectification of his frontiers at the expense of Germany, he decided to try what could be done by an appeal to Austria. If the latter would but yield Venice, Italy would drop out of the war; Austria would be able to turn with undivided forces against Prussia; and at the proper moment France would intervene, and dictate a settlement of the affairs of the Confederation to suit her own convenience.

Austria, alarmed at the threatened attack on her on two sides, and uncertain of the temper of Hungary, did actually offer to buy the neutrality of Italy by the cession of Venetia without territorial equivalent. The temptation to La Marmora to accept was a strong one; for it meant that Italy might obtain without a blow what might cost her much blood and treasure, and yet, in the end, perhaps not be hers. But 'honour and fidelity' commanded him 'not (under the circumstances) to break loose from Prussia,' and he refused. Baffled by this unlooked-for scrupulousness, Napoleon turned to another, and favourite, expedient. In a speech at Auxerre, on May 6, he had once more, to the alarm of Europe,

¹ Cf. Speech of March 14, 1867 (Sorel, *Hist. diplomatique de la guerre Franco-Allemande*, i. 32).

denounced the treaties of 1815, 'which some try to-day to make the basis of our foreign policy'; and it was with some relief that the Powers learned that he proposed no more than the assembling of a European Congress for the special purpose of settling the affairs of Venice, the Duchies, and the German Confederation.¹ From the point of view of the general interests of Europe little objection could be raised to the project, and Russia and England readily gave it their adherence. But to Austria nothing could be less welcome than a proposal which threatened to open up once more the whole question of her position in Italy, complicated with perilous appeals to the principle of nationality generally. She did not, indeed, venture to refuse openly to take part in a consultation of the Powers; but she coupled her acceptance of the invitation to the Congress with conditions which would have made its deliberations futile, and the whole project fell through.²

The proposal of a Congress had, then, served no purpose save to give both sides time to complete their preparations for the war which was now inevitable. Napoleon hastened to assume the attitude which he believed would make him the arbiter in the struggle. With Austria he concluded a treaty by which, in return for his neutrality, she undertook, in the event of victory, not to establish a united Germany. To Prussia he promised a benevolent neutrality, while to ensure her defeat he attempted to draw Italy away from the alliance. Finally, on June 12, he announced, in a message to the Chambers, that France would demand no aggrandisement, unless a neighbouring Power, by extensive annexations, should threaten the balance of power.³

The last diplomatic formalities before the appeal to force were, meanwhile, being enacted by Austria and Prussia. On June 1 the former announced her intention of placing the whole question of the Duchies in the hands of the Diet, and, at the same time, of summoning the Estates in Holstein.

¹ Sorel, i. 13.

² *Parl. Papers*, lxxvi., 1866, p. 345.

³ See Sorel, i. 18.

This Bismarck denounced as a breach of the Gastein Convention; and at the same time declared that, in consequence of this breach, the joint occupation of the Duchies was revived, and that Prussia would now have the right to march into Holstein. Next day, on June 4, he laid the whole matter in a circular note before the Powers; and, at the same time, published the treaty of January 16, 1864, by which Austria and Prussia had agreed to arrange the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein by common consent.

It now only remained to define the relations of Prussia to the Confederation. Already, on May 19, in reply to a peremptory demand of the Diet for a declaration of her intentions with regard to the peace of the Confederation, Prussia had declared that she must withdraw, and rest on her position as a European Power. Bismarck now handed in at Frankfort the protest of Prussia against Austria's action.

Prussia, he declared, would only recognise the right of a reformed Federal Power to settle the Schleswig-Holstein Question; and this reformed Power must be based on a German Parliament, which would be a guarantee that any sacrifices Prussia might make would be for the good of all Germany, and not of particular dynasties. Next day the Prussian plan of reform was put in circulation. Austria was to be excluded from the Confederation; a confederate navy was to be created; the supreme command of the army was to be divided between Prussia and Bavaria; a German Parliament, elected by manhood suffrage, was to be established; and, lastly, the relations of the Confederation with German Austria were to be regulated by special treaty. The German states were asked whether, in the event of the actual Confederation being shattered by war, they would be prepared to join this new organisation.¹

In presenting this scheme of reform to the Diet Prussia was under no illusion as to the prospects of maintaining peace.

¹ Hahn, i. 447.

The die had, in fact, already been cast. On June 7, General Manteuffel, after formally proclaiming the Gastein Convention at an end, had marched into Holstein; and the Austrians, accompanied by the Government of Duke Frederick, had fallen back on Altona, protesting against the violation of her agreements by Prussia. On the 10th the Prussian general announced that, owing to the action of Austria, he was regretfully compelled to take over the government of Holstein as well as that of Schleswig, and he at once proceeded to suppress all manifestations in favour of the duke of Augustenburg. Throughout Germany public opinion was violently excited against the selfish and aggressive policy revealed in what seemed a mere act of international piracy. In the Diet, too, the overwhelming mass of opinion was opposed to Prussia. A few of the smaller northern states sided with her; but Pforten, the Bavarian Minister, gave voice to the views of the majority when he declared once more that Bavaria could never contemplate any reorganisation of the Confederation by which one of the great Powers should be excluded. Austria took advantage of this temper to protest at Frankfort against Prussia's action, not only as a breach of the Convention of Gastein, but as a violation of the treaty of Vienna, which, under Article XIX. of the Final Act, would justify Austria in moving for Federal execution against her. On June 12 the formal breach between the two Powers was proclaimed by the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors. On June 14 their rival motions were placed before the Diet of the Confederation; that of Prussia for the reform of the Federal Constitution, that of Austria for Federal execution against Prussia. Bismarck had been careful to allow no ambiguity as to the issues at stake. Should the Austrian motion be passed, Prussia would declare the Confederation at an end; and in the event of her victory in the coming war, those states of northern Germany which had voted against her would cease to exist as sovereign states.

Prussia
occupies
Holstein.

Prussia
withdraws
from the
'Bund.'

The Diet, by a majority of nine to six, decided to take the risk, and supported Austria's motion. Prussia at once withdrew her delegate from Frankfort.

The whole question was now transferred from the Cabinet to the camp. The Prussian plan of campaign had been already prepared, and nothing remained but to set in motion the military machinery which, under the direction of Moltke and Roon, had been brought to an unprecedented pitch of perfection. Had the lesser German states remained neutral, the whole of the Prussian forces would at once have been concentrated on Bohemia. As it was, the object of the Prussian generals was to crush the levies of the separate states before they should have time to concentrate. The scattered condition of the Prussian troops stationed at Coblenz and Wetzlar, on the Weser and the Elbe, favoured this plan. Bismarck gave one last chance to the lesser states of reconsidering their vote at Frankfort and securing their safety by remaining neutral during the war. But the German princes were for the most part convinced that Austria must win in the coming struggle, and elected to abide by their common decision.

The campaign of 1866 has a special interest as being the earliest example of war carried on under modern conditions. The Prussian organisation and the Prussian needle-gun had both been seen at work in the Danish war of the year before, but on too small a scale to waken the world to the revolution in military science which was in progress. At the outbreak of the war in 1866, so little had this been realised, that the Austrian troops were still armed with the old muzzle-loaders, and the states of the Confederation had not hesitated to plunge into a quarrel for which, by all the canons of modern warfare, they were utterly unprepared. They were soon to understand that, under the new system, it is too late to prepare for war after its outbreak. Prussia fully realised the necessity for striking swiftly. The bulk of her army was concentrated round the

Prussian
plan of
campaign.

Beginning
of the war,
June 1866.

frontiers of Bohemia; in Silesia, 115,000 men, under the Crown Prince; in Lusatia, 93,000 under Prince Frederick Charles; near Torgau, 46,000 under General Herwart von Bittenfeld. Besides these, some 9000 men were watching the Moravian frontier, while at Berlin 24,000 *Landwehr* were held in reserve. To oppose to the federal troops in the west Prussia had no more than some 48,000 men.

On June 15 the Prussians crossed the Saxon frontier, King John and the Saxon troops retiring before them by way of Pirna into Bohemia, and, on the 18th, occupied Dresden. On the 17th Manteuffel had occupied Hanover; and, on the 18th, Cassel was in the hands of the Prussians. Within three days from the outbreak of hostilities Prussia had occupied three states. Ten days later, on June 28, the surrender of the Hanoverian army at Langenzalsa settled the fate of the northern states for the time, though this still depended ultimately on the fortunes of war in Bohemia.

The supreme command of the Austrian army had been conferred, in spite of his own reluctance to accept it, on Benedek, who as a general of division had gained a well-deserved reputation in the Italian wars. His plan was, using Olmütz as his base, to advance into Saxony, or by way of Glatz into Silesia, against the Crown Prince. This scheme it was the object of the Prussians to frustrate by so concentrating their forces as to prevent the junction of the Austrian and Bavarian armies and throwing their united strength across the line of Benedek's advance.

On June 17th, Benedek started, expecting to reach the Upper Elbe in about twelve days. Moltke, who directed the military operations by telegraph from Berlin, ordered the Prussian generals to meet at Gitchin, leaving details to their own discretion. On the 23rd Prince Frederick Charles entered Bohemia, was joined on the 25th at Reichenberg by the army of the Elbe, and next day advanced with his united force on the line of the Iser, the passage of which he secured by the defeat of the Austrians at Podol. On the

29th he again advanced, and a combat at Gitchin gave him the command of that town. The Austrians retired, in some confusion, on Sadowa and Königgrätz. The Prussians, meanwhile, in accordance with Moltke's plan, had been advancing in three columns from the east, and had forced Benedek to give up all thought of carrying out his original plan. The news of the capture of Gitchin made it hopeless for him even to hold his actual position, and he too fell back on Königgrätz. The crisis of the campaign had now been reached. So far Moltke's plan had worked almost without a hitch; but it was felt that all depended on the result of the great battle which was now impending. King William, Moltke, and Bismarck, who had up till now remained at Berlin, joined the army at the front, in order to be present when the final issue was decided.

The battle of Sadowa was fought on July 2. The Austrians had in position, strongly posted, 222,000 men with 770 guns. The Prussians numbered 221,000; but at the beginning of the action the army of the Crown Prince was several hours' march, by bad roads, from the battle-field, and everything depended on his arriving in time. Had the Bavarian Government, absorbed in dreams of its own military hegemony in south Germany, held less jealously aloof, the fortune of the day might have been reversed. But the Austrian left wing, where the Bavarians should have taken their position, remained weak and exposed; and, just when the fate of the battle was wavering in the balance, the arrival of the Crown Prince turned the scale decisively against the Austrians. Never was victory more complete or final. 'Your Majesty,' said Moltke to King William, 'has won not only the battle, but the campaign.'

From the day of Sadowa the interest of the war becomes diplomatic rather than military, and it is Bismarck, and not Moltke, who guides it to its conclusion. Bismarck, indeed, tells us that the Prussian strategy during the latter

part of the campaign was due to his initiative; and that it was owing to his advice that the Prussian leaders, instead of spending time in attempting to reduce Floritsdorff, merely masked the fortress, while with the main body of their troops they executed those manœuvres by which they ultimately, towards the middle of July, cut off the Austrians under Benedek from the capital. If the strategy which had placed Vienna at the mercy of the Prussian army was Bismarck's, he had the more right to snatch from the king and his generals at the last moment the immediate fruit of their victories. To enter Vienna in triumph was naturally the desire of the Prussian fighting men, from King William downwards. But from the moment that Sadowa had decided the issues of the actual struggle, Bismarck had been planning to restore the old friendship with Austria. He realised already that, however far the present war might lead Germany on the road to unity, this could only be attained after a second and a bloodier struggle with France, a struggle in which the co-operation, or at least the neutrality, of Austria, would be invaluable. To sacrifice the chance of this to a sentiment, however natural, seemed to him madness, and he resisted every suggestion that would, if carried out, inflict unnecessary humiliation on Austria. The entanglement of the federal relations once removed, there was nothing to prevent the two states from entering on that close alliance to which the multitude of their common interests pointed; and to sacrifice this for the sake of a few square miles of territory, or the pleasure of a military parade through Vienna, would have been folly. There was, moreover, in the immediate circumstances much to make a moderate policy and a speedy settlement expedient. In the first place, the campaign in Italy had proved by no means so favourable to the allies as that in Bohemia. The Italian army had crossed the Mincio on June 23; and the very next day, on the fateful ground of Custoza, had sustained a defeat which effectually

Bismarck's
policy after
Sadowa.

The
campaign
in Italy.

upset any calculations based upon its effective co-operation with Prussia from the south. The disaster of Sadowa, it is true, prevented the Austrians from profiting by their victory; and the withdrawal of 50,000 men under the Archduke Albert from Italy, in order to reinforce Benedek, gave the Italians an opportunity of carrying out the original plan of campaign and advancing through Venetia, so as to occupy the Austrians from the south, while Prussia operated from the north. But the Italian generalship was no better on the present than on former occasions; and before they had made up their minds to a vigorous initiative, events had occurred which hastened a settlement before they had had an opportunity of restoring the somewhat tarnished reputation of their arms.

Of these events the chief was the intervention of Napoleon in the quarrel. To the French Emperor the news of Sadowa Intervention of Napoleon. had come as a rude shock. He had built all his plans on the event, either of an Austrian triumph, or on a contest so evenly balanced that the sword of France thrown into the scale would prove decisive. Yet, though the conditions were so much less favourable than he had hoped, he felt that, if he were to interfere at all, he must do so now. When, therefore, under the impression of the disaster of July 2, the Austrian Government offered to cede Venice to France, to dispose of as she pleased, in return for the withdrawal of Italy from the war, Napoleon opened negotiations with the Courts of Vienna and Berlin with a view to mediation. It was the possibility of these 'good offices' turning into armed interference which decided Bismarck to come to terms with Austria quickly. To keep Napoleon in play, and to bring pressure to bear on Austria, while at the same time he offered terms which she could honourably accept, became the object of Bismarck's policy. It was to this end that he made an effort to stir up Hungarian nationality against Austria. But Deák, the Magyar leader, while stoutly maintaining the rights of his nation, saw in

the union of Hungary with the Hapsburg crown, and in the relations of Austria with the German Confederation, the surest guarantee against that Slav preponderance which, of all things, the Magyars had most reason to dread. Attitude of
If, then, in Hungarian matters, he was the foe of Hungary.

Austria, in German matters he was no less the foe of Prussia. Under these circumstances, it was clearly the best policy, as the sequel proved, for Hungary to strengthen her claim on Austria by refusing to take part against her in her hour of need.

The attempt to create an effective diversion in Hungary having failed, King William agreed to accept the mediation of France so far as to express his willingness to discuss matters with Napoleon, though he stipulated that in accordance with the terms of the treaty of April 8 no truce was to be entered upon without the consent of Italy. For the moment, this put a stop to any immediate prospect Napoleon
of a settlement; for the Italians had been worked and Italy.
into a most warlike mood by what they regarded as the insult of offering them Venice 'as an alms' by the hand of Napoleon. On July 8, Victor Emmanuel crossed the Po at the head of his troops, but was stopped by a telegram from Napoleon forbidding him to invade Venetia (now French territory), and requiring him to accept the truce agreed to by Prussia. The king was willing to consent, but on three conditions—the cession of Venice to Italy direct, the cession of the Italian Tyrol, and an agreement not to introduce into the terms of the peace any reference to the status of Rome. Napoleon's answer was to threaten an Austro-French alliance, and for a moment it seemed as though France were about to take arms against both Italy and Prussia. But the army, busy now in replacing the old muzzle-loaders by breach-loading *chasse-pots*, was not ready; a war would upset much that French valour and diplomacy had laboriously achieved in Italy and elsewhere; and, on the whole, it seemed better to await Prussia's declaration of her terms and to accept them if moderate.

Under these circumstances, it was clearly Bismarck's policy to demand nothing not essential to his plans. These latter had, indeed, been sensibly widened by the revelation, lately made, of Napoleon's inner mind. The war had been begun to secure Prussia's 'rights' in the Duchies and the reform of the Confederation. But in view of the loudly expressed dislike of France for German unity, the welding together of Germany under the House of Hohenzollern became more than ever a counsel of self-preservation. To achieve this end, while lulling Napoleon with the belief that German disunion was being perpetuated, was the aim of Bismarck's diplomacy. Public opinion was clamouring for the absorption by Prussia of all the German states which had sided against her; but Bismarck realised that this could not be done without a demand by France for 'compensations'

Bismarck's 'moderation' and the terms of peace. which he was not prepared to yield. On the other hand, if he were to make it appear that Prussia aimed at no more than the hegemony of a Confederation from which the southern German states would be excluded, it would be possible to secure the support of Napoleon for a plan which would seem to stereotype that very division of Germany which it was his aim to ensure. The French Emperor, in fact, fell readily into the trap; and stipulating only that there must be no visible unity of Germany, consented, on July 14, to support, with slight modifications, the conditions of peace presented by Prussia. Of these the main items were the exclusion of Austria from Germany, the annexation of the Duchies by Prussia, and the division of Germany into two Confederations, divided by the river Main, of which the southern, while retaining its sovereign, international status, should have the right to enter into national relations with the other by mutual consent.

Up to this point negotiations had not been opened between the combatants. Both were, however, equally anxious to come to an agreement. Austria was in no condition to

continue the struggle. Her treasury was empty; Hungary, until her national aspirations were satisfied, refused to do more than remain neutral; and, finally, the Viennese, panic-stricken at the prospect of a siege, were clamouring for peace and the restoration of their forfeited Constitution. Bismarck, for his part, recognised that this was the moment for coming to terms, for delay might serve to hatch a dozen incipient complications. England and Russia had already protested against any fundamental alteration of the German Federal Constitution, save by the same authority as that which had created it—a European Congress; and now Russia was again pressing this solution upon the Powers. Bismarck threatened to reply to this ‘interference from outside’ by stirring up the Poles and the Magyars; and Napoleon would have nothing to do with a meeting in which he would have to take a secondary place. But Napoleon was only too likely to change his mind; and it was well to come to an arrangement while he was still in a mood favourable to Prussia. After some diplomatic preliminaries, then, formal negotiations between the representatives of Austria and Prussia were begun, on July 22, at Nikolsburg.¹ A brilliant victory gained, two days before, by the Austrian Admiral Tegethoff over the Italian fleet under Persano off the island of Lissa did something to forward the settlement by lessening Austria’s sense of humiliation. None the less, the problems to be solved were difficult enough. Italy, smarting under the sense of her defeats, demanded the Tyrol as the price of her accession to the truce, and still refused to accept Venice at the hands of Napoleon. Napoleon, in his turn, thought the present a favourable opportunity for renewing his claims to the frontier of the Rhine, or at least to a slice of the Low Countries. The Emperor of Russia, on the other hand, was troubled by the blow about to be dealt at the principle of ‘legitimacy’ by the proposed ‘complete dethronement of

Preliminary
negotia-
tions at
Nikolsburg.

¹ For documents, see Hahn, i. 478, etc.

entire dynasties' in Germany. Bismarck brushed aside the ill-timed scruples of the Tsar, humoured the ambition of Napoleon, and ignored the obstinacy of Italy. In spite of these obstacles, his diplomatic generosity succeeded in its object, and a month after the opening of the negotiations the definitive peace was signed at Prague. The terms of this were substantially those of the original draft approved by Napoleon. Austria agreed to the dissolution of the German Confederation and to her own withdrawal from the affairs of Germany. Prussia, enlarged and consolidated by the annexation of the Duchies, the kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, a portion of Hesse-Darmstadt, and the free city of Frankfort, became the acknowledged leader of a North German Confederation embracing all the states north of the Main. Those to the south of that river were formed into a South German Confederation entirely independent of, but able to enter into treaty relations with, that of the North. Austria was to pay a war indemnity, but, with the exception of Venice, was to surrender no territory. Bismarck had brought pressure to bear on Victor Emmanuel to accede to the Treaty of Prague, and the few outstanding difficulties with Italy were soon settled. A compromise was arranged, by which Venice was handed over to Italy without her having to receive it directly from the hands of Napoleon, and without the Austrian Emperor having formally to recognise the Italian kingdom. The claim of Italy to a portion of the Tyrol was given up; and, on September 3, the definitive treaty of peace between Austria and Italy was also signed.

Never had a struggle between two great Powers been shorter or more decisive. To the world at large it seemed

Prussia and Austria had changed places, not only in Germany, but in Europe, and that the power of the Hohenzollerns had been founded on the irretrievable ruin of that of the Hapsburgs. It was scarcely conceivable that a loosely knit empire, which had all but

Peace of
Prague,
Aug. 23, 1866.

The recon-
struction of
Austria.

broken up in the storms of 1848, should survive the crushing blow of Sadowa and the violent severance of the ties which for centuries had united it with Germany. The task of re-establishing the shaken edifice of the Austrian monarchy was, indeed, sufficiently perilous and difficult. Already, since the revolution of 1848, nearly a dozen experiments had been made, only to fail in turn: the Constitution granted by the Emperor Ferdinand on April 25, 1848; that granted by Francis Joseph in May 1849 and withdrawn by the patent of December 31, 1851; the absolutist *régime* of Schwarzenberg; the Constitution of October 20, 1860; the tentative federalism of M. Goluchowski; the centralised Liberal Constitution of Schmerling of February 26, 1861, suspended by the proclamation of September 20, 1865; and, finally, the federalist experiments of Belcredi which, on the eve of Sadowa, had all but driven Hungary into the camp of Austria's enemies. In effect, the attitude of Hungary, conscious of holding the destinies of the Empire in her hands, made a return to any of these experiments impossible; for the Magyars would accept no settlement which did not recognise their national independence and the full equality of the crown of St. Stephen with that of the emperors of Austria. As long as the Austrian Empire was based on a theory of German ascendancy, fortified by the support of the union with Germany, an understanding with Hungary had been impossible. But, after Sadowa, the position was entirely altered. Germans and Magyars alike were interested in preventing the 'Slavisation' of Austria, and in maintaining the preponderant influence of their own higher culture. But this they would only achieve by combining to uphold their own dominant power, each in the sphere of influence which had been clearly demarcated for them by history. In short, the solution of the problem of Austria's future was to be sought in 'Dualism.'

Immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Prague, at the instance of Count Belcredi, a Hungarian Ministry had

been appointed, and the Diet summoned for the special purpose of arranging a *modus vivendi* between Hungary and the Imperial Government. The extreme national party in Hungary were opposed to any agreement which should leave more than a personal union under the same crown between

Austria and Hungary. Fortunately a more moderate view was represented by Francis Deák, who saw that it would be possible, without any sacrifice of national principle, to have a common organisation for those interests which were common to the two halves of the monarchy. The great influence of Deák secured the victory of his plan, and in November 1866 the Magyar scheme was submitted for the approval of the provincial diets. It met with strenuous opposition, both from the Slavs, who desired Federalism, and the German Liberals, who demanded the centralised Constitution of 1861. The Emperor, alarmed at the rigour of their protest, summoned on January 2, 1867, an extraordinary *Reichsrath* for the purpose of examining the whole question. But the Germans, sure of being outvoted, raised so clamorous an opposition to this, that Belcredi, in despair, resigned. He was succeeded, on February 7, by Baron Beust, ex-minister of Saxony, and Bismarck's old antagonist. Beust solved the constitutional difficulty by giving up the idea of an extraordinary *Reichsrath*, and summoning the ordinary *Reichsrath* under the Liberal Constitution of 1861; at the same time, he conciliated the Hungarians by confining the sphere of its authority to one-half of the Austrian Empire. Hungary itself was to remain under its own Government; and the little river Leitha was established as the conventional boundary between the two halves of the Hapsburg monarchy. The task of the Cis-Leithan Parliament was, in the first instance, to discuss and settle the terms of the agreement with the Trans-Leithan, or Hungarian, Government. Strenuous opposition was naturally aroused by a system which subordinated the Slav majority to the

Deák.

The Dual
Constitution.

German minority in one-half of the monarchy, and to the Magyar minority in the other; but in the end the dual Constitution, already elaborated by a committee of the Hungarian Diet and agreed to by the Emperor, was accepted by the *Reichsrath*.

According to this arrangement the two halves of the monarchy were to be absolutely independent, save for certain purposes common to the interests of both, namely, foreign affairs, finance, and the army. The three departments concerned with these affairs form the sole ministry common to the whole Empire, and are presided over by the chancellor, with whose office is combined that of minister of foreign affairs. Popular control over imperial questions was at the same time secured by the novel expedient of the 'delegations.' These consist of sixty members elected by the Hungarian Diet and sixty elected by the Austrian *Reichsrath*, which meet every year, at Vienna and Pesth alternately. They debate separately, and communicate the results reciprocally in writing. If, after three communications, no decision is arrived at, they meet and vote in common, and—in order to avoid the prickly language question—in silence. Finally, the yearly contribution of the two halves of the monarchy to the imperial treasury was settled by the so-called *Ausgleich* (Compromise), which was made renewable every ten years.

However unsatisfactory this settlement was to the Slavs, who saw themselves hopelessly sacrificed, it was fairly satisfactory to the Germans, who secured through it the dominance which had been threatened by their severance from Germany; and wholly so to the Magyars, who received not only the guarantee of their liberties, but of their right to impress their national stamp on the subject races within their borders. The gulf which, throughout the century, had yawned between the Hungarian people and the House of Hapsburg was at last bridged over; and the keystone was placed in the arch by the coronation at Pesth, in June 1867, of the Emperor

Francis Joseph with the crown of St. Stephen. The wisdom of the Dual System has been, on the whole, proved by the fact that, in spite of constant warnings of overthrow, and in spite of the perennial instability caused by the subterranean workings of nationalist forces, the structure of the Hapsburg monarchy is, after thirty years, still intact.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870

Napoleon and the rise of Prussia—Collapse of the Napoleonic idea—Napoleon and Bismarck—Prussia and the southern states—The military Conventions and the Zollverein—French public opinion and the new Power—Dynastic crisis in Spain—The Hohenzollern candidature—Excitement in France—King William and Count Benedetti at Ems—Bismarck and the 'Ems telegram'—France declares war—Prussian military organisation—Unreadiness of the French—Affair of Saarbrücken—Battles of Wörth, Weissenburg, and Spicheren—Effect in isolating France—Battles round Metz—Effect in Paris—Battle of Sedan—Fall of the Empire—Government of National Defence—New phase of the war—The Germans before Paris—Gambetta at Tours—The *levée en masse*—Capitulation of Metz—Efforts to relieve Paris—Diplomatic dangers to the Germans from the prolonged siege of Paris—Russia denounces the Treaty of Paris of 1856—The Vatican Council and Papal Infallibility—Italian occupation of Rome and fall of the Temporal Power—Fall of Paris—Peace negotiations—The cession of Alsace and Lorraine—The Peace of Frankfurt—Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles.

THE instinct which in France had hailed the battle of Sadowa as a national defeat was not at fault. The triumph of Prussia was indeed, and was felt to be, a humiliation for Napoleon. After the Italian campaign of 1859 the reputation of the French Emperor had stood at its zenith. His policy had been uniformly successful; he had crushed Russia in the Crimea, Austria in Italy; and, in defiance of the 'treaties,' he had added Savoy and Nice to France as the price for his aid in creating a new nationality in Europe. The world had learned to look to Paris, as it had once looked to Vienna, as to the political oracle which should pronounce its fate; and Napoleon, from being laughed at as a dreamer and a charlatan, had come to be regarded, with as little

justice, as a saturnine genius whose mind was for ever evolving schemes, only too likely to be realised, for the aggrandisement of his empire at the expense of Europe. This opinion had been shaken first by the sorry part played by France during the Polish rising of 1863; it was shattered by the disgraceful outcome of the French intervention in Mexico; it was to be finally dissipated by the diplomacy of Bismarck and the strategy of Moltke.

The French expedition to Mexico concerns the student of European history only in so far as it reacted upon the politics of Europe. It had its origin in the decision of Napoleon III. and Mexico. the Mexican Congress, confirmed by the President Juarez, on July 17, 1861, to suspend all payments to foreign creditors for two years. A joint protest of England, France, and Spain was the result; and during December 1861 and January 1862 the three Powers landed troops in Mexico to enforce the just claims of their subjects, while at the same time disclaiming any intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the country. Under this pressure Juarez yielded; a Convention was signed, on February 12, at Soledad, by which the Powers recognised Juarez, promised to open negotiations for a settlement of outstanding difficulties, and received, meanwhile, the right to garrison certain Mexican towns as a guarantee. But at this point Napoleon showed his hand. He had already hinted that peace and prosperity could only be secured to the country by means of monarchical institutions. A message was now brought from Europe by the Mexican general Almonte, a bitter enemy of Juarez, to the effect that Napoleon would recognise the invitation sent by certain Mexicans to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, and that, in the event of his election as Emperor of Mexico, he would support him by force. The effect of this was at once to break up the Triple Alliance. But, in spite of the protests of England and Spain, France persevered; Juarez was unable to hold his own against the French troops; and, on May 29, 1864, after securing a guarantee from

Napoleon, and, as he believed, in response to the wishes of the Mexican people, the Emperor Maximilian landed at Vera Cruz. He was soon bitterly undeceived. The object of Napoleon was only to gather beyond the Atlantic the laurels it was increasingly difficult to harvest cheaply in Europe. His opportunity had been the great civil war in the United States, which had prevented the interference of the Americans with his plans. But with the collapse of the South this aspect of the affair was entirely altered. Not only were thousands of Southerners set free to join the standard of Juarez in the mountains; but the United States at once protested, in the name of the 'Monroe doctrine,' against the proceedings of France, and demanded her immediate withdrawal from the American continent. The demand was backed by an immense army of seasoned veterans, flushed with victory; and unless Napoleon was prepared to risk all on a desperate struggle many thousands of miles from France, he had no choice but to obey. He attempted to make conditions; but the only one which the American Government would grant was to promise neutrality in the struggle between Juarez and Maximilian. This was a piece of hypocrisy too transparent to serve its ends; for every one knew, including the unhappy Maximilian, that the moment the French troops were withdrawn the Empire was doomed. The Empress Charlotte travelled to Europe to seek aid, and to beg Napoleon to remember his promises. His reply was to advise Maximilian to abdicate, and to withdraw with the French troops from Mexico. This Maximilian, who felt himself bound to stand by his partisans, refused to do; and when, on February 5, 1867, the last French troops sailed from Vera Cruz, he remained behind to die. On the 19th of June, after being betrayed to his enemies, he was tried by court-martial and shot.

If Napoleon's defiance of the Monroe doctrine had ended in failure and disgrace, his defiance of the 'treaties,' if not so shameful, was to prove even more fatal in its results for

France. Napoleon III., like Metternich, was fond of general principles. To the unnational, legitimist system of Vienna he opposed the 'Napoleonic idea,' based on the principles of nationality, of universal suffrage, and of himself, as the incarnation of the Revolution. He had in some sort revived the dream of Alexander I.—the dream, that is, of a European Confederation, not, indeed, of sovereigns by divine right, but of democratic national communities, of which the crowned representatives should from time to time meet in Congress under his own presidency as leader of the premier state. He had, in pursuit of this dream, encouraged, not without misgiving, the growth of Italy and of Prussia. And now, instead of the democracies of his dreams, bound to France and to himself by ties of gratitude, there was springing up on his eastern frontier a military empire of which the cohesive principle was to be antagonism to France, and on his southern frontier another military state which had shown only too clearly during the recent peace negotiations that it resented the trammels which bound it to his counsels. The French

French public opinion and the rise of Prussia.

had accepted with enthusiasm the principle of nationality; they were none the less alarmed at the sudden apparition of the armed and rival peoples which were its logical outcome. A great outcry arose in France against the unprincipled ambitions of Prussia. At all hazards the liberties of the South German states, old-time allies of France, must be saved. On March 14, 1867, Thiers, giving voice to the sentiment of all France, declared publicly that Prussia must not be allowed to go further, and that the unification of Germany must at all costs be prevented.

To Bismarck the warlike temper of the French was neither unexpected nor unwelcome. He had from the first realised that the war with Austria must be followed by a second with France; and he held that such a war alone, in which North and South would stand shoulder to shoulder against a common foe, would bind

Bismarck's policy after 1866.

Germany together by a tie of sentiment as well as of material interests.¹ From the moment, then, that the issue with Austria was decided the single aim of his policy was to prepare for the inevitable struggle, by consolidating the North German Confederation, by drawing closer the military and civil relations between this and the South German states, and by securing the goodwill, or at least the neutrality, of the European Powers. In one respect his task was considerably lightened. From being the most unpopular, he had suddenly become the most popular, figure in Germany; and his plans were no longer hampered by a life-and-death struggle with 'progressive' forces at home. With characteristic disregard for personal sentiment, he determined to take advantage of this change in public opinion to make his peace with Liberalism; and to this end, in spite of the misgivings of the king—ever tenacious of his divine prerogative—he introduced into the Prussian Parliament a bill indemnifying the Government for their illegal action in raising, without the consent of Parliament, the taxes for the purpose of carrying through those military reforms which events had proved so essential.² New elections, held under the impression of the overwhelming success of the Prussian arms, had meanwhile resulted in the reduction of the Progressive Opposition to an insignificant minority; and even of these some twenty-six, under the name of National Liberals, seceded from their party, and proclaimed their unqualified support of Bismarck's foreign policy. The bill of indemnity was passed, under these circumstances, by 230 to 75 votes; and Bismarck, freed from the constitutional conflict which had hitherto hampered his movements, was able to devote himself to completing the edifice of German unity.

The problem had been simplified, but not solved, by the ousting of Austria from the Confederation. Prussia,

¹ Bismarck, ii. 41, 'That a war with France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of history' (see also ii. 56, etc.).

² Bismarck, ii. 76.

indeed, could afford to ignore the protests of the dispossessed princes in northern Germany; and a hint from Berlin was enough to scatter the Guelph armaments in Switzerland and Belgium. The worst that Bismarck had to fear in this quarter was a few more irreconcilables sitting with the Poles and Danes on the Opposition benches in Parliament. It was otherwise with the states of the South.

From time immemorial haters of Prussia, they had recently seen their worst fears realised, and their cherished independence, perilously secured by the rivalry of the two Great Powers within the Confederation, threatened by the overthrow of Austria. It is true that their international position had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Prague, but, individually, they were too weak to maintain it; and their mutual jealousies were too great to allow of any rapid realisation of a South German Confederation, which for the present existed only on paper. It was not unreasonable, then, to hope or to fear that the South German states would seize the first opportunity of turning against Prussia and oversetting an intolerable situation. Happily for the success of Bismarck's policy, he possessed the means for solving the problem in an exactly opposite sense. This was due in large measure to the mis-

Napoleon
asks for
'compensa-
tions.'

guided diplomacy of Napoleon. The Emperor, whose calculations had been upset by the disaster of Sadowa, had sent Count Benedetti early in August to Berlin to demand, under threat of war, 'compensations' for France on the left bank of the Rhine. Only on Bismarck's curt refusal to yield a foot of German territory was the proposition altered to a demand for the cession of Luxemburg, and the help of Prussia in conquering Belgium for France. To this latter proposal Bismarck purposely delayed giving a reply; but of the first he knew how to make excellent use in defining the relations between Prussia and the South German states. The latter had been accustomed to regard Prussia as the enemy, and France as

the friend, of their independence. Bismarck now simply published the negotiations, in the course of which Napoleon had proposed to compensate France at the expense of his *protégés*. The effect was immediate. One after another the southern Governments hastened to make their peace with Prussia, and to conclude with her offensive and defensive alliances against this new and greater peril. Treaties were signed with Prussia on August 3 by Würtemberg, on the 17th by Baden, and on the 22nd by Bavaria, giving the supreme command in time of war over their armies to the king of Prussia, and practically placing the whole of Germany under the Prussian military system. Within a year of the peace the financial budgets of South Germany had also, to all intents and purposes, passed under the control of Prussia. The tariff Conventions between the German states (*Zollverein*) had been renewed by the Treaty of Prague, but they were made terminable on six months' notice. On May 28, 1867, Bismarck gave notice that the denunciation of the Conventions by Prussia would be published on the following January 1, and at the same time he invited the ministers of the southern states to a conference at Berlin for the purpose of discussing the renewal of the treaties. Whatever the value of the Main as a political boundary, to have established it as a commercial frontier would have been to ruin the trade of South Germany. The southern states, then, had no option but to accept Bismarck's terms; and the result was the establishment of a tariff-council and a tariff-parliament, composed of North German organisations, strengthened by South German members. The reply of Bismarck to the declaration that Germany must never be united was the proclamation of the fact that, in all but name, the unification of Germany was already complete. Thiers had spoken on March 14; on March 19 Bismarck published the secret military treaties between Prussia and the South German states.

The
'August'
Conventions,
1866.

The German
Tariff-
Parliament.

However complacently Bismarck may have viewed the excitement caused in France by these events, to the Emperor Napoleon himself this was probably wholly unwelcome. He was ill and aging, and, after the sorry fiasco in Mexico, little disposed to risk his throne in fresh adventures. He tried to calm public opinion by the issue of a semi-official *brochure*, in which the outcome of the war of 1866 was represented as a triumph for France, as having permanently alienated Prussia and Austria, and for ever divided Germany by the frontier of the Main. At the beginning of 1867, moreover, he took the first steps towards sharing the responsibilities of the government with the representatives of the nation, and so diverting some of the blame for its failures from his own head. On January 19 was issued the first instalment of those reforms which ended, on May 8, 1870, in the establishment by plebiscite of the Liberal Empire. None the less it seemed essential to find some 'compensation' to throw as a sop to still the growing clamour against Prussia. Napoleon, warned by Bismarck's uncompromising attitude that it was useless to look to the Rhine, turned his attention to Luxemburg.

The Grand-duchy of Luxemburg had, by the Treaty of Vienna, been included in the German Confederation, though attached to Holland by personal union under the sovereignty of the House of Orange, and to Belgium by the sympathy of its inhabitants. The right, moreover, of garrisoning the fortress of Luxemburg itself—regarded as the gate of Lower Germany—had been at the same time granted to Prussia. In spite of its strategic importance, Luxemburg had not been included in the new North German Confederation, partly because it was an appanage of a foreign crown, partly because of the anti-German temper of its inhabitants. On the other hand, its value to the crown of Holland was still largely discounted by the maintenance by Prussia of her right to retain a garrison in the fortress. Under these circumstances the king of

Holland agreed, if the matter could be arranged with the other Powers concerned, to sell his sovereign rights in the duchy to France.

The proposal to annex to France a state so long connected by intimate ties with Germany raised a hurricane of patriotic indignation beyond the Rhine. Public opinion clamoured for the chastisement of French insolence; and the experts of the General Staff urged the expediency of declaring war before the French should have had time to prepare for the war which they were obviously planning. But Bismarck, to whom—whatever may have been his earlier views on the subject—the French claim to Luxemburg certainly did not come as a surprise, did not desire to press matters to extremes. The military reorganisation of the provinces recently annexed to Prussia had not yet been completed; and, above all, he was averse from declaring war except on a plea which should justify such a course to Providence and the Powers.¹ These latter had hastened to interpose in the interests of peace. A proposal of Count Beust for the cession of a slice of Belgium to France in return for Luxemburg failed owing to the refusal of King Leopold to yield any Belgian territory. Finally, the suggestion of Russia was accepted, and the whole matter referred to a Conference of the Powers, which met at London on May 7, 1867.² On the 11th was signed the Treaty of London, by which Luxemburg was declared neutral territory under the guarantee of the Powers. The Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn, and the king of Holland, who retained the sovereignty, undertook to demolish the fortifications of Luxemburg, which henceforward was to remain an open town.³

The settlement of the Luxemburg Question had done no more than postpone the danger of war, and both sides began to sound the other Powers as to their attitude in the event of this breaking out. That France would not be without

¹ Bismarck, ii. 58; cf. pp. 101, 249.

² *Parl. Papers*, lxxiv. 1867, p. 449.

³ Hertslet, iii.

allies seemed obvious. Austria, under the guidance of Beust, was doubtless thirsting for revenge and for the restoration of her place in Germany. Italy was bound to Napoleon by ties of gratitude. Lastly, a useful diversion might be created in the north by making use of the resentment of the Scandinavian nations at Prussia's action in Schleswig-Holstein. Moreover, in spite of the publication of the military treaties by Bismarck, it was still assumed in Paris that the South German states would welcome a French invasion. Bismarck had been blind to none of these possibilities, and the wisdom of his attitude towards Russia—especially during the Polish rising—now became apparent. Whatever the opinion of Russian statesmen may have been as to the rise of a great military Power on their western frontier, their attention for the present was concentrated on the problems of the East, in which Prussia would prove a useful ally against the pretensions and the intrigues of Austria. Beust was already threatening to make Galicia a centre of a new Polish movement, and a combination of Austria and France would certainly bring this to a crisis. Under these circumstances, Bismarck's promise to support Russia in denouncing the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris was enough to purchase her neutrality, and even, in the event of Austria taking up arms, her active aid. To counteract this Russo-France and Austria. Prussian *entente* the Emperors Napoleon and Francis Joseph met at Salzburg in the autumn of 1867, and discussed a project of alliance. The meeting was cordial, but the alliance never got beyond the stage of discussion, and nothing was signed. Opinion in Vienna was, in fact, sharply divided on the question of a renewal of war with Prussia, especially in league with France. Count Andrassy, the Hungarian premier, roundly declared that the monarchy had gained rather than lost by its severance from Germany; the Germans were averse from a war against their brothers over the border in the cause of France, a war which,

The interna-
tional situa-
tion before
the war.

Russia and
Prussia.

France and
Austria.

as Bismarck pointed out, could, if successful, only mean the victory of Pan Slavism.

If the relations of Napoleon with Austria were undefined, those with Italy were even less satisfactory. King Victor Emmanuel, indeed, felt himself bound by ties of ^{France and} gratitude to the French Emperor, and, quite apart ^{Italy.} from political considerations, would willingly have gone to his aid. But the mass of the Italian people were growing day by day more resentful of the claim of France to dictate to their Government, and there was a serious risk that complaisance to the wishes of Napoleon, if carried too far, might endanger the monarchy. It was, above all, the ^{The 'Roman} Roman Question that roused the bitterest feel- ^{Question.'} ings. The same clerical influences, supreme at the Tuileries, which were thrusting the Emperor against his better judgment into war with Prussia, prevented him from completing his work in Italy by withdrawing his support from the temporal power of the Pope. And every year demonstrated more clearly the passionate desire of the Italians to crown the edifice of their union by making Rome the capital of the kingdom. The hot-headed contempt of Garibaldi, supported as he was by popular sentiment, for conventions written or unwritten had more than once threatened to provoke a rupture with France, and kept the Government of Turin in a perennial state of tension. As early as 1862 he had headed a raid from Sicily, aimed at Rome, had been met at Aspromonte by Italian troops, and fallen wounded 'by an Italian bullet.' This had sufficed to overthrow the Rattazzi ministry, helpless between the anger of Italian patriots and the resentment of the French clericals. Minghetti, who succeeded Rattazzi at Milan, cautious and timid, sought safety in a compromise pregnant with future troubles. In September 1864 he signed a Convention by which France undertook to withdraw her troops gradually from Rome, in return for which the Italian Government was to guarantee the Papal territories against aggression. By an additional secret article it was stipulated

that the capital of Italy was to be moved from Turin to Florence. This arrangement had been understood by both sides as merely intended to tide over a difficulty. None the less, when it became known in Italy, it raised a storm of indignation, as a deliberate surrender of the Italian claim to Rome; riots broke out in Turin to protest against the transference to another town of the rank which Turin was only prepared to yield to Rome; and the Minghetti ministry fell. During the Government of La Marmora which followed, the Roman Question had been for the moment obscured by the war of 1866 and the acquisition of Venetia, only to become doubly acute after the conclusion of peace. The question of the Italian capital had, in fact, now become a mere episode in the great war—the ‘Kulturkampf’—between modern civilisation and the revived mediævalism which had begun with the reconstitution of the Order of Jesus, and which was to culminate in the dogma of Papal Infallibility. Already the Church had thrown down the gauntlet to all that is commonly held to mark the nineteenth century as an age of progress. In the ‘Syllabus’ issued on December 8, 1864, the Pope had declared solemnly, if not *ex cathedra*, that it was an error to suppose that the successor of St. Peter could or ought to be ‘reconciled to or compromise with progress or liberalism or modern civilisation,’ and had gone on to illustrate his meaning by condemning all that differentiates the modern from the mediæval world—liberty of thought, toleration, in short, all that had been gained for humanity through ages of struggle. Already the great Œcumenical Council had been projected which would, it was hoped, rivet for ever the ultramontane yoke on the neck of the Catholic Church. Under these circumstances, religious passions were added to the nationalist ardour which refused to rest till the flag of Italy had been planted on the Capitol. Armed bands hovered on the borders of the Papal states, while Garibaldi fretted in his enforced seclusion at Caprera. The Government wavered counsellless

The ‘Syllabus’ and the General Council.

between fear of France and of internal revolution, conniving at the supply of arms to the volunteers, and setting nine warships to prevent Garibaldi from leaving his island. But all precautions became vain when it was known that France had herself violated the spirit of the Convention by allowing French regulars to serve under the disguise of Papal volunteers. An angry correspondence passed between the Cabinets of Florence and Paris, which ended by the threat of Napoleon that, if the Italian Government did not prevent the invasion of the Papal states, France would interfere by force, and a counter-threat that, if France occupied Civita Vecchia, Italy would retaliate by occupying another portion of the Papal states. Meanwhile Garibaldi had slipped past the blockading squadron, and on October 23, 1867, ^{Mentana.} invaded the territory of the Church at the head of a body of volunteers. Napoleon now carried out his threat of despatching troops to the aid of the Pope. These came in contact with the Garibaldians, who had just defeated the Papal troops, at Mentana, on November 3, and put them to rout. 'The chassepots,' wrote the French commander in his despatch, 'have done wonders.'

All this was not calculated to draw nearer the relations between Italy and France. The most that Napoleon could count upon was the personal goodwill of Victor Emmanuel and the fact that, at least, the Italians, in spite of the victory won in common in 1866, had no feeling of gratitude or good comradeship for the Prussians, who had openly accused them, during the Venetian campaign, of deliberately ruining the chances of an overwhelming success. Italy and Austria were, in fact, determined to play for their own hand: Austria for her position in the East; Italy for Rome. When France should have invaded South Germany and won her first inevitable victories, it would be time enough to join in the general scramble; but, meanwhile, the two Powers contented themselves with a general guarantee of each other's territories in the event of a Franco-Prussian war and with an agreement

to take no share in it, unless it were entered into on the part of France with the consent of both of them.

By the beginning of 1870 Prussia was thoroughly ready for war; and Bismarck, while not prepared to imperil the diplomatic advantages of Prussia by precipitating the issue, was waiting anxiously to pick up the gauntlet the moment that France should throw it down. The occasion arose in connection with a matter which directly concerned neither France nor Germany.

Once more the affairs of unhappy Spain were to become of supreme importance for the whole of Europe. The Carlist wars, waged on both sides with incredible bitterness, had left the country impoverished, decadent, a prey to irreconcilable factions. For a while, indeed, under the stern rule of Marshal O'Donnell, there had been a gleam of the old spirit of imperial Spain; and the Spanish arms had won new lustre in Morocco, in San Domingo, in South America, and in Mexico. But in the last case O'Donnell's action had roused the wrath of Napoleon, and he was forced to retire from office. Queen Isabella, pleasure-loving and superstitious, was entirely in the hands of her lover Marfori, of a nun named Patrocinio, and of her confessor Dom Claret; and for a while ministries were made and unmade at the dictation of this camarilla. Liberalism, however, was still strong in the army; and the wholesale banishment of generals was at best an expedient for postponing the inevitable day of reckoning. At last, on September 17, 1868, Marshal Prim raised the standard of revolt at Cadiz, and at once found that the army and the bulk of the nation were at his back. Isabella, who had in vain sought help of Napoleon in her distress, on September 30 fled into France, while her former favourite, Serrano, became President of a provisional Government, in which Prim functioned as Minister of War. The question of the future government of the country was settled by an appeal to the electors. The constituent Cortes decided, on May 21,

Spain and
the Hohen-
zollern
candidature.

1869, by 214 votes to 71, in favour of constitutional monarchy. It was less easy to settle on the personality of the monarch. Carlos VII., grandson of the original pretender, who from Paris duly proclaimed his rights, was clearly impossible, and his name was not even mentioned. To the cadets of royal houses on the lookout for crowns there was nothing very attractive in a throne as bankrupt and unstable as that of Spain. To have offered it to the Duc de Montpensier, the most obvious candidate, would have meant mortally offending Napoleon, who could never have endured an Orleans prince on the throne of Spain. The king of Italy refused the dubious honour for his second son. At last Prim believed that he had found a candidate acceptable to all the Powers in the person of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a distant relative of the House of Prussia, but much more closely related to Napoleon through the Murats and the Beauharnais, while the fact that he was a Catholic would appeal to the Spanish people. Prince Leopold, after causing inquiries to be made, at first refused to take up the thankless task; but, on being pressed, he consented to accept the crown, subject to his election by the Cortes and the approval of King William as the head of his family. On June 28, 1870, the king informed the prince that he would not oppose his wishes; and the Spanish ministry thereupon decided, on July 4, formally to offer the crown to Prince Leopold, subject to the approval of the Cortes, which no one doubted would be given.

The news that a Hohenzollern prince was about to mount the throne of Spain roused the anger of the French people against Prussia to ungovernable fury. The Liberal Cabinet of Ollivier found itself, between an excited public opinion and the Napoleonic idea, on the horns of a dilemma; and at the risk of repudiating that very principle of free popular choice on which the power of Napoleon himself rested, allowed itself to be swept away by the tide. On July 4 the Duc de Gramont declared that 'France would not tolerate the

establishment of a Hohenzollern, or of any other Prussian prince on the throne of Spain', and on the 6th, in the Chamber, he again took up the theme in a still more peremptory tone. 'We do not believe,' he said, 'that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people compels us to submit to a foreign power disarranging to our detriment the existing balance of power in Europe by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles v. . . . It is our firm hope that this event will not be realised. . . . If it prove otherwise, . . . we shall know how to do our duty without hesitation and without weakness.'¹ This utterance was taken by Bismarck as in itself an official international threat 'with the hand on the sword hilt'; and, taken in combination with the insulting tone of the Parisian press, it made it impossible for Prussia to yield consistently with her own honour.² Bismarck, indeed, maintaining throughout a scrupulously 'correct' attitude, denied, in answer to the expostulations of the French ambassador, that Prussia had anything to yield. Officially the ministers knew nothing of the affair, which concerned the king alone, and him too not as king, but as head of the whole name of Hohenzollern. This attitude merely increased the suspicions of the French Cabinet, and Count Benedetti was forthwith sent to Ems, where King William was taking the waters, to treat with the king direct. His reception was what might have been expected. The king expressed his regret at the view taken of the matter in Paris; repeated that his concern in the affair was merely as head of his family; declared that, as far as he was concerned, the Prince of Hohenzollern was at liberty to reconsider his decision, but that he could not, and would not, force him to do so. Meanwhile, the chancelleries of Europe were busy seeking a solution. In reply to Italy, Lord Granville, in the name of the British Cabinet, declared that the time was not

¹ Sorel, *La Guerre Franco-Allemande*, i. 77

² Bismarck, ii. 92.

ripe for European intervention; but in common with Austria, he addressed remonstrances to Madrid and Berlin, suggesting the withdrawal of Prince Leopold in the interests of the peace of Europe.¹ This, in fact, seemed the most obvious solution of the difficulty, and on July 12 the Prince of Hohenzollern publicly renounced his candidature. Ollivier, the same day, announced this decision in the Chambers as a concession of Prussia; and with this the incident should have been closed. But in Paris there was no desire for its closure. The war-party in the Chambers, supported by the Parisian populace, 'for whom war was a drama, and history a romance,' demanded guarantees that Prussia would not renew her sinister designs. Marshal Leboeuf had declared the army to be in all respects prepared for any emergency; further delay would only give Prussia time to complete her preparations; and no better pretext for war could be found than a purely dynastic question which concerned Prussia only, and in which the South German states could have no conceivable interest. On July 12 Count Benedetti at Ems received a telegram from the Duc de Gramont instructing him to demand from the king of Prussia that he would on no future occasion authorise the renewal of Prince Leopold's candidature.

On the afternoon of July 13 Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke were seated together in the Chancellor's room at Berlin. They were depressed and moody; for Prince Leopold's renunciation had been trumpeted in Paris as a humiliation for Prussia. They were afraid, too, that King William's conciliatory temper might lead him to make further concessions, and that the careful preparations of Prussia for the inevitable war with France might be wasted, and a unique opportunity lost. A telegram arrived. It was from the king at Ems, and described his interview that morning with the French ambassador. The king had met Benedetti's request for the guarantee required

Episode of
the 'Ems
telegram.'

¹ *Parl. Papers*, lxx., 1870, p. 19, etc.

by a firm but courteous refusal; and when the ambassador had sought to renew the interview, he had sent a polite message through his aide-de-camp informing him that the subject must be considered closed. In conclusion, Bismarck was authorised to publish the message if he saw fit. The Chancellor at once saw his opportunity. In the royal despatch, though the main incidents were clear enough, there was still a note of doubt, of hesitancy, which suggested a possibility of further negotiation. The excision of a few lines would alter, not indeed the general sense, but certainly the whole tone of the message. Bismarck, turning to Moltke, asked him if he were ready for a sudden risk of war; and on his answering in the affirmative, took a blue pencil and drew it quickly through several parts of the telegram. Without the alteration or addition of a single word, the message, instead of appearing a mere 'fragment of a negotiation still pending,' was thus made to appear decisive. In the actual temper of the French people there was no doubt that it would not only appear decisive, but insulting, and that its publication would mean war.¹

On July 14 the publication of the 'Ems telegram' became known in Paris, with the result that Bismarck had expected. The majority of the Cabinet, hitherto in favour of peace, were swept away by the popular tide; and Napoleon himself reluctantly yielded to the importunity of his ministers and of the Empress, who saw in a successful war the best, if not the only, chance of preserving the throne for her son. On the evening of the same day, July 14, the declaration of war was signed; and the next day it was announced in the Senate that the Government had called up the reserves, and would 'take measures to safeguard the interests and the honour of France.' The same day, July 15, King William returned to Berlin, and, after a council of war, ordered the immediate mobilisation of the armies of the North German Confederation, while, at the same time, the Federal Parliament was

¹ For Bismarck's own account, see Bismarck, ii. 95.

summoned for the 19th. England made a last attempt to preserve peace by suggesting mediation under Protocol xxiii. of the Peace of Paris;¹ but both France and Prussia refused to consider the proposal, and the die was cast for war.

Everything now depended upon the outcome of the first phases of the struggle. The French plan was to concentrate the main bulk of their forces on the upper Rhine, and to invade southern Germany. A couple of victories would, it was assumed, decide the wavering counsels of Austria and Italy, and bring over the South German states to the French side. But the French Government had not calculated on their own unreadiness, nor on the careful perfection of the German preparations for a contest long expected. The plans of French diplomatists were based upon the assumption of the complete efficiency of the French army, those of French generals upon the certainty of the co-operation of powerful allies. A few days sufficed to dissipate both illusions. The diplomatic isolation of France was the first to reveal itself. No sooner was war absolutely decided on than Bismarck published the draft, in the handwriting of Benedetti, of a treaty with Prussia, of which the object was the annexation of Luxemburg by France.² In vain Benedetti protested that the treaty had been dictated by Bismarck himself. The old ambitions of France were too clearly revealed in it, alarming to all states of secondary rank, and provoking England to demand a guarantee for the absolute neutrality of Belgium, which was signed at Berlin on the 8th, and at Paris on the 11th of August. Meanwhile, Count Beust, protesting that France had placed herself hopelessly in the wrong, put an end at once to any hope of the immediate co-operation of Austria by publishing, on July 20,

French plan
of campaign.

Neutrality of
Belgium
guaranteed.

¹ Granville to Lyons, etc., July 15, 1870; *Parl. Papers*, lxx., 1870, p. 57.

² In *The Times* of July 25, 1870.

the Austrian declaration of neutrality. This was followed, on the 23rd, by that of Russia, which was so worded as to convey a threat that, should Austria at any time go to the aid of France, Russia would be unable to hold aloof. On the 25th, Denmark, under pressure from England and Russia, also issued a declaration of neutrality. Italy followed suit on the same day. At the same time, Austria and Italy had come to an agreement with a view to common action in the event of an actual invasion of South Germany by France.

The surprising military developments of the early days of the war soon proved that no such contingency would arise. German plan of campaign. Moltke had, during the winter of 1869, elaborated a plan of campaign, according to which 300,000 men were, at the outbreak of war, to be massed along the Middle Rhine, ready either to fall on the flank of an army invading southern Germany, or for a forward movement into France. The plan had been perfected down to its minutest details; and eighteen days after the issue of the order for mobilisation (July 16), the German armies were massed, with transport complete, at their appointed posts. Along the Saar as far as Saarlouis, 85,000 men, under Steinmetz, formed the so-called first army. To the east of this, from Saarlouis, through Saarbrücken, to Saargemünd, stretched the second army, under the 'Red Prince,' Frederick Charles. For the protection of South Germany the third army, consisting of 200,000 men under the Crown Prince of Prussia, was massed between Landau and Carlsruhe. On August 2, King William arrived at Mayence, and two days later all was ready for active operations. The machine-like precision of the German movements seemed

Unreadiness of the French. all the more marvellous in contrast with the hopeless confusion of those of the French. Napoleon's plan had been to mass 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strassburg, and to advance in force over the Rhine at Maxau, while 50,000 men remained in reserve at Châlons, and 30,000 were despatched by sea to

create a diversion by landing in Denmark. But when, on July 28, the Emperor arrived at Metz, he found no more than 130,000 men, while at Strassburg the army was also 20,000 men or more short of its full complement. At the same time, the completion of the mobilisation was delayed by the hopeless confusion reigning in every department of the army.¹ On August 2, the war was opened by a reconnaissance of Frossard's division towards Saarbrücken, which, after a gallant defence, was evacuated by the small German force which held it. This was telegraphed to Paris as a great victory, the more significant since in it the Prince Imperial had received his baptism of fire. It was the last victory gained by the French Empire. On August 4, at Weissenburg, the first serious engagement of the war ended in a victory for the Germans: significantly enough, a victory for that Third Army, which, though commanded by the Prussian Crown Prince, was mainly composed of Bavarian and other South German troops. On August 5, the first and second armies also advanced, crossed the Saar at Saarbrücken, and next day attacked and carried the heights of Spicheren. On the same August 6, the Crown Prince had attacked Marshal Macmahon's army of 45,000 men at Wörth, and, after a bloody contest, gained a decisive victory. Within a week of the actual outbreak of hostilities, the French armies which were to have conquered South Germany were in full retreat toward Châlons and Metz.²

The political consequences of the German victories were even greater than the military. All prospect of an intervention of Austria or Italy in the struggle was at once obviated; and it became possible for Lord Granville to carry through his plan for effectively isolating the war. At the suggestion of England

Affair of
Saarbrücken,
August 2.

Battles of
Weissenburg
and Wörth.

Political consequences
of the
German
victories.

¹ See Martin, *Hist. de France*, vii. 85.

² The most reliable and accessible military history of the war is *The Franco-German War* by various writers (semi-official), translated by Major-General J. F. Maurice, C.B.

a 'League of Neutrals' was formed—Austria alone of the non-combatant Powers remaining outside—by which it was agreed that no Power was to intervene in the war without written notice to the rest of its intention to change its policy.¹ This, while ostensibly leaving each Power free to intervene, in effect made it possible for a clever diplomacy to prevent any joint intervention of the European Powers, which England dreaded, lest a European Congress, at which Russia would certainly take a leading place, should reopen the Eastern Question by a revision of the Treaty of Paris of 1856.

At Paris the dream of conquest and glory dissolved at the first touch of disaster in fury and consternation. The Liberal ministry of Ollivier, which had been pushed against its better judgment into war, went under in the storm, and Count Palikao essayed to form a Government which should be able to regain the lost confidence of the people. Leboeuf was at the same time replaced at the head of the army by Marshal Bazaine; and Napoleon himself was virtually deposed in favour of the Empress, who was made Regent. The safety of the Empire, however, could not be secured by any political changes at Paris, and all depended upon

the course of the war. This had by no means been decided by the victories of August 5 and 6. The army of Châlons was still intact; Bazaine still commanded an unbroken force of 170,000 men at Metz; and should Macmahon succeed in effecting a junction with these at Verdun, or some other spot selected, the German advance might yet break upon a second and stronger line of defence. The object of the Germans was, then, to prevent this concentration and, if possible, to cut off Bazaine and enclose him in Metz. At the Prussian headquarters not a moment was lost. On August 11, the left wing of the Prussian armies, under the Crown Prince, crossed the Vosges; and the first and second armies, moving parallel with him on the inner line, described a half circle in the

Military
develop-
ments after
August 6.

¹ Granville to Lyons, Aug. 16, 1870; *Parl. Papers*, lxxi., 1871, p. 25.

direction of Metz along the course of the Moselle. This strategy brought the Germans with their broad front to the French line of retreat. The latter had already begun their retirement on Verdun; but, on August 14, they were attacked by Von der Goltz at Colombières, where, without gaining a decided success, he succeeded in delaying their retirement until the arrival of the main body of the German forces rendered it impossible. The bloody battles of August 16 and 17 at Vionville, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte followed; the general result being that the French plan of concentration was hopelessly shattered, and Bazaine with 170,000 men locked up in Metz. The backward movement of Bazaine having failed, Macmahon set out from Châlons to attempt to effect a junction with him on the Meuse. The Crown Prince marched in pursuit; at Beaumont the French were worsted, and Macmahon was forced to direct his march on Sedan. Here, on September 1, was fought the last battle of the Empire. The French army, defeated after a fearful struggle, and cooped up in Sedan under the guns of a greatly superior force, was compelled to lay down its arms. Napoleon having vainly sought death on the field of battle, surrendered his sword to the king of Prussia in person.

Battle of
Sedan, Sep-
tember 1,
1870.

The capitulation of Sedan ended the first phase of the war; and, had this been a contest solely brought about by the ambitions of princes, the whole war might have ended with it. But, in the words of M. Sorel, 'it was given to the war of 1870 to prove that quarrels between nations have a more implacable character than quarrels between sovereigns, and that the principle of nationality, so far from producing any progress in political morality, on the contrary, leads men to return to the most barbarous practices.'¹ Napoleon himself was careful to explain to the Prussian king that the sword he was surrendering was not that of France. He was but stating a fact which the French people soon made obvious.

¹ Sorel, i. 262.

The Empire had only been maintained with difficulty after the defeats of August. After Sedan it became impossible.

Fall of the Empire. The arrival of the news in Paris was immediately followed by a revolution which swept away

the feeble remnants of the Liberal Empire. The Legislative Chamber had assembled at dead of night; and Jules Favre proposed, without a word being raised in protest, the deposition of the Emperor. Thiers, in the hope of preparing the way for a restoration of the Orleans dynasty, brought in a motion for the constitution of a provisional Government by the Chambers, and the speedy convocation of a Constituent Assembly; but before this could be put to the vote, the Chamber was invaded by a mob; the deputies of Paris, headed by Favre and Léon Gambetta, marched to the Hôtel de Ville, and there proclaimed the Republic. The Empress,

Government of National Defence. deserted by all, fled to England; a Government of National Defence was constituted, with General Trochu at its head, Jules Favre as Minister of

Foreign Affairs, and Gambetta, Minister of the Interior. In view of the critical situation, Thiers, without accepting the principle of the Republic, recognised the new Government and recommended his friends to do the same. At the same time, on September 6, Favre despatched a circular note to the Powers, justifying the overthrow of the Empire, and laying upon Napoleon personally the responsibility for the war, for the continuance of which, now that he was fallen, there was no excuse. 'The king of Prussia,' he wrote, 'declared he was fighting, not France, but Napoleon. We desire peace; but if he continues this unjust war, we will fight to the end. We will not yield an inch of French soil, nor a stone of French fortresses.'¹

This uncompromising declaration rudely dissipated the hope that had for a moment been cherished at the German

¹ Sorel, i. 298. King William had said nothing of the kind, but only that the Germans were fighting the French *army*, not the well-behaved civil population.

headquarters that the victory of Sedan had ended the war. The temper of the French had been too manifest for years past for Bismarck to believe that they had not desired war, or even that they would not renew it, after defeat, on the first favourable opportunity; and he was determined that, if peace were conceded, it should only be in return for such a cession of territory as should ensure Germany against a renewal of war. It was determined, in fact, immediately after Sedan, that the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, with the fortresses of Metz and Strassburg, should be the *sine qua non* of peace; and, under these circumstances, the advance of the army of the Crown Prince on Paris was pressed on without delay. By September 19, 147,000 men, with 622 guns, were assembled before the capital, and the German headquarters had been established in its immediate neighbourhood.

The war now entered into a new phase, in which France was to prove that, whatever the corruption of her Government, the traditional courage and patriotism of her people were in no way abated. The fortunes of the country were, indeed, as yet by no means desperate. The armies of France had been shattered, it is true; but 400,000 of the enemy were held inactive by the investment of Metz, and almost as many more would be required before Paris. If, then, these two places could hold out for some months, it would be possible to raise fresh armies in the south for the purpose of relieving them, and, ultimately, of combining to drive the Germans out of France. But this latter task could not be performed by a Government cooped up in Paris; and it was, therefore, decided to establish a second seat of government in the south. Before the hostile lines had closed round Paris, then, M. Crémieux, with three other Government at Tours. members of the ministry, left the capital and established themselves at Tours. The experiment was not at first successful. Crémieux, an honest man and good lawyer, had little experience in governing men, and his authority was

from the first disputed. A separatist movement even developed; Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulouse raised the red flag of the Commune; and at the former of these places representatives from thirteen departments met to form a League of the South, while in the west the royalist departments began to organise a similar League. If the heroic resistance of Paris, now closely invested, was not to be altogether in vain, a firm hand at the helm of government was absolutely essential. The need called forth the man. On October 7 Gambetta escaped from Paris in a balloon, and, reaching Tours in safety, took over the supreme direction of affairs. His fiery patriotism and imperious will soon succeeded where a more conciliatory temper had failed. France once more felt the hand of a master; discord vanished; and the country, at the call of the Dictator, rallied to the tricolour of the Republic. The plan of Gambetta was well conceived, and might have been successful but for the treason of Bazaine at Metz, and, possibly, his own imperious temper, which led him to interfere unduly with the military chiefs. France was to be divided for purposes of military organisation into four districts, of which the centres were to be at Lille, Le Mans, Bourges, and Besançon; and for each district there was to be a separate army and a separate commander. The forces thus raised were to be used to effect the relief of Paris, partly by harassing the enemy and disturbing his long line of communications, partly by direct attack on his main forces. Early in October the Germans discovered, in fact, that a considerable force was being collected in Bourges and in its immediate neighbourhood; and Moltke ordered General Von der Tann to march, with part of the investing force from Paris, on Orleans, to take the city, and then to cross the Loire for the purpose of destroying the arsenal and stores at Bourges. The first part of the programme was successfully carried out; on October 11 the French were defeated outside Orleans, and the city was occupied. But the force at the

disposal of the German commander was not of sufficient strength to face the considerable army which he discovered to be present on the further side of the river. The surrender of Strassburg, on September 27, had set free the division of General Werder, who was now ordered to march to the support of Von der Tann; before he could carry out his orders, however, the capitulation of Metz released an immense force, which rendered unnecessary the perilous march of his comparatively small division through a hostile country.

The treason of Bazaine consisted, on his own confession, in the fact that he placed the interests, if not of his own ambition, certainly of political party, before those of his country. From the first his conduct had been ambiguous; and after the news of the catastrophe of Sedan, it became increasingly clear that his attention was divided between the German enemy at his gate and the domestic enemy in authority at Paris and Tours. His duty to France was obviously to make a determined effort to break through the investing lines which held her only remaining regular army practically prisoners. He preferred to remain all but inactive, and to spend his time in negotiations with the enemy for a peace which should leave him at the head of an unbroken army, and arbiter of the destinies of France. Bismarck, as usual, gauged his man, and used him. He affected to regard him as the sole legitimate authority remaining in France; and what with negotiations and intrigues, kept him in play till the opportunity for a successful sortie was passed, and, on October 27, after a half-hearted demonstration to save appearances, he was forced to lay down his arms. For France it was a second Sedan. One hundred and seventy thousand men and immense stores of war material fell into the hands of the enemy; but, worse than this, the investing armies were now set free to operate in other fields. The second army, leaving the first under Manteuffel to operate on the Meuse, marched southward to join Von der Tann on the Loire; while Werder was left free to march eastwards

The capitulation of Metz, Oct. 27.

against the forces which were gathering under General Cambriels.

In face of this fresh and crushing catastrophe Gambetta displayed the same indomitable spirit. His reply to the news that France had lost another army was to issue, on November 2, a proclamation ordering a *levée en masse* of the whole population capable of bearing arms. At the same time he ordered General Aurelle des Paladines, whom after the defeat of October 11 he had appointed to the command of the army of the Loire, to advance, ready or unready, to drive Von der Tann out of Orleans. The sole chance of the French, indeed, seemed to be to defeat the weaker detachments of the enemy before the arrival of the hosts of Prince Frederick Charles. On November 9 Paladines attacked the Germans at Coulmier, defeated them, and drove them out of Orleans. Had he been able to follow up his victory, the position of the Germans before Paris might have been endangered; and, the force of Von der Tann once thoroughly demoralised, the divisions of the army of Metz advancing to his relief might have been defeated in detail. But the French general could not rely on his raw and untrained troops, and remained at Orleans in order to complete their organisation. Meanwhile the leading divisions of the army of Prince Frederick Charles thrust themselves in between Orleans and Paris; Gambetta insisted on an attempt being made to relieve the capital; and Paladines, allowing his better judgment to be overruled, advanced, after arranging with General Trochu for a simultaneous sortie of the garrison of Paris. The bloody battles which followed to the north of Orleans, between November 28 and December 2, ended once more in the success of the Germans. The army of the Loire was cut into two halves, which were driven in opposite directions, and on December 5 Orleans was reoccupied. The sortie from Paris, attended with the same varying fortune, ended in the like ill-success; and General Ducrot, who on November 29 had carried the heights of Champigny,

was, on December 4, driven back into the city. During the same days Manteuffel, operating in the north, had gained a victory before Amiens (November 27); Rouen was occupied on December 6; and a few days later his army reached the sea at Dieppe. In January a fresh attempt to relieve Paris from the north was made by General Faidherbe; but it was checked at the indecisive battle of Bapaume on the 3rd, and finally defeated at St. Quentin on the 19th.

The collapse of the French resistance in the south soon followed. While Chanzy, with half the army of the Loire, was left to oppose Prince Frederick Charles, the division under Bourbaki was ordered by Gambetta to strike eastward and effect a diversion by an inroad into Germany. The plan seemed at first to promise success. Werder, who had been opposing a force of auxiliaries under Garibaldi, and part of whose troops were engaged in besieging Belfort, was obliged to fall back before Bourbaki's superior numbers. But a flank attack delivered by one of his lieutenants at Villersexel delayed the French advance long enough to enable him to take up a strong position at Montbéliard, where he decided to await the arrival of Manteuffel, who was hurrying to his assistance. Between January 15 and 17 Bourbaki hurled his starved and frozen battalions in vain against the German lines. At last, seeing the impossibility of continuing the struggle, he began his retreat. Werder was in no condition to follow; and Bourbaki was in no condition to obey Gambetta's order to turn against the isolated column which Manteuffel was leading from the north. The French general retreated towards Pontarlier, in the hope of making his way round to Lyons. But Werder was now on his track, and Manteuffel stood at his front. The unfortunate general made a desperate effort to take his own life; and on February 1 his broken and disorganised battalions, still eighty-five thousand strong, escaped over the Swiss frontier and laid down their arms. No better fortune had attended Chanzy. In a series of engagements he had

been gradually driven back from Vendôme to Le Mans, where, on January 12, his power had been broken in a final struggle. At the beginning of February France lay at the feet of her conqueror.

It was not only in the military sphere that the period of the siege of Paris had been one of intense anxiety for the German leaders. The annexation of Alsace and eastern Lorraine had been proclaimed immediately after the fall of Strassburg, on September 27; and, in face of the overwhelming success of the German arms, European criticism was dumb. But with the unexpected vitality of the French resistance, and the occasionally precarious position of the German armies round Paris, voices began once more to rise in protest against the tearing up of 'the Treaties' and in favour of a joint intervention of Europe. The possibility of such outside intervention was the main hope of the Government of National Defence, the main fear of Bismarck.¹ As early as September 13 Thiers, in spite of the weight of his seventy years, had started out on a tour to the various European courts in the hope of engaging them to help secure at least an armistice to enable the elections to be held. He met with but scant encouragement. It was at this point that the foresight of Bismarck in securing the goodwill of Russia produced its effect. Of all European statesmen, Count Beust alone desired a European intervention 'to moderate the demands of the conqueror and soften the bitterness of the sentiments which must crush the vanquished.' He had suggested a collective step at London as early as September 28, and on October 12 had written in the same sense to the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg. But the views of Russia as to the concerted action of Europe were, since 1856, no longer those of Alexander I. or Nicholas, and she was only too glad to seize the opportunity offered to her by Bismarck to repudiate the obligations forced upon her by the

Diplomatic
situation
during the
siege of
Paris.

¹ Bismarck, ii. 107, etc.

Congress of Paris, even though, incidentally, this involved the denial of those international principles of which she had once been the prime champion. In a circular, addressed on October 29 to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris, the Russian Government announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the clauses of the treaty which limited her sovereign rights in the Black Sea. 'It would be difficult to affirm,' it added, 'that the written law founded on the respect for treaties, as the basis of public right and rule of the relations between states, has preserved the same moral sanction as in former times.'¹ It was a commentary both practical and theoretical on Beust's despairing exclamation: '*Je ne vois plus de l'Europe!*' Austria, between her fear of Russia and of the growing power of Prussia, was indeed in a singularly helpless position. On September 10, under the impression of the catastrophe of Sedan, she had joined the League of Neutrals; but this had only bound her hand and foot in the diplomatic toils spread by Lord Granville to stay the feet of a too active diplomacy. For England under the Gladstone ministry, though prodigal of good advice, was sparing of action. By maintaining an attitude scrupulously 'correct' it would not be difficult, under the circumstances, for Bismarck to keep 'Europe' at arm's length.

Russia repudiates the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.

Anxious as Bismarck was to secure a settlement before there should be any serious risk of this being taken over by a European Congress, the difficulties had been insuperable

¹ Sorel, ii. 71, 91. This action of Russia for a moment threatened at least a diplomatic breach with England. At Bismarck's suggestion a Conference was held at London (for which Prussia issued the invitations on November 26) to arrange the affair. Bismarck, in order to prevent the affairs of France being raised at the Conference, took 'vulgar but effective' methods to prevent Favre attending (Sorel, ii. 125; Bismarck, ii. 251). While perforce conceding the Russian demand, the Conference in order 'to reconcile facts with principles' agreed, on January 17, to a formula announcing that 'contracting Powers could only rid themselves of their treaty engagements by an understanding with their co-signatories.'

as long as France retained any power of resistance ; for the demand for the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, which Prussia made the *sine qua non* of peace, was met by a consistent refusal to cede a foot of French soil. Moreover, in the absence of any regularly constituted Government, all negotiation must necessarily be in the air ; for it was doubtful, as Bismarck said, whether France would accept the decision of Paris. The first condition of serious negotiations, then, would be for an armistice to enable the Government to issue writs for the election of a Constituent Assembly to settle the future government of France. As early as September 18, Favre had had an interview with Bismarck at Ferrières ; but the eloquence of the excitable Frenchman had been wasted on the Iron Chancellor, and the only terms on which Bismarck would negotiate had been rejected as an insult to France. But since then had followed the weary months of the siege, failure of sortie after sortie, the pitiless bombardment, the death of thousands by famine and disease, rumours of the approach of relieving armies raised only to be dashed, and now the culminating news that, of all the armies on which the hopes of France had been set, not one survived. To all—even to Gambetta—it was clear that the time had come to negotiate. A final sortie was made from Paris on January 21. Its failure left those in authority in the city face to face with the fact that provisions for only a fortnight were left ; and for the purpose of revictualling so large a city, time would be necessary. On January 23 Favre once more sought an interview with Bismarck at Versailles in order to discuss the terms of a general armistice and of the capitulation of Paris. On the 28th the armistice was signed, its avowed object being to give an opportunity for the election of a National Assembly, to be convened for the express purpose of deciding as to the continuance of the war or the terms of peace. The armistice was agreed to by Prussia on condition that the forts of Paris and all war material should be surrendered ; that the guns of the *enceinte* should

Capitulation
of Paris,
Jan. 28, 1871,

be dismantled, and the regular troops of the garrison lay down their arms. Favre, in an unfortunate moment, obtained one concession which was to cost France dear: the National Guard were allowed to keep their arms and artillery.

Bismarck's fear that France would not accept the decision of the Government of Paris was not realised. Even Gambetta recognised the necessity for accepting the armistice, though he protested against its having been concluded without his participation, and attempted to exploit it for the purpose of organising fresh forces of resistance. The elections were fixed for February 8. Gambetta, in the interests of the Republic and of an irreconcilable policy, had issued a decree excluding all ex-officials of the Empire from the franchise; but, on the protest of Bismarck, this had been cancelled by the Paris Government; whereupon Gambetta resigned. On February 12 the National Assembly was formally opened at Bordeaux, whither the secondary Government had fled from Tours after the first disasters to the army of the Loire. The Government of National Defence now declared its functions at an end; and Thiers, whose patriotism and unwearying efforts during the war had been conspicuous, was called to the head of the state. After appointing a ministry and calling on the Assembly to refrain for the present from discussing the burning question of the future government of France, he set out for Paris to negotiate the terms of peace. On February 26 the preliminaries were signed. France was to cede Alsace and eastern Lorraine, including Metz and Strassburg, and to pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs. Pending the ratification of the treaty, a part of Paris was to be occupied by German troops. On March 1 the Germans, headed by the king of Prussia, now also German Emperor, marched through the Champs Élysées, thirty thousand strong. They remained in Paris, however, only forty-eight hours, the treaty of peace being ratified by the Assembly at Bordeaux on March 3. It was stipulated in the treaty that the German

Terms of
peacesigned,
Feb. 26, 1871.

troops were to be withdrawn from France gradually as the war indemnity was paid off, a process which it was calculated would take years. Some outstanding questions, financial and others, of minor importance still remained to be settled, and the definitive treaty of peace was only signed at Frankfort on May 10.

The war, begun by Napoleon to prevent the consolidation of Prussian power in Germany, had ended, as Bismarck hoped and expected, in welding together the dissevered halves of the German nation into a powerful empire. Already, in November 1870, the South German states had, one by one, attached themselves to the North German Confederation. On the eve of the final breakdown of the French resistance, Bismarck thought the time had come to crown the edifice of German unity by placing the imperial crown on the head of the king of Prussia. The project was not carried through without opposition. King William himself displayed a strong reluctance to exchange the crown of the Prussian monarchy, with its glorious traditions, for one which he affected to regard as a mere stage property. The opposition of the kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg was more comprehensible. But, in a letter to the former, Bismarck pointed out that the defined authority of a German Emperor over Bavaria would be more tolerable than the indefinite claims of a king of Prussia based on mere superiority of force. King Louis yielded to the argument, and himself wrote urging the king of Prussia to assume the imperial crown. The submission of Würtemberg perforce followed that of Bavaria. King William allowed himself to be persuaded, and, on January 18, in the great hall of the palace of Versailles, was hailed as Emperor by the grand-duke of Baden on behalf of the sovereigns of Germany. The title altered nothing in the powers and privileges which had belonged to the president of the German Confederation. It was the supreme symbol of the unity of Germany. But Germany was united, not in the sense of the French monarchy, but as a confederation of

states more or less independent, each with its parliament having authority over all matters not defined in the treaties as imperial—which varied greatly in scope in the different states—and of which the sovereigns as hereditary members of the Federal Council (*Bundesrath*) possess considerable weight in moulding the policy of the empire. The authority of the Emperor remained, and remains, based upon the military power of Prussia, which is supreme throughout Germany, and which the imperial title was intended at once to typify and to disguise.

France, too, was to rise from her disasters strangely altered; but with the conclusion of the war with Germany the throes of her new birth were not yet over. As usual, the demagogues of Paris thought the overthrow of the old Government and the misfortunes of their country an excellent opportunity for establishing their own authority. Unhappily, Favre, in the simplicity of his belief in the goodness and sweet reasonableness of 'the people,' had placed a weapon in their hands by stipulating with Bismarck that the National Guard should be allowed to retain their arms. As the Germans advanced into Paris these had retired to Montmartre with their artillery. Next day regular troops were sent to withdraw this; but the soldiers were won over by the mob, and their generals were taken and shot. By this time a revolutionary Government had established itself at the Hôtel de Ville and proclaimed the Commune. The regular troops were hereupon withdrawn to Versailles, where Thiers and the Assembly were now established. A civil war now broke out, under the eyes of the Germans, between the red flag and the tricolour; and for six weeks Paris was subjected to a second bombardment more destructive than the first. After severe fighting, the Versailles troops managed to penetrate into the city, the Communists burning and destroying as they retired; and when, at last, the National Government was in possession of the capital, half the public buildings were blackened ruins. The fight had been conducted with

atrocious barbarity, no quarter being given on either side, and it had been once more demonstrated that Frenchmen are more cruel to each other than to their common foes. If the result of the Franco-German war has been largely to substitute for the old cosmopolitanism of the French a suspicion and dislike of foreigners alien to their nature, that of the Commune has certainly been largely to increase the bitterness of party feeling within France itself.

One other outcome of the German victories in France remains to be mentioned. The downfall of the French

The Italians
occupy
Rome, Sept.
20, 1870.

Empire, which had been used by Russia for ridding herself of the obnoxious clauses of the treaty of 1856, was taken advantage of by

Italy to complete the edifice of her unity by the occupation of Rome. The moment was, in more ways than one, singularly opportune. The battle of Sedan had deprived the Papacy of all hope of that French support on which it had hitherto relied for the maintenance of the temporal power; and for the time it seemed as though its spiritual power also was threatened as the result of its own measureless pretensions. The Catholic Powers had been alarmed and offended by the promulgation at the General Council of the Vatican, on July 18, 1870, of the dogma of Papal infallibility, which was taken as a serious menace to the rights of lay sovereignty; and the Old Catholic movement, more especially in Germany, was exhibiting a vigorous development which has not been maintained. When, therefore, on September 20, the Italian troops, after meeting with but a formal resistance, entered Rome, not a voice among the Powers was raised in serious protest. With the Pope the Italian Government offered to make a liberal arrangement on Cavour's principle of 'a free Church in a free State.' The Pope was to retain, in the Vatican, the status of a sovereign prince, with the right to receive ambassadors from foreign Powers and to maintain a guard; and the Government, at the same time, guaranteed him a liberal annuity. But Pius ix.

was too deeply pledged to the maintenance of the temporal power to accept even these terms. He retired into the Vatican, refused to hold any communication with the Italian Government, and proclaimed himself to the world as a prisoner for conscience' sake, an attitude which has been but slightly relaxed by his successor. The spiritual power of the Papacy at the beginning of the new century is greater than it has ever been since the Middle Ages. To the impartial mind it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this is largely due to the fact that it is no longer complicated with and hampered by the petty cares and ambitions of an Italian prince.

CHAPTER XIX

THE TREATY OF BERLIN

General results of the War—The recovery of France—The third Republic—Risk of war in 1875—League of the three Emperors—Bismarck and Clericalism—Isolation of France—The Eastern Question—Panslavism—Rising in the Balkan Peninsula—The Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum—Conference at Constantinople—'Reform' in Turkey—The Russo-Turkish War—The Congress and Treaty of Berlin—Russia in Central Asia—Affairs of the Balkan States.

THE results of the Franco-German war proclaimed to all the world the triumph of the principle of nationality over that of the community of Europe. In the agony of her death-struggle France had in vain invoked the aid of the Powers to preserve the principles of those treaties of 1815 which, so long as they had seemed to be directed against herself alone, she had done her best to destroy. But Bismarck's diplomacy had succeeded in preventing the intervention of a European Congress in the quarrel between France and Prussia, and the result was clear to all the world. The dream of a confederated Europe had been finally mingled with the air; the rights of states, great or small, were no longer based upon any fiction of international law, but upon

'The good old plan
That he should take who has the power,
And he should keep who can.'

And this new-old principle of the right of conquest had, cynically enough, borrowed for its justification the phrases of the Liberalism of '48. In the name of nationality the

Italians had occupied Rome. In the name of nationality Germany held Alsace-Lorraine. The treaties of Vienna and of the Holy Alliance had been directed against the rivalry of kings. The principle of nationality, in overthrowing these treaties, had substituted the far more bitter rivalry of peoples. To men of discernment the logical outcome was clear. 'We have earned,' said Moltke in the Reichstag shortly after the conclusion of peace, 'in the late war respect, but hardly love. What we have gained by arms in six months we shall have to defend by arms for fifty years.' The actual armaments of the nations are the practical commentary on this text.

In one respect, indeed, the marvellous political foresight of Bismarck had been at fault. The ruin of her military system and the crushing burden of the war indemnity would, he thought, render France for years to come helpless for purposes of aggression; and Germany would be able to devote herself to developing her internal resources, without the risk of having to fight again to retain what she had won. He had, however, failed to realise the astonishing power of recuperation which France, mainly owing to the native thrift of her peasant population, has always shown. Long before the term stipulated in the Treaty of Frankfort the necessary loans for paying off the vast war indemnity had been raised, and French soil freed from the 'contamination' of the foreigner. At the same time, in spite of the enormous financial burden involved by this process, all parties united in the task of building up once more the military power of France, with the scarcely disguised object of some day being in a position to reconquer the lost provinces. When, four years after the end of the war, the military reorganisation of the country was completed by the law of March 1875, France could put into the field an army, including militia (territorial army) and reserves, of 2,400,000 men.

The recovery
of France.

The settlement of two vast and complicated questions on which the sentiment of Frenchmen was united was found

easier than that of the problem of the future government of France, on which it was grievously at variance. The laying of the red spectre of the Commune had left the Government, in semblance though not in spirit, a republic. Thiers, a life-long supporter of constitutional monarchy,¹ was at the head of the Executive, and of the Assembly the great majority was frankly monarchist and reactionary. But the majority itself, though united against the definitive establishment of the Republic, was hopelessly split up into Legitimists, Bonapartists, and Orleanists. For months and years the weary war of debate and intrigue continued; and, meanwhile, every by-election proved that the country was becoming used to the republican form of government and tired of the futile polemics of the monarchist parties. Thiers himself soon realised that the triumph of any one of the monarchist factions would unite against it all the rest, and declared himself in favour of a conservative republic as the form of government which would divide Frenchmen least. On May 24, 1873, he was driven from office by a combination of the monarchist parties; and Marshal Macmahon became head of a Government more or less pledged to a Bourbon restoration. But the meditated *coup d'état* was wrecked upon the perennial stumblingblock of Bourbon obstinacy. The offer of the crown was made conditional on the acceptance of the tricolour flag; but the Comte de Chambord declared that he preferred principle to power, and that he would never surrender the white lilies of the Bourbons. This attitude, of which the foolishness was perhaps redeemed by a touch of nobility, settled the question. Macmahon himself exclaimed that, if the tricolour were replaced by the white flag, 'the chassepots would go off of themselves.' On February 25, 1875, after

Formal
establish-
ment of the
Republic.

¹ 'A republic necessarily turns to blood or imbecility' (Speech of March 17, 1834; Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, ii. 106); but, '*Le temps des rois est passé*' (March 22, 1848, p. 107).

a *de facto* existence of four years, the Republic was formally constituted.¹

The development of affairs in France had been for German statesmen a subject of watchful solicitude. Above all, the eager and ostentatious arming of the whole nation seemed, in view of the loud and persistent cry for 'revenge' by which it was accompanied, of sinister significance; and at Berlin voices were raised in influential quarters in favour of forestalling the action of France by attacking her once more before her preparations were complete. But Bismarck recognised the unwisdom of such a policy. He had no desire to win for the new German Empire the reputation for wanton aggressiveness which had ruined that of Napoleon. He saw, too, that the conditions of 1875 were not those of 1870, and that an attack on France would probably lead to a coalition of the Powers against Germany in the interests of the European balance. And so, while consolidating the Empire and developing its military resources, he desired to make it plain that this was for purposes of defence only, and that the attitude of Germany towards Europe was henceforth to be wholly conservative.² The social unrest of the times conveniently provided him with an opportunity for at once displaying the correctness of his views and providing Germany with allies. The horrors of the Commune, the activity of the Nihilists in Russia, and the spread of Socialism in Germany were indeed symptoms alarming enough to the established powers to call for precautions. As early as September 1870, Bismarck had already sounded the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna as to a

¹ Care was taken to ensure its conservative character. The legislative body was divided into two chambers, of which the upper one (Senate) was to be elected, partly by special electoral colleges assembled *ad hoc*, partly by the Lower House. Accidental vacancies in the Senate are filled up by co-optation. The President is elected for seven years by both houses voting in common. This avoids the perils of the *plébiscite*, and makes it impossible for a President to play the part of Napoleon in 1848.

² Bismarck, ii. 189

Triple Alliance directed against the Revolution, an alliance into which monarchical Italy was ultimately to be admitted.

The League of the Three Emperors. Two years later, in September 1872, his efforts were rewarded by the meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin. Russia, Austria, and Germany were once more united—not by any perishable protocols, but by a union of royal hearts—in a ‘Holy Alliance’ for the suppression of misrule and the preservation of the world’s peace on the basis of existing treaties.¹ Further interchanges of royal courtesies during the following year cemented the league, and a formal visit of King Victor Emmanuel to Berlin proclaimed the sympathetic attitude of Italy.

Bismarck’s motive, in this strange revival of a shadow or the Holy Alliance, was certainly not any single-minded devotion to the doctrine of the divine right of monarchy. The diplomatic edifice of which the foundation was the league of the three Emperors was, in fact, crowned by the proclamation of the French Republic. The Emperor William, interested in maintaining the prestige of kingship, had been inclined to favour the restoration of the legitimate dynasty in France; and the German ambassador at Paris, Count Harry Arnim, had long been intriguing in this sense.² But Bismarck realised that to Germany a legitimist would be a much more serious menace than a republican France. In 1870 it had been the clerical party at the Tuileries which had hurried France into war with Protestant Prussia. But Germany, under the guidance of Prussia, was just now at hand-grips with clericalism, embarked for better or for worse on that ‘war of cults’ (*Kulturkampf*) which was to end, if Bismarck were a true prophet, not ‘at Canossa,’ but in the crushing of ultramontane arrogance. Were clericalism established once more at the Tuileries, what more likely than that the war of revenge would be disguised under the form of a clerical crusade, a crusade in which, possibly, France would have the assistance of Catholic Austria. And at the court of Henry v.

¹ See speech of Feb. 19, 1878, IIahn, iii. 90.

² Bismarck, ii. 175, etc.

the Jesuits would be supreme. Bismarck therefore used his influence on the side of Thiers; Arnim, proving refractory, was crushed; and the Emperor William was once more taught that political principle must sometimes give way to political expediency. For while monarchical Germany stood surrounded by powerful allies, republican France remained an outcast among nations. England, indeed, vaguely sympathised with her troubles; but Bismarck knew that he had nothing to fear from this complacently insular attitude, and that his object of isolating France had been attained. But France alone would never venture to attack Germany; and thus, amid the arming of the nations, the peace of western Europe was for the time secure.

As so often before, it was a new phase of the Eastern Question which was destined to break up the apparent harmony of the Powers. The fall of Count Beust and his replacement, in November 1871, by the Hungarian Count Andrassy had been entirely satisfactory to Bismarck; for it symbolised in effect that transference of the centre of gravity of the Hapsburg monarchy from Vienna to Pesth which, in earlier days, he had himself recommended as essential to a cordial understanding between Prussia and Austria. But, for the same reason, it filled the Russian Government with vague alarms; for Austria, having surrendered her ambitions in Germany, would as likely as not seek compensations in the Balkan peninsula, a prospect not pleasing in view of certain Russian aspirations shortly to be revealed. Bismarck had known how to tide over the crisis. For the time it had not been difficult to persuade the Tsar, frightened by the spectre of Nihilism, that the duty of presenting a united front against revolutionary unrest was of more importance than 'any rivalry over the fragments of nations that people the Balkan peninsula'; and at their meeting in 1872 the three Emperors had agreed to settle in common any questions that might arise in the East. The undertaking was sincere enough in intention, and for a while

Isolation of
France.

Reopening
of the
Eastern
Question.

produced its effect. But the days were past when an Alexander I. or a Nicholas could subordinate the national sentiment of Russia to the supposed exigencies of a 'European' policy. As early as 1856 Count Nesselrode had pointed this out as the inevitable outcome of the Crimean war; and since then Slav nationalism, emulous of the successes of Germans and Italians, had been gathering in force sufficient to sweep away the prudent calculations of conservative statesmanship. The denunciation by Russia of the neutrality of the Black Sea had been a repudiation, however legitimate, of a European obligation. The fortification of Sebastopol, and the building up of a new navy in the Euxine, seemed the earnest of her intention to undo, at the first convenient opportunity, what remained of the work of the Congress of Paris in the East. The new-birth of Slavism was greeted throughout Russia, and wherever Russian influence penetrated, with boundless enthusiasm; and Moscow became the centre of a Pan-Slav agitation which Gortschakoff, jealous of Bismarck's reputation, was at least at no pains to discourage. The propaganda was carried on with restless zeal. Everywhere in the Balkan countries Russian agents were present, seeking by every conceivable means to convert the Christian populations to the new race gospel which was to lead to their emancipation from the infidel yoke. The result was inevitable. A vague unrest pervaded the Balkan states; and the Turks, already roused from their perennial lethargy by the news of the undoing by the Conference of London of the work of 1856, fell as usual into the opposite extreme of active panic. They felt that they had been the fools of Europe, and that behind the deceptive façade of the Concert a great Christian plot was maturing for the destruction of their religion and their race. To meet this danger a new party, that of 'Young Turkey,' sprang into existence. Its leader was Midhat Pasha, its object to shake off the tutelage of the Powers, to wake once more the old, fierce spirit of the Koran, and to oppose to Christendom the

Russia and
the Treaty of
1856.
(Panslav-
ism.)

united force of 150,000,000 true believers. Panslavism, in short, was to be opposed by Panislamism.¹

The influence of this Mussulman reaction, which made rapid headway among the officials of the Porte, was not likely to make for peace among subject Christian populations already excited by Panslavist dreams. In the summer of 1875 an insurrection, evidently in the first instance the work of foreign agitators, broke out in Herzegovina, with the usual accompaniments of robbery, coercion of unwilling peasants into rebellion, and murder of inoffensive Mussulmans.² An attempt of the governor, Dervish Pasha, to suppress the movement was defeated, on July 24, at Nevesinie; the revolt rapidly spread; volunteers poured over the frontiers from Montenegro and Serbia; and soon the whole wild borderland was in a blaze. The consuls of the European Powers now intervened, and agreed to lay before the Porte the demands of the insurgents. These were moderate enough: religious liberty, the right to give evidence, the establishment of a local, native militia, the fixing of the scale of taxes, and their regular collection. The Ottoman Government, in reply, promised, on October 2, shortly to issue a project of reform for the whole empire. On December 12, as the result of rebel victories, more definite offers were made. Religious equality was to be established throughout the empire, there were to be elective councils, in which Christians were to sit, for the administration of the vilayets, and a local militia was to be raised. This new *Irade* produced as little effect as the last. The insurgents, flushed with victory, scoffed at the Turkish promises, which indeed they had some reason to distrust. A triumphant march on Niksitsh, at the end of the year, and the destruction of another Turkish detachment, had brought them into touch with the southern frontier of Montenegro. Bulgaria was astir; and Serbia, whose prince, Milan Obrenovitch, harboured dreams of a new Serb empire,

¹ E. Driault, *op. cit.* p. 208.

² Report of Consul Holmes (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, lxxxiv, p. 143).

was arming. With the spring, unless the Powers intervened, the whole Balkan peninsula would be ablaze.

For Austria especially, with the mixed populations of her southern frontier, and sensitive as ever to nationalist influences, the situation was one of singular peril. The Dual Empire was based upon a compromise which left the Slav race subject to the dominance of Magyars and Germans, and a widespread Pan-Slav movement was therefore in itself a menace to its constitution if not to its actual existence.

The wisdom was now apparent of Bismarck's policy, made possible by Austria's judicious change of front. Russia, in the pursuit of her ambitions in the East, had reckoned upon the gratitude of Germany to leave her a free hand; and as long as these ambitions did not conflict with the interests of the new Empire, Bismarck was prepared to humour them. But the Austria of Andrassy, having ceased to be a menace to Germany, was once more what she had been in the days of the Holy Empire—a bulwark of Germanism against the Slav hordes. In a struggle between Russia and Austria Germany must inevitably take the part of the latter; and this fact, rather than the vows of 1872, determined the three eastern Powers to use a common language towards Turkey in the present crisis, for fear of a worse thing.¹ As the result of an

exchange of views between the three courts, Count Andrassy, on December 30, 1875, drew up a general statement of the causes of the perennial unrest in Turkey, with suggestions for its cure. He pointed out that the efforts of the Powers to localise the present disturbances had, so far, been unsuccessful. The

¹ In the autumn of 1876 Bismarck was sounded on behalf of the Tsar as to the attitude of Germany in the event of a war between Austria and Russia. His reply was that Germany could not remain neutral in the event of the position of one of the two, as a great Power taking part in the councils of Europe, being endangered. The result of this plain declaration was that 'the Russian storm passed from Eastern Galicia to the Balkans' (Bismarck ii. 228).

rebels, in spite of every discouragement, were still holding their own; and, meanwhile, the Turkish promises of reform, embodied in the recent *firmans*, were but vague statements of general principles, which had not, and were probably not intended to have, any local application. The Ottoman arms and the 'moral means' of reform, then, having alike failed to remedy a condition of affairs which was a standing menace to the peace of Europe, the time had come for concerted action of the Powers in order to press the Porte to translate its promises into acts. An outline of the most essential reforms then followed. At the head of these was placed the recognition rather than the mere toleration of the Christian religion. The abolition, so often promised, of the vicious system of farming the taxes was to be insisted upon; and, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the religious was complicated with an agrarian difficulty, the Christian peasants were to be turned into free proprietors, in order to save them from their double subjection to the great Mussulman landowners. Elected provincial councils were to be established, irremovable judges appointed, and individual liberty guaranteed. Finally, a committee of four Mussulmans and four Christians was to be empowered to watch over the carrying out of the reforms.¹

The 'Andrassy Note,' after receiving the general approval of the French and English Governments, was submitted to the Porte on January 31, 1876. The Divan accepted four points of the five submitted, but refused to submit the sovereign administration of the Sultan to control. There, however, its activity ended. No attempt to carry out the promised reforms was, or perhaps could be made; and, meanwhile, the insurrection was spreading. Bosnia was now in arms, and its governor, Selim Pasha, had been driven over the border. Montenegro was seriously preparing to intervene, and Milan had given the command of the Servian troops to the Russian general Tcherniaief. In May the

¹ Hertslet, iv. 2418.

Bulgarians began their insurrection with the murder of some Mussulman policemen. The arming of Monte-negro roused the wild Mohammedan hillmen of Albania. Reprisals beget reprisals; and, on May 7, these culminated in the murder of the French and German consuls at Salonica.

The three Emperors were in conference at Berlin when the news of this tragedy reached them. They immediately decided 'to draw closer their intimacy'; and, on May 13, issued a memorandum in which they pointed out that, though the principles of a settlement had been accepted on both sides, the struggle in Turkey still continued, owing partly to the distrust of the Christians for the promises of the Porte, partly to the contention of the latter that it could not carry out reforms in districts in open revolt. Under these circumstances, the Powers suggested a combined action of the fleets, and the enforcement on both sides of a two months' armistice. *If at the end of that time no settlement had been arrived at, further action could be taken.* The 'Berlin Memorandum' was accepted by France, but rejected by England. Lord Derby pointed out, justly enough, that the final clause was calculated to destroy the whole ostensible object of the note; for the insurgents would never lay down their arms if they knew that by holding out they would provoke an active intervention of the Powers in their favour. The protest of England was fatal to the policy of the Memorandum. On May 13 the British fleet had taken up its station in Besika Bay; and, however much the Powers might regret the insular attitude of England, they were not prepared to allay one trouble at the risk of producing another.

Meanwhile, 'Young Turkey' took up with violence the challenge of Europe. Sultan Abd-ul Aziz, feeble and enervated by excesses, had for years been the puppet of the Powers. At the beginning of May a mob of 6000 'softas' had marched on Yildiz Kiosk and demanded the dismissal

of the Russophile Vizier Mahmoud. The Sultan yielded, but with an ill grace, and vowing to his intimates to deal with the divinity students as his father had dealt with the Janissaries. He was forestalled. On May 30, softas and soldiers rose, with Suleiman Pasha at their head; Abd-ul Aziz was deposed, and presently murdered; while, weeping and protesting, the half-imbecile Murad was dragged from his prison to the throne. Three months later the poor remnants of his intellect had yielded to the strain of 'power'; he too was deposed, and the present Sultan, Abd-ul Hamid II., reigned in his stead.

Deposition
of Sultan
Abdul Aziz,
May 30.

The subject Christian races saw in the central troubles of Islam the opportunity for at last sating their ambitions and their hate. On June 30 Servia declared war against Turkey. Two days later Montenegro followed suit. They soon, however, had reason to repent of their rashness. Under the inspiration of the revived spirit of Islam the Ottoman armies showed an unexpected vigour. Some successes at the outset, indeed, raised the hopes of the Slavs, but also revealed the conflict of their views. Servian and Montenegrin worked but ill together, each scheming to profit at the expense of the other in the eventual partition; victories were succeeded by crushing defeats; until, by the beginning of September, Prince Nicholas had been driven back into his mountains, and Milan, hard pressed in his own country, was forced to beg an armistice and to pray for the intervention of the Powers whose advice he had flouted.

Servia and
Montenegro
declare war,
June 30, 1876.

The attitude of England towards the Berlin Memorandum had made an active intervention of the European Concert impossible. At the same time, however inclined Russia might have been to act alone, she dared not, in view of Bismarck's frank avowal, risk by doing so an open rupture with Austria. Yet at any moment an overwhelming national sentiment might force the Tsar to intervene. Under these circumstances it had been judged expedient for the two

Powers to prepare for all contingencies by a timely understanding. On July 8, 1876, the Emperors Alexander and Francis Joseph met at Reichstadt; and, while maintaining for the present the policy of non-intervention, arrived at an agreement, afterwards embodied in a treaty, by which, in the event of developments in Turkey forcing Russia to enter Bulgaria, Austria should be empowered to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. This made Russian intervention in Turkey possible by securing the neutrality of Austria. Events were soon to make it inevitable.

The armistice over, the victorious Ottoman advance into Serbia continued; the fortress of Alexinatz fell; the southern half of the principality was conquered; the road to Belgrade lay open; and all Serbia was at the mercy of the Turks. The quality of this mercy had, meanwhile, been too clearly shown by the fate of Bulgaria. In their fear of a general insurrection breaking out on the flank of their northward march, the

The
'Bulgarian
Atrocities,'
May 1876.

Ottomans had set to work to stamp out with ruthless severity the first beginnings of revolt. Hordes of irregular warriors, Mussulman Bulgarians and Circassians, were suffered to wreak their will on the wretched Christian peasantry, and the victims of their blood lust were soon numbered by tens of thousands.¹ Not since the massacre of Chios had the conscience of Europe been so deeply stirred. In England Mr. Gladstone made the 'Bulgarian atrocities' the text of a series of speeches against the whole Eastern policy of the Government; a great revulsion of public feeling against the Turks took place;² and even inside the Cabinet opinion began to waver as to the possibility of maintaining the traditional attitude towards the Ottoman Empire. On September 14, the Porte offered to make peace on terms which would have practically deprived Serbia of the last shreds of independence.

¹ See Mr. Baring's reports, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, lxxxii.

² See *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield*, i. 307, etc.

(G. Carslake Thompson).

But even the English Government saw that such a settlement was impossible; and Lord Derby, to forestall if possible the inevitable action of Russia, offered the mediation of Great Britain to procure peace on terms which would have secured the *status quo* in Serbia and Montenegro and local autonomy in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. To these terms the Powers gave a general assent, and on September 25 they were presented to the Porte. But Turkey, determined not to part with a shred of sovereignty, and not deceived by the superficial unanimity of the Powers, remained stubborn. The terms of peace having been refused, the British ambassador, as a last resource, was directed to demand the conclusion of an armistice for at least a month, at the end of which a Conference was to be called at Constantinople for the consideration of the whole matter. In the event of the Turks refusing to consider this, Sir Henry Elliot was to withdraw from Constantinople, 'as it would be evident that all further exertions on the part of Her Majesty's Government to save the Porte from ruin would have become useless.'¹

Mediation
of Great
Britain.

The reply of the Porte was to offer an armistice of six months, and at the same time, on October 12, to publish an elaborate scheme of reform for the whole empire, together with special measures for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was a clever move. A six months' armistice would save the risks of a winter campaign, while the promulgation of a real Liberal Constitution was well calculated to secure once more the wavering friendship of Great Britain.² And, indeed, the English Cabinet was only in search of an excuse for upholding its traditional policy. Lord Derby had already protested against the number of Russian volunteers serving in the Servian army, 'which had assumed proportions little short of national assistance'; he now pressed the Russian Govern-

¹ Derby to Lord A. Loftus, October 30, 1876 (Hertslet, iv. 2488, etc.).

² Cf. Lord Granville's remarks on the speech of the Ottoman ambassador at the Guildhall banquet (Hans. 3 S. vol. ccxxxvii. p. 21).

ment to accept the Turkish proposal, at the same time indicating that its refusal to do so would be taken as showing a fixed determination on the part of Russia to go to war.¹ Austria and France had accepted the armistice readily enough. Bismarck had no objection, but would fall in with the views of Russia. These were soon made clear. In a note of October 14, Gortschakoff argued, truly enough, that a long armistice would only prolong a state of tension intolerable alike to the peoples concerned and to all Europe. Russia must insist on the acceptance by the Porte of an armistice of a month or six weeks, as England had originally proposed. Further diplomatic correspondence passed, revealing a hopeless tangle of opinion. Russia determined to cut the knot. On October 31, General Ignatieff presented to the Porte a Russian ultimatum, demanding an immediate armistice of six weeks. This was an argument which the Porte appreciated, and it yielded. On November 2, in a remarkable conversation with Lord A. Loftus, the Emperor Alexander defined and justified the attitude of Russia; and, as Nicholas I. had done before him, made an appeal to the good sense of the English nation. The ultimatum, he said, had been due to the total defeat of the Servian forces and to his fear that atrocities like those in Bulgaria might be repeated. The manœuvres of the Porte had rendered abortive all attempts of collective Europe to stop the war; and even if Europe were willing to accept these repeated rebuffs from Turkey, he could no longer consider such a course consistent with the honour, dignity, or the interests of Russia. He was anxious not to separate from the European Concert, but the actual state of affairs was intolerable, and if Europe would not move, he should be obliged to act alone. Why could not England and Russia act together? The idea of a Russian conquest of India was absurd; and as for Constantinople, he

¹ For a *résumé* of this correspondence, see Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus, Despatch of October 30, 1876 (Hertslet, iv. 2488).

repeated on his solemn word of honour that he entertained neither the wish nor the intention to possess himself of it.¹ On November 3, the pacific assurances of the Russian Emperor were embodied in a despatch to the British Government, with the request that they might be published. For Russia, it argued, the only rational course was to leave the keys of the Black Sea in hands feeble enough not to close to Russia that commercial outlet, nor to menace her security; and Turkey 'fulfilled this programme.' What, then, was to prevent the English from assisting the Russians to rescue their fellow-Christians of the East from an intolerable oppression?² The reply of the English Government to these advances was a circular of Lord Derby, of November 4, proposing the assembly of a Conference at Constantinople on the basis of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and a declaration of the Powers that their aim in intervening was not territorial acquisitions or exclusive commercial privileges.³ Less official, but more momentous, was the warlike speech delivered by Lord Beaconsfield on November 9 at the Lord Mayor's banquet, in which he clearly enough showed the irreconcilable character of his own attitude towards Russia. 'If England enters into a conflict in a righteous cause,' was the burden of his argument, 'her resources are practically inexhaustible.' The Tsar's reply was to repeat, to an assembly of notables at Moscow, that, if he were unable to obtain in concert with Europe the guarantees he had a right to demand from Turkey, he was resolved to act alone, in the certain conviction that in such a cause he would have the whole country behind him.⁴ At the same time, on November 19, Russia issued a despatch accepting the Conference, and repeating her pacific assurances. All the Powers, she said, were agreed on the necessity for reforms; they differed only as to the nature of their guarantee. The London Cabinet

England
proposes a
Conference.

¹ Hertslet, iv. 2506.

³ *Ibid.* 2516.

² *Ibid.* 2513.

⁴ *Ibid.* 2518.

desired to reconcile the common object with the letter of stipulations concluded in former times (*i.e.* in 1856), but experience had shown that European action in Turkey had been reduced to impotency by those stipulations. It was essential now to realise that the independence of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace.¹

All the Powers had accepted the idea of the Conference; all were agreed in the desire to establish peace; but here their agreement stopped. Russia, in face of the protests of England, had advertised her fixed intention to occupy Bulgaria 'temporarily' as a guarantee of Turkey's fulfilment of her promises. In return, she would be prepared to see Austria holding Bosnia, and the French and British fleets in the Sea of Marmora. England, on the other hand, had suggested the granting of autonomy to Bulgaria, which, according to Andrassy, meant cutting the backbone out of the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck alone declared the whole weary Eastern Question to be 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier,' and was prepared to play 'the honest broker' in the arrangement of any settlement that should preserve the harmony of the Powers.² The plenipotentiaries

The Conference at Constantinople.

reached Constantinople during the second week in December; and in view of the obvious inexpediency of exhibiting their disagreements before the Porte, it was decided to hold preliminary conferences, from which the Turkish representatives could be excluded, in order, if possible, to reach an agreement before the opening of the formal Conference, which was to meet, under the presidency of Savfet Pasha, on December 23.

The result of the preliminary discussions was in due course submitted to the formal Conference as the unanimous proposal of the Powers. According to this, certain small districts were to be ceded to Montenegro and Servia; administrative autonomy was to be granted to Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herze-

¹ Hertslet, iv. 2520.

² Speech of Feb. 19, 1879, Hahn, iii. 90.

govina ; in all these provinces Christian governors were to be appointed, and the Ottoman troops confined to the fortresses. The Circassians settled in Bulgaria were to be sent back to Asia. Finally, an international Commission, supported by a force of 6000 Belgian and Swiss gendarmes, was to be constituted to watch over the execution of these measures. Unfortunately, the Porte was less impressed by the unexpected unanimity of the Powers than offended by the far-reaching character of their proposals. On December 11, as a counter-demonstration, the Constitution for the whole Ottoman Empire, promised in the *firman* of October 12, had been solemnly proclaimed. Turkey was henceforward to be a constitutional state, with an elected Lower House, a Senate nominated by the Sultan, and a ministry responsible to Parliament.¹ Under these circumstances the Porte assumed towards the Conference an attitude of injured rectitude. By the settlement of 1856, argued Savfet Pasha, the Ottoman Empire had been recognised as possessing equal rights with the other Powers ; and the proposal to interfere with the sovereign prerogative of the Sultan was now the more unfortunate, since it was brought forward at a moment when he was granting to his people a Constitution which would secure to all, without distinction of race or religion, those guarantees for security, equality, and justice which Europe only asked for certain provinces, and as a special privilege. In the end, the Porte declared that it had no choice but to reject the programme of the Conference, more especially those articles of it relating to the international committee of control, and the right of foreign Powers to a voice in the appointment of Valis.²

Proclama-
tion of the
Ottoman
Constitution,
Dec. 11, 1876.

Turkey
rejects the
proposals of
the Confer-
ence.

The failure of the Concert, if the Tsar's threats had been seriously meant, involved the separate action of Russia ; and a Russian circular was now despatched asking the Powers

¹ For the Ottoman Constitution, see Hertslet, iv. 2531.

² Despatch of Savfet Pasha (Hertslet, iv. 2545).

how far they were prepared to go for the purpose of enforcing their views. England made a last effort to avert a war which now seemed inevitable. On February 16, at her instance, Turkey signed a treaty of peace with Servia on the basis of the *status quo*; and another Conference was assembled at London, which, on March 31, addressed a collective note to the Porte, calling on it to carry out the reforms demanded, and to reduce its armaments to a peace footing, and threatening that, if it failed to respond to these representations, Europe would again—deliberate.¹

The patience of Russia was now, however, exhausted, and to the collective note was added what was practically a Russian ultimatum. If the Porte, it said, had any serious intention of carrying out the will of Europe as expressed in the Protocol, let it send a special envoy to St. Petersburg to treat of disarmament. Any repetition of massacres such as those in Bulgaria would, however, stop the Russian measures for demobilisation.² On March 19 the Ottoman Parliament had been solemnly opened by the Sultan Abd-ul Hamid, and to this the Russian demands were as solemnly submitted. The result was a foregone conclusion. The reply of the Porte, endorsed by the representatives of the Ottoman people, was to protest against the Protocol, and more especially against the 'offensive terms' of the Russian declaration added to it, and the assumption that Russian disarmament must be made contingent on the cessation of troubles which, as every one knew, were caused by foreign agitation. The message, in conclusion, expressed the pain felt by the Ottoman Government at 'the small account taken by the Powers, both of the great principles of equality and justice which the Imperial Government seeks to introduce into the internal administration, and of its rights of independence and sovereignty.'³

¹ Hertslet, iv. 2563.

² Annex to London Protocol (*Ibid.* 2565).

³ Savfet to Musurus Pasha, April 9, 1877 (*Ibid.* 2568).

The die was now cast. On April 16 Russia had signed with Roumania, in return for the recognition of its independence, a Convention permitting the passage of Russian troops through the Principality. On April 24 the Tsar gave the order for his armies to cross the Ottoman frontier, 'in order to obtain by force what the united efforts of the Powers have been unable to obtain by persuasion.'

Russia
declares war,
April 24, 1877.

In spite of the bellicose attitude of the British Government, the war was destined to be practically a duel between Russia and Turkey. In the earlier stages of the struggle, indeed, an effective intervention of England was impossible. Republican France had little inclination to play the part of Napoleon III. in the Crimea; and the neutrality of Austria had been secured, partly by the understanding of Reichstadt, partly by a further guarantee given by Russia that she would not establish any protectorate over a Turkish province, would abstain from occupying Constantinople, and submit the final settlement after the war to a European Congress. Deprived of allies, England was forced to accept the inevitable; though unhappily, as usual, she did so with a bad grace.¹ On June 8, some weeks after the outbreak of the war, England signed a Convention of neutrality, on condition that Russia at the same time should undertake to respect the neutrality of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and not to touch Constantinople or the Straits.

Attitude of
the Powers.

At the beginning of the campaign the situation was almost entirely favourable to the Turks. The Russians, it is true, as a result of their alliance with the Roumanians, held the entire left bank of the Danube. But the Ottoman navy held command of the Black Sea, while

The war.

¹ Cf. Lord Derby's despatch of May 1, 1877 (Hertslet, iv. 2607), and Granville's remarks on 'those numerous little demonstrations of "benevolent neutrality" which have added so little to our dignity or strength, and which have had no practical result, excepting to irritate Russia' (Hans. 3rd S. ccxxxvii. 22).

Turkish gunboats patrolled the great river, of which the right bank was occupied by a force of over 200,000 men under the command of Achmet Eyub Pasha. In spite of these formidable obstacles, however, the passage of the river was secured with trifling loss. The gunboats were destroyed by Russian shore batteries; bands of Cossacks succeeded in passing the stream and throwing disorder into the scattered detachments of the Turks; and finally General Zimmermann, on June 22, crossed with a considerable force into the Dobrudsha, with the object of drawing the Ottoman forces away from the point where it had been decided to effect the passage of the main army under the Grand Duke Nicholas. The feint was entirely successful. The Turks, believing that Zimmermann's division was the vanguard of the army of invasion, fell back to the rampart of Trajan, and only a few battalions were left to oppose the passage of the Russian army, which took place on the night of June 26 at Zimnitza, opposite Sistova. The Ottoman troops were easily scattered, and Sistova itself occupied, on June 27, without a blow. A solemn mass and Te Deum, at which the Tsar himself assisted, celebrated the first triumph of the Christian arms.

The question now arose as to what was next to be done. The main bulk of the Turkish forces were concentrated in the quadrilateral formed by the fortresses of Rustchuk, Silistria, Varna, and Shumla, face to face with General Zimmermann, and on the flank of the principal Russian army. The rules of orthodox warfare demanded that a blow should be dealt at the central force of the enemy, and that the strong places on the flank of the invasion should be reduced, before penetrating further into the country. But the easy passage of the Danube had given the Russian generals a mean opinion of their enemy's quality; it was necessary to rally the Christian populations by a striking success; and the investment of fortresses was, at best, a slow and inconclusive process. It was decided, then, to make a dash across the Balkans on Constantinople, and to bring the war to a glorious

conclusion by a blow straight at the heart of the Turkish power. The enterprise was intrusted to General Gourko, a brilliant cavalry officer; while the main body of the Russian army, under the Grand Duke Nicholas, remained on the line of the Jantra to observe the movements of the Turks and to keep open communications with the Danube and with Roumania.

Gourko marched from Biela on July 3, captured Tirnova on the 7th, and, avoiding the Shipka Pass, crossed the Balkans by the narrow defile of Hainkoi, entered Kazanlik on the 13th, and attacking unexpectedly from the south, drove the Ottoman post from the hill of Shipka. As a result of this brilliant raid the two available passes over the mountains were in the hands of the Russians, Roumelia lay open to invasion, and the plan of a dash on Adrianople and the capital seemed within measurable distance of success.

From this moment, however, the tide began to turn. The news of Gourko's raid reached Suleiman Pasha in Montenegro on July 11. Five days later he embarked at Antivari, landed on the 19th at Dede-Agatch, and, hurrying on by railway, threw himself, between Tirnova and Karabunar, with a considerable army across the path of the invader. His right, passing by the defile of Demir-Kapou, joined hands across the Balkans with the left wing of the Ottoman main army. Gourko, defeated in several encounters, was forced back through the pass of Hainkoi; and, of all his conquests, was able only to maintain his hold on the Shipka Pass, where the Turkish regiments, with splendid but useless bravery, hurled themselves in vain against the strong entrenchments of General Radetzky.

In the north, meanwhile, the Russians were faring even worse. The aged Achmet Pasha had been superseded by Mehemet Ali, a French convert to Islam, and a man of unoriental energy, who managed by clever manœuvres to hold the Russian armies in check and keep that of General Zimmermann bogged in the malarious swamps of the Dobrudsha.

More alarming still was the fate of the Russian right wing, commanded by General Krüdener. Krüdener had, on July 16, occupied Nicopolis, and directed General Schilder to take possession of Plevna, a place important as commanding the junction of the roads between Nicopolis and Lowatz, and Sofia and Sistova. But, meanwhile, Osman Pasha, with 40,000 men and ninety cannon, had thrown himself into the place and hastily entrenched it. Schilder, advancing to the attack, was hurled back in disorder on Biela and Nicopolis. Krüdener himself, hastening forward to repair this disaster, shared the same fate. His attack was repulsed, with the loss of 8000 men, and he was compelled to fall back with his shattered battalions on the Danube.

The whole aspect of the war was suddenly changed. The dream of a triumphal march on Tsarigrad, in which, in spite of the bitter experiences of the past, the Russians had indulged, was dissipated. For the moment it was no longer the Ottoman, but the Russian Empire, that seemed to stand in deadly peril; and all Europe watched in breathless suspense the struggle round the insignificant little Bulgarian town, on the fate of which that of the whole Orient depended. The danger was fully realised at the Russian headquarters. The Grand Duke Nicholas, leaving a corps of observation to watch Mehemet Ali, hurried with the bulk of his forces, 70,000 strong, to Plevna. Here, on September 11, he delivered a grand attack which, it was confidently believed, would more than retrieve former failures. The result was an even more overwhelming disaster. The Roumanians on the right wing, and Skobelev on the left, succeeded, it is true, in carrying the Turkish positions; but the central attack was driven back with immense slaughter, and the whole Russian army was forced to retire with a loss of some 16,000 killed and wounded.

On the top of this crushing blow came evil tidings from Asia, where Moukhtar Pasha had earned the title of Ghazi

or 'The Victorious,' by driving the Russian invaders under Melikoff back over the frontier. In the face of this accumulation of misfortunes it became necessary to modify the whole plan of campaign; for there was no question any longer of an advance on Constantinople, with Plevna unreduced on the right, and the unbroken army of Mehemet Ali on the left, of the line of march. For some weeks nothing was done but to guard against the Turks in the Quadrilateral taking the offensive, while the whole resources of the Empire were drawn for material to repair the wrecked prestige of the Russian arms. That this was possible was due to the jealousy and incompetence of the Ottoman general's lieutenants, and to the incurable objection of the Turks to a bold initiative. The last hope of their making the most of a favourable situation which was unlikely to recur was gone when the energetic Mehemet Ali, as the result of a palace intrigue, was replaced by Suleiman Pasha, a general not so much incompetent as utterly corrupt. Instead of being driven back into the Danube, the Russians had plenty of time to collect a host of 300,000 men round Sistova, and to make elaborate preparations for the reduction of Plevna by starvation, since it could not be taken by assault. The command of the investing army was given to Todleben, the defender of Sebastopol, and under his direction an impenetrable ring of steel was soon drawn round the heroic army of Osman; while southward the Russian hosts spread ever further toward the Balkans, prepared, as soon as Plevna should have fallen, to sweep down upon Roumelia and the capital. Osman Pasha was not provisioned for a long siege; and as soon as the Russian investment was complete, the fall of the town was only a question of a few weeks. On December 10 Osman, now at the end of his resources, made a desperate effort to break through the Russian lines. He was unsuccessful, and, after a bloody struggle, was compelled to surrender with the remnant of his army.

The southward march of the Russians now began. In

spite of all the efforts of the Turks to retake it, the Shipka Pass was still in their hands, and their advance over the Balkans met with little serious opposition. Misfortunes fell thick upon the unlucky Turks. In Asia, Moukhtar's career of victory had come to a sudden stop; the Russians had once more crossed the border, had taken Kars on November 18, and were advancing on Erzeroum, while their scouts had been seen as far south as Trebizond. The Servians, too, had declared war again on December 14, had swept down on the old Serb capital Prizrend, and, capturing a Turkish division, had turned the line of the Balkans from the west. Suleiman hurried southwards from the Quadrilateral, with 130,000 men, to try and stem the tide of invasion. But the Russian advance was now irresistible. On January 1, 1878, Gourko occupied Bugarovo; on the 5th he entered Sofia; and, pushing the Turks before him to Philippopolis, defeated them, after a ten days' battle, on the 17th. Suleiman, caught between Gourko's victorious army and a fresh division under Radetzky advancing from Shipka, was forced to retire; and, on January 20, Gourko entered Adrianople in triumph.

The rapid advance of the Russians on Constantinople had been watched by the British Government with growing Attitude of uneasiness. The neutrality of England had England. from the first, like that of Austria, been 'conditional';¹ and, on December 13, Lord Derby had already addressed a memorandum to Count Schuvaloff expressing the 'earnest hope' that Russia would refrain from any attempt to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles; and stating that, in the contrary event, the British Government would hold themselves free to take whatever course might appear to them necessary for the protection of British interests. In reply to a request of Prince Gortschakoff for a clearer definition of those interests, with a view to an understanding with Russia, Lord Derby, on January 13, 1878,

¹ See Speech of Lord Beaconsfield (Hansard, 3 S. vol. 237, p. 35).

again reiterated the objection of England to 'any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia,' and asked whether Prince Gortschakoff was prepared to give assurances that the peninsula of Gallipoli would not be occupied by Russian troops. To this last the Russian Government readily agreed, on condition that no Turkish troops should assemble there, and that England herself would undertake not to occupy the peninsula. With this arrangement the British Cabinet for the time rested content; and the news that Turkish plenipotentiaries were on their way to the Russian headquarters to negotiate an armistice gave hopes of a speedy settlement.

The Ottoman Government, as soon as the fate of Plevna was decided, had appealed to the Powers for their collective mediation. This had been refused; but, on the Porte making a separate appeal to the Queen, England, with the full consent of the other Powers, tendered her 'good offices' as mediator between the belligerents. In reply to the British note, the Tsar had stated his anxiety to bring the war to an end and his readiness to open negotiations. But, apparently, this pacific spirit was not shared by his generals. The Ottoman envoys had sought the Grand Duke Nicholas at Kazanlik; but not till the Russian headquarters were established at Adrianople were negotiations seriously opened.

This delay revived the fears of the British Government. Parliament had been specially summoned for January 17; and in the Queen's speech it was declared that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence might render incumbent the adoption of measures of precaution which would necessitate an appeal to the liberality of Parliament. A statement so cautiously worded scarcely amounted to a threat of war; but it none the less indicated the trend of opinion in the Government. Within the Cabinet, indeed, serious differences of opinion were begin-

Threatened
war between
England and
Russia.

ning to manifest themselves. The maintenance of peace, so far as this was consistent with the upholding of British interests, was, it is true, the object of all ministers. But here their agreement stopped. Split in the British Cabinet. The majority, headed by Lord Beaconsfield, believed that Russia could best be held to her promises by a conspicuous demonstration of British intention to resist their violation by force. Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon maintained that, so long as Russia had not violated any of the conditions on which England had promised neutrality, such demonstrations were neither justifiable nor politic, and greatly calculated to provoke the very evils they were intended to avoid. When, on January 23, the Cabinet decided, on hearing the news of the Russian occupation of Adrianople, to send the fleet to Gallipoli, Lord Carnarvon resigned office, and Lord Derby was only persuaded to reconsider his decision to take the same step by the receipt of the Russian terms of peace, which induced Lord Beaconsfield to rescind the orders to the fleet. At the same time, on January 28, the Cabinet proclaimed its intention of not shrinking in the last resort even from war, by introducing a proposal of a credit of £600,000 for the express purpose of preventing any tampering by Russia with the treaties regulating the navigation of the Straits.

Three days later, on January 31, the representatives of Russia and Turkey signed at Adrianople a protocol defining the preliminary bases of peace between the belligerent states, with a view to the conclusion of an armistice. According to this instrument, the rights and privileges of Russia in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were to be confirmed; an indemnity, the form of which was left for subsequent settlement, was to be paid to Russia for her losses in the war; Bulgaria was to be erected into an autonomous, tributary principality, with a national Christian Government and a national militia; Montenegro, Roumania, and Servia were to be independent,

Convention of Adrianople, Jan. 31, 1878.

and were to receive an increase of territory, territorial indemnity, and a rectification of frontier respectively; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be endowed with autonomous administrations, adequately guaranteed; and similar reforms were to be carried out in the other Christian provinces. A Convention of armistice, signed the same day, handed over to the Russians the fortresses of Widdin, Rustchuk, and Silistria, confined the Turks in Bulgaria to the district of Varna and Shumla, and allowed the Russians to advance to within a few miles of Constantinople.

In accordance with the terms of the armistice, the Grand Duke Nicholas now advanced his headquarters to Tchataldja, within sight of the domes of Constantinople.

This was only in accordance with the usual practice of war, and technically at least was no breach of Russia's engagements with England. None the less even Lord Derby now withdrew his opposition to the passage of the British fleet through the Dardanelles; and two war-vessels were ordered to lie off Gallipoli, and one off the Princes Islands, 'for the protection of life and property.

The
Russians
before Con-
stantinople.

The situation was now extremely critical. A fresh agreement, it is true, between Russia and England was arrived at, by which the latter undertook not to land troops, the former not to occupy the lines of Bulair; but the indiscretion of a single subordinate officer might have led to war. Austria, too, was menacing; and Count Andrassy declared openly that some of the terms arranged at Adrianople were inconsistent with the interests of the Dual Empire. To add to the peril, Greece judged the moment opportune for realising her Panhellenic dream of adding Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, and Macedonia to her crown; and, on February 2, declared war on Turkey.

Greece
declares war
and is
suppressed.

But here at least the Powers were at one; and their united protests, together with a threatened descent of the Ottoman fleet on the Piraeus, sufficed to stop this untimely demonstration.

It was becoming daily more evident that a European Congress was the only means of escape from a dangerous situation. Both England and Austria had declared explicitly that the settlement after the war must be 'European'; and, on February 5, Count Andrassy had formally invited the Great Powers to a Conference. There was much to make Russia agree to a course which threatened to wrest from her the prize already within her grasp. Her victory had been won at terrible cost, and her exhausted armies were scarcely in a condition to face a fresh campaign, in which Austria and England would probably be united against her. Roumania, too, was growing restive, and had already protested against the proposal to restore Bessarabia to Russia in exchange for the less desirable Dobrudsha. In spite of Bismarck's openly expressed sympathies for Austria, moreover, Russia believed that she could reckon, in a Congress of the Powers, on the whole-hearted support of Germany, which she had earned by her attitude during the war of 1870. Prince Gortschakoff, then, agreed on behalf of Russia, to the convocation of a Congress of the Powers.

Before the necessary preliminaries could be arranged, the Convention of Adrianople had been converted, on March 3, into the Treaty of San Stefano. In this instrument there was certainly no tendency to consider the susceptibilities of the other Powers. It was, in fact—or would have been, had it ever been effective—the formal dissolution of the Ottoman power in Europe. A huge war indemnity was exacted, or, in default of payment, the cession to Russia of Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars in Asia, and of the Dobrudsha in Europe. The latter was to be given to Roumania in exchange for Bessarabia, which would again bring the Russian frontier to the Danube. Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro were to be independent states, and of these Servia was to receive the districts of Nish and Mitrowitza, and Montenegro an addition of territory at

The Treaty
of San Ste-
fano, March
3, 1878.

the expense of Bosnia, together with the two ports of Dulcigno and Antivari, on the Adriatic coast. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be granted free institutions under the protection and control of Russia and Austria. But, most important of all, Bulgaria was to be erected into an autonomous principality, stretching from the Danube to the Archipelago, and comprising, besides Bulgaria north of the Balkans, Eastern Roumelia and Macedonia. This greater Bulgaria, which would have cut what remained of European Turkey into two unequal halves, was to have an elected prince and an elected assembly. The latter was to be charged with the task of making a Constitution under the guidance of a Russian Commissioner, appointed for two years, and supported by an army of occupation of 50,000 men. Finally, all fortresses on the Danube were to be razed; Crete was to be administered in accordance with the arrangements agreed upon in 1868, after the last insurrection; the other Christian provinces were to receive certain promised privileges; and Armenia was to have guarantees for good government.¹

The Treaty of San Stefano seemed to realise the worst fears of the Powers. Austria saw herself about to be cut off from all hope of realising her ambition of reaching Salonica and the Archipelago; England saw the ruin of her position in the East. Their attitude soon revealed their anxiety. Andrassy asked and received from the Delegations a vote of 60,000,000 gulden, with the scarce disguised view of a military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British Government called out the reserves, increased the garrison of Malta, and made arrangements for bringing troops from India. Lord Derby, still maintaining his earlier attitude, now resigned; and, on March 28, Lord Salisbury took over the Foreign Office. The risk of war was increased by a hitch in the negotiations, which still continued, for the assembling of the Congress

¹ See map at the end.

England demanded that Russia should lay the whole Treaty of San Stefano before the Congress, in order that this might decide how far it was in conflict with existing treaties. Russia did not deny the right of the Powers to discuss each several paragraph of the treaty, but claimed the right on her own part to accept or reject the results of such discussion, which she could hardly do if she herself had submitted the treaty in its entirety. On April 1, a circular of Lord Salisbury, in effect, declared the whole treaty to be in conflict with existing international agreements, and denounced it as fatal to British interests, giving as it did to Russia a crushing preponderance in the East. Gortschakoff, still anxious to avoid war, sent a reply calculated to turn away wrath. The efforts of Bismarck, too, to secure peace were unremitting, and a long step in this direction was taken when the two Powers most concerned defined their objections to the treaty.¹ Austria demanded no more than a diminution of the territory granted to Bulgaria, an earlier evacuation by Russia, and the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by her own troops, in accordance with the understanding reached at Reichstadt. The British demands, defined in a memorandum signed on May 30, were in part identical, in part more far-reaching, and included the curtailment of the territories taken from Turkey not only in Europe, but in Asia. To some of these demands the Tsar gave a conditional consent; others were left for the consideration of the Congress. England, which had throughout made no disguise of her mission to defend Turkey against Russian aggression, meanwhile signed, on June 4, a secret treaty with the Porte, by which, in the event of Russia retaining Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, she undertook to guarantee the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. In return, the Porte was, in co-operation with England, to undertake thorough reforms in Asia Minor, and to allow Great Britain to garrison and administer the island of Cyprus.

¹ See Bismarck's Speech of Feb. 19, 1879, in Hahn (*Bismarck*, iii. 83).

The issues now being clearly defined, no obstacle to the assembling of the Congress remained; and, on June 13, it was formally opened, under the presidency of Bismarck, at Berlin, the various Powers being in every case represented by their Premiers or Foreign Ministers. After heated discussions, which at times threatened to break up the conferences, a definitive settlement was finally arrived at on July 13. By the Treaty of Berlin the far-reaching provisions of that of San Stefano were very greatly modified. This was especially the case in the most important matter of all—the creation of a great Bulgarian state. Instead of a Bulgaria stretching from the Danube to the Archipelago, the new autonomous principality was to have the Balkans for its southern boundary, and was further dismembered in order to enlarge Servia and, by handing over the Dobrudsha, to compensate Roumania for the cession of Bessarabia to Russia. Southern Bulgaria, henceforth to be known as East Roumelia, was to receive certain guarantees for good government; but its governor was to be nominated by the Porte, which also retained the right of garrisoning the frontier posts and holding the Balkan passes. Of the other vassal states, Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro were to be independent and sovereign. Roumania, with the Dobrudsha, received the port of Kustendje on the Black Sea; Servia was enlarged at the expense of Bulgaria; Montenegro obtained the extensions promised at San Stefano, except the district of Spizza, which was ceded to Austria. The claims of Greece to Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia were listened to, but not admitted. The most the Powers would concede, at the instance of France and Italy, was that the Porte should be invited to negotiate separately with Greece, with a view to the cession of Thessaly and a part of Epirus, the Powers undertaking, in the event of no understanding being arrived at, to use their good offices. As regards the Great Powers, Austria was authorised to 'preserve order' in Bosnia and Herzegovina for an indefinite

The Con-
gress of
Berlin.

Treaty of
Berlin, July
13, 1878.

time; Russia, besides regaining her position on the Danube by the cession of Bessarabia, kept Kars and Batoum in Asia, Great Britain, after strenuous opposition, giving her consent on condition that the latter port should be left unfortified. As a counter blast, however, to these Russian triumphs the English Government published, on July 9, the secret treaty containing the cession of Cyprus.

The Treaty of Berlin was a compromise and, like all compromises, pregnant with future troubles. At the time it was regarded, with truth, as a defeat for Russia, a triumph for England; and Lord Beaconsfield, bearing back with him from Berlin 'peace with honour,' was, after such alarms of war, greeted with boundless enthusiasm. That he had gained, for the moment, a striking diplomatic triumph, is true enough; but, at the risk of trespassing on controversial ground, it is fair to say that, after twenty years, it has been generally recognised as a victory won in a hopeless cause; and that, if Russia has since then not recovered her influence in Turkey, this has been due in the main to causes not foreseen by the statesmen of the Congress of Berlin. As for England, it may be doubted whether she has gained in the long run by transferring the attention of Russia from the near to the far East.

Results of the Treaty of Berlin. 'Asia,' said Lord Beaconsfield, 'is wide enough for both England and Russia.' This was true enough but for the mistaken statesmanship on either side, which had made all mutual confidence of the two Powers impossible. Count Matuzsevic had declared years before that, as long as the frontiers of the two states in Asia were as far apart as it then seemed they were likely for a long time to remain, all danger of a conflict was impossible. But the tides of Russian and British power were now rolling together. Russian intrigues in Kabul almost led to war in September 1878; the conquest of Turkestan followed in 1881; in February 1884 England learned with alarm that Merv had submitted to the Tsar's rule; on March 30, 1885,

Advance of
Russia in
Central Asia.

a skirmish between Russians and Afghans, ending in the occupation of Penjdeh, opened up questions which once more brought Russia and England to the verge of war. The incident was happily settled; but the stream of Russian progress, turned aside from India by the barrier of the Himalayas, has flowed eastward unchecked, till it has issued, so far, in the conquest of Manchuria and the creation not far from the Chinese capital of a naval base on the Pacific. Incidentally, it has created in the far East an Eastern Question beside which that of the near East sinks into insignificance.

In the near East, too, Europe was, however, destined soon to learn that the settlement of Berlin had changed much, but settled nothing. The definitive treaty of peace between Turkey and Russia was signed on February 8, 1879; but not till the following August did the Russian troops begin their retirement, and the British fleet sail out of the Sea of Marmora. The Porte had been saved from annihilation; but, bankrupt, and in the debt of Russia for the war indemnity of 200,000,000 roubles, its situation was by no means secure. It was not improved by petulant efforts to kick against the pricks. The Bosnians were encouraged in their fierce opposition to the occupation of their country by Austria, which, after much difficulty, was only accomplished in the autumn of 1879, and not finally secured till, in 1882, a fierce general insurrection had been suppressed by overwhelming force. Still more strenuous was the resistance to the cession of the Adriatic ports to Montenegro. The 'Albanian League' held Dulcigno in the name of Islam and of the Sultan; and a naval demonstration of the Powers was needed to force the Porte to compel its surrender. Even then the Ottoman troops had to take the town by force before, on December 5, 1880, it was given up to Montenegro. The same stubborn spirit was shown in the negotiations for the cession of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece; and the Powers were at length forced, as stipulated by the treaty, to mediate. The Ottoman Government still refused to give up

Janina; and, finally, on May 22, 1881, a treaty was signed by which Greece received Thessaly and a portion of Epirus.

Apart from the intractable temper of the Porte which created friction at the outset, the general results of the war of 1878 have justified the misgivings of Russian statesmen rather than the fears of England. It was soon apparent that, in helping to create independent Christian nationalities in the Balkan peninsula, Russia had by no means strengthened her influence. Bulgaria was the first to grow restive. The Con-

Russia and
Bulgaria,
1878-1895.

stitution had been settled, under the direction of a Russian provisional governor, early in 1879; and, on April 29, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a relative of the Tsar, was elected Prince by the *Sobranje*.

At the same time the Bulgarian militia was organised by Russian officers, and the Russian protectorate seemed assured. But an anti-Russian, national party soon formed itself, and Prince Alexander found himself forced to place

Union of
Bulgaria and
Eastern
Rumelia,
1885.

himself at its head. On September 19, 1883, the resignation of the two Russian officers, Sobolef and Kaulbars, marked the definite breach with Russia. This was soon followed by the bloodless revolution in Philippopolis, on September 18, 1885, by which East Roumelia declared her union with Bulgaria. Prince Alexander assumed the style of 'Prince of the two Bulgarias.'

The Powers duly protested against this violation of the Treaty of Berlin; but the reasons which had led them to break up the greater Bulgaria created by the Treaty of San Stefano no longer existed, for Bulgaria had made it clear that she did not intend to become a Russian province. The protest of the Powers, then, remained a protest only; and Russia, in face of this attitude, could do no more than show her dudgeon by withdrawing her officers from the Bulgarian army and breaking off diplomatic relations with Sofia.

But if Russia was filled with righteous anger at the ingratitude of Bulgaria, the other Christian peoples of the peninsula were offended at the success of a stroke delivered in defiance

of the Powers. Greece at once demanded 'territorial compensation,' and massed troops on the borders of Thessaly. She was promptly called to order by the Powers, and, proving refractory, was brought to reason by a 'pacific blockade' of her coasts. The protest of the Serbs against the aggrandisement of Bulgaria was more vigorous and more fatal. King Milan, at the head of his troops, invaded Bulgaria in the autumn of 1885.

War between
Serbia and
Bulgaria.

But he was defeated at Sliwnitza on November 19, and driven back over the border. The victorious Bulgarians followed, and Prince Alexander was well on the road to Nish, when the Powers once more intervened. Prince Alexander agreed to suspend hostilities and come to terms. He had gained, in fact, all that he wanted. The union of Bulgaria was accepted as an accomplished fact.

It was, however, impossible for the new state to continue in a condition of chronic tension with Russia. An active and intriguing Russian party still existed, especially in the army; and, on August 21, 1886, their activity reached its climax in the kidnapping of the prince, who was compelled to sign an act of abdication, and then carried over the border into Austria. Called back by the national party under Stambouloff, who had succeeded in driving out the Russian faction, he returned to Sophia in triumph. But he realised the precariousness of his position in face of the hostility of Russia, and, failing to disarm the resentment of the Tsar, he resigned the crown (September 7, 1886).

Coup d'état
in Sofia, and
abdication of
Alexander,
Aug. 1886.

The triumph of the Russian party was even now not assured. The regency was in the hands of Stambouloff, and, under his influence, on July 7, 1887, the *Sobranje* elected Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, a grandson of Louis Philippe, and an officer in the Austrian army. For some years the struggle against Russian domination continued, Stambouloff carrying out his policy with ruthless force. But Ferdinand

Bulgaria is
reconciled
with Russia,
1895.

wearied of a policy which, while it built up a vigorous Bulgarian nationality, kept him, owing to the hostility of Russia, outside the charmed circle of recognised crowned heads. In 1895 Stambouloff was murdered, and the prince took the opportunity of reconciling himself with Russia. The irreconcilable Alexander III. was now dead; the 'conversion' of the infant Boris, heir to the Bulgarian throne, to whom Nicholas II. stood sponsor, was the outward and visible sign of the repentant attitude of Bulgaria towards Russia.

The Eastern Question, then, so far as it concerns the break-up of the Turkish Empire and the relation of Russia in this matter to the other Powers, assumed at the end of the century an aspect unexpected by the framers of the Treaty of Berlin. On the coasts of the Black Sea, two new nations, Roumania and Bulgaria, have established the nucleus of a maritime power, and acquired thereby, incidentally, an interest in the destiny of Constantinople and the Straits. In the Balkan peninsula it is no longer, as at the opening of the last century, a question of a possible partition between Russia and Austria, but of the struggle of mixed and rival populations for domination. The attack of Greece upon Turkey, provoked by the unrest in Crete in 1897, revealed many things. Amongst others, it revealed the fact that the Turkey of to-day, with its growing network of strategic railways and its hardy army drilled by German officers, is no longer the weak, loosely-knit empire of the earlier half of the century. It revealed, too, that a new Power had come into the competition for the inheritance of the East. Germany alone of the great Powers had gained no overt advantage by

Growing
influence of
Germany in
Turkey.

the Treaty of Berlin, and the reputation for disinterestedness thus acquired stood her in good stead. Her cynical attitude during the Armenian massacres confirmed an influence which for years had been steadily growing at Constantinople. The Emperor William's peaceful crusade to Jerusalem was entered on in no mere impulse of Lutheran piety, but was an elaborately

studied *coup de théâtre* which covered far-reaching, if perfectly legitimate, designs. The other Powers, and notably England, had scattered their influence to the winds by futile and irritating protests against what they were impotent to prevent. Germany, whose eyes had for years been fixed on the undeveloped wealth of Asia Minor, saw, and seized, her opportunity. This latest development has not made the Eastern Question less complicated or less interesting.

CHAPTER XX

THE NEW ERA

The Expansion of Europe—The Powers after the Berlin Congress—The 'Armed Peace'—The Tsar's 'Rescript'—The Franco-Russian *entente*—The Triple Alliance—Bismarck and Russia—Death of Alexander II.—Pan-Slavism—Deaths of William I. and Frederick III.—Fall of Bismarck—William II.—France and Russia.

DURING the closing years of the nineteenth century the centre of gravity of the civilised world shifted with astonishing suddenness. The questions at issue between the Great Powers were no longer, as they had been preponderatingly in 1878, European, but world-wide. They were no longer connected with national aspirations on the banks of the Rhine, in the Balkan peninsula, or on the coasts of the Adriatic, but with imperial ambitions in Asia, in Africa, and the islands of the South Seas; and the still unsolved problems of European national boundaries sank into questions of almost domestic interest compared with the stupendous issues at stake in Africa and the far East.

Until Germany, in 1884, laid the foundation of her colonial empire by annexing Angra Pequena on the south-west coast of Africa, there was nothing to warn the world of the coming change. Till then the Great Powers had, in spite of occasional alarms and rumours of war, not come into critical contact outside Europe. In central Asia, it is true, the tides of Russian and British conquest had long been steadily rolling together; but the perilous moment of their meeting was not yet. In northern Africa, too, the expansion of French

Colonial and
Commercial
Expansion.

empire had, ever since the first landing in 1830, filled British statesmen with uneasiness; but the crisis, culminating in the English occupation of Egypt, had not yet been reached. On the whole, until after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, continental statesmen had been too much absorbed in the task of reconstructing the map of Europe to pay much heed to things beyond; and, by tacit consent of the nations, Great Britain had, as it were, obtained a lien on the unoccupied spaces of the globe. And since peoples, like individuals, lay small store by what they can obtain with ease and hold without difficulty, the prevailing disposition in England had for some time been to regard a colonial empire as a burden rather than a source of profit. It was, perhaps, due in the first instance to the grandiose imagination—oriental rather than English—of Lord Beaconsfield that what had been looked on mainly as a ‘commercial asset’ was touched with an element of romance, and the new ‘Imperialism’ sprang into existence. But with a people so essentially unimagi-native as the English, one or two brilliant diplomatic *coups* would not have sufficed to reverse a traditional point of view. It was not the bestowal of the title of Empress of India upon the Queen in 1876, nor the catchwords of the new ‘Imperialism’—which would have carried away French opinion—but the sudden revelation of the rise of new and more formidable trade rivals, that roused England to a consciousness of her world-wide possibilities and, through this—since she is eventually more religious than commercial—of her world-wide responsibilities.

Whatever the new tendencies, on the morrow of the Berlin Congress they were not yet obvious. Of European states, Russia and England alone could be described as world Powers, whose attitude towards European questions was largely determined by rivalries outside Europe. The colonial ambitions of France, though already active, had not yet overshadowed the main object of her policy—the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Germany,

Europe after
the Treaty of
Berlin.

though a busy agitation had already begun for the creation of a colonial empire, was still mainly occupied with watching France, and establishing her own preponderance in the councils of Europe. Austria, whose whole character and constitution prevented her from becoming a colonial power, was solely bent on confirming and developing her influence in Bosnia and the Balkan peninsula. Italy, but for vague jealousies provoked by French triumphs in northern Africa, indulged as yet in no visions of empire. The attention of the diplomatic world was still focussed on Old Europe.

For twenty-seven years, since the Congress of Berlin, Europe, save for comparatively unimportant disturbances on her outer fringe, has been at peace. This peace, unexampled since the age of the Antonines in its duration, has been unexampled also in its quality. It has been unquiet, apprehensive; the outcome, not of the removal of the causes of strife, but of the very perfection of the preparations for a struggle which, regarded as inevitable, is ever postponed, because no one can measure its horror nor forecast its result. This 'armed peace,' the legacy of Bismarck and Moltke to the world, has been for nearly three decades the dominant fact in European international politics. Amid constant rumours of war the temper of responsible statesmen has never been less warlike; for no Foreign Secretary would now dare, like Palmerston, to end a despatch with a glib threat of extreme consequences, unless he were backed by an overwhelming public opinion. And public opinion is no longer likely to declare lightly for war in countries where every man is liable to military service. And so, in spite of national rivalries, which have never been more intense, in spite of unhealed sores and unsatisfied ambitions, the peace of Europe remains, founded upon fear.

In the famous circular of August 24, 1898, in which the Tsar's proposal for an international Conference, to arrange a general disarmament, was announced to the world, Count Muravieff thus sums up the consequences of these political

conditions. 'The preservation of peace has been put forward as the object of international policy. It is in its name that the great states have concluded between themselves powerful alliances; it is the better to guarantee peace that they have developed their military forces in proportions hitherto unprecedented, and still continue to increase them without shrinking from any sacrifice. All these efforts, nevertheless, have not yet been able to bring about the beneficent results of the desired pacification. . . . In proportion as the armaments of each Power increase, do they less and less fulfil the objects which the Governments have set before themselves. Economic crises, due in great part to the system of *armaments à outrance* and the continual danger which lies in this accumulation of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of things continue, it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking being shudder in anticipation.'¹ The deduction which the Emperor of Russia desired, through his minister, to draw from these premisses will be dealt with later; meanwhile the statement is valuable as a clear exposition, which there is no reason to distrust, of the underlying motives of diplomacy since the Berlin Congress. It explains why the Powers, for all their lions' skins, have roared like very sucking-doves.

The new Holy Alliance of the three Emperors was sadly shaken, if not immediately shattered, by the diplomatic wrangling in the Berlin Congress. Russia, in view of her own benevolent neutrality during the crisis of the war of 1870, had looked to a grateful Germany to support her views in the East. But Bismarck held that he had sufficiently dis-

The Tsar's
Rescript of
Aug. 24, 1898.

The Powers
after the
Berlin
Congress.

¹ For the Hague Conference, see Fred. W. Holls' *The Peace Conference at the Hague*; *International Tribunals*, by W. Evans Derby.

charged that debt by the destruction of the treaty of 1856; and, for the present, it suited his policy at once to court Austria and to distract her attention from Germany by encouraging her designs in the Balkan peninsula. As for Austria, cordial relations with Russia were impossible after the revelation of her designs made by the latter Power at San Stefano. Under these circumstances, Russia, isolated and defeated at the Congress, and full of bitterness against her late friends, began to look round for new alliances. There was one open which seemed at once obvious and impossible. The idea of a Russo-French alliance was a very old one. It had been realised once at Tilsit, and the failure of the experiment had not prevented the idea from becoming a tradition of the Russian Foreign Office; though the loyalty of Alexander I. to the Holy Alliance, and the hatred of Nicholas I. for revolutionary France, had prevented it from being brought within range of practical politics. In France, too, statesmen of very various shades of opinion had long seen the advantages to be derived from a partnership which Lamartine, in his exaggerated manner, declared to be 'the cry of nature, the revelation of geography, the alliance of war, the balance of peace.'¹ But here, too, the intense sympathy of the French democracy for the struggle of Poland for freedom had helped to postpone for fifty years an understanding, of which the advantage to France could perhaps best be measured by the great anxiety with which the prospect of it was viewed by the statesmen of other nations. But now that the grievances of Poland had been overshadowed by other and greater ones nearer home, and when the violent contrast between conflicting political principles had been somewhat worn down by the sobering hand of time, the way seemed open for an approach between the two countries. To the political, a personal motive was added; and Prince Gortschakoff, in making tentative overtures to France, was moved partly by a desire to strike a blow at his old rival and

¹ Quoted in Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*.

enemy, Bismarck. The latter knew well enough what was in the air, and without breaking, or indeed desiring to break, with Russia, drew closer the bonds of Germany's alliance with Austria. In August 1879 he had met Count Andrassy at Gastein; a personal exposition of their views had emphasised their general agreement; and on September 21 they signed at Vienna a treaty providing that, in the event of either Power being attacked, both should make common cause. The treaty was ratified by the Emperor William on the following October 15, but was for the time kept secret, while the relations between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg remained outwardly cordial.¹

Austro-German defensive Alliance, Aug. 1879.

The situation was, soon, still further rapidly modified. In the spring of 1881, the shadow of Africa, so soon to obscure all other issues, fell upon European affairs.

On May 2, by the Treaty of the Bardo, the French Government formally declared its protectorate over Tunis. This, rightly regarded as but the first step towards eventual annexation, created an immense ferment in Italy, who saw in this, apart from her own pretensions and actual interests in Tunis itself, the proof of a deliberate policy of excluding her entirely from any influence in northern Africa. For a moment the two countries seemed on the verge of war. Bloody riots broke out in the south of France between French and Italian work-people; at Rome the Government fell; and Signor Depretis, the new premier, was forced to break off diplomatic relations with France, and to announce a considerable increase in the establishment of the army. Fortunately, matters did not come to the worst extremes; and after a few months relations between Paris and Rome were quietly resumed. But the affair had, none the less, produced a lasting modification of the European situation. The last shred of the good understanding between France and Italy had been torn away, the French accusing the

France, Tunis, and Italy, 1881.

¹ Bismarck, ii. 257, etc.

Italians of base ingratitude, the Italians retorting by refusing to recognise an obligation which had been wiped out long since by the enforced cession of Savoy and Nice, and by a dozen aggressions since, which had proved too clearly that the disinterested professions of France were but the mask for selfish plans of aggrandisement. Italy, in disgust, turned from her old friends to seek an alliance with her old enemies the Germans, and negotiations were opened with a view to her joining in the league between Austria and Germany. The idea was not easy of realisation. To the Italian 'irredenti' Austria was still 'the enemy,' which stood in the way of the consummation of Italian unity by unrighteously maintaining her hold on the Italian Tyrol and Trieste. Bismarck, too, disliked and distrusted the ultra-Radical Italian Government; and the one principle they had in common — opposition to the Papacy — which would a year or two before have helped to an understanding was likely now to prove a stumblingblock. For the Iron Chancellor had learned by experience, what all history should have taught him, that it is wasted effort to try and crush with the mailed fist a substance at once so tough and so elastic as conscience; he had realised, moreover, that the German Empire had in the growing forces of social democracy a more dangerous enemy than the spiritual pretensions of Rome, and that against this enemy no ally was likely to prove more valuable than the Catholicism which he had been combating. In short, he was preparing to come to terms with the Holy See; and the Pope was not likely to believe in the sincerity of his repentance if on the road to Canossa he stopped at the Quirinal.¹ Still, some

The Triple
Alliance,
1883.

approach to an understanding was possible; and a visit of the king and queen of Italy to Vienna, in October 1881, was rightly assumed to be of political significance. Two years later, in 1883,

¹ For the 'Kulturkampf' and the rise of social democracy in Germany, see Bulle, *op. cit.* vol. iv.

the existence of the Triple Alliance between Austria, Germany, and Italy was an open secret. Its object was, of course, to insure the maintenance of peace.

Of the great European Powers three were now in avowed alliance, three were 'revolving in their own orbits,' which were, none the less, determined by the attraction or repulsion of the other bodies in the political constellation. In England, where the Gladstone Government had replaced that of Beaconsfield on April 24, 1880, the policy, now become traditional, of avoiding continental 'entanglements,' had been maintained and accentuated. Nevertheless, at odds with Russia on the frontiers of India, and with France in Egypt, it was natural that Great Britain should look with a friendly eye on the Triple Alliance, which formed, indirectly, a bulwark of her policy. But, in spite of Bismarck's coaxing, she refused to depart from her attitude of benevolent isolation, and the only overt sign of her general attitude was a marked increase in the cordiality of her relations with Italy, whose sea-power in the Mediterranean would have been invaluable to her in the event of a war with France. Bismarck, meanwhile, in spite of the elaborate precautions taken against Bismarck the hostility of Russia, did not yet despair of and Russia. retaining her friendship. The Triple Alliance had been kept in the background, and was, moreover, no more than an expansion of the understanding between the Emperors of Austria and Germany, one of the objects of which was—as Bismarck had pointed out in 1879¹—while providing for joint defence in the event of an attack by her on either of the allied Powers, to cultivate peace with Russia as sedulously as before, and still further to consolidate the alliance of the three Emperors. In the early spring of 1881 a fearful crime had placed a further obstacle in the way of the realisation of this plan. On March 13, the Emperor Alexander had signed a *ukase* which would have

¹ In a letter to the king of Bavaria (Bismarck, ii. 258).

laid the foundations of constitutional government in Russia by establishing a consultative assembly elected by the provincial and communal assemblies. On the afternoon of the same day, before the decree had been published, he was murdered by the explosion of a nitro-glycerine bomb under his carriage. His successor, Alexander III., was anti-German in feeling, and had identified himself with that Pan-Slav movement which Bismarck recognised as the chief menace to the peace of Europe. But it was soon apparent that the Slav sympathies of the new Emperor were held in check by a genuine love of peace, and Bismarck's diplomacy was successful in keeping open the way to an *entente cordiale* with Russia. His policy seemed crowned with success when, in September 1884, the three Emperors once more met at Skierniewice, to give a conspicuous proof of their pacific intentions which, though constantly insisted on, seemed to be belied by the ever-growing national armaments. Here, in order to secure Germany in the event of a possible change of front on the part of Austria, Bismarck persuaded the Russian and German Emperors to sign a secret treaty guaranteeing 'benevolent neutrality' in the event of either being attacked. This was no more inconsistent with the purely defensive treaty with Austria and Italy than the latter had been with the cordial relations between Russia and Germany which Bismarck had always aimed at maintaining. It was destined, however, to fall short of the desired effect. It had scarcely been signed, when events in the Balkan peninsula, culminating in the union of the two Bulgarias, strained the relations between Austria and Russia almost to breaking point; and, since Bismarck still considered it expedient to support Austria, the breach between Russia and Germany, though not declared, was in effect complete.

The secret treaty remained nominally in force until 1890; and had Bismarck remained in office, some effort would probably have been made to renew and render it more effective.

But, meanwhile, fundamental changes had taken place in the direction of affairs in Germany. On March 9, 1888, the Emperor William I. had died at the patriarchal age of ninety-one; and, on the following June 15, the tragic death of his son, the Emperor Frederick, brought the young Emperor William II. to the throne. Bismarck had every reason to suppose that a minister who had been indispensable to the ripe experience of the old Emperor would be yet more indispensable to his grandson. But those who had had an opportunity of observing the new ruler closely, recognised that the chancellor had, for once, come in contact with a temper more masterful than his own. In October 1889, Alexander III. and Bismarck met once more in Berlin; and the chancellor was once more successful 'in dissipating the doubts which' the Tsar 'had brought with him from Copenhagen, including the last, which concerned my own continuance in office.' 'He was far better instructed than I was when he put the question,' adds Bismarck in his memoirs, with a touch of bitterness. In March 1890 Bismarck, insisting on the rule of 1852, that ministers of departments should only communicate with the Crown through the minister-president, *i.e.* himself, was requested by the Emperor to resign the German chancellorship and the Prussian presidency, and passed into restless retirement at Friedrichsruh. In Prussia, and—as far as the Constitution allowed it—in Germany, a period of personal rule began. The same year the secret treaty with Russia lapsed, and was not renewed.

William II.
German
Emperor,
1888.

Fall of
Bismarck,
1890.

In 1889 the Tsar had publicly toasted 'his only sincere and faithful friend, Montenegro.' In 1890 the isolation of Russia, sensible before, was conspicuous. That of France had been already proclaimed when, in answer to the 'fan-faronades' of the patriotic party in Paris, and to rumours of war which unpleasant 'frontier incidents' made more ominous than usual, Bismarck had, early in 1888, pub-

lished the treaty of 1879 with Austria. France, too, found herself isolated and without allies. Under these circumstances, the mutual benefits to be gained by an alliance were too obvious any longer to allow mere differences of aims, temperament, or principles to prevent France and Russia from joining hands.

The Franco-Russian Alliance.

In July 1891 a visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt advertised the new brotherhood-in-arms. For the first time the world listened, incredulous, to Russian military bands discoursing the unfamiliar strains of the 'Marseillaise.' In October 1893 the Russian fleet returned the visit at Toulon; and finally, in October 1896, the edifice of the Russo-French alliance was crowned by the visit of the young Emperor Nicholas II. to Paris, and a return visit of President Felix Faure to St. Petersburg in the following year.

Under the changed conditions of Europe, there was nothing in the new Franco-Russian alliance to inspire the same fears with which its bare possibility had filled the chancelleries of Austria and England in the days of the Grand Alliance. The Dual, like the Triple Alliance, was proclaimed by its principals as but one more guarantee of European peace, as no more, in fact, than a 'strategic position' necessitated by that of the other Powers. It was of advantage to France in rescuing her from her dangerous isolation and the nervousness which this engendered. Russia derived from it a more immediate and solid advantage. Apart from an immense loan, readily subscribed in Paris, she obtained the support of France in her policy of expansion in the far East, and in the near East found in France, instead of, as heretofore, a rival, an accomplice.¹ The benefits proved in the event somewhat one-sided. England had, perforce, to allow the Russian aggressions in China: her isolation did not prevent her from 'humiliating' France at

¹ Notably in the matter of the Armenian massacres, when Russia, supported by France, prevented the concerted action of Europe, declaring that she did not wish 'to see Armenia turned into a second Bulgaria.'

Fashoda. The collapse of Russia, later, in the war with Japan, accentuated the increasing suspicion of French people, that France, in her eagerness to find an ally, had paid a price out of proportion to the benefits received.

The mention of Russian advances in China, and of the conflict of French and English interests on the Upper Nile, brings vividly before the mind the change in the diplomatic conditions of the world during the last decade of the century. The expansion of Europe. The foundations of this change, of late as rapid as it has been revolutionary, had of course in most cases been laid long since. The expansion of Greater Britain in the nineteenth century was but the logical and inevitable outcome of her first adventures over sea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the same way, the gradual extension of the dominion of the Tsars over central Asia has been, at any rate till of late years, less a matter of deliberate policy than of political necessity, the result—as in the case of our own Indian Empire—of punitive expeditions against troublesome border tribes, followed by annexation. The trouble that would ensue when the borders of Russia and of Imperial India should be drawn together was clearly foreseen. It was not foreseen that the situation would be complicated by the simultaneous rise of similar problems in other quarters of the globe, owing to the competition of the other Powers in the race for empire.

In 1878, owing to Russian intrigues in Afghanistan, the relations between England and Russia were already critical; but the timely intervention of the Tsar in the interests of moderation had prevented a rupture. Russia and England in Central Asia. The Afghan War had followed, memorable for the treacherous murder of the British Resident in Cabul, Cavagnari, and the famous march of Roberts to Kandahar. Mr. Gladstone, who came into office before the war was concluded, in 1880 decided to reverse the 'forward policy' of the Beaconsfield Government; but the final victory of the

British nominee, the Ameer Abdurrahman, in October 1881, secured English influence in Afghanistan, at any rate, for a time. Meanwhile, however, Russia had been steadily advancing in the direction of the Afghan border. Her military railway had already been pushed into the heart of the Turcoman country, and on January 12, 1881, Skobeleff stormed the Tekke stronghold of Geok Tepe. The effect of this victory was immense. The Central Asian tribes submitted, and in 1882 the Russian Government signed with Persia a Convention, by which the latter surrendered to Russia her rights of sovereignty in Merv, which was occupied in February 1884 by General Komaroff, Skobeleff's successor. In the following April, Saraks, on the road to Herat, was also occupied. In response to the energetic protests of the British Government, Russia consented to the appointment of a joint Commission for the delimitation of the boundaries between Russia and Afghanistan. But while this was still deliberating, General Komaroff attacked and dispersed The Penjdeh incident, March 30, 1885. an Afghan post which had occupied Penjdeh, a village on the Mourgh-Ab, to the south of Merv. Once more, war seemed almost inevitable. Once more, however, the peaceful temper of the Tsar and of the Gladstone Government came to the rescue. The Boundary Commission hastened its labours, and a Convention was ultimately signed by which the frontier of Afghanistan was fixed at the Zulficar Pass, and Merv, Saraks, and Penjdeh were left in the hands of the Russians. The tide of Russian conquest, deflected from India by the barrier of the Himalayas, turned north-eastward. The Pamirs were invaded in 1891 and 1892, and partitioned by agreement with England in 1895. A year or two later, the war between China and Japan gave Russia an opportunity for which she had long been waiting; and by the 'leasing' of Port Arthur she obtained an ice-free port on the Pacific Ocean.

The appearance of Russia as an aggressive power in China brought her into contact, not only with England, whose trade

interests in the Celestial Empire are paramount, but with Germany and France, as well as with the new maritime Power of the East, Japan. France had for some time been aiming at building up once more in another part of the Orient the empire which she had lost in India. Napoleon had started the enterprise in 1862 by the acquisition of Saigun. In 1874 an attempt to give this some value by concluding a treaty with the king of Anam, who agreed to accept French 'protection,' led to troubles with the natives, notably the half-piratical 'Black Flags,' and eventually to a formal war with China, which claimed to exercise suzerainty over the coveted territories. A Convention signed at Tientsin with Li Hung Chang, the Viceroy of Pe-chili, on May 11, 1884, was repudiated at Peking; but after a week or two's further fighting, the Chinese Government gave in, and the preliminaries of a treaty were signed at Paris by an agent of Sir Robert Hart, the Chinese Director of Customs, by which China agreed to recognise the French protectorate over Anam and Tonkin, to open up the three contiguous Chinese provinces to European trade, and within three months to conclude a commercial treaty with France.

Rivalry of
the Powers
in the far
East.

France and
Tonkin.

A situation was now rapidly developing in the Indo-Chinese peninsula between the French and English similar to that on the northern frontier of India between the English and Russians. In the autumn of 1885 the violence of King Theebaw of Burma compelled the Viceroy of India to declare war upon him, which ended in the dethronement of the king and the annexation of the country. Between the British and French possessions in the far East the independent kingdom of Siam remained; and it became an object of British diplomacy to preserve this, like Afghanistan, as a 'buffer state.' This object has not been attained. In 1893, France picked a quarrel with Siam; and though the intervention of

Burma.

Siam.

England sufficed to preserve the independence of the bulk of the Siamese kingdom, the boundaries of French and British territory met, in the end, on the river Me-kong, in the Shan country.¹

The partition of China, of which France had thus set the example, was later on to produce a rich crop of results, of which the world is only now beginning to gather the bitter fruits. Of more immediate importance in its bearing in the relations to each other of the European Powers was the partition of Africa, which began almost at the same time. The vast continent, of which at the time of the settlement of Vienna in 1815 only the outer fringe had been incorrectly mapped, had been opened up by a succession of travellers, of whom the most illustrious was Livingstone. Still, until several years after the Berlin Congress, Europe was concerned almost exclusively with the historic parts of the continent, including Egypt and those northern states which in the days of the Roman Empire had been included in the Mediterranean civilisation. These, always important, had gained immeasurably in value by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. France, which ever since 1830 had been busily extending her empire on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, believed herself, with some justice, to have a special claim on the ancient country which had been once more illustrated by the genius of her children.² But England could never endure to see the shortest sea-route to India in the hands of a hostile power; and every argument which had led her in the past to oppose the preponderance of France in the Mediterranean was doubled in force. The purchase by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, in November 1875, of the Khedive's shares in the Canal was more than a profitable commercial investment; it was the basis of a formal claim of Great Britain to have a voice in the control of an enterprise so vital to her imperial interests.

¹ For the Far Eastern Question, see Driault, *op. cit.*

² See a remark of Palmerston, quoted in Guizot, *Memoirs*, iv. p. 352.

The same financial confusion in the Khedive's affairs which had led to the sale of the shares, led also by logical steps to the actual occupation of Egypt by English troops. Ismail, for the prosecution of his magnificent projects in the Soudan, had borrowed with more than Oriental recklessness; and in 1878 he found himself face to face with Europe clamouring for interest on loans which he was totally unable to pay. The expedient of raising new loans, at exorbitant rates, in order to meet the claims on the old ones, was but a palliative which increased the disease; and, in the end, nothing was left for him but bankruptcy or European control. The Powers, indeed, left him no choice; and in 1878 a dual control of France and England was established over the finances. From this moment Egypt was pawned to the bondholders, and the resources of the country were drained to pay the enormous debt contracted by an irresponsible ruler. Certainly, whatever the legal justice of the case, the natives had a grievance. They endured for a while, then rose in protest. In January 1881 an insurrection broke out, headed by Arabi Bey. A year later, the 'nationalists' had so far succeeded that all the European employees were dismissed from the Khedivial Government. It was a declaration of war against France and England. The French and English Governments protested and demanded the dismissal of Arabi. The answer was a massacre of Europeans in the streets of Alexandria, and the formation of a ministry of which Arabi was the heart and soul. Armed intervention was now inevitable, and England invited France to co-operate in enforcing the will of the Powers. But France, already involved in costly and interminable operations in Tonkin, was unwilling to risk fresh complications elsewhere. England alone bombarded Alexandria, and conducted the campaign of Tel-el-Kebir. England alone remains in 'temporary' occupation of Egypt.¹

Bismarck could not but view with satisfaction the preoccu-

¹ Milner, *England in Egypt*; Cameron, *Egypt in the 19th Century*.

pation of France in distant quarters of the globe. On January 3, 1885, the French Minister of War, Campenon, Germany and colonial expansion. resigned rather than support a policy which threatened to make the army less efficient for possible use in Europe. His successor, Lewal, in justifying the policy of the Government, declared that the French army was too good to lie for ever, as though asleep, with eyes staring toward the Vosges. This summed up the whole situation; and it is more than possible that the realisation of the value of distracting the Powers from the European situation may have determined Bismarck to embark Germany on a policy of colonial expansion, more or less seriously pursued as it suited Germany's needs of the moment. It might prove useful to be able to stave off inconvenient claims nearer home by graceful concessions in Togoland or the Cameroons. England, too, jealous of the rapid growth of German sea-borne trade, was becoming restive, and needed a lesson. The Chancellor had been personally piqued by the dilettante and procrastinating methods of the Foreign Office. He determined to wake it up; and he succeeded.

On May 2, 1884, the German flag was informally hoisted at Angra Pequena. The British Government was taken by surprise; but after consultation with the authorities at the Cape of Good Hope, it was found that England had no legal claim to the territory in question, and it was determined to Angra Pequena. recognise the German protectorate.¹ On August 7 this was formally proclaimed, and the German Imperial standard solemnly broken. An attempt to annex Santa Lucia Bay on the other side of Africa was defeated by the timely intervention of the Cape Government; but, on July 5, Togoland was declared under German protection, and on the 14th the Cameroons were annexed. Togoland and the Cameroons. England was now thoroughly awake, and proceeded to snatch in haste what, ten years earlier, she might have absorbed at leisure. She had already been

¹ For full diplomatic correspondence, see Hahn, Bismarck, v.

alarmed by the advance on the Upper Niger of the French, who aimed at building up an empire stretching from the Mediterranean to the Congo. She now, in 1884, formally recognised the treaties made by the British United African Company with the Niger chiefs, and succeeded in forestalling Germany in the annexation of the Niger delta. The control of the Congo was also in dispute. In 1876 an informal Congress had met at Brussels under the presidency of King Leopold, and this had resulted in the formation of the International African Association, ^{The Congo.} with a special committee to develop and exploit the Congo territories. The Portuguese, however, raised a claim to the river, and this was admitted by a treaty concluded with Great Britain on February 26, 1884. A great outcry at once arose against the idea of handing over the vast regions involved to the most retrogressive of European states; and the suggestion was made that the whole question should be laid before a Conference of the Powers.

The whole scramble for Africa had, in fact, by this time resulted in a situation so confused and so pregnant with possible quarrels, that it was more than expedient that some general principles should be laid down by international authority as to the future development of the partition. The Conference assembled at Berlin on November 15, 1884, and remained in session until January 30, 1885. ^{Conference of Berlin, 1884.} The three main questions on which it had to give a decision were that of the Congo, of the Niger, and of the conditions on which fresh annexations should be regarded as valid. On the first of these the decision was, to recognise the International African Association as an independent state under the title of the Congo Free State. At the same time, trade in the Congo basin was declared free, and the navigation of the river was placed under the supervision of an international Commission. Practically the same settlement was arrived at with regard to the Niger, save that it was placed under French and British

protection, with the reserve of certain rights in the regulation of navigation to Great Britain. Finally, it was decided that occupation of coast territory, to be valid, must be effective, and at the same time the obligations attached to 'Spheres of Influence'—a term new to diplomacy—were defined.

Apart from the intrinsic importance of its decisions, the Conference of Berlin marks an epoch in the world's history. With the exception of Switzerland, all the European states were represented in it; but what was of greater significance, the United States of America, for the first time, shared in the deliberations of Europe. It was a foreshadowing of the momentous changes to be wrought, at the close of the century, by the Spanish-American War, and the appearance of America on the world's stage as an imperial power. The process had already begun which was accentuated by the Conference at The Hague. The idea of the Concert of Europe was expanding into that of the Concert of the World.

Important as were its achievements, the Berlin Conference had by no means settled all the questions arising out of the partition of Africa. Its attention, apart from the statement of general principles, had been confined to the west coast, and meanwhile matters were rapidly developing in other quarters as well. In April 1885, as the result of the activity of the German explorer Dr. Peters, the continental possessions of the Sultan of Zanzibar on the east coast were annexed by Germany. England yielded to the inevitable with a good grace, and the objections of the Sultan were overruled by a naval demonstration off Zanzibar. At the same time a German protectorate had been proclaimed over Witu; and by November 1886 the boundary Commission appointed by the British and German Governments had reached a satisfactory settlement. As a result of the mismanagement of the chartered German East Africa Company, which led to a serious rising of the natives against both

Germans and English, German East Africa was, in 1889, placed under an Imperial Commissioner; and, by 1890, German authority was established on the coast from Cape Delgado to the river Wami. All this had not been accomplished without friction with England. For Bismarck colonial was always subordinate to European policy; and he had used the zeal of the colonial societies, partly as a means for bringing gentle pressure to bear on England, partly to distract the attention of the French, and to prove to them the identity of their interests with those of Germany against the grasping egoism of the island Power. If this was his policy, it was for a while crowned with success; and for a while, in France, the bitter memory of Fashoda blotted out that of Alsace-Lorraine.

Meanwhile the temper of the English Government was more than conciliatory, and every effort was made to remove causes of misunderstanding by a clear definition of claims and rights. In August 1889 an agreement was reached with France regulating the relations of the two countries on the Gambia and at Sierra Leone; and in August of the following year another treaty was signed defining their spheres of influence in Central Africa. In the same year the French protectorate over Madagascar was formally recognised. With Germany, too, a definitive treaty was signed on July 1, 1890. By this the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Germany in East Africa were defined, and Germany recognised the protectorate of England over Zanzibar and Pemba. In return, England made over to Germany the island of Heligoland in the North Sea. By the same treaty the spheres of influence of the two Powers in South-West Africa were also defined. Italy, meanwhile, having occupied Assab as early as 1882, and Massowa in 1885, had, in 1888, annexed the barren coast of the Red Sea from Cape Kasar to Obock, and founded the ill-fated colony of Eritrea. In 1889 her annexation of the Somali coast brought her into contact with

Treaties of
England
with France
and
Germany.

England; and a treaty signed in March 1891 regulated their relations at the mouth of the river Jub. Since then the overthrow of the Khalifa by Lord Kitchener and the reconquest of the Soudan once more brought the English and French into contact; and the raid of the French on the Upper Nile, and the 'Fashoda incident,' threatened for a while a serious complication, the happy avoidance of which, owing to the prompt disavowal by the French Government of the action of their adventurous lieutenant, made possible that cordial understanding between France and Great Britain which led in 1904 to the satisfactory settlement of all serious outstanding questions between the two countries.

This rough and incomplete outline of the history of the expansion of Europe during the last fifteen years has been given to show how vast are the issues to be decided by the Powers, compared with those which were before them in 1815. Then the task of the European Alliance was but to maintain the peace of a small quarter of the globe on the basis of the territorial boundaries fixed at Vienna. The task proved beyond its strength. Now the aim of an International Court of Arbitration must be, if it is ever to be an effective instrument for peace, to adjust the warring claims of all the world, defined, or partly defined, in a thousand treaties. Can it succeed?

On May 18, 1899, in response to the circular, already quoted, of Count Muravieff, the delegates of twenty-six states met at The Hague to consider the subject of diminishing the crushing burden of armaments and the feasibility of substituting arbitration for war. A comparison of the list of sovereigns represented with those who had taken part in the Congresses of Vienna or Aix reveals the changed order of the world. Beside the delegates of the European Powers, there were present those of the United States, of Mexico, of China, Japan, Persia, and even of Siam. On the 29th July the labours of the Conference resulted in a 'Convention for

The Peace
Conference at
The Hague,
1899.

the pacific settlement of international disputes,' which was to remain open for the signature of the Powers till the end of the year. The proposal for a general disarmament had been found, as had been expected, impracticable; but an agreement had been reached for still further modifying the horrors of war; and it had been decided to establish an international Court of Arbitration, of which the principles and the processes were defined. Almost it seemed as though the vision of the poet were about to be realised, and

'The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,'

on the eve of becoming an accomplished fact. The outbreak of the South African war, immediately after the close of the Conference, seemed to dash the hopes of humanity, hopes which had never been shared by the diplomatic world. Not that the expressions of satisfaction of statesmen at the result of the Conference were mere cant. The Court of Arbitration may be able, by the impartial examination of treaties and other documentary evidence, to settle a hundred disputes, which in earlier times, would assuredly have hurled nations into war. None the less wise diplomacy has always recognised the limitations of treaties. The failure to do so was the secret of the ill-success of Metternich and of the system of the Grand Alliance. '*Rebus sic stantibus*,' says Prince Bismarck,¹ is involved in all treaties that require performance.' And again, 'All contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the struggle for existence. No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two. The maxim, "Ultra posse nemo obligatur," holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text.'² These are truths which limit,

¹ *Mem.* ii. 280.

² *Ibid.* ii. 270.

but do not necessarily destroy, the possible value of arbitration as a means of settling international quarrels. The code on which the decisions of an international tribunal will have to be based will, necessarily, be the sum of existing treaties. In many, perhaps in a majority of cases, these would suffice. But unless the development of the world, the rise and decay of nations, the pressure of growing populations, are to be arrested, circumstances are sure to arise in which the conventional barriers erected by the past must go down before the irresistible pressure of the struggle for existence. This was proved, once for all, by the failure of Metternich's policy of 'stability.' It was recognised by Alexander I. when, by the treaty of the Holy Alliance, he attempted to found the Federation of Europe upon the basis of common principle and the recognition of common interests. M. de Beaufort, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, in addressing the assembled delegates at The Hague, paid a tribute to the lofty vision of Alexander, to which he ascribed the humane impulse which had prompted the rescript of Nicholas II. It is easy, in the light of after events, to laugh at the folly of those who 'build theories for an imaginary world'; but it is also easy to underestimate the practical effect of impracticable ideals. The dream of universal peace seems further off than ever. Yet a great step was taken towards it when it was publicly recognised as the common aspiration of those responsible for the world's order. The days are long past when wars of conquest were regarded as the crowning glory of kings. The day may yet dawn when the peoples, taught by bitter experience, will see that their true interest lies not in the exaggeration of national differences, but in the practical realisation of those far more numerous common interests which, as the intellectual and material development of the world progresses, should bind the nations together in one vast commonwealth.

TABLE I.

THE FRENCH BOURBONS.




TABLE II.

THE BOURBONS IN SPAIN AND THE SICILIES.




TABLE III.

THE HOUSE OF SAVOY.




TABLE IV.

GENEALOGIES TO ILLUSTRATE THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION.




TABLE V.

HOUSE OF DENMARK.




TABLE VI.

HOUSES OF GOTTORP AND ROMANOW.




TABLE VII.

HOUSE OF AUGUSTENBURG.





TABLE VIII.

TO ILLUSTRATE THE RELATION OF PRINCE LEOPOLD OF HOHENZOLLERN, THE CANDIDATE FOR THE SPANISH CROWN, TO THE HOUSE OF PRUSSIA.



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